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 INTRODUCTION 
Literally speaking ‘Unjust Enrichment’ means when a person takes benefit 
from other person and does not give anything in return i.e. the person unjustly 
enriches himself at the expense of another. 
Unjust Enrichment is: 
¾ the retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering 
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is 
reasonably expected ; 
¾ a benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not 
legally justifiable for which the beneficiary must make 
restitution or recompense ;  
¾ the area of law dealing with unjustifiable benefits. 
The principle of unjust benefit implies that the person having passed on the 
burden of tax to another, directly or indirectly, would not be entitled to get the 
refund, even if such refund is permissible. Having passed on the burden of tax 
to another person, directly or indirectly, it would be clearly a case of unjust 
enrichment. 
A principle developed at the common law and equity, whereby, roughly, a 
person who is unjustly enriched, either by receipt of value from the plaintiff in 
circumstances where he or she ought to return it, or by profiting from a wrong 
done to the plaintiff, is required to pay over the value of that enrichment to the 
plaintiff. 
Person taking advantage of unclear legal position would be subjected to the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment and will be liable to refund back the money so 
received. 
In certain cases where money is obtained by mistake or through fraud or for a 
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consideration which has wholly failed, the law implies a promise to repay it. 
The rule against unjust enrichment is embodied in Section 70 of Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 and founded not upon any contract or tort but upon a third 
category of law, namely quasi contract or restitution . 
The retaining of a benefit (as money) conferred by another when principles of 
equity and justice calls for restitution to the other party and also the retaining 
of property acquired especially by fraud from another in circumstances that 
demand the judicial imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of those who 
in equity ought to receive it . It is a doctrine that requires an equitable remedy 
on the behalf of one who has been injured by the unjust enrichment of 
another. 
Thus the basic meaning is that it would be unjust to allow one person to retain 
a benefit received at the expense of another person. There is a legal maxim 
also that Nemo Debet Locupletari ex Aliena Jactura which means that no one 
should grow rich out of another person’s loss. The unjust enrichment has been 
stated to have three things namely; that the defendant has been enriched by 
the receipt of benefit; he must have been enriched at the expense of plaintiff 
and allowing defendant to keep the benefit will be unjust. 
The present study examines about the doctrine of unjust enrichment under 
contractual obligations which can be defined as something which is not in 
accordance with the accepted standards of fairness or justice and which is also 
unfair. 
When a person gains something from another, then it is said that the person is 
enriched. This enrichment can be both just and unjust. A student receives 
graduation present from his parents it is also an enrichment which is just. 
When a person wrongfully uses others property at the expense of other, then it 
is unjust. 
The principle of unjust enrichment is simply stated as: A person who has been 
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unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to 
the other. The meaning of this line is that if a person has gained benefit from 
other person and thereby causing loss to the other person, then the person who 
has gained is required to reimburse the plaintiff equal to the amount of benefit 
received by the defendant. 
The principle of unjust enrichment can be understood in three ways:  
• Unjust enrichment can be interpreted as a principle of Aristotelian 
equity, providing correction when normally sound rules produce 
unjust results in particular cases. 
• Unjust enrichment can be characterized as a principle 
incorporating a broad ideal for justice, from which courts can 
deduce solutions to particular restitution problems. 
• Unjust enrichment can be understood simply as expressing a 
common theme of restitution cases. 
Statement of Problem: 
Unjust Enrichment states that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the other is required to reimburse the other party to the extent of 
the enrichment. It happens that sometimes a person uses the benefit from 
other person and then there is no point of compensation raised at the time of 
contract but after the completion of the act, sometimes the person becomes 
morally liable to pay the damages to the party. Then at that times whether the 
person should reimburse the other party or not. 
It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for 
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to 
prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, 
another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies 
under English law are generally different from remedies under law of contract 
or tort in India, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the 
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Common law known as quasi-contract or restitution.  
The principle presupposes three things that (i) the defendant has been 
enriched by the receipt of benefit; (ii) he must have been so enriched at the 
plaintiffs expense, and (iii) It would be unjust to allow him to keep the 
benefit. Enrichment may be in form of direct advantage to the recipient’s 
wealth such as by the receipt of money or indirect one for instance where 
inevitable expense has been saved. 
Although the situations giving rise to claims in quasi-contract are diverse, 
their common framework is that they involve a special relationship between 
two persons where the law imposes a duty on one to pay a sum of money or 
(exceptionally) to deliver specific property to another. The relationship is 
based either upon the involuntariness of the payment or transfer, its qualified 
nature, or the conduct of the transferee. The underlying aim seems to be an 
obligation upon the defendant to make restitution of a benefit which he ought 
not in justice to retain at the expense of the claimant. Theoretical basis of 
quasi-contractual liability are implied Contract.  
The view that quasi-contractual claims are based on unjust enrichment also 
found sound support. It is now also recognized as the basis of restitutionary 
obligations under the English law.  
In Indian law the principle of unjust enrichment finds recognition in the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872. But even apart from cases falling within sections 
68-72 of the Act, relief against unjust enrichment has been granted in other 
forms of action also in situations where the contract was invalid for want of 
proper forms or authority; every gain or enrichment that is not unlawful. The 
principle of unjust enrichment has been stated to presuppose three things: 
(i) That the defendant has been enriched by the receipt of benefit; 
(ii) He must have been so enriched at the plaintiffs expense; and  
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(iii) It would be unjust to allow him to keep the benefit.  
The Law Commission of India considered that the provisions made in 
sections 68-72 were inadequate. It recognised that the situations attracting 
application of the law of restitution would be so numerous that it would be 
difficult to state the principles exhaustively in a legislative enactment, but 
recommended that a residuary section be provided for to cover situations not 
specifically provided for in the work. 
Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what 
has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man 
from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from another which is 
against conscience that he should keep. There are different remedies in 
Contract or in Tort and a distinct third category of restitution. But still there is 
a need to throw light on other remedies also for the unjust enrichment. 
Objectives of Study:  
Where a person does or delivers something to another without intending to do 
so gratuitously, he is entitled to received compensation for the thing or 
restoration of the thing delivered if the either party has enjoyed the benefit of 
the thing done are delivered.  
There are many situations in which law as well as justice required that certain 
person be required to conform to an obligation, although he has neither 
broken any contract nor committed any tort. For instance, a person in whose 
home certain goods have been left by mistake is bound to restore them. If any 
person is unjustly benefited at the expense of another person, the former is 
bound to restore the benefit to the latter or to make compensation thereof.  
Where a person has paid or delivered anything to another by mistake or 
coercion, he is entitled to get repayment of it from the other. The obligation to 
pay reasonable remuneration for the work done when there is no binding 
contract between the parties is imposed by a rule of law, and not by an 
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inference of fact arising from the acceptance of services or goods. There was 
a need to explore the issue of unjust enrichment in full fledge way and the 
researcher has discussed the thrust area in wider perspective.  
Following are the main objectives of the present research work: 
¾ to critically analyze the concept of Unjust Enrichment in the 
Indian scenario as well as the position of the concept in 
other legal systems also. 
¾ to analyze the role of judiciary towards the concept of 
Unjust Enrichment. 
¾ to review the remedial approach in existing Indian legal 
scenario and to discuss the therapeutic measures. 
Hypothesis:  
At the outset of the study the researcher has formulated some important 
assumptions to be tested throughout the study, these are given as under: 
¾ Unjust enrichment is a unifying legal concept which explain why the 
law recognizes, in a variety of distinct categories of case, an obligation 
on the part of defendant to make fair and just restitution for a benefit 
derived at the expense of a plaintiff and which assists in the 
determination, by ordinary processes of legal reasoning. This research 
work demonstrates these premises. It is argued that, they remain valid 
despite pressures and tendencies to follow a trend evident in some 
other jurisdiction towards more loosely structured action and more 
general concepts of what may be deemed equitable at a philosophical 
level. 
¾ Due to lack of knowledge and effective implementation of laws 
dealing with contractual obligations the unjust enrichment are taking 
place. It requires an equitable remedy on the behalf that who has been 
injured by the unjust enrichment of another. 
7 
 
¾ The law of restitution is not fully developed in India that is why an 
exhaustive statute is presumed to be passed by the competent 
legislature. 
¾ The future of unjust enrichment may well be concerned with broader 
definitions and some degree of exchange of concepts in Indian law, 
common law and equity as exploration of this possibility is itself a 
major study. This assumption in this work is confined to necessary 
comparative observations. 
Research Methodology: 
The present research study is mainly a doctrinal and analytical. Critical 
analysis of statutory enactments on doctrine of unjust enrichment as well as 
analysis of various statutes operating in the field have been discussed. 
Keeping this in view the researcher has gone through different books, 
journals, case laws, proceedings of conferences, symposia, seminars, reports 
of Commissions and Committees, web references, E-journals etc. The 
relevant material is also collected from the secondary sources. 
Review of the Literature: 
Several books, journals, articles, judicial decisions and juristic works which 
are available in different libraries on the topic have been reviewed and studied 
and conclusion has been drawn in this regard.  
The Law of Contract Act by G.H Treitel (1975) this book contains about the 
introducing part of the law of contract, agreement, consideration, contractual 
intention form, content of a contract, standard form of contract, mistake, 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, illegality, statutory,  
invalidity, capacity, plurality  of parties, privity, assignment, agency, 
performance, breach, frustration and remedies etc.  
The Modern law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution by Gerard Mc Meel 
(2003). There are six chapters in the book that cover a treatment of 
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"Defences". Even though Indian law has had a statutory basis since 1872, the 
law is comparatively underdeveloped in India. This book, by making 
available all the latest developments in English law in this area in the 1990s, 
precisely, simply and in a small volume, has greatly influenced the 
development of the law in India also. 
Atiyah’s Introduction the Law of Contract (2007) is a well Known volume. 
This edition provides with an introduction to the theories policies and ideas 
that underlie the law, placing an equal emphasis on the law and critical 
analysis. The edition has analyzed the law of contract in a modern context and 
to account for recent development in the Law as well as those in academic 
thinking and writing. Addressing European influence and including 
perspectives from comparative law, this remains a stimulating and 
authoritative exposition of the concept of unjust enrichment. 
Chitty on Contracts (1977), this book highlights about the formation of 
contract, capacity of parties, the terms of the contract, legality and public 
policy, joint obligations privity and assignment, performance and discharge, 
remedies for breach of Contract, restitutions and conflict of law and obviously 
Unjust Enrichment in details.   
Cases on contract by Patterson and Goble (1949), in this edition a 
considerable number of judicial decisions have been discussed on unjust 
enrichment Various pronouncements are added by the author in a systematic 
order.  
The Law of Contract by P.C. Markanda (2008), this book contains exhaustive 
commentary and case law references on formation of contract, principle for 
interpretation of contracts, contracts which are legal and enforceable, 
performance of contracts enforcement of Contract, frustration of Contract, 
novation of Contract, breach of contract and damages, law of guarantee, law 
of agency, law of bailment, law relating to government contracts, tenders and 
blacklisting etc. 
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Contract Act Cases And materials by V. Kesava Rao (2014), this book has 
focused on the general principles of the law of Contract codified in sections 1 
to 75 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The fundamental of the Law of 
contract are presented by a judicial mixture of judicial comments, legal 
provisions, law reforms reports in seven segments comprising of eighteen 
chapter. The conceptual frame work of contract and law of Contract is the 
realm of the first segments, while the second deals with the formations of a 
contract, the third and fourth segments respectively deal the contract imposed 
on consumers while discharge from contractual obligations and breach of 
contract and its attendant consequences are deals in segments six and seven. 
The unique feature of the books is an exclusive focus on decisions of courts in 
India. Leading English cases are provided at the end of every chapter for a 
better understanding of the concepts and to facilitate comparisons. This 
endeavour is with the objects of fastening the development of Indian 
contractual jurisprudence and the concept of unjust enrichment as well. 
Smith and Thomas: A casebook on contract by J.C Smith (2001) this book has 
discussed in detail about the formation of a contract, consideration, privity of 
contract, obligation arising from the contract and its formation, rights and 
remedies of the injured party and unjust enrichment in a detailed manner. 
Law of contract Authored by Sir William Anson (2010), has comprised in 
seven parts under which first part indicates about the formation of contract, 
part second deals with the factors tending to defect contractual liability, part 
third examines about the limits of the contractual obligation, part fourth 
analyzed performance and discharge, part fifth deals with remedies and 
breach of contract while part six discusses about the agency and part seven 
examines about the quasi-contract. 
Indian contract Act and Specific Relief Act written by Pollock & Mulla (2010) 
is one of the classics in legal literature. This edition has discussed the details 
of the Contract Act, section wise as well as concept wise. The recent 
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development in the Law of contracts in other commonwealth jurisdiction has 
also been included in the book. The learned author has made it more 
intellectually inspiring the concept of unjust enrichment. 
Laws of Contract by Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s (1991), this well known 
text provides a clear account in narrative form of the principles of the English 
laws of contract. It provides recent developments in case law and legislations 
The doctrine of consideration, the relief available in respect of inchoate 
contracts, letters of comforts, exemption clauses non-disclosure under 
influence, illegality, termination and self induced frustration, including the 
doctrine of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution.  
Contract and Specific Relief by Avtar Singh (2013) is a popular and classic 
work. The work deals with the intricacies of the contract law in a straight 
forward and lucid style. The book covers many new developing areas in 
contract law which are of practical and academic importance. The revised 
book covers recent Supreme Court and High Courts decisions on issues 
including Unjust Enrichment arising of modern day trade and commerce 
which have been contributed to the development of the law on the subject. 
The Indian Contract Act by R.K. Bangia (2013), this book deals with the 
principles of the Law of Contract. This volume narrates the legal frame works 
for formulation of trade business and commercial translation. The book deals 
with much significant development on the issues like Unjust Enrichment 
which has taken place in the fields of contractual transaction. 
Business law Authored by Avtar Singh (2011) the present book is comprised 
of the salient and important branches of the subject of mercantile law 
containing amalgamated versions of statutory provisions and judicial 
pronouncement. Till the preceding edition, the statutory coverage was 
comprised of the Contract Act, Partnership Act, Sale of  Goods Act, 
Negotiable Instruments Act and the Companies Act. The book has also been 
enriched with copious references to judicial decisions particularly in the field 
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of unjust enrichment. 
Restitution and equity: An Analysis the principal of Unjust Enrichments 
written by Emily L. Sherwin published in Texas Law Reviews vol. 79, no.7 
June 2001 discussed about the law of restitution and to embody a principle 
against unjust enrichments: This article is based upon the study of the 
principle against unjust enrichments and its connection, if any, to equity. The 
articles concludes that restitution should not be confused with Aristotelian 
equity, because there is nothing both unique to restitution and common to all 
instances of restitution that justifies courts in according less respect to rules 
than they would in other areas of law. 
The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichments by Edwin W. Patterson 
published in Missouri Law Review vol. I issue 3 June (1936). This article 
gives emphasis on “Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment”. Its 
scope and context have revealed that far from being esoteric it deals with 
some rather simple and basic notions of justice, that it has many applications 
to situation which arise in the ordinary affairs of life and that its doctrines cut 
across almost the whole field of private law.  
The scope and structure of Unjust Enrichments by klim Chuk, Dennis 
published in University of Toronto Law Journal vol. 57, no.4 (2007). This 
articles reviews about the history of unjust enrichments its definition, 
structure and scope of restitution law. 
Unjust Enrichments and Unjust Sacrifice by S.J. Stoljar (1987), 50 Modern 
Law Review this particular article deals with the theory of unjust enrichments, 
its concept and instances of restitutionary liability as being based on a 
proprietary theory. 
The Emergence of Unjust Enrichments as a cause of Action and the remedy of 
constructive Trust by M.M Litman (1988) 26 Alberta Law Review deals with 
the historical  survey regarding emergence evolution and subsequent 
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developments of the theory of Unjust enrichments. Moreover this article 
examines about the judicial interpretation on the theory of restitution.          
The juridical nature of Unjust Enrichments Authored by G.B. Kuppert 
(1980), 30 University of Toronto Law Journal deals with the judicial 
pronouncements in evolving the doctrine of unjust enrichments and the 
concept of restitution. 
Chapter Plan  
The instant research venture is captioned: “Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment 
under Contractual Obligations: A Critical Appraisal”. To facilitate the study 
the research is designed to have nine chapters. 
Chapter I deals with “Unjust Enrichment and Restitution: A conceptual 
Framework”. In this chapter Unjust Enrichment is analyzed in its historical 
perspective. It also means that no one should be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another. In other words it means that no should take some the 
advantage of possession of another person which causes some loss to one 
party and gain to another party is analyzed in this chapter.  
Chapter II is devoted for the study of “Restitutionary Techniques under 
Common Law and Specific Relief Act”. This Chapter divided into two parts. 
Part  A deals with “Restitutionary Techniques under Common Law”. In this 
part common Law and Equity, quasi-contract, rescission, tracing and 
claiming, restitutionary claims and restitution on ground of failure of 
consideration are analyzed critically. In part B entitled “Restitutionary 
Techniques under Specific Relief Act”, development of Law under Specific 
Relief Act is discussed and analyzed.  
Under chapter III, a study is made regarding “Defective Transfers” such as 
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, inequality and 
unconscionability and necessitous intervention thoroughly and analyzed 
critically.  
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Chapter IV deals with “Unjust Enrichment under Indian Contract Act, 1872: 
An Analysis”. In this chapter it is analyzed that what are the remedies 
available under Indian Contract Act if the payment is made under mistake of 
fact or under ineffective Contract or under compulsion. 
 Under Chapter V entitled “Unjust Enrichment under the Constitution of 
India”, applicability of Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act,1872 
and vis-a-vis Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India are analyzed 
analytically.  
Chapter VI deals with “Restitution from Public Authorities”. Restitution past, 
restitution present and restitution future are discussed in this chapter 
thoroughly. 
Chapter VII deals with “Enrichment by Wrongdoing”. In this chapter issues 
like fiduciary relationship, the obligation of the fiduciary, remedies for breach 
and diversion of opportunity are discussed analytically. 
Chapter VIII deals with “Illegality and Public Policy as Defences”. The 
Consequence of illegality, proof of illegality, agreements opposed to public, 
defences and public policy precluding a restitutionary claim are analyzed 
thoroughly in this chapter. 
The last chapter of this research work i.e. Conclusion and Suggestions deals 
with concluding remarks and strong suggestions on the thrust area of the 
research work. 
14 
 
Chapter - I 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION:  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Literally speaking ‘Unjust Enrichment’ means when a person takes benefit 
from other person and does not give anything in return i.e. the person unjustly 
enriches himself at the expense of another. 
Unjust enrichment is: 
• The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering 
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably 
expected. 
• A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally 
justifiable for which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense.  
• The area of law dealing with unjustifiable benefits1. 
The principle of unjust benefit implies that the person having passed on the 
burden of tax to another, directly or indirectly, would not be entitled to get the 
refund, even if such refund is permissible. Having passed on the burden of tax 
to another person, directly or indirectly, it would be clearly a case of unjust 
enrichment if the importer seller is then able to get the refund of the duty paid 
from the government notwithstanding the incidence of tax having already 
been passed to the purchaser2. 
A principle developed at the common law and equity, whereby, roughly, a 
person who is unjustly enriched, either by receipt of value from the plaintiff in 
circumstances where he or she ought to return it, or by profiting from a wrong 
done to the plaintiff, is required to pay over the value of that enrichment to the 
plaintiff3. 
                                                            
1 Black Law dictionary, 8th edn. at p. 1573. 
2 C.K. Thakkar, Enclopediac Law Lexicon, Justice Volume 4 Ashoka Law House. 
3 J.E. Penner, Oxford Law Student Dictionary  at p. 302. 
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Person taking advantage of unclear legal position during the pendency of leis 
would be subjected to the doctrine of unjust enrichment and will be liable to 
refund back the money so received4. 
Where a person unjustly obtains a benefit at the expense of another, in certain 
cases where money is obtained by mistake or through fraud or for a 
consideration which has wholly failed the law implies a promise to repay it. 
The rule against unjust enrichment is embodied in Section 70 of Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 and founded not upon any contract or tort but upon a third 
category of law, namely quasi contract or restitution5. 
The retaining of a benefit (as money) conferred by another when principles of 
equity and justice calls for restitution to the other party also the retaining of 
property acquired especially by fraud from another in circumstances that 
demand the judicial imposition of a constructive trust on behalf of those who 
in equity ought to receive it6. It is a doctrine that requires an equitable remedy 
on the behalf of one who has been injured by the unjust enrichment of 
another. 
Thus the basic meaning is that it would be unjust to allow one person to retain 
a benefit received at the expense of another person. There is a legal maxim 
also that Nemo Debet Locupletari ex Aliena Jactura which means that no one 
should grow rich out of another person’s loss. The unjust enrichment has been 
stated to have three things:  
• That the defendant has been enriched by the receipt of benefit. 
• He must have been enriched at the expense of plaintiff and  
• Allowing defendant to keep the benefit will be unjust.7 
  
                                                            
4 B.L. Bansal and Rajiv Raheja, Capital Legal and Medical Dictionary, vol. 2 edn. 2006 at p. 1778. 
5 Dr. A.R. Biswas, Encylopaedic Law Dictionary, 3rd edn. 2008 wadhwa Nagpur at p. 1486. 
6 Merraim,Webster’s Dictonary of Law, 1st edn. 2005 at p. 515. 
7 Pollock and Mulla, Indian Contract Act, 1872 14th edn., vol. II at p. 1042. 
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1.2 Unjust Enrichment: Historical Perspective 
The historical background of the theory of unjust enrichment can be divided 
into three phases. The first phase lasted till the second half of eighteenth 
century. Although there are clear traces of remedies being given in the 
situations that would later coalesce as unjust enrichment, there was no 
consciousness of any feature linking them to each other. Although the 
medieval English lawyers knew nothing about the general principles of unjust 
enrichment, even then in number of situations they did give remedies that 
would later be explicitly categorized in this way. Apart from this a number of 
statutory writs were present to deal with such specific cases and majority of 
these claims were taken into consideration in the common writs of debt and 
account. It is a basic concept of contractual liability that the parties had legal 
capacity. In the 15th century, it was laid down that an infant, though not 
normally liable on contract, would be liable to pay the price of necessary 
items like food, clothing or educational purposes. Sophisticated analysis 
would want to differentiate between liability of price and liability for price of 
goods, but there was no hint of this before the end of sixteenth century. 
The development of the action of as sumpsit did not produce any immediate 
changes in the substance of these rules, though as a matter of form it came to 
supersede the older remedies of debt and account. So the person who had 
discharged another’s liability might bring as sumpsit to obtain an indemnity 
only in case when the payment is made at the request of the defendant. The 
capacity of as sumps it is best seen in the development of quantum meruit 
which means that what one has earned. Here the plaintiff typically alleged 
that the defendant in consideration of some service rendered to the plaintiff at 
his request, promised to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable value of the 
service. It may be possible that sometimes there is no such express agreement 
but then it can be deduced from the circumstances of each case. If a person 
takes a cloth to tailor for making shirt then it was not difficult to infer that the 
person has promised to pay for the shirt. Before the middle of 18th century, 
17 
 
quantum meruit claims were being allowed where the inference of a genuine 
agreement to pay a reasonable sum was far less secure.  
In the second half of the 18th century Lord Mansfield introduced the principle 
that in some cases the action would be allowed where both the request and 
promise were fictitious. The quantum meruit and indetatitus assumpsit for 
money laid out essentially took over and expanded those situations that in 
medieval law had clustered around the central core of contractual liability. 
Alongside these, taking over and expanding those situations clustering around 
property notions in the middle ages was the action of indebitatus assumpsit 
for money had and received. This action started to emerge at the beginning of 
17th century but it was in the eighteenth century that it really came into its 
own.  
Since, the early years of eighteenth century the courts have moved from the 
proposition that these are based on implied promises to the wholly inaccurate 
proposition that they were based on implied contracts. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment was originally based in English law upon 
the principle of assumpsit or a contract which has and received and was 
declared by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Mcfarlon8, that the gist of this kind of 
action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by 
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money. In the case of Sadler 
v. Evans9, he commented that the action for money had and received was: a 
liberal action, founded upon large principles of equity, where the defendant 
cannot conscientiously hold the money.  
The defence is any equity that will rebut the action. The courts of equity 
covered much ground as the common law action for money had and received, 
by the eighteenth century, the courts of equity exercised a general jurisdiction 
to grant relief where there is unjust for are recipient of property to retain the 
                                                            
8 (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at 1012. 
9 (1766) 4 Burr 1984 at 1986. 
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property himself. 
The second half of eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century the law of 
torts and the law of contract were structured around each other in theoretical 
framework in which former based on the natural lawyer’s theory of 
imputation and the latter on the will theory. The American lawyers at the start 
of twentieth century brought the broad principles of Joseph Story i.e. 
equitable jurisprudence and were able to manipulate constructive trusts into 
remedial devices so as to reverse the unjust enrichment. 
The first, faltering steps away from the implied contract theory were taken in 
India in the 1860s in the case of Rambux Chittangeo v Modhoosoodun Paul 
Chawdhary10, it was held in this case with reference to Pothier and Austin 
jurisprudence that a claim for contribution from a co surety was not a 
contractual claim, that the use of the language of implied contracts was 
something forced on the common law by the purely fortuitous fact that the 
remedy was framed in the as sups it and the system like Indian was not 
dependent on the forms of action could profitably abandon all the talks of 
implied contracts. 
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 followed this line: under the heading of certain 
relations resembling those created by contract where it included claims for 
necessaries supplied to those without contractual capacity, claims for 
indemnity or contribution, claims to be paid for the beneficial services 
provided without the intention of making any gift, claims against the finder of 
goods and claims for the money paid by the mistake. It went certain changes 
through judicial interactions and came to be based more and more on the 
doctrine of restitution.  
In India, the principle was developed under Section 69 and Section 70 of 
Indian Contract Act, 1872. Within a decade of the passing of the act it was 
held that the co surety claims for contribution was in fact a contractual term 
                                                            
10 (1867) 7 WR (India) 377. 
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after all and the earlier cases discussing its contractual nature, it was said, 
were delivered before the passage of the act, especially when legislation had 
not stepped in the plain language to give distinct vitality and affect to certain 
relations between parties out of those moral obligations one to another a legal 
fiction had grown up for implying a contract and while as learned expositions 
of law, they can be read with interest and advantage for practical purposes to 
the point under consideration they are absolute and irrelevant. 
The judicial mind is unconsciously moved by the major inarticulate promise, 
in this breach of the law that none should be allowed to unjustly enrich 
himself at the expense of another. The law so developed by judicial 
conscience appears to discover obligations to defeat unjust enrichment or 
unintended acquisition by their situation. The natural tendency of courts is 
that wherever they find unjust enrichment is to order restitution. 
According to Section 68, if a person, incapable of entering into a contract or 
anyone whom he is legally bond to support, is supplied by another person 
with necessaries suited to his conditions in life, the person who has furnished 
such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable 
person. For example, A supplies B, a lunatic, with necessaries which are 
necessary for his survival. A is entitled to be reimbursed from the B property. 
In the case of Jai Indra Bahadur Singh v. Dilraj Kaur11, a minor being bound 
to support his sister, money advanced to a minor for marriage of his sister has 
been held to be necessaries under this section and also recoverable from the 
property. 
In the case of Benaras Bank Limited v. Dip Chand12, it was said that a creditor 
can recover money advanced to the minor for necessaries and can recover the 
money out of the minor’s estate. 
According to Section 69, a person who is interested in the payment of money 
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12 AIR 1936 ALL 172. 
20 
 
which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it is entitled to 
be reimbursed by the other. 
In the case of Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria v State of Gondal13, the party 
had agreed to purchase certain mills, he was allowed to recover from the 
seller the amount of already overdue municipal taxes paid by him in order to 
save the property from being sold at the auction. 
In the case of Dakshina Mohun Roy v Saroda Mohun Roy Chowdhry14, it was 
held that money paid by a person while in possession of an estate under the 
decree of the court for preventing the sale of the estate for covering the arrears 
of government revenue may be recovered by him under this section. 
According to Section 70, where a person lawfully does something for another 
person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and 
such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make 
compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or 
delivered. For example, if A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B’s house by 
mistake. B treats the goods as if they are of his own and uses that good. Then 
B is required to or bound to pay the amount to A for the goods. 
In the case of Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited v. Union of India15, 
the plaintiff lawfully carried a cargo of coal and delivered it to the defendants 
union. The correspondence showed that the plaintiff did not intend to do it 
gratuitously and the defendant had accepted the cargo and thus defendant 
became liable to pay compensation to the plaintiff under Section 70. 
In the case of State of Rajasthan v Raghunath Singh16, a grantee of loses of 
minor minerals is entitled to recover by way of compensation various 
amounts deposited by him in pursuance of the grant of the lease in the event 
of cancellation of lease. 
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15 AIR 1971 Cal 150. 
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In the case of Bhagavadas Krishnadas v. P. S. Soma Iyer17, the purchaser of 
property allowed the defendants to continue their residence in the building 
until they found other occupation and there was no indication in the evidence 
that the plaintiff had done so gratuitously, the plaintiff was entitled to 
remuneration for use and occupation. 
In the case of Bhicoobai v. Hariba Raghuji18, a property belonging to a caste 
is attached in execution of a decree and a member of the caste pays to the 
decree holder the amount due to him under the decree to save the property 
from sale in execution then it was held that he is entitled to be reimbursed out 
of the caste property. 
In the case of Kashi Nath Singh v Nawab Alam Ara19, the villagers utilised 
water from the pay on the construction of bund, contribution towards the 
construction was payable on the account of villages under Section 70. 
In the case of Modi Sugar Mills Limited v Union of India20, X had a contract 
with Union of India for the manufacture of biscuits for the Union, and 
component material was to be supplied by the union which it did in 
containers. Later, X failed to return the containers, despite demand from the 
union. The union deducted the amount of value of containers from the 
security deposit and other sums due to X. X bought a suit for the recovery of 
amounts deducted. It was held that the material and containers were always 
the property of union and it never passed to X. The union did not intend to 
pass the containers gratuitously and respondent had received benefit, in that it 
did not have to supply in its own containers. Section 70 was applied in this 
case and respondent was liable to pay compensation. 
In the case of Noor Mohommad v Mohammad Jiajddin21, a Muslim groom 
after solemnization of the marriage refused to take his wife because of her 
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father’s refusal to pay for the nautch girl brought with the marriage party, the 
expenses borne by the girl father on the meals for the marriage party and for 
the band and lights paid to the groom’s father were not gratuitous but for 
consideration of marriage, and could be restituted to the bride’s father. 
According to Section 71, a person who finds goods belonging to another and 
takes them into his custody is subject to the same responsibilities as that of 
bailee. 
In the case of Union of India v. Amar Singh22, goods booked for Quetta before 
the partition of the country were found to be missing when the wagon 
containing the goods was received at New Delhi. The owner sued 
East Punjab railway which was handling the wagon from Indo- Pakistan 
border into India. It was held that when the railway administration in Pakistan 
left the wagon containing goods within the borders of India and the 
forwarding railway administration took them into their custody, it could not 
deny liability under Section 71. 
In the case of Newman v. Bourne and Hollingsworth23, P, a customer in D’s 
shop, put down a brooch with her coat and forget to pick it up. One of the D’s 
assistant found it and placed it in a drawer over the weekend. It was found 
missing on Monday, D was held liable to P in view of the absence of that 
ordinary care which in the circumstances a prudent man would have taken. 
In the case of Union of India v. Mahommad Khan24, plaintiff’s timber was 
lying on a piece of land which was subsequently leased out to the defendant. 
The latter gave notice to the owners of timber to remove it but it was not 
removed. The defendant then cleared the site and the timber was damaged or 
removed.  
The plaintiff’s claim under section 71 was dismissed as the defendant had not 
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24 AIR 1959 Ori 103. 
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taken the goods into the custody. 
According to Section 72, a person to whom money has been paid, or anything 
delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it. For example, 
A and B jointly owe 100 rupees to C, A alone pays the amount to C and B not 
knowing of this fact, pays 100 rupees over again to C. Then C is bound to 
repay the amount to B 
In the case of Tilokchand Motichand v Commissioner of Sales Tax25, a firm 
paid sales tax of more than twenty six thousand rupees in respect of sales to 
consumers outside the state of Bombay and which were not liable to pay any 
sales tax. The firm had itself collected the tax money from its customers. The 
amount was ordered to be refunded on one condition that it should produce 
receipts from customers outside Bombay showing that the refund in question 
had been passed over to them. The firm was order to return the tax money and 
it would be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The firm paid it. The firm 
sought to recover back the money as it is paid under mistake under coercion. 
The court held that payment was made under coercion and would have been 
recoverable under Section 72. 
In the case of Associated Cement Company limited v. Union of India26, the 
railway authorities charged extra fare under the mistaken belief that the goods 
would have to be carried by longer route, they were ordered to return the extra 
fare. 
In the case of S. Ketrabarsappa v. Indian Bank27, a bank mistakenly credits 
entry in customers account and customer withdraws the amount. He would be 
bound to pay back the money along with the interest. 
In the case of Food Corporation of India v. K. Venkateswara28, where the rice 
                                                            
25 AIR 1998 MP 241. 
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millers were paid an amount in excess of the agreed rate because of a mistake 
in the classification according to quality, they were required to disgorge the 
unjust enrichment 
1.3 Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment  
The Sections 68-72 embodies the doctrine of unjust enrichment29. The general 
purport of the section is to afford to a person who pays money in furtherance 
of some existing interest, an indemnity in respect of the payment against any 
other person who, rather than he, could have been made liable by law to make 
the payment 30 . The Section converts the natural obligation into a legal 
obligation to pay on the part of the person who has received benefit of the 
payment by another person of what he was bound to pay31.  If there is a direct 
contractual relation between the parties, there is no occasion to rely upon this 
section.32  
This Section lays down a wider rule than once required by the English 
Authority. The word ‘interested in the payment of money which another is 
bound by law to pay’ might include the apprehension of any kind of loss or 
inconvenience, and not merely the actual detriment capable of being assessed 
in money 33 . It was not enough, in the common law, to find a claim to 
reimbursement by the person interested, if he made the payment himself. It 
was stated for example: 
If A is compellable to pay to B damages which C is also compellable to pay to 
B., then A, having been compelled to pay to B, can maintain an action against 
C for money paid for the circumstance raise an implied request by C to A to 
make such payment in this case. In other words A can call upon C to 
                                                            
29 Govindram Dordhandas Seksaria v State of Gondal (1950) 77 IA 156, AIR 1950 PC 99. 
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31 Subbakke Shettithi v Anthamma, Shetihi AIR 1934 Mad 628. 
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indemnify him34.  
The obligation here had thus to be stated as a fictitious contract in order to 
find a place for it within the rules of the common law pleading. The meaning 
was that C, who did not In fact ask A to pay, was treated as if he had done so. 
Such a right to indemnity arose, for example, where one man’s goods were 
lawfully seized for another’s debt, e.g. as being liable to distress, and were 
redeemed; by the owner would be entitled to indemnity from the debtor, 
thought he may have exposed his goods to the risk of distress by a voluntary 
act done at the debtor’s request or for his benefit35. Such claims would now 
fall in the English law under the head of restitution or unjust enrichment36.  
But under this Section, the fiction is superfluous, and the duty may be 
expressed, as in this section, in plain and direct terms without any talk of an 
implied request37. It has been stated authoritatively with judicial approval:  
Where the plaintiff has been compelled by law to pay, or, being compellable 
by law, has paid money which the defendant was ultimately liable to pay, so 
that the latter obtains the benefit of the payment by the discharge of his 
liability, under such circumstances the defendant is held indebted to the 
plaintiff in the amount38.  
The requirements for the application of the provisions of this section are:39  
(i) The plaintiff must have made an actual or virtual payment of money. 
(ii) The plaintiff must have been compelled to pay this money to a third 
party. 
(iii) The defendant must have been legally liable to pay the third party. 
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35 Chitty on Contracts, 28th edn, para 30-001 et seq. especially at p. 1500. 
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37 Moule v Gerett (1872) LR Ex 101. 
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Though the plaintiff would usually stand in some kind of  
relationship to the person for whom he paid, no relationship of privity is 
necessary to give a right of action.  
1.4 Theory of Unjust Enrichment  
“A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is required to make restitution to the other.”  
Lord Mansfield who is considered to be the real founder of such obligations, 
explained them on the principle that law as well as justice should try to 
prevent “unjust enrichment”, that is, enrichment of one person at the cost of 
another. His Lordship offered this explanation in Moses v Macferlan40:  
“Jacob issued four promissory notes to Moses and the latter 
indorsed them to Macferlan, excluding, by a written 
agreement, his personal liability on the endorsement. Even so 
Macferlan used Moses on the endorsement and he was held 
liable despite the agreement. Moses was thus compelled to 
discharge a liability which he had excluded arid, therefore, 
sued to recover back his money from Macferlan.” 
He was allowed to do so. After stating that such money cannot be recovered 
where the person to whom it is given can “retain it with a safe conscience”, 
Lord Mansfield continued: 
“But it lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a 
consideration which happens to fail; or for money got 
through imposition; or extortion; or oppression; or for an 
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to 
laws made for the protection of persons under those 
circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, 
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is 
obliged by ties of natural justice and equity to refund the 
money.” 
A liability of this kind is hard to classify. Partly it resembles liability under 
the law of tort inasmuch as it arises independently of any contract. Partly it 
resembles contract inasmuch as it is owed only to one party and not “to 
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persons generally”. Thus, it can be accounted for either under an implied 
contract or under natural justice and equity for the prevention of unjust 
enrichment. Lord Mansfield preferred the latter theory.  
But beginning with the decision of the House of Lords in Sinclair v 
Brougham41 it became fashionable to discard Lord Mansfield’s formulation 
and to rely upon an implied-in-fact contract. 
A building society undertook banking business which was outside its objects 
and, therefore, ultra vires. The society came to be wound up. After paying off 
all the outside creditors, a mixed sum of money was left which represented 
partly the shareholders money and partly that of the ultra vires depositors, but 
was not sufficient to pay both of them. The depositors tried to get priority by 
resorting to the quasi-contractual action for recovery of money had and 
received for the depositors’ benefit, for otherwise the shareholders would be 
unjustly enriched. 
The House of Lords allowed rateable (paripassu) distribution of the mixed 
fund among the claimants, but did not allow any remedy under quasi-contract. 
Lord Haldane maintained that common law knows personal actions of only 
two classes, namely, those founded on contract and those founded on tort. 
“When it speaks of action arising quasi ex contract it refers only to a class of 
action in theory which is imputed to the defendant by a fiction of law.42”  
Similarly, Lord Sumner observed that an action for money had and received 
rests, not on a contractual bargain between the parties, hut “upon a notional or 
imputed promise to repay”43.  Lord Parker expressly pointed out that if a 
promise to pay back an ultra vires loan could be imputed to the company as 
quasi-contractual obligation, the result would be to validate a transaction 
which has been declared to be void on the ground of public policy and the law 
would be enforcing a notional contract where an express contract would have 
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been void44.  
This approach dominated decisions for a long time and the decision was taken 
to have settled that the juridical basis of quasi-contract was the implied, 
notional or fictional contract. Where the circumstances of a case do not lead 
to an inference of this kind or where such an inference would be against the 
law, no liability will arise45.  
1.5 Relation between Unjust Enrichment and Restitution  
Unjust enrichment is unfamiliar, even too many lawyers. A central example is 
a mistaken payment. Suppose that I pay you $1000 in the mistaken belief that 
I owe it to you. Provided that my claim does not get caught up in the finer 
tuning, I will be entitled to restitution from you. You have been enriched any 
my expense, and there is, in the mistake, an ‘unjust factor’, a factual reason 
why you should make restitution. ‘Unjust enrichment’ is the generalised 
description of the event. It forms the genus; mistaken payment is a particular 
species. Like cases must be treated alike. The generic description serves to 
gather together all the other events which ought to be treated in the same way 
as mistaken payment. For example, it money is paid over on a specified basis, 
and the basis fails, restitution must likewise follow. The ‘unjust factor’ is 
different in this case. It is failure of basis or, in the traditional phrase, failure 
of consideration. 
If rather few common lawyers have yet had a legal have yet had a legal 
education which built the category of unjust enrichment into their intellectual 
armoury, it is because until quite recently no law school could do the job. It is 
still a novel category. Its content was formerly fragmented arid dispersed by 
language, and concepts, thrown up by the intuitive pragmatism of the past. 
Yet its identification and organisation has been one of the great success 
stories of the twentieth century. That stone has now been rolled to the top of 
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the hill, and there it will certainly stay, unless some jurist manages to send it 
rolling down the other side.  
There are some who are inclined to try. The High Court of Australia has 
played an important part in disengaging the new law of unjust enrichment 
from its muddled earlier history46. Nevertheless, some distinguished Australian 
lawyers have shown themselves to be sceptical, even hostile. They either 
doubt its claims to have sorted out a large area of the common law or believe 
that the sorting out could have been done, and still can be done, much better 
in some other way. This lecture is about some Australian species of that 
sceptical hostility or hostile scepticism. It is of course wholly right to test and 
probe. If the stone is unstably perched on the summit, it is dangerous. If it is 
dangerous, it should be pushed down under supervision as soon as possible. 
But my theme today will be that it is not unstable. These particular Australian 
suspicions are false. On the contrary, the recognition of the law of unjust 
enrichment is a genuine advance in the rationality of the common law. Since, 
rationality and justice go hand in hand, it should not be repudiated.  
On the civilian side of the Western legal tradition the law of unjust 
enrichment goes back two millennia. The seeds were sown in the first life of 
Roman law, when the ius civile was the law of the Romans themselves. It was 
ultimately brought to flower in its second life, but not till some centuries after 
Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis had become once again the law library of 
Europe. This is not the place to trace that history, nor to examine the different 
positions taken by different national codifiers. In the codes the ius commune 
split up, much as the Rhine when it reaches its delta. However, we ought not 
to contemplate the twentieth century story within the common law without 
taking note of the fact that a century ago, in 1900, the enactment of the 
German Burgerliches Gesetzbuch included a compact set of outline rules for 
the operation of the fundamental principle that, in the vent of unjust 
enrichment, the party enriched must make restitution. That was one 
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culmination of the long history of the subject, or perhaps more accurately a 
staging post. But, if in experience difficult, the singularly clear German 
statement also serves as a marker for the beginning of common law’s attempt 
to make sense of its own position in the same matter. Under the rubric 
Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (‘Unjustified Enrichment’), of the German 
Civil Code stated the principle in these words: 
A person who, through a performance by another or in some other way at the 
expense of that other, has received something without any legal ground is 
bound to make restitution to that other. This obligation also arises in the case 
in which the legal ground later falls away or the result contemplated by the 
performance, as judged by the nature of the legal transaction in question, fails 
to materialize.  
On the common law side, no detailed account has yet been written of the 
history of this subject in the first third of this century. The forces gathered 
which would eventually assemble the scattered pieces. It is difficult to prove 
that the German Civil Code at 812 was a catalyst. It is difficult to believe that 
it had no role at all. This formative period issued in the restatement of 
restitution, which the American Law Institute commissioned from Professor 
Austin Scott and Professor Warren Seavey in 1933 and published in 1937. As 
Justice Gummow has recently written, the early work was all American. 
‘England,’ he says ‘followed well behind. Sixty years later, in 1997, the 
American Law Institute finally set Professor Andrew Kull working on the 
second Restatement. That will be a twenty-first century event. If it takes a 
decade it will have been done quickly, for in the meantime the subject has 
grown and grown up. But it has grown up in a manner which in some ways 
poses serious problems for Professor Kull. 
A great wave of learning has swept around the major common law 
jurisdictions of the world. Justice Gummow is quite right to emphasise the 
American initiative, and the very brevity of his brief account no doubt 
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justifies his making no reference to the English chapter. But in truth the story 
cannot be understood without any reference to England. The work which 
started in America later moved across the Atlantic, and it was from there that 
it spread through the Commonwealth and, ultimately, back to the United 
States. Professor Kull’s problem is that the American case law is still in a 
relatively raw condition. Structural doctrine in private law has been largely 
forsaken by the great American law schools, just at a period in which this 
particular subject stood in particular need of more attention of precisely that 
kind. 
England reacted instantly to the first restatement47.  But between the first 
enthusiastic reaction and the substantive response, the Second World War 
intervened. Wars disrupt. Despite the length of the interruption, Goff and 
Jones was the response to the restatement48. About the same time, graduate 
courses sprang up in Oxford, London, and Cambridge- in Cambridge under 
Gareth Jones himself, in London under George Webber, who was my own 
inspiring teacher, in Oxford under Guenter Treitel and Derek Davies. It was 
that book and those courses which provided the momentum which carried this 
exciting new learning throughout the Commonwealth and provoked the 
writing of new books in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand49.  
The literature has in turn produced the cases, and one court after another has 
accepted that the common law does indeed have a law of restitution of unjust 
enrichment. The torrent shows no sign of abating. Professor Andrew 
Burrows’ Law of Restitution, together with the marvellous volume of cases 
and materials which he has recently put together with Professor Ewan 
McKendrick, has made the subject accessible at the LL.B. level. The subject 
has acquired its own dedicated journal, the Restitution Law Review. Only the 
other day Dr. Robert Chambers, previously of this University, and I, as the 
persons responsible for a biennial publication called ‘The Triple R’ (The 
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Restitution Research Resource), were bemoaning the fact that the days when 
it was possible to achieve comprehensive coverage were over. 
That this has been a major twentieth century story is not in doubt. Whether it 
is a success story we will not know for certain for another hundred years. 
Great advances in knowledge and understanding take time to test, and they 
are not often achieved without errors and digressions. The errors and 
digressions have to be rooted out. The deepest question is whether the whole 
story ought really to be reversed. Mr Ian Jackman, a Sydney barrister, thinks 
it should. He studied the subject in Oxford and believes that he has discovered 
congeries of latent defects. In the varieties of restitution his aim is to send the 
stone rolling down the hill. And Justice Gummow’s preface to Mr Jackman’s 
book, though it stops short of saying it in so many words, suggests that that 
most learned judge would have the reader believe that in his view Mr 
Jackman’s attack has not missed its mark. That which Justice Gummow 
endorses will command attention all over the world. 
1.6 Scope of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution  
It is true that the words “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are words of 
common speech, but they are words of vague and uncertain significance, and 
their vagueness is not clarified or restricted by familiar established usage 
which gives them meanings as words of art in the law.  
There is danger that this Restatement, when it is published in final form in the 
fall of 1936, will speak to the legal profession not with the tongues of angels 
but with the voices of Babel.  
It would be most unfortunate if this Restatement were to attain only a success 
d’estime. An examination of its scope and content will reveal that, far from 
being esoteric, it deals with some rather simple and basic notions of justice, 
that it has many applications to situations which arise in the ordinary affairs 
of life, and that its doctrines cut across almost the whole field of private law.  
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Every practicing lawyer, with only a few possible exceptions, will at some 
time have need for an understanding of the law which this Restatement is 
designed to expound and clarify. The purpose behind this is to indicate the 
scope of the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, and to place 
its subject matter in the system, if it be a system, of American law. 
Although the present writer has served from the beginning as one of the 
advisers to the Reporters engaged in formulating this Restatement, in 
presenting these comments he does not speak either for them or for the 
Institute. 
The scope of the Restatement may be described roughly as the field of quasi 
contracts and the field of constructive trusts. The legal profession is probably 
less familiar with the former subject than with the latter. For this reason, as 
well as because it is the subject with which the present writer is more familiar, 
the greater part of the following discussion will be devoted to the field of 
quasi contracts50.  
Quasi Contracts is, among the major branches of private law, the latest to 
receive recognition as a distinct part of the law of obligations. Contracts 
emerged from the interstices of procedure near the close of the eighteenth 
century. Torts appeared as a distinct subject matter about the middle of the 
last century. It was not until the publication of Professor William A. Keener's 
treatise in 1893 that quasi contracts became a recognized part of the system of 
English or American private law.  
This is not to say that the tripartite division of the law of private obligations 
was not thought of before the close of the nineteenth century. As early as 
1832, John Austin in his lectures on jurisprudence at the University of 
London, divided rights in personam into contracts, quasi contracts and 
delicts51.  
                                                            
50 Keener, A treatise on the of Quasi Contracts (1893) at p.287. 
51 Austin, Jurisprudence 4th edn. (1873) at  p. 55.  
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In making this classification, how-ever, he was not using the language of the 
contemporaneous English bench and bar, but was borrowing from the more 
subtle analysis and the more orderly system of the civil law of continental 
Europe. He recognized that in the English common law the quasi contractual 
obligation was concealed beneath the fiction of implied contract. 
The historical antecedents of this threefold division are to be found in the 
Roman law as early as the second century, and the textbook which the 
Emperor Justinian had compiled for law students, known as the Institutes of 
Justinian, sets forth a distinct though limited category of quasi contractual 
obligations. A fourth category of the later Roman law also mentioned by 
Austin52, was the quasi delict, but this distinction, which Austin thought 
useless, has not been received in English or American law. Nor did Austin’s 
attempt to introduce the conception of quasi contract have any immediate 
influence. Thus the recognition of quasi contract did not come in American 
law until near the close of the nineteenth century.  
Even after the publication of Keener’s learned treatise, the reception of the 
concept of quasi contract in American judicial opinions was very slow. 
The courts continued, as they had been doing long before that publication, to 
make many applications of the principles of quasi contractual liability without 
using the terminology and without developing the basic ideas of the subject. 
The Romans had a word for it which clearly denoted the fictitious character of 
the “contract”; but the English and American courts, with characteristic 
reluctance to accept new terminology, continued to apply the term “implied 
contract” which left conveniently unsettled the question whether the 
implication was an inference of fact or a rule of law. In resorting to the fiction 
of an “implied contract”, the courts were often led astray. At the worst they 
conjured up an artificial consent as the basis of the obligation.’  
                                                            
52 Id at p. 945-959. 
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At best they uttered some hornbook formula and left the true grounds of 
decision unexpressed. Even in the grist of current judicial decisions applying 
the doctrines of quasi contract, only a minority label them or analyze them 
correctly; and for this reason it is all the more important that the practicing 
lawyer should be able to recognize the thing without its proper label. Yet a 
minority of courts in recent years, enlightened by the work of Keener or by 
the excellent treatise of Professor Woodward published twenty years later53,  
have begun the work of staking out this third estate of the private law of 
obligations54.  Thus the restatement of quasi contracts is not an attempt to 
force a wholly esoteric body of professor-made law upon a suffering 
profession; it is an attempt to find the boundaries of a field which has been 
well trodden for at least two centuries; and it is badly needed at this time 
because the boundary lines are uncertain. 
The historical development of quasi contract serves to explain the un-certainty 
as to its scope. In Anglo-American law, as in Roman law, it was invented as a 
category to include obligations which could not be conveniently subsumed 
under either contract or tort, as soon as those two categories came to be 
defined by general principles. Quasi contracts was the catch-all. It is not 
surprising that into this limbo of unlabeled specimens were thrown some 
which could not be allowed to remain when a general theory of quasi contract 
came to be developed. Two examples are debts of record (e. g., judgments) 
and statutory, official, or customary duties. Ames included in quasi contracts 
these two classes of obligations, and a third class, those founded upon unjust 
enrichment55, of the latter much will be said later on.  
The inclusion of the two former illustrates the rationale of quasi contract in its 
earlier American stages. A judgment had long been called a “contract of 
record,” presumably because an action of debt could be maintained upon a 
judgment, and in the modern category of contract the action of debt was 
                                                            
53 Woodward, Quasi Contracts (1913) at p. 124. 
54 Matter of Buccini v Paterno Contruction Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170. N. E. 910 (1930). 
55 Ames, ‘The Histroy of Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 64. 
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included.  
Yet it was too violent a fiction to suppose that the defendant who had bitterly 
fought a tort action to the court of last resort had consented to pay the 
judgment. It might have been called a tort obligation, since the original cause 
of action was in tort; but this forthright manner of speaking would have been 
offensive to some other venerable doctrines of the common law, notably the 
doctrine of merger by judgment. Thus Ames, and Keener following him,56” 
placed the obligation of record in the old Roman junk room. The statutory or 
customary duty was placed there for a similar reason, namely, because the 
action of debt could be maintained upon such an obligation. Here again the 
obligation, which was in the nature of a tax or a penalty, was not based upon 
any conduct of the obligor which a layman or even a clear headed lawyer 
would call “consent”. The obligation imposed by an official duty might have 
been squeezed under contract, just as marital duties sometimes are; yet the 
refinement of the conception of contract which took place in the nineteenth 
century left no room for these long range consents. Despite his inclusion of 
the first two classes of quasi contractual obligations, Keener devoted almost 
his entire book to the third class. And when Professor Woodward reviewed 
the subject two decades later, he gave only a bare mention to the first two 
categories, and urged that the title “quasi contract” should be reserved for the 
third category alone57. Thus, it seems fair to say that obligations of record 
(which are sui generis) and statutory or official duties (which presumably 
belong in the domain of public law) are not included under quasi contract. 
They are not included in this Restatement. To distinguish quasi contract from 
tort, another rather ingenious but highly artificial distinction was made. Both 
obligations are imposed by the law regardless of the consent of the obligor. 
They cannot be distinguished by reference to the type of conduct which gives 
rise to the obligation, or by the moral aspects of that conduct, since some tort 
                                                            
56 Keener, Op.cit at p. 16. 
57 Woodward, op. cit at p. 180. 
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obligations are imposed without fault of the obligor (e.g., liability for 
trespassing animals, for blasting, in some states) and many quasi contractual 
obligations are based upon morally wrongful conduct, as in the case of waiver 
of tort, fraud, etc.  
The distinction which was devised to separate the two was this primary tort 
obligation is negative to refrain from acting; the primary quasi contractual 
obligation is affirmative, to act. The law imposes a primary duty not to 
commit a tort; upon the breach of this primary duty the secondary duty to 
make reparation, to pay damages, arises. On the other hand, the law never 
imposes a duty not to commit a quasi contract; it imposes a quasi contractual 
obligation only to make recompense for the obligor’s unjust enrichment, or, 
as will be noted later, to make restitution to the obligee.  
The distinction between a negative duty and an affirmative duty was thus 
made the boundary wall. Of this distinction it may be said that it is clear and 
fairly workable and not without value in fixing an artificial boundary. Some 
objections to it may be pointed out. To begin with, the proposition that tort 
obligations are never affirmative may be open to question. If one includes 
equitable torts, the duty of a trustee to invest idle funds would seem to be an 
affirmative duty, since a court of equity will make him pay for the cestui’s 
loss regardless of whether the trustee profited by the failure to act. The 
trustee's liability arises out of an affirmative tort obligation. A more serious 
objection is that the same tortuous conduct may give rise to an action in tort 
(based upon the secondary tort duty) or an action in quasi contract (often 
called “waiver of tort”) tore cover for the unjust enrichment of the tort-feasor. 
In other words, the distinction is drawn between the primary tort duty and the 
quasi contractual duty which is secondary or remedial. Thus the distinction 
fails to mark a boundary between primary tort duties and the antecedents of 
quasi contractual duties. 
It has frequently been said that quasi contract, like constructive trust, is a 
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purely remedial concept. This statement implies that there are no primary or 
antecedent quasi contractual duties. This is true in the sense that the quasi 
contractual obligor does not necessarily breach any antecedent duty to the 
obligee in receiving or acquiring the benefit in question. For instance, a payee 
who unwittingly receives money paid by mistake, in supposed satisfaction of 
a debt which was previously paid, does not violate any legal duty to the oblige 
by receiving the money; the only breach of duty is in failing to pay it back 
when he learns of the mistake. If, however, primary rights are merely 
concepts or hypotheses useful in predicting how courts will decide,” it seems 
there is a hypothetical quasi contractual right, and its correlative duty, before 
the money was paid. A further objection to this distinction between quasi 
contract and tort is that it takes no account of the ethical or social aspects of 
the conduct which gives rise to the respective obligations. 
The principle that one who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another must make restitution is the basic principle of this Restatement. 
For the sake of convenience this will be called the principle of unjust 
enrichment. This principle satisfies the requirements of a synthetic or 
classificatory principle for all of the doctrines of quasi contracts and of 
constructive trusts, with possibly a few exceptions. This is not to say that such 
a vague principle is a workable test of liability in a particular case, if unaided 
by precedent; the analytic aspect of the principle will be referred to later on. It 
may be objected that the principle does not serve to differentiate tort from 
quasi contract; many tort actions involve restitution for benefits unjustly 
acquired, as in the actions for the conversion of chattels, or in actions for the 
specific recovery of land or chattels. The answer is that these remedies fulfill 
a dual function, that of reparation for a tort and that of restitution for benefit 
acquired.  
The distinction between tort and quasi contract relates to the substantive law 
of obligations; the system of remedies which grew up under the common law 
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and which have been liberalized by the codes of procedure does not dovetail 
neatly with the divisions of substantive law. In any practical or applied 
science the same instrument may be used for different purposes. 
The field of quasi-contract has been restricted by most writers to obligations 
enforceable in an action at law. This restriction may be explained by the fact 
that the various doctrines which were later assembled in the category of quasi 
contract were developed in courts of law through the application of the 
common counts in general assumpsit, and by the further fact that a great law 
judge, Lord Mansfield, was the first to liberate some of these doctrines from 
the stifling fiction of a promise58. But the principle of unjust enrichment is 
applicable to suits in equity, and a considerable body of equitable doctrine 
may be subsumed under it.  
That these doctrines were omitted from the field of quasi-contract was an 
historical accident arising from the fact that substantive law in its early stages 
is concealed beneath the forms of procedure. The American codes of 
procedure have generally abolished the distinction between actions at law and 
suits in equity. Whatever else this may mean (and one need not rush into this 
well trodden arena of controversy), it indicates that there is no longer any 
reason for separating the substantive equity doctrines based upon unjust 
enrichment, from the legal doctrines based upon  the same principle.  
The Restatement is a systematic presentation of substantive law. It therefore 
includes rules which are equitable as well as those which are legal. Since, 
however, the term quasi contract had already acquired a meaning which 
restricted it to obligations remediable at law, it was decided to discard the 
term “quasi-contract” from the title of the Restatement. It has accordingly 
been relegated to the subtitle of Part I. 
The title, as has been said, is cumbersome and unfamiliar. To understand it 
requires knowledge of the historical antecedents of the doctrines which item 
                                                            
58 Supra note 8. 
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braces and a careful study of those doctrines. For these reasons this 
restatement may be slow in gaining acceptance by the bench and bar. Yet it 
has the distinct advantage of sweeping away the accumulations of several 
centuries of confused and misleading terminology; and the legal problems for 
which it offers a solution are so common and pervasive that, if it proves to be 
properly drawn for this purpose, it ought to be widely used. Only time will 
tell. 
Neither “restitution” nor “unjust enrichment” is quite comprehensive enough 
to include all the situations which fall within the field covered by the 
restatement. Two examples may suffice. It is generally accepted that a person 
who performs services in repairing another's building under an entire contract 
which he is prevented from performing by the fortuitous destruction of the 
building can recover the reasonable value of his services59. Some authorities 
argue that the property owner is enriched by each stroke of the hammer or the 
paint brush 60 ; but others refuse to accept this somewhat Pick Wickian 
conclusion. At all events the measure of restitution to the plaintiff exceeds the 
amount of increase in the assets of the defendant, since the increment of value 
due to half painting a house, for instance, seems scarcely equal to the value of 
the labor and materials used in half-painting it. Hence restitution seems to be 
the basis of recovery, although recovery is limited to the benefits received by 
the owner; he would not be liable for materials which the painter had bought 
for this purpose but had not yet used on the house61. On the other hand, there 
are some rules which compel the acquirer of a benefit to make “restitution” to 
a person who never had the benefit. An example is the duty of a trustee to 
account to the beneficiary of a trust for profits received by the trustee from his 
investment of the trust funds in violation of his trust, as by buying and selling 
speculative securities. The profits are received from third persons, yet they 
belong to the beneficiary because acquired by the wrongful use of his 
                                                            
59 Butterfield v Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891). 
60 Woodward op.cit at p. 117. 
61 Matthews Cont. Co. v Brady 104 N.J.L. 438 140 at p. 433 (1928). 
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property. Here unjust enrichment is the basis of recovery. However, it is not 
easy to find examples which cannot be subsumed readily under either 
heading. There is much to be said for limiting the title to “Restitution”, a term 
which has some recognition in judicial opinions62.  
The principle of unjust enrichment has been attacked on two sides. On the one 
hand it has been argued that it is too vague and indefinite to be a guide to 
decision, since it does not define what is “unjust”. In an article which has 
stood the test of time (as few of them do!), Judge Learned Hand nearly forty 
years ago63  defended this principle on the broad ground (if I interpret him 
rightly) that a basic principle may be “logically perfect” although it refers to 
other legal principles or rules which in turn denote the operative fact son 
which rights or duties rest. The distinction referred to above, between using 
the principle of unjust enrichment as a classificatory instrument, and using it 
as an instrument for analyzing the facts of a particular case and deter-mining 
their legal consequences, seems pertinent here. Courts using the Re-statement 
will not be given blank checks to fill in with the amount of unjust enrichment 
which the judicial hunch of the moment tells them the plaintiff is entitled to. 
No more than in the decision of tort cases they have used the ancient principle 
of “Sic Utero Tuo” to invent new species of tort liability. The species of quasi 
contract liability are defined by rules which are no vaguer than the rules of 
many portions of the law of torts, although the latter have a much larger body 
of judicial precedents.  
The principle of unjust enrichment will be used deductively, if at all, only in 
the novel or boundary-line case. Even there it will be used as a general test of 
the propriety of extending the law to include new obligations to make 
restitution, and will be restricted in application by the absence of analogous 
precedents64.  
                                                            
62 Schwasnick v Bland-in, 65 F (2d) 354. 
63 Hand, ‘Rstitution or Unjust Enrichment’ (1897) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 249. 
64 Graf v Neith co-operative Diary Products, 216 Wis. 519 257 N.W. 618 (1934). 
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Professor Woodward, on the other side, has criticized unjust enrichment as 
too narrow a formulation of the quasi contractual obligation65. He insists that 
the receipt of benefit is sufficient; it is not necessary that the recipient's estate 
should be enriched as a result of the transaction. The obligation of the house 
owner to pay the house painter for half painting the house which was burned 
down gives him no qualms; the owner received the product of the painter’s 
labor and materials, and it is immaterial that he was fortuitously prevented 
from enjoying them to the fullest extent. In this simple case the present writer 
has no difficulty in finding that the owner was enriched by the painting, since 
the painting was useful in protecting the house from sun and storm. A more 
difficult case is the one in which recovery was sought for the wages of an 
artist, a noted mural painter, who died when he had partly completed the 
mural decorations of a palatial residence in New York City. Here the personal 
representative of the painter was allowed to recover the reasonable value of 
the services, and Judge Cardozo gave as the measure of recovery” the benefit 
to the owner in advancement of the ends to be promoted by the contract66. If 
the painter was at the time of his death performing labor and services in the 
manner called for by the contract, it would make no difference that the 
painting was a modernistic nightmare which would decrease rather than 
increase the sale price of the house. Here the concept of enrichment, if 
applicable at all, becomes slightly artificial. The owner was enriched, it may 
be said, in the sense that he got what he asked for. The painting had value to 
him in so far as it satisfied his want; even the economist, who treats of value 
in a different way, does not inquire into the sanity of wants. Thus the decision 
can be squared with the principle of unjust enrichment. A recent Connecticut 
case went further than any other case has gone, in allowing an owner to 
recover the expense of redecorating a house at the request of a purchaser who 
had made an oral and illusory promise to buy it, and who subsequently backed 
                                                            
65 Woodward op. cit at p. 8. 
66 Matter of Buccini v Paterno Contruction Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E. 910 (1930). 
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out of the deal67.  
Here the defendant received nothing tangible, yet in a highly artificial sense 
he got what he asked for. In construing enrichment to mean an enhancement 
in the net value of one’s estate Professor Woodward gave it too narrow a 
meaning. 
Another class of cases in which this problem becomes acute is one in which 
an agent purporting to act as such but without actual or apparent authority, 
obtains money from a third person, deposits it in the principal's bank account, 
and then draws it out and embezzles it before the principal knows it is there68.  
Professor Woodward considers the principal as having received a benefit for 
which he should make restitution69. The courts generally hold there is no 
liability in such a case70, on the ground that the principal received no benefit. 
It is arguable, of course, that money in the bank is necessarily a benefit; but 
an asset of which the principal learns only after it has disappeared seems too 
fleeting for practical evaluation. Since the knowledge of the faithless agent is 
not to be imputed to the principal, the case is analogous to the use of one’s 
premises as a temporary hiding place for stolen money. If, however, the agent 
uses some of his ill gotten gains to pay off the principal’s debts, the principal 
is to that extent liable, although he never had the money in his pocket71.  
Discharge of one's debt is a benefit; it is also an enrichment. It seems, then, 
that either benefit or enrichment must be taken in a sense sufficiently broad to 
cover substantially the same ground. 
Quasi-contractual duties are enforced by the recovery of a money judgment; 
constructive trust implies the existence of a trust res, which may be the object 
of specific restitution. This distinction has important consequences, especially 
                                                            
67 Woodward op. cit. at p. 102. 
68 First National Bank of Las Vegas v Oberne, 121 Ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886). 
69 Woodward op. cit. at pp. 72, 75. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Supra note 68. 
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when the obligor is insolvent. Hence, the Restatement is divided into two 
main parts non-specific restitution, which embraces quasi contracts and 
equitable obligations to make restitution in money; and specific restitution, 
which includes the subject-matter of constructive trusts and also some rights 
to specific restitution which may be redressed in an action “formerly 
denominated legal”. For instance, the defrauded seller of a chattel can 
maintain replevin or a similar legal action to recover the chattel, while the 
defrauded grantor of land is required, in most jurisdictions, to seek an 
equitable remedy for restitution of the land. Yet the obligation to make 
specific restitution seems the same in both cases, and both are appropriately 
brought together in the Restatement. 
Almost every transaction or other activity of man in society may somehow 
come within the scope of application of the law of quasi contracts; and yet no 
one by planning to can acquire a quasi contractual right. A person who plans 
to acquire such a right by thrusting a benefit upon another person is an 
officious intermeddler and is denied restitution. 
With some reservations one can also say that people do not plan to incur or to 
avoid quasi contractual duties.  The law of quasi contracts is the hospital of 
frustrated plans and expectations. The performance of a contract is prevented 
by the default of the contractor or by supervening impossibility, or the hopes 
and expectations aroused by the contract are frustrated by the discovery that 
they were aroused through fraud or mistake. The task of quasi contracts is to 
salvage from the wreckage that minimum of legal redress which is 
represented by restitution for unjust enrichment. It offers a last resort to the 
victims of mistake, oppression and misfortune. Since, transactions involving 
large amounts of money are ordinarily well planned, it is not surprising to find 
that the amounts involved in quasi contract litigation are usually small. In a 
system of law which relies upon appeal to courts of last resort to get its rules 
settled, rules which involve ordinarily only small amounts are likely to remain 
unsettled. The scarcity of reported precedents on many questions of quasi 
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contract law bears out this hypothesis. Hence, a restatement of this subject 
will, if it proves effective to accomplish its ends, help those who are least able 
to help themselves. 
Merely to list the topics covered by the quasi contracts part of the 
Restatement would fail to disclose the subject matter with which it deals. The 
topic of “Coercion” for instance, embraces not only duress and undue 
influence, but also the payment of a debt which is owed by the pay or and by 
another person, who is thus benefitted. Hence the right of a surety to 
indemnity from his principal and the right of contribution between co sureties 
or between joint tort feasors, are within the scope of the subject. Mistake, 
“waiver of tort” and benefits conferred under contracts or other bargains. 
Among these are supplying necessaries to a person in an emergency, and the 
conferring of benefit necessary to save a person’s life, as in the case of the 
physician who treats the unconscious victim of an accident. These rules are 
exceptions to the general principle, stated above, that one who thrusts his 
services upon another is officious. The law of torts, it is generally assumed, 
imposes no duty upon the Good Samaritan to help the friendless victim; but 
the law of quasi contract gives the Good Samaritan a right to restitution if he 
chooses to intervene and if his intervention was urgently necessary. 
To such an un officious benefactor it is not enough to say that virtue is its own 
reward. 
The bulk of quasi contractual litigation falls under the broad category of 
mistake. In this topic are included the case where the mistake of one party 
was induced by the fraud of the other, the case where the mistake was induced 
by the innocent misrepresentation of the other, and the case where the mistake 
was not attributable in any sense to the other party. In the last case the 
mistaken party has no tort remedy, and in the second case he has no tort 
remedy in most jurisdictions. In these two cases the right of restitution is the 
only right of the unfortunate. Mistake of law, perhaps the most confused 
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subject in the entire field of law, is comprehensively discussed in the 
Restatement, and it is believed that, although an ideal solution of this problem 
is not yet attained, the rules there presented will help to clarify the decisions 
on this subject. A careful study of the precedents shows that the maxim, every 
man is presumed to know the law is a hoary old imposter in the field of quasi 
contract, and he has accordingly been banished to the field of criminal 
administration, where he may properly belong.  
The Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment does not contain all 
the rules of quasi contracts. Another group of quasi contractual obligations 
which are only touched upon in the present restatement are those arising out 
of marital relations and those imposed upon persons having limited or no 
contractual capacity, such as infants, lunatics and municipal corporations72. 
There may be others which a succeeding generation of lawyers will discover, 
or invent. 
The fictitious character of the constructive trust has longer been understood 
by the legal profession than that of the quasi contract. The term “constructive 
trust” seems to have been derived from section eight of the English Statute of 
Frauds which, after requiring that all trusts be manifested and proved by 
writing, accepted trusts which “result by the implication or construction of 
law. 73 ” This famous phrase is the foundation of both resulting and 
constructive trusts. Without going into the distinction between “implication” 
and “construction” one can say that the resulting trust has come to be 
classified as a genuine trust, and the constructive trust as a fictitious or 
remedial trust based upon the principle of unjust enrichment. The facts which 
give rise to constructive trusts ordinarily include those which give rise to a 
quasi contractual obligation; the constructive trust presupposes that the 
benefit is in the form of a specific thing and is capable of restitution. The 
special field of constructive trusts, however, contains three main groups of 
                                                            
72 Tooke, ‘Quasi Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations’ (1934) 47 harv. L. Rev. at p. 1143. 
73 29 Chas. II, C. 3 (1976) at p. 8. 
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rules :-Those in which land is acquired under an oral agreement, those in 
which property is wrongfully acquired or retained under a will (including by 
analogy, a policy of life insurance) and those in which a fiduciary is 
benefitted by his breach of duty. Certain rights analogous to those of the 
beneficiary of a constructive trust, such as the right to an equitable lien on a 
wrongdoer’s property and the right of subrogation, are included along with 
the constructive trust proper. 
The concluding chapter is based on the rules as to tracing of ill-gotten gains 
rounds out this part of the Restatement. 
The Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment will repay careful 
study by the legal profession. Unfortunately it will require a great deal of 
careful study if one is to understand its pronouncements. Lacking the 
authority of the state, it can command the attention of its readers only by the 
learning and wisdom of those who prepared and approved it, and by its 
intrinsic merit as a reliable and comprehensible treatise on law. The tripartite 
form of the earlier restatements black letter text, comment and illustrations-
has been retained. The black letter statement of many of the doctrines of quasi 
contracts is vague and cryptic, and one must go to the comment and 
illustrations for enlightenment. Fortunately, the comment of this Restatement 
endeavors to present, more clearly than in some earlier ones, the underlying 
ethical principles which justify the rules; and the illustrations are commonly 
taken from reported decisions.  
The decisions, however, are nowhere cited in the proposed final draft. To the 
present writer this seems a mistake of major consequence. The law of quasi 
contracts is not a well understood subject. No digest heading brings together 
its precedents. They are scattered from Abandonment to Zoning, and only the 
practiced eye can pick them out. Even one who has studied the subject for 
many years has difficulty in recognizing quasi contract decisions under their 
many disguises. The scarcity of precedents on many topics, as above 
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indicated, affords another reason why the publication of annotations would 
have been a boon to the legal profession. It may be true that one of the 
original purposes of the restatement was to break with the unwieldy and 
stifling bulk of precedent in American law. Yet the transition from case law to 
code law cannot be made abruptly, if indeed, it can be made at all.  
The quest for certainty does not end on the barren heights of abstract 
formulas. 
As in the case of other Restatements, this one represents many com-promises 
between conflicting views. Any composite intellectual product will have this 
characteristic. The present occasion is not the one to criticize in detail the 
formulations finally adopted. In making a restatement of the law one must “be 
bold, young man, but not too bold.” It is believed that this Restatement is a 
valuable clarification of some difficult and important legal problems, and that 
it will lead to further discussion and clarification as it comes to be widely 
used by the legal profession. 
1.7 Doctrine of Restitution  
Restitution as enunciated in Section 65 aims at preventing a party to a void 
contract to retain benefits received under it 74 . “Restitution” means “the 
restoring anything unjustly taken from another75. The word ‘restitution’ in its 
etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation 
or reversal of a decree what has been lost to him in execution of the decree or 
in direct consequence of the decree”76. In fact, restitution or restoration is 
synonym words. The word ‘restitution’ means, “action or an act of restoring 
or giving hack something to its proper owner; an act of reparation for loss or 
injury previously inflicted; action or an act of restoring a person or persons to 
a previous status or position, the fact of being restored or reinstated”. As per 
the same dictionary, the word ‘restore’ means “(i) Give back, return, make 
                                                            
74 N. Purkayastha  v Union of India, AIR 1953 Assam 33. 
75 Whaton’s Law of Lexicon  rep. edn. (1976) at p. 877. 
76 Zafar Khan v Board of Revenue, AIR 1985 SC 39. 
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restitution of something previously taken away or lost; (ii) make amends for; 
compensate for; make good (loss or damage); set right, repair, etc.” 
As explained in Aiyer’s Judicial Dictionary, ‘restitution’ means “the 
rescinding contract or transaction so as to place the parties to it in the same 
position with respect one another which they occupied before the contract was 
made or the transaction took place”. Fraud renders any transaction voidable at 
the option of the party defrauded; and if, when it is avoided, nothing has 
occurred to alter the position of affairs, the rights and remedies of the parties 
are the same as if it had been void from the beginning. The party exercising 
his option to rescind is entitled to be restored, as far as possible, to his former 
position. Such a restoration is restitution in integrum77.  
Under Section 65, when an agreement is discovered to be void or when a 
contra becomes void, a person who has received any advantage in respect of 
such agreement or contract is bound to restore or to make compensation for it 
to the person from whom he received. This intention envisages the principle 
of restitution after benefits has been received and the agreement is latter 
discovered to be void or the contract became void. But section 65 has no 
application to a case of contract which is known to both parties to be illegal or 
to be tainted with fraud78. Section 65 envisages the principle of restitution 
after benefit has been received. The Section is based on the doctrine of 
restitution in integrum and as such it does not make a new contract between 
the parties but only provides for restitution of the advantage taken by a party 
under the contract. But in a case who’s the plaintiff was aware of the illegal 
object of the agreement or illegality or void character of the agreement he 
cannot invoke Section 65 to his aid79. In other words, Section can be invoked 
in a case where the contract is void from its inception hut the parties or at 
least the plaintiff laboured under a bona fide mistake and the contract is later 
discovered to be void or later on became void. In such a case, the plaintiff is 
                                                            
77 Satgur Prasad v Her Narain Des, AIR 1932 PC 89. 
78 Nihal Singh v Rambai, AIR 1987 MP 126.  
79 Ramkrishna Ganpat Rao v Kondi Ram Jaysing Rao Naikwade, AIR 2002 Bom 48. 
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entitled to get back his money or property but Section 65 would have no 
application as the contract is void from its inception and the plaintiff was 
aware of it80.  The question of restoration of benefit would not arise if a party 
had received the benefit after the agreement ceases to be a contract 
enforceable by law i.e. after it ceases to be a contract81.  
1.8 Persons not Competent to Contract 
In order to appreciate the issue whether a minor or a person not competent to 
contract under law is liable to restore any benefit received by him under the 
contract under Section 65 of the Act. It says that “when an agreement is 
discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has 
received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore 
it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it.” 
The Contract Act does not provide that the expression “any person” occurring 
in Section 65 would not include a minor or any other person not competent to 
contract. In the absence of such specific exclusion, it may not be in 
conformity with the provisions of Section 65 to take a view that Section 65 
does not apply to a void contract entered into with a minor or other person not 
competent to contract. 
It is true that in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose82, the Privy Council had 
refused to apply the provision to a contract by minor on the ground that “this 
section, like Section 64 starts from the basis of their being an agreement or 
contract between competent parties and has no application to a case in which 
there never was and never could have been, any contract”. Sections 64 and 65 
of the Contract Act envisages contract between competent parties and that 
since in case of a contract by minor, no contract comes into being as it is void 
ab initio. The Privy Council in that case held that a moneylender who has 
advanced money to a minor on the security of the mortgage is not entitled to 
                                                            
80 Sundara Gownder v Balachandran, AIR 1990 Ker 324. 
81 Jagdis Prasad v Produce Exchange Corporation, AIR 1946 Cal  245. 
82 (1903) ILR 30 Cal 539. 
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repayment of the money when the mortgage is declared to be invalid. But the 
view taken by the Privy Council cannot be said to lay down a correct law, if 
one goes by the language of Section 65 of the Contract Act. As observed by 
the Law Commission of India in its 13th report on “Contract Act, 1872”, “in 
the other line of cases, Section 65 and sometimes Section 70 was held to be 
applicable” to a contract by minor or any other person not competent to 
contract. In Mohori Bibee’s case, supra, the Privy Council seems to have not 
taken note of the distinction between an agreement and a contract. In fact, 
Section 65 of the Act deals not only with agreements enforceable by law, but 
also with agreements not enforceable by law as has been held by the Privy 
Council itself in its later judgment in Thakurane Harnath Kaur v. Thakur 
Inder Bahadur Singh83, in which the Privy Council has clearly held that “an 
agreement, therefore, discovered to be void is one discovered to be not 
enforceable by law, and, on the language of the section, would include an 
agreement that was void in that sense from its inception as distinct from a 
contract that becomes void”. The Mysore High Court in Dyaviah v. 
Shivamma84, observed that: 
“the section covers two types of cases. The First relates to 
agreements discovered to be void and the second relates to 
contracts which become void. So far as the second part is 
concerned, the implication is that the contract must be a valid 
one when it was made and that it becomes void subsequently. 
The first part which contemplates cases where “an agreement 
is discovered to be void”. 
1.9 Restitution under English Law 
According to English law if a minor has obtained undue benefit in any 
transaction, he is required to restore back the benefit so received by him, 
under the equitable doctrine of restitution. Under the doctrine he is asked to 
restore back the exact things taken by him. It is applicable only to goods or 
property received by a minor so long as they can be traced, and are still in his’ 
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possession. Since, it is difficult to identify money and to prove whether it is 
the same money or different one, the doctrine does not apply to money. Even 
as regards goods or property, if the same have been consumed or transfered 
and are no more traceable, the doctrine of restitution does not apply there. 
The case of Leslie v. Sheill85  explains the doctrine. In this case, the defendant, 
a minor, falsely misrepresented himself to be a major, and obtained two loans 
of £200 each from the plaintiff who was money-lenders. The plaintiffs 
brought an action to recover £ 475 being the amount of loan taken and interest 
thereon. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the money could not be 
recovered if that were allowed that would amount to enforcing the agreement 
to repay loan, which is void under the Infants’ Relief Act, 1874. 
It was explained that the object of the doctrine of restitution is to restore back 
the ill-gotten gains taken by the minor, rather than enforcing the contract. If a 
minor is asked to pay money which cannot be traced and which he no more 
possesses, it would amount to enforcing the agreement. Where the question of 
repayment is there, the doctrine of restitution does not help, or as stated by 
Lord Sumner, “Restitution stops where repayment begins.86”  
The doctrine has beer’ explained by Lord Sumner In the following words87:  
“When an infant obtained an advantage by falsely stating 
himself to be of full age, equity requited him to restore his ill-
gotten gains, or to release the party deceived from 
obligations or acts in law induced by the fraud, but 
scrupulously stopped short of enforcing against him a 
contractual obligation, entered into while he was an infant, 
even by means of a fraud.” 
As regards the question of restoring back the property is concerned, Lord 
Sumner referred to the following judgment of Lush J. in Stocks v. Wilson88:  
                                                            
85 (1914) 3 KB. 607. 
86 Id. at p. 618. 
87 Ibid. 
88 (1913) 2 KB. 235, at 247. 
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“What the Court of Equity has done in eases of this kind is to 
prevent the infant from retaining the benefit of what he has 
obtained by reason of his fraud. It has done no more than 
this, and this is a very different thing from making him liable 
to pay damages and compensation for the loss of the other 
party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud 
he can be compelled to restore it.” 
As regards the question of refund of money which had arisen in Leslie v. 
Sheill, Lord Sumner further observed89:  
“In the present case the money was paid over in order to be 
used as the defendant’s own and he has so used it and, I 
suppose, spent it. There is no question of tracing it, no 
possibility of restoring the very thing got by fraud, nothing 
but compulsion through a personal judgment to pay an 
equivalent sum out of his present or future resources, in a 
word nothing but a judgment in debt to repay the loan. I think 
this would be nothing but enforcing a void contract. So far as 
I can find, the Court of Chancery never would have enforced 
any liability under circumstances like the present, any more 
than a Court of Law would have done so.” 
1.10 Compensation by minor under Indian Law 
It has been noted above that in England restitution, that is, the restoring back 
the property by a fraudulent minor is permitted, if the property can be traced. 
According to Leslie v. Sheill90, the money obtained by a minor cannot be 
recovered from the minor as the same cannot be traced. If a minor is asked to 
pay back the money, it may mean enforcing contractual obligation against a 
minor, which the law does not permit. 
The question which has arisen in India is how far a minor can be asked to 
restore back the benefit wrongly obtained by him under a void agreement? 
Can a minor be asked to pay compensation to the other party? 
In India, the question of compensation under the following two kinds of 
provisions has arisen before the Courts: 
                                                            
89 Supra note 85. 
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1. Whether a minor can be asked to pay compensation under Sections 64 
and 65, Indian Contract Act for the benefit obtained by him under a 
void agreement? 
2. Whether a minor can be asked to pay compensation in view of the 
provisions contained in Sections 39 and 41, Specific Relief Act, 1877? 
1.10.1 Compensation under Indian Contract Act 
The question, whether a minor can be asked to pay compensation to the other 
party, under Sections 64 and 65, Indian Contract Act had arisen in Mohori 
Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose91, While discussing this case, it has already been 
noted that in this case the Privy Council had held that the question of 
compensation under Sections 64 and 65, Indian Contract Act, arises where the 
parties are competent to contract, and these provisions do not apply to the 
case of a minor’s agreement. The matter came for consideration before the 
Law Commission of India 92 . The Law Commission disagreed with this 
interpretation put to Section 65 by the Privy Council. In its view 
compensation under Section 65 be allowed even if the invalidity of the 
agreement is because of the fact that a party is incompetent to contract. It has 
recommended that an Explanation be added to Section 65 to indicate that the 
Section is applicable where a minor enters into an agreement on the false 
representation that he is a major93. Inspite of the above stated recommendation 
by the Law Commission, no amendment has been made in the Act so far. 
Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act recognises quasi-contractual liability to 
compensate a person at whose cost some benefit has been enjoyed. According 
to that provision, where a person lawfully does anything for another person, 
or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such 
other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make 
compensation to the former in respect of or to restore, the thing so done or 
                                                            
91 Supra note 82. 
92 Law Commission of India 13th Report (contract Act, 1872), 1958. 
93 Ibid. 
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delivered, The question which arises is ? Can a minor who has enjoyed the 
benefit as contemplated under Section 70 be required to pay compensation 
under that provision? It has been held that Section 70 cannot be invoked 
against a minor94. In this context, it has been observed95:  
“The minor is excluded from the operation of Section 70 for 
the reason that his case has been specifically provided lot by 
Section 68... Besides, in the case of a minor, even the 
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of work done or thing 
delivered which is the foundation of the claim under Section 
70 would not be present, and so on principle, that Section 
cannot be invoked against a minor.” 
It is submitted that the above stated interpretation is neither logical nor in 
consonance with the provision contained in Section 70. Section 70 deals with 
every “person”, which would include a minor, and moreover, there is nothing 
in the Indian Contract Act, which prevents the case of a minor being covered 
both under Sections 68 and 70 of the Act. 
1.10.2 Compensation under Specific Relief Act 
Whether a fraudulent minor can be asked to pay compensation in view of 
provisions of Sections 39 and 41, specific Relief Act, 1877, came in for 
consideration in some cases. Before discussing the case, the relevant 
provisions may be noted: 
Section 39: “Any person against whom a written instrument is void or 
voidable, who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left 
outstanding, may cause him serious Injury, may sue to have it adjudged void 
or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to 
be delivered up and cancelled.” 
Section 41: “On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument, the Court may 
require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation to 
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the other which justice may require.” 
In Mohori Bibee’s case, the minor had applied for the cancellation of the 
mortgage deed, executed by him, under Section 39, Specific Relief Act and 
the Privy Council considered the question of compensation to be paid by him 
under Section 41 of that Act. It was held that since in this case the loan had 
been advanced to the minor with the full knowledge of his minority, the 
question of payment of compensation to such a money-lender did not arise. 
On the question of compensation under Section 41, Specific Relief Act, there 
is a sharp difference of opinion between two sets of High Courts, one view 
having been expressed by the Lahore High Court and another by the 
Allahabad High Court. 
1.10.3 Lahore High Court View 
The question of compensation arose before the Lahore High Court in Khan 
Gul v. Lakha Singh96. There the plaintiffs, who had advanced a sum of Rs. 
17,500 to a minor, brought an action against him to recover the amount. The 
minor was held liable to refund the same. 
While deciding the case Sir Shadi Lal, C.J. made a liberal interpretation of the 
above stated statutory provisions and also the equitable doctrine of English 
law. Decision on the following points in the case needs a mention: 
(i) According to section 39, Specific Relief Act, 1877, a minor may sue 
for the cancellation of an instrument pertaining to a void agreement, 
and when he so goes to the Court (as a plaintiff) to claim the relief, the 
Court may ask the minor to pay compensation to the other side under 
Section 41. In this particular case the minor was not the plaintiff but 
was the defendant. The Lahore High Court still held that the minor 
should be asked to pay back the money. In Its view the other party 
deserves to be compensated by a fraudulent minor, in equity, 
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irrespective of the fact that the minor is the plaintiff or the defendant. 
(ii) Sir Shadi Lal, C.J. also made a significant departure from the English 
doctrine of restitution and the decision of Leslie v. Sheill97, according 
to which there can be only restoration of specific property wrongfully 
obtained by a fraudulent minor, if the same can be traced in his hands 
and he cannot be asked to pay back money as the same cannot be 
identified, otherwise it would amount to enforcing an agreement which 
is void. 
According to the decision in the present case, asking a minor to return the ill-
gotten gain in the form of money is not the enforcement of contract but it is 
only the restoration of the pre-contract position. The relief is allowed not 
because there is a contract between the parties, but it is because there is no 
contract but one of the parties has unjustly benefited at the cost of the other. 
1.10.4 Allahabad High Court View 
In Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal98, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High 
Court considered at length the decision of the Lahore High Court and 
expressed entirely the opposite view. As regards the two points discussed 
above, i.e., firstly, compensation under the Specific Relief Act, and secondly, 
the question of restitution of compensation, the conclusions were different 
from those arrived at by the Lahore High Court. 
(i) Regarding the minor’s responsibility to compensate under Specific 
Relief Act, it was held that a minor cannot be asked to give any relief 
to the other party when the minor is a defendant in the case. A minor 
can be asked to give relief when he himself is plaintiff and wants some 
relief for himself. If the minor, who is defendant in a case, is asked to 
provide relief, that is contrary to the spirit and language of section 41, 
Specific Relief Act 1877 and will also amount to enforcing a contract, 
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which is void. 
(ii) Regarding the question of paving money compensation by a minor, the 
rule laid down in Leslie v. Sheill99 was followed and it was held that a 
minor may be asked to restore back the property if the same can be 
traced, but he cannot be asked to pay money compensation because 
that would amount to enforcing void contract against a minor. 
Sulaiman, C.J., while expressing his disagreement with the views of 
Sir Shadi Lal, C.J. said100:  
“Where the contract of the transfer of property is void, and 
such property can be traced, the property belongs to the 
promise and can be followed. There is every equity in his 
favour for restoring the property to him but where the 
property is not traceable and the only way to grant 
compensation would be by granting a money decree against 
the minor, decreeing the claim would be almost tantamount to 
enforcing the minor’s pecuniary liability under the contract 
which is void.” 
The view expressed by Sir Shadi Lal, C.J. in the Lahore case has been 
considered to be better, by Pollock and Mulla101. The Law Commission also in 
its Reports102, has preferred the views of Shadi Lal, C.J. expressed in the 
Lahore case on both the points discussed above. In other words, it was in 
favour of permitting an action against a fraudulent minor irrespective of the 
fact whether in the case the minor is the plaintiff or the defendant. It also 
stated that requiring a minor to refund the money gain made by him unjustly 
did not amount to enforcement of the contract. It recommended a suitable 
amendment of the Specific Relief Act for the purpose of clarifying the 
position. The Law Commission’s views and recommendations are as under103:  
“Having considered the rival points of view we are inclined 
                                                            
99 Supra note 85. 
100 AIR 1937 All. 610, at p. 617. 
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to prefer the view of Shadi Lal, C.J. in the Lahore case104. We 
have already recommended the acceptance of the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment.”  
According to that doctrine, the obligation to restore an unjust benefit should 
not depend upon the mere accident of a person coming before the Court as a 
plaintiff or defendant. We also agree with the view that restoration of status 
auto ante would not amount to the enforcement of the void contract against 
the defendant. The principle applicable to a minor will also apply to the case 
of a person of unsound mind. We recommend, therefore, that a subsection 
should be included in the new provision suggested by us to the effect that 
when a defendant successfully resists a suit on the ground that the contract is 
void owing to his incapacity at the time of the contract, he must restore any 
benefit, whether proprietary or monetary, which he has actually received 
under the contract. But no question of liability to make any compensation 
would arise in such a case.” 
Unjust Enrichment means that no one should be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another. It also means that no person should take advantage of 
position of another person which causes some loss to one party and gain to 
another party. The theory of unjust enrichment came through English law. In 
the early 18thcentury, the general lawyers knew nothing about the theory of 
unjust enrichment, even then in number of situations they had given remedies 
that were later categorized under theory of unjust enrichment. 
The researcher has assumed that the person is required to pay if he is liable. 
The hypothesis of the researcher is true that if a person has taken benefit from 
another person and has not given anything in return, then he is liable to pay 
back. In all the cases of unjust enrichment wherever the court feels that one 
person has taken benefit out of another person and has not given anything in 
return, the court makes the person liable and directs the person to compensate 
or return the benefit. 
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The main objective of conducting the project was to understand the decision 
of courts in Indian Scenario on the topic of unjust enrichment. Various 
remedies are available for unjust enrichment in Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
Sections 68-72 deals with remedies available in the case of unjust enrichment 
in various cases like when necessary goods are provided to one person, 
obligation of a person enjoying benefit of a non gratuitous act, responsibility 
of the finder of goods, thing delivered to another person by mistake or 
coercion. The courts also in most of the cases have always tried to give 
decision in favour of plaintiff in the case of unjust enrichment. 
Whenever the court feels that the defendant has taken benefit from the 
plaintiff and has not compensated him, then court directs the defendants to 
either compensate the benefit received by the defendant. 
In Section 72 of Indian Contract Act, only thing delivered by mistake or 
coercion is taken into consideration. 
Like coercion and mistake there are other ways also like undue influence, 
misrepresentation , fraud which can be used by a person to take benefit out of 
another person. So, provision related to misrepresentation, fraud and undue 
influence should also be made under Indian Contract Act, 1872. 
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Chapter-II 
RESTITUTIONARY TECHNIQUES UNDER COMMON  
LAW & SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 
 
A. Restitutionary Technique under Common Law 
2.1 Introduction 
The law of restitution is that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another is required to restore the value of the benefit received to 
the other. In respect of the branch of the subject which concerns restitution in 
response to wrongdoing, a second principle underlies recovery, namely that a 
person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense of another.  
These principles clearly have their roots in moral philosophy. This does not 
detract from their usefulness as organising principles for instances of recovery 
in the law of restitution. The principles are no more vague than the injunction 
that bargains should be upheld, which underpins the law of contract, or the 
neighbour principle in the tort of negligence. The principles afford no licence 
to a judge to follow his own moral convictions or to attempt to achieve natural 
justice. They are fleshed out by the instances of recovery in the decided cases. 
The principle of unjust enrichment has been entrenched as the general theory 
since Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd1 but it has not always held sway. In the 
eighteenth century Lord Mansfield had recognised a principle akin to unjust 
enrichment as underpinning the action for money had and received. In Moses 
v. Macferlan2 it was observed: ‘In one word, the gist of this kind of action is 
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case is, obliged by the ties 
of natural justice and equity to refund money. 
Such ‘generalities’ attracted the scorn of early twentieth-century judges such 
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as Hamilton LJ in Baylis v. Bishop of London3  and Scrutton LJ in Holt v. 
Markham.4 Later on it was observed that the whole history of this particular 
form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppiness 
of thought.’ Perhaps fearing that too large a generalisation would upset settled 
law, such judges clung to the notion that the basis of the obligation in 
restitution was implied contract or implied promise. Such was the emphatic 
opinion of Lord Sumner in Sinclair v Broughan,5 the leading early twentieth 
century House of Lords case which stunted the development of a coherent law 
of restitution for the next 50 years. The implied contract fallacy, which 
necessitated the bizarre pretence that the thief of money impliedly promised 
to repay it, had apparently deep roots in Roman Law and the old system of 
pleading. 
Only in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough 
Council6  was the fiction eventually rejected. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
asserted. 
“Subsequent developments in the law of restitution 
demonstrate that this reasoning is no longer sound. The 
common law restitutionary claim is based not on implied 
contract but on unjust enrichment: in the circumstances the 
law imposes an obligation to repay rather than implying an 
entirely fictitious agreement to repay.... In my judgment, your 
Lordships should now unequivocally and finally reject the 
concept that the claim for moneys had and received is based 
on an implied contract. I would overrule Sinclair v Brougham 
on this point.” 
Nevertheless, given the abstraction of the underlying principle, Lord Wright’s 
comment on Lord Mansfield’s statement of principle is instructive: ‘Like all 
large generalizations, it has needed and received qualification in practice 
(Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Cobe Barbour Ltd.)7 In some 
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respects the cautious conclusion of Lord Diplock in Orakpo v. Manson 
Investments Ltd.8 still represents an accurate statement of English law: ‘there 
is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it 
does is to provide specific remedies in particular cases of what might be 
classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is based upon the civil 
law. 
Contrast the view of the High Court of Australia, where unjust enrichment 
was described by Deane Jin Pave and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul:9 It constitutes 
a unifying legal concept which explains what the law recognizes, in a variety 
of distinct categories of case, an obligation on the part of a defendant to make 
fair and just restitution for a benefit derived at the expense of the plaintiff and 
which assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes of legal 
reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognize such 
an obligation in a new or developing category of case. 
The implied contract fiction has now been jettisoned in England. Accordingly 
restitution is now capable of developing and adapting to meet new situations 
and new modes of transacting. As Sir Donald Nicholls V-C observed in CTN 
Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher.10 
“It is suggested that English law should recognise a 
generalised right to restitution. It is not always easy to 
discern what this call involves, although it appears to be a 
suggestion that once a defendant has been enriched at the 
expense of the claimant, there must presumptively be 
restitution unless the defendant can affirmatively prove some 
legal justification for retaining the benefit. Such is the 
approach of some civil law systems. However, it is submitted 
that it is still necessary and desirable for the claimant 
affirmatively to prove some unjust factor or ground for 
restitution which entitles him to relief. It is a general rule of 
English law that he who asserts must prove. A presumption in 
favour of restitution would be detrimental to the public 
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interest in the stability of transactions and the security of 
receipt. It would encourage speculative and wasteful 
litigation.” 
2.2 Historical Backgrounds 
Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in Moses v Marferlan11 
describing the action for money had and received, stated: 
“It lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration 
which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition 
(express or implied); or extortion; or oppression; or an undue 
advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to laws 
made for the protection of persons under those 
circumstances.” 
This taxonomy is substantially similar to any modern list of grounds for 
restitution. Therefore by the mid-eighteenth century much of the modern law 
of restitution was already in place, in the form of a body of common law 
doctrine usually termed quasi-contract. This name, and the implied contract 
theory upon which it was supposedly based, owes much to the circumstance 
that after Slade‘s Case12 actions in what we would now describe as contract 
and restitution, were both brought utilising the form of action called 
assumpsit. The forms of action were the nominate sequence of writs which 
entitled the plaintiff to a remedy if he could ring his case within the 
parameters of a particular form. This old-fashioned system of pleading was 
abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852. However this primitive 
system of pleading had formed the organising categories in legal thought for 
centuries. As Birks has recently written: 
“When the scaffolding provided by the forms of action was 
knocked away in the nineteenth century, the common law had 
not yet prepared the rational structures necessary for 
stability. Much as some crabs scuttle into a crevice while a 
new shell hardens, it found temporary security in tighter 
respect for precedent.” 
                                                 
11  Supera Note 4 
12  (1602) 4 Coke 92 b, 76 ER 1074. 
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As regards the new intellectual framework for organising the disparate body 
of legal material, some subjects fared better than others. For example, it was 
contemporaneous with Victorian procedural reforms that the first modem 
treatises on the law of contract began to be written and the subject was taught 
in the emerging university law schools. It was at this stage that quasi-contract, 
with its common procedural heritage and fictional promises and requests, was 
hived off as an appendix to the law of genuinely consensual transactions. As 
far as English law is concerned, the two landmarks of the second half of the 
twentieth century were the publication of Goff and Jones’s magisterial 
account of precedent, The Law of Restitution (1966), and of Peter Birks’s 
classic of analytical jurisprudence, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
(1985). On the judicial front, in the 1990s doctrine came full circle with the 
acceptance of the principle of unjust enrichment in Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd.13  and the rejection of the implied contract heresy in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council14  A foundational distinction in civil law is between obligation and 
ownership. An obligation or right in personal is a claim against a person. In 
contrast, a claim to ownership or a right in term is a claim to an interest in a 
thing, which depends upon the continued existence of that thing. Therefore if 
A agrees to buy B’s car for £ 1000 we can distinguish between A’s claim 
against B for compensation for non-delivery of the car which is a personal 
right, and a claim by A against B for delivery of the car, which is a real claim. 
Claims for the return of property which has been lost or stolen are not within 
the province of the law of restitution. Such claims are analytically within the 
law of property, although traditionally handled by English law via tortious 
remedies for interference with rights. In contrast, most claims in the law of 
restitution are personal claims. Usually property has passed in the money or 
property which has been transferred to the defendant. The claim is a personal 
one which, if successful, results in judgment in debt correlating to the value 
                                                 
13 (1991) 2 AC 548. 
14 (1996) 1 AC 669. 
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by which the defendant has been unjustly enriched. 
However, the law has occasionally permitted restitutionary proprietary claims, 
whereby the claimant succeeds in demonstrating that not only has the 
defendant been unjustly enriched at his expense, but that the defendant 
remains unjustly enriched at his expense through the retention of money or 
other property which represents the value subtracted from him. The advantage 
of pursuing an in rein claim of this nature, is potentially two-fold. First, the 
claimant will be a secured creditor in the event of the defendant’s insolvency. 
Secondly, in some circumstances, (he asset in question may have increased in 
value. A restitutionary proprietary claim results in the judgment granting an 
interest in an asset or assets of the claimant usually by way of trust or charge. 
The basis for permitting and recognising such restitutionary proprietary 
claims remains controversial. They are, however, to be distinguished from 
pure proprietary claims which belong with the law of property and are outside 
the boundaries of the law of unjust enrichment. A defendant is not enriched 
by receiving or retaining property which the law recognises as belonging to 
the claimant. A claim for its return is purely proprietary. 
2.3 Common Law and Equity 
Restitution traditionally known as quasi-contracts which developed at 
common law, constitutes the foundations of most of the modern law. 
However, techniques also developed in equity for reversing unjust 
enrichment; but it was not until the publication of the Restatement in the 
United States or of Goff and Jones in England that the two components of the 
modern law were systematically analysed alongside each other. The situation 
was neatly encapsulated by Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd.15  where he said In fact the common 
law still employs the action for money had and received as a practical and 
useful, if not complete or ideally perfect. Instrument to prevent unjust 
                                                 
15  (1943) 1 AC 32 at p. 64. 
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enrichment, aided by the various methods of technical equity which are also 
available.’ 
Despite the passing of the Judicature Act, 1873, fusing the administration of 
law and equity, restitution has been hampered by continuing asymmetry 
between the differing approaches of common law and equity to particular 
problems. For historical reasons, equitable techniques have been more 
commonly employed where wealth has gone astray at the instance of a 
recalcitrant fiduciary, such as a trustee or company director, or where trust 
funds or corporate assets have been dissipated. The tension between 
competing strategies and the possibility of inconsistent results is one of the 
major problems faced by the modern law. It is still necessary to introduce 
separately the common law forms of action and the devices of technical 
equity which are still employed either directly or by analogy in modern case 
law. 
2.4 Quasi-Contract 
It is to distinguish between ‘implied contracts in facts’ and ‘implied contracts 
in law’. The former encompassed situations where the courts, employing the 
objective approach, discerned a genuinely consensual contract in the acts or 
performance of the parties, without any explicit contractual intention being 
voiced. Such cases belong in the province of the law of contract. For a recent 
example consider G. Percy Trentham Ltd v Aechital Luxfer Ltd.16 The latter 
category, of implied contracts in law, involved cases where the promise was 
entirely fictional. These are now the common law components of the law to 
restitution. Historically they utilised the same form of action as genuinely 
consensual contracts, namely assumpsit (‘he undertook’) and in particular the 
writ of indebitatus assutnpsit (‘having become indebited he promised to pay’). 
In Fibrosa v Fairbairn17  Lord Wright stated. 
                                                 
16 (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25. 
17 (1943)1 AC 32, at p. 63. 
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“The writ of indebitatus assumpsit involved at least two 
averments, the debt or obligation and the assumpsit. The 
former was the basis of the claim and was the real cause of 
action. The latter was merely fictitious and could not be 
traversed, but was necessary to enable the convenient and 
liberal form of action to be used in such cases. This fictitious 
asstimpsit or promise was wiped out by the Common Law 
Procedure Act, 1852.” 
In quasi-contractual cases the plea of the promise was entirely fictional and 
could not be denied by the defendant. Four sub-categories of indebitatus 
assumpsit were employed in situations we would now classify as being 
concerned with reversing unjust enrichment: 
(a) The action for money had and received; 
(b) The action for money paid; 
(c) Quantum meruit; and  
(d) Quantum valebat. 
In respect of the last two, these species of indebitatus assumpsit replaced 
earlier nominate writs of quantum meruit and quantum valebat. 
2.4.1 Action for Money had Received 
Being a common Law, this was the core of quasi-contract, personal action 
which lay only to recover money.18 As such it forms the core of the modern 
law of restitution and is the branch where the courts have been most explicit 
about the unjust factor or ground for restitution. The five principal situations 
in which action for money had and received was employed were: 
(a) Money paid under a mistake; 
(b) Money paid under compulsion; 
(c) Money paid where there was a failure of consideration; 
(d) In Situation where the plaintiff was permitted to employ the device of 
                                                 
18  Nightingal v Devisme (1770) 5 Burr 2589. 
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waiver of tort, whereby he could recover the benefits received by a tort 
feasor, rather than c1aim Compensation for loss; and 
(e) Where the plaintiff could trace money at common law into the hands of 
the defendant, usually an indirect recipient. 
Since the Victorian procedural reforms there is no need to plead the fictional 
promise. Further, the ancient restriction to money would no longer apply 
today and as long as problems of enrichment were overcome, an action for 
restitution would apply in respect of the non-money benefits by analogy with 
the old action for money had and received. 
2.4.2 Action for Money Paid 
This was a common law, personal form of action. It lay where a plaintiff paid 
money to a third party resulting in the defendant’s benefiting because his debt 
to that third party was discharged by the payment. It lay only where the 
plaintiff and defendant were liable to a common claimant, in circumstances 
where the defendant was primarily liable for the debt. Therefore it was a pre-
condition of recovery that the plaintiff was legally compellable to make the 
payment and that the payment had the effect of discharging the defendant’s 
debt. The action was thus concerned with enrichment in the shape of 
discharge of another’s liability. The restriction to money paid to a third party 
could not be maintained in principle today. Further, it is an open question 
whether the right to recover should be extended to circumstances where a 
claimant pays or transfers benefits, not because of any legal compulsion, but 
as a result of reasonably necessary intervention in the defendant’s affairs. 
Before the Victorian procedural reforms, it was necessary to plead a request 
to make the payment by the defendant, but this was obviously fictional. 
2.4.3 Quantum Meruit 
This was a common law, personal claim, meaning ‘as much as he deserved’, 
or, in modern parlance, ‘reasonable remuneration’. The enrichment took the 
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form of services rendered. It had both contractual and restitutionary 
manifestations. In British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge & 
Engineering Co19. A quantum meruit claim (like the old actions for money 
had and received and for money paid) straddles the boundaries of what we 
now call contract and restitution, so the mere framing of a claim as a quantum 
meruit, or a claim for a reasonable sum, does not assist in classifying the 
claim as contractual or quasi-contractual. 
Contractual claims are now embodied in statute. If there is an otherwise 
complete express contract for services but no price is specified, a reasonable 
charge is payable.20 As with the action for money paid, before the Victorian 
procedural reforms it was necessary to plead a request by the defendant. 
Claims in restitution for services rendered faced difficulties in establishing 
enrichment. Usually this could be demonstrated where the services were 
requested, freely accepted or incontrovertibly beneficial. The courts have been 
less explicit with regard to grounds for restitution in respect of claims for 
services rendered. However, there are instances of quantum merit recovery 
which can be categorised as arising from mistake.21 Necessity22  and failure of 
consideration23.  
2.4.4 Quantum Valebat 
This was a common law, personal form of action meaning ‘as much as it was 
worth’, or, in modern parlance, ‘a reasonable price’. This is the appropriate 
form where the enrichment received is in the form of tangible personal 
property. It is less commonly encountered because quantum meruit is often 
used compendiously in respect of claims for work and materials in this 
context often described as the common counts for work and materials. 
Similarly, the action ‘straddles’ contract and restitution. In an express contract 
                                                 
19  (1984) 1 All ER 504 at p. 509 
20  Section 15 Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982. 
21 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (1936) 2KB 403. 
22 Rogers v Price (1829) 3 Y & J 28, 148 ER 1080. 
23 Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd (1989) 1 WLR 912. 
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for the sale of goods, if the price is not determined by the parties, a reasonable 
price is payable.24 Historically, a request had to be pleaded, but this was 
clearly fictional. There appear to have been quasi- contractual instances of 
recovery.25 There is little explicit discussion in the case law of issues of 
enrichment and grounds for restitution. As with quantum mereit claims, 
enrichment will be established by demonstrating that goods were requested, 
freely accepted or incontrovertibly enriching. With regard to grounds for 
restitution, these should be symmetrical with the unjust factors developed in 
relation to money claims. 
2.5 Rescission 
Rescission is the process of setting aside and unwinding a contract or other 
transaction, where the integrity of the transferor’s intent has been vitiated. It 
constitutes the paradigm restitutionary response to benefits transferred under 
apparently binding contracts, where the transferor’s consent to the transaction 
is defective, it developed both at common law and in equity. Before the 
Judicature Act, for example, rescission was available at common law for 
misrepresentation, but only where there was proof of fraud. After the 
Victorian reforms it was the more liberal rules and flexible machinery of the 
courts of equity which were adopted and resconcision is now available for a 
negligent or even wholly innocent misrepresentation.26 The right to rescind or 
avoid a contract now extends to cases of duress, undue influence and mistake. 
Where the transaction is wholly executory, rescission extinguishes the 
obligations which the parties have assumed. However, where there has been 
some performance of the transaction, rescission operates as a reslitutionary 
proprietary claim under which there is mutual restitution of all the species of 
benefits: money, goods, land, and intangibles. 
                                                 
24 Section 8 Sale of Goods Act, 1979. 
25 Sumpter v Hedges (1898) 1 QB 673. 
26 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 
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In Whittaker v Campbell27  Robert Goff Li stated: 
“Looked at realistically, a misrepresentation, whether 
fraudulent or innocent, induces a party to enter into a 
contract in circumstances where it may be unjust that the 
representor should be permitted to retain the benefit  
acquired by him. The remedy of rescission, by which the 
unjust enrichment of the representor is prevented, though for 
historical and practical reasons treated in books on the law 
of contract, is a straight forward remedy in restitution subject 
to limits which are characteristic of that branch of the law.” 
Theory, rescission is available as a self-help remedy, but ultimately it may 
require the support of a judicial order. 
Rescission which operates retrospectively by restoring benefits which have 
been transferred is sometimes termed rescission and initio, although it may 
not perfectly restore parties to their pre-transaction position. It should 
therefore be contrasted with termination in response to a breach of contract 
and discharge by frustration which operates prospectively only. Different 
considerations apply to restitution of benefits in respect of broken and 
frustrated contracts. 
There was some insistence that the restitution of benefits should be of 
precisely the same benefits as were originally transferred. It was said that 
there should be restitutio in integrum. That is, there was a rule that rescission 
would be allowed only where precise counter-restitution was possible. 
However, the courts were astute to do what was ‘practically just28  and were 
particularly robust on the plaintiff’s behalf where he was the victim of fraud29  
There was even House of Lords authority suggesting that services could never 
be restored.  30More recently, both juristic writings and the courts have 
insisted upon the flexible nature of the remedy of rescission and there are 
suggestions that precise counter-restitution will not be insisted upon, but that 
                                                 
27 (1983) 3 All ER 582, at p. 586 
28 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, at p. 1279. 
29 Spence v Crawford (1939) 3 All ER 271. 
30 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & South- Western Railway Company (1915) SC (HL) 20. 
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there may be substitutionary counter-restitution.31 
2.6 Tracing and Claiming 
In most of the restitution claims concern direct recipients of subtracted 
benefits. In such cases the ‘enrichment’ and ‘at the expense of” stages of the 
enquiry are satisfied by applying common-sense rules on benefit and 
causation. More complicated cases occur where the claimant’s wealth passes 
through several hands, or the value subtracted from him is now to be found in 
a new form, Claims against remoter recipients or to a new repository of the 
claimant’s wealth are often made and a sophisticated regime obtains in 
respect of them. Both juristic and judicial authority now insists on sharply 
distinguishing tracing and claiming. 
First of all it is necessary to distinguish pure proprietary claims, where the 
claimant seeks to recover an asset belonging to him which still exists in its 
original form, These are part of the law of property, although usually they don 
tortious garments in the English courts. Thus, ill locate my stolen bicycle, my 
claim to be entitled to it is proprietary in nature. Tracing is the process 
whereby the restitutionary claimant may identify wealth subtracted from him 
even though the original property has been exchanged with other assets. The 
essential concern is with substitutions. The reach of restitution is extended by 
recognising, somewhat artificially, that value derived from the claimant 
inheres in the product of the exchanges. Therefore, if the thief exchanges my 
stolen bicycle for £100 or for a video recorder, the law may regard the 
substituted asset as traceably derived from my wealth. Despite the artifice, 
tracing through substitutions of assets is permitted. 
Technical rules and presumptions have been developed to identify value 
subtracted from a claimant in the hands of a potential defendant. Differing 
approaches were observable at common law and in equity, although the 
latter’s approach was more liberal to claimants and tended to supersede the 
                                                 
31 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd (1985) QB 428. 
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former in practice. However, tracing was neither a right, nor a remedy. It 
satisfied the identification threshold set by the ‘enrichment’ and ‘at the 
expense of’ inquiries. It could also identify the quantum of relief, whether 
value received or value surviving. It did not, however, complete the 
investigation. Claiming required a ground for restitution, and ultimately an 
election as to the measure and nature of relief. Tracing could support a 
personal claim either at law. More commonly the motive for tracing was to 
lay the foundation for a restitutionary proprietary claim, especially where the 
defendant was insolvent. Therefore tracing assists the restitutionary claimant 
in more complicated cases to identify what has become of his assets in order 
ultimately to lay claim to them.  
The Judicial discussion of the distraction in leading case,32Millett observed: 
“Tracing properly so-called, however, is neither a claim nor 
a remedy but a process. Moreover, it is not confined to the 
case where the plaintiff seeks a proprietary remedy; it is 
equally necessary where he seeks a personal remedy against 
the knowing recipient or knowing assistant, it is a process by 
which the plaintiff traces what has happened to his property, 
identifies the persons who have handled or received it, and 
justifies his claim that the money which they handled or 
received (and, if necessary, which they still retain) can 
properly be regarded as representing his property. He needs 
to do this because his claim is based on retention by him of a 
beneficial interest in the property which the defendant 
handled or received. Unless he can prove this he cannot (in 
the traditional language of equity) raise an equity against the 
defendant or (in the modern language of restitution) show 
that the defendant’s unjust enrichment was at his expense.... 
The plaintiff will generally be entitled to a personal remedy; 
if he seeks a proprietary remedy he must usually prove that 
the property to which he lays claim is still in the ownership of 
the defendant. If he succeeds in doing this the court will treat 
the defendant as holding the property on a constructive trust 
for the plaintiff and will order the defendant to transfer it in 
specie to the plaintiff”. 
Therefore in a personal claim for money received, the cause of action is 
                                                 
32 Boscawen v Bajwa (1996) I WLR 328 at pp. 334-35 
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constituted once the defendant receives the property. In contrast, where a 
restitutionary proprietary claim is made, the claimant must reach beyond the 
veil of receipt and demonstrate that the defendant remains enriched at his 
expense; that is, there is some identifiable asset in which value subtracted 
from him still inheres. The divergent common law and equitable techniques 
for tracing and claiming will now be considered. 
2.6.1 Tracing and Claiming at Common Law 
The money could be traced from the plaintiff into the hands of either a direct 
or indirect recipient who was not a bona fide purchaser for value, the plaintiff 
had a quasi-contractual, personal claim to recover in the form of an action for 
money had and received. The cause of action was constituted when it was 
demonstrated the money had reached the hands of the recipient. It did not 
have to be shown that money remained in the hands of the recipient. Where 
the recipient was a good faith purchaser the money passed into currency.33 
It is stated that the common law power to trace is defeated if the money was 
mixed with other money en route to the defendant recipient. However, it was 
possible at common law to trace value through a substitution of money for 
other assets.34 For a recent application seeing Trustee of the Property of F C. 
Jones & Sons Ltd v Jones35. In practice tracing at common law is not often 
relied on, because of the more sophisticated approach of equity. The only 
claim available at common law was a personal judgment for money had and 
received.  
2.6.2 Tracing in Equity 
The power to trace in equity aided a plaintiff in identifying benefits which had 
been subtracted from his assets into the hands of direct and indirect recipients. 
The plaintiff was entitled to trace through mixtures and substitutions and 
                                                 
33 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452.  
34 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
35 (1997) 1 Ch 159. 
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sophisticated rules and presumptions were developed governing how the 
interests of competing claims to combined assets should be adjudicated. There 
were two essential pre-conditions before this power could be exercised: 
(a)  The wealth must have been subtracted in circumstances which 
involved a breach of trust or other fiduciary relationship. 
(b)  The plaintiff must have been able to establish a proprietary base. 
In Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd36  Buckley UK stated: 
“it is a fundamental feature of the doctrine of tracing that the 
property to be traced can be identified at every stage of its 
journey through life.’ According to Birks: If the plaintiff 
wishes to assert a right in rem to the surviving enrichment, 
the plaintiff must show that at the beginning of the story he 
had a proprietary right in. the subject-matter, and that 
nothing other than substitutions or intermixtures happened to 
deprive him of that right in rem.” 
It must be stressed that tracing is a power or technique, and not a cause of 
action in itself. Tracing may lead to a personal claim in equity, termed 
knowing receipt (although the need for knowledge is controversial), where the 
cause of action is complete once the value reaches the hands of the defendant 
recipient. Alternatively, where an asset can still be identified as representing 
the claimant’s wealth, in the defendant’s hands, a restitutionary proprietary 
claim may be sought.  
2.6.3 Constructive Trust 
The most important contribution of equity to the remedies for prevention of 
enrichment is the device we all know as the constructive trust. For the device 
Lord Mansfield deserves neither credit nor blame. It emerged from the fog of 
eighteenth-century equity and in its modern applications is much more recent 
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than the remedy of quasi-contract.37  Dawson further identified the two 
different spheres in which constructive trusts have been recognised.38 
It should nevertheless be clear by now that the constructive trust in its modern 
from is a purely remedial device, aiming principally at the prevention of 
unjust enrichment. It has taken a place beside quasi-contract as a generalised 
remedy, giving specific rather than money restitution. It has contributed to the 
efficient and ingenious techniques reaching particular assets. It has 
contributed also an additional motive for prevention of enrichment, the 
motive compelling restitution of profit as a means of deterring wrongdoing. 
Within subtractive unjust enrichment the constructive trust functions as a 
restitutionary proprietary claim which can be the result of a successful tracing 
exercise. In this context the English courts are moving towards the American. 
Position voiced by Dawson, that the device is remedial rather than 
institutional ‘Where a person holding title to property is subject to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly 
enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.’ The 
recognition of a constructive trust with the claimant as beneficiary has two 
keys advantages: first, the claimant obtains priority over unsecured creditors 
in the event of the defendant’s insolvency; secondly, if the trust property has 
increased in value the claimant is entitled to the profits. Further, within 
restitution for wrongs, constructive trusts are composed for prophylactic 
reasons to force wrongdoers to disgorge their ill-gotten gains.39 In this latter 
context the cause of action does not depend upon tracing, but breach of a legal 
duty arising in another category, usually fiduciary duty. 
  
                                                 
37 J. Dawson, Ungist enactment  a amparatine Analysis, Boston: Brown and company, 
      1951 at p. 26. 
38 Id. at pp. 32-33. 
39 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid (1994) 11 AC 324. 
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2.6.4 Equitable Lien or Charge 
Equitable lien as a device for accomplishing restitution is for the most part an 
off-shoot of the constructive trust. In its modern applications it is the end 
result of tracing.40 
Whereas a consensual lien or charge is the right of a creditor to have a 
particular asset appropriated to the discharge of his debt, the equitable lien or 
charge identifies an asset in the hands of the defendant to which value 
belonging to the plaintiff has been contributed. The claimant is held entitled 
to a quantified interest or part-share of the assets. The remedy is more 
proportionate to the enrichment received by the defendant. Accordingly an 
equitable lien or charge is a restitutionary proprietary claim which entitles a 
restitutionary claimant to priority over unsecured creditors. Where the lien 
takes the form of a quantified interest it seems that the claimant will not be 
entitled to profits, but where the lien takes the form of a proportionate share in 
an unidentified asset, it seems the claimant is entitled to a proportionate share 
of any profits: The greater sensitivity or proportionality of the equitable lien 
has led to it being favoured in some recent authorities: for example, Lord 
Napier and Ettrick v Hunter.41 
2.6.5 Subrogation 
Subrogation means substitution, or, using the favoured metaphor, stepping 
into the shoes of another. It is the transfer of a right of action from one party 
to another by operation of law. Whereas ‘assignment’ is the technique by 
which a right of action is transferred consensually, where the transfer results 
by operation of law it is termed ‘subrogation’. The entitlement of the 
restitutionary claimant to enforce the right of action vested in him as a result 
of subrogation constitutes a restitutionary proprietary claim. For example, in 
indemnity insurance, where an insurer pays the insured following the 
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occurrence of an insured event, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated to the 
position of the insured with respect to any claim the insured may have against 
any wrongdoer in respect of the event Subrogation typically arises in respect 
of insurance, guarantees and invalid loans.  
2.6.6 Resulting Trusts 
An equitable restitutionary proprietary claim in the context of subtractive 
unjust enrichment. Resulting trusts arise in many contexts, but there have 
been attempts in justice writings to explain resulting trusts on unjust 
enrichments grounds.42 The potential for resulting trusts as a vehicle for 
restitution in response to unjust enrichment has been curtailed by the decision 
in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council.43   
2.7 Restitutionary Claims 
The monetary claim which is sometimes called a claim to restitution 
‘damages’, though it is not strictly a claim for damages at all. A claim of this 
kind can arise if the defendant obtained a benefit as a result of the breach of 
the contract that he ought to return or hand over to the claimant, in such a 
case, the claimant is not asking for compensation for art injury or loss that he 
suffered (though he may have suffered an injury or loss), but, instead, that the 
defendant simply return or hand over the benefit he obtained from the breach. 
The basis of such a claim is therefore that the defendant was unjustly 
enriched, while the remedy that is sought is that the enrichment be undone. 
Historically, such claims were closely intertwined with the law of contract-
until recently some of them were called claims in ‘quasi contract’ but it is 
now recognized that they are based on the distinct legal ground of unjust 
enrichment.44 It is important, nonetheless, to examine such claims in some 
detail in this chapter. Although arguably undeveloped in certain respects, they 
                                                 
42 Peter Birks, An introduction to the Law of Restitution, edn, 1989 Oxford: Clarendon Press  
43 (1996) 42 at p. 69. 
44 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale ltd. (1991) ZAC 548. 
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play an important role in filling what might otherwise be considered large 
gaps in the scheme of remedies available to contracting parties. 
There are two distinct ways in which a defendant who has broken a contract 
may have been enriched, and the law distinguishes sharply between them. 
Firstly, the defendant may have been enriched by receiving or taking 
something from the claimant himself. And secondly, he may have been 
benefited by receiving or taking some benefit from a different source 
altogether. 
2.8 Restitution on Grounds of Failure of Consideration 
The first situation is very common and is illustrated by the ordinary case of a 
claimant who has paid something under a contract where the defendant 
subsequently fails to perform at all, that is to say, where there has been a 
‘total failure of consideration’.49 In cases of this kind, it has long been 
recognized that the claimant has a right to recover his payment, not as 
damages for breach of contract, but in a quasi-contractual action or, as it 
would today be called, a claim for restitution. This action is not confined to 
cases of contract, although it finds its most frequent application in this field. It 
is, in many cases, an alternative remedy for the complete non-performance of 
a contract. Where money has been paid in advance by one party and the other 
party fails to perform, the innocent party may simply bring an action for 
general damages, which will include what he has paid, or it may bring an 
action to recover what he has paid, without making any further claim for 
damages. Thus, if a buyer pays for goods which are not delivered, he may sue 
for damages or he may claim the return of his price on the ground of total 
failure of consideration.45 
In some cases, this remedy is available where no action can be brought for 
breach of contract, either because there has been no contract, no breach of 
contract, or no loss from the breach. For example, an alleged contract may 
                                                 
45 Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd (1939) I KB 724. 
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prove to be void owing to lack of a proper offer or acceptance, or a valid 
contract may fail to become operative owing to the failure of a condition 
precedent. In these cases, there is a right of recovery of money on a total 
failure of consideration, although there is no question of a breach of contract 
for example frustrated contract. If a person pays money under a contract 
which is subsequently frustrated before he has received any benefit from it, he 
cannot sue the other party for breach, because there is no breach, but he can 
recover what he has paid on the ground that there has been a total failure of 
consideration. 
It is therefore frequently advantageous for a person who is content to recover 
his money to claim it on the ground of total failure of consideration rather 
than to sue for damages. If he takes the former course he establishes a good 
prima facie case simply by showing that he has received nothing for his 
money, whereas if he chooses the latter course he must actually prove that 
there has been a contract and a breach and some loss flowing from the breach. 
The restitutionary route particularly advantageous where the value, of 
performance is less than the contract price. This can happen when the 
claimant made a mistake in entering the contract or because circumstances 
subsequently changed. For example, if a defendant contracts to build a store 
for the claimant at a cost of £100,000 and the defendant then breaches the 
contract, it may be found that the value of the store, if built, would not be 
anything close to £100,000. Obviously, it would be outrageous to allow the 
defendant to retain the advance payment on the basis that he had thereby 
saved the claimant some wasted expenditure. In such a case, the money can 
again be recovered on a total failure of consideration. 
The concept of total failure of consideration is somewhat technical. There 
may be a total failure of consideration even though the defendant has actually 
done some work or expended some money in the performance of the contract, 
provided that what he has done has not benefited the other party. For 
example, if a person orders machinery to be specially constructed for him, 
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there will be a total failure of consideration if none of the machinery is 
delivered to him, although work may have been commenced and money 
expended on it.46  
On the other hand, if some benefit has been received under the contract, no 
matter how trifling, there is no total failure of consideration. Just as there is 
generally no right to part payment for part performance, so also there is 
generally no right to part recovery for partial failure of consideration. Very 
often, this does not matter because the claimant will have an ordinary action 
for damages for breach, which will enable him to recover the value of the 
partial failure of consideration. But in some cases the total failure rule leads to 
results that appear highly unjust. The American case of City of New Orleans 
v. Firemen’s Charitable Association47 provides a good example. A contract 
was entered into between the claimant city authorities and the defendants for 
the supply of fire-fighting services. The defendants contracted to keep 124 
men, a specified number of horses, and a quantity of horses available for the 
fighting of fires. The claimant city claimed that the defendants had in fact 
maintained fewer men, horses, and equipment than the contract required, and 
thereby saved themselves some $38,000, but the claimants did not allege, and 
presumably could not prove, that the defendants had failed to put out any fires 
as a result of this deficiency. It was held by the Louisiana court that the 
claimants had no redress for this breach of contract because they had not 
proved any ‘loss’ resulting from it, a decision which is entirely in accordance 
with English law. No separate claim was made for a restitutionary award, but 
under English law (and American law as well) such a claim would have been 
denied on the basis that there was no total failure of consideration, as the 
claimant city had received some of the benefit of the contract. 
The refusal to make a restitutionary award in such circumstances seems 
difficult to justify. In City of New Orleans the claimants paid a certain sum of 
                                                 
46 Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairm Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1943) AC 32.  
47 (1819) 9 So 486. 
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money on the condition that the defendants have ready a certain number of 
men, etc. to fight fires. If the defendants had not agreed to supply this number 
of men, the contract price would have been different. Thus, the claimants paid 
for something they did not get, and the defendants were able to keep 
something they did not deserve. These are, or at least should be, compelling 
grounds for ordering restitution of the price that was paid for the extra men In 
this case, recall, the defendant mining company was paid (through a reduction 
in the price that they had to pay for mining rights) to replant mined lands, 
which obligation they deliberately breached. But the court awarded the 
claimant islanders only nominal damages, on the basis that the breach had not 
in fact harmed them (as they had moved to another island). In terms of 
compensating the claimants for the harm caused by the breach, this result (as 
we saw earlier) may be justified. But issues of compensation aside, it seems 
clear that the mining company was unjustly enriched-they had retained a 
payment that was given to them on the condition that they do something 
which they failed to do. If the replanting obligation had been contained in a 
separate contract, the claimants clearly could have recovered their payment on 
the basis of failure of consideration. But because the obligation was included 
within a larger, partly performed contract, such recovery was not possible; the 
necessary ‘total’ failure of consideration could not be proven. Fortunately, the 
courts have given some indication in recent years that they recognise the rule 
needs to be revisited.48 
The modern law will provide a remedy to a claimant for a partial failure of 
consideration in certain cases where there has been no breach of contract at 
all. Where the contract is frustrated, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act, 1943 enables the court to order part payment in the event of a partial 
failure of consideration. Thus if a house-holder pays a painter £coo to 
decorate his house, and the contract is frustrated after one room has been 
painted (e.g. by the destruction of the house by fire) a proportionate part of 
                                                 
48 D.O. Ferguson v. Sohl (1992) 62 Build LR 92. 
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the £500 can be recovered. So if a contract like that in City of New Orleans 
was frustrated instead of being breached, the claimants might have been able 
to recover a proportionate part of the price they had paid. 
The 1943 Act, also modifies the nature of the right to recover for failure of 
consideration, whether partial or total. If the contract is not performed owing 
to frustration as distinct from breach, it seems particularly unfair to permit 
recovery of all the money paid on the ground of total failure of consideration 
if work has been done and money expended on the contract, even if the other 
party is left with no benefit from the work and money. In such Cases, the Act 
of 1943 enables the court to permit some or all of the money to be set off 
against the cost of what has been done. The same applies to the right to 
recover for partial failure of consideration. 
2.9 Restitution for ‘Wrongs’ 
The second type of restitutionary claim-where the defendant’s enrichment has 
come from some other source is much more restricted. Here we come up 
against a fundamental principle of the law, which some see as a further 
illustration of the relative weakness of contractual sanctions. If the defendant 
simply breaches his contract and proceeds to devote his time and resources 
elsewhere, any gains he makes from that other source are, in general, his, and 
the claimant has no claim to them. Similarly, he is not required so account for 
any gains that he makes in the form of saved expenses. 
There are two long-standing exceptions to this principle. First, if the 
defendant’s gain comes from exploiting the claimant’s property, then a 
restitutionary claim will be available, even if there is no loss and hence no 
claim to ordinary damages. For instance, if, in breach of contract, a chauffeur 
uses his employer’s Rolls to take a party of friends for a day’s outing, any 
payment he receives for this breach of contract will be recoverable by the 
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employer.49 Secondly, a contracting party who owes fiduciary obligations by 
reason of the nature of the contract or the relationship between the parties, and 
who obtains gains from some outside source by breaching these obligations, 
will be liable to pay these gains over in a restitutionary claim. The agent who 
accepts a bribe front a third party, for instance, is liable to the employer in a 
restitutionary action even though no loss can be proved. 
Neither of these traditional exceptions makes much of a dent in the general 
principle that gain-based awards are not available for breach of contract. 
Indeed, each may be explained not so much as responses to breaches of 
contract per se, but as responses to other kinds of wrongdoing, in particular 
the wrongs of unlawfully using another’s property (the tort of conversion or 
trespass) and breach of fiduciary duty (an equitable wrong). Two more recent 
exceptions to the traditional approach are potentially more far-reaching. In 
Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v. Parkside Homes Ltd,50 the defendant built a 
number of homes in breach of a restrictive covenant that had been included in 
the contract for the land on which the houses were built. The development 
caused no loss or injury to the claimant, so a claim for ordinary compensatory 
damages was not possible.  
The Court of Appeal nonetheless awarded the claimant 5 per cent of the 
developer’s expected profits, which they held was a reasonable estimate of the 
amount the claimant would have demanded to relax the covenant. The 
decision is intuitively appealing, but it raises a number of questions. Clearly, 
the claimant in Wrotham could have sought an injunction preventing the 
development, and it could have then waived this injunction for a fee, but 
given that it did neither of these things and given, further, that it might have 
refused to relax the covenant for any price-it is somewhat artificial to make an 
award on this basis. More generally, the decision seems to mix compensatory 
and restitutionary aims: the award supposedly seeks to give the claimant what 
                                                 
49 Reading v. Attarney General (1951) AC 507. 
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it would have received by way of payment for relaxing the covenant, but then 
appears to calculate this amount according to the defendant’s profits (a kind 
of partial restitution-though no formulae has emerged from determining how 
much of the profits must be returned; the courts have awarded anywhere from 
5 per cent to o per cent). But notwithstanding these questions the basic idea 
that a contracting party should not be able to breach clauses of this kind with 
impunity is compelling and so it is not surprising that the courts have 
subsequently applied the Wrotham principle to a number of cases involving 
breaches of restrictive covenants. The Court of Appeal has also recently 
applied the principle to a case dealing with intellectual property rights.  
In Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc51 the claimant was 
awarded a percentage of the profits the defendant had made through awarding 
recording licenses in breach of the contract by which it had obtained master 
recordings of the musician Jimi Hendrix. Despite one Court of Appeal to the 
contrary,52 it now appears that a Wrotham-style award is in principle available 
in any case where the defendant gained from the breach of a (valid) 
contractual covenant not to use property or property rights in certain ways. 
Even where it is successfully invoked, the Wrotham principle only supports 
awarding the claimant a percentage of the profits earned by the defendant.53 
The second exception to the rule against gain-based awards is potentially 
more far-reaching because where it is successfully invoked it permits the 
court to award the full measure of the defendant’s profit. In Attorney-General 
v. Blake54 the defendant was a former member of the intelligence services who 
published an autobiography in breach of a contractual covenant not to divulge 
information obtained during his employment. In a clear break with past 
jurisprudence, the House of Lords held that the Crown was entitled to an 
award calculated as the amount of the defendant’s royalties from the book. 
                                                 
51 (2003) All ER (D) 328 (Mar.). 
52 Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes Ltd'(1993) I WLR 1361. 
53 Lane v O'Brien Homes (2004) EWHC 303 (QB). 
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 87 
 
The scope of the exception introduced in Blake is unclear. The court stressed 
that a gain-based award of this kind should only be made in exceptional 
circumstances, but unfortunately, they said little more except that ordinary 
damages must be inadequate and that all the circumstances must be taken into 
account. In the Court of Appeal, it was suggested that there were at least two 
categories of cases where such an award would be appropriate. The first are 
cases of ‘skimped performance’ where the defendants fail to provide the full 
extent of contractually specified services. Examples would include cases such 
as City of New Orleans and Tito F Waddell, mentioned earlier. In these cases, 
the ‘gain’ awarded to the claimant would be the savings that the defendant 
made by failing to perform fully (not the amount of the contract price that was 
paid for the relevant obligation-though in practice these amounts will be very 
similar). The second category is illustrated by the facts of Blake itself. This is 
where the defendant has profited by doing the very thing that he contractually 
agreed not to do. Wrotham Park, which was mentioned earlier, also fits into 
this category. 
The House of Lords’ reasons for refusing to support these categories are not 
difficult to imagine. In cases such as City of New Orleans, the claimant’s real 
complaint (as we have seen) is not that the defendant made an unjust fail from 
an external source, but that the defendant unjustly held on to something-part 
of the contract price that was given to him by the claimant. The answer to this 
complaint, in principle anyway, is not to permit a gain-based award, but to 
remove the artificial ‘total failure of consideration’ limitation on ordinary 
restitutionary claims. The issues raised by the second category of cases, where 
the defendant makes her gain by ‘doing the very thing’ she agreed not to do, 
are more complex.  
The defining feature of these cases is not merely that the defendant made a 
gain by breaching a negative covenant, but that the claimant did not (it 
appears) suffer any loss from the breach. It is this feature, indeed, that seems 
to support a restitutionary remedy, for otherwise the claimant is left with no 
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apparent remedy for a deliberate breach. But, again, in many of these cases 
the real culprit appears to be the limits imposed on ordinary restitutionary 
claims. If the claimant paid for the covenant (as will typically be the case), 
then, as in cases of skimped performance, the claimant should in principle be 
able to recover the price paid for the covenant in an ordinary action for 
restitution. The reason this is not possible is, again, the ‘total failure of 
consideration’ rule. 
Finally, the parties to an unenforceable agreement may have a right to 
restitution of any benefits that they conveyed to the other party in 
performance of the agreement. Such rights are often extremely important in 
practice: as was mentioned earlier, in most disputes involving substantive 
limitations on enforceability the real issue is not whether the agreement is 
enforceable, but whether one or both of the parties can get back the value of 
benefits they conveyed under the agreement. In a book of this nature, 
however, restitution can be discussed only in brief outline. The rules in this 
area are highly complex and are, in any event, a part of the law of unjust 
enrichment rather than the law of contract. 
An initial observation is that the mere enforceability or ‘illegality’ of an 
agreement is not itself a basis for ordering restitution. Restitution is normally 
award in order to reverse an unjust enrichment, and the fact that an agreement 
was unenforceable does not establish that benefits transferred under it led to 
an unjust enrichment. An ordinary completed sale of illegal narcotics, for 
example, does not lead to an unjust enrichment: the transaction is voluntary 
and each party gets what he or she bargains for. 
In most cases involving unenforceable agreements, the basis on which it is 
argued that one party was unjustly enriched is ‘failure of consideration’ 
meaning that the basis on which the benefit was conveyed (namely the 
counter performance ‘failed’ or did not materialize. The ‘failure of 
consideration’ principle only applies, of course, in cases involving partly 
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executed contracts: where both parties have performed (as in the above 
narcotics example) there is no failure of consideration. But even where a 
prima facie case for restitution exists on this basis, the courts will normally 
deny restitution for another reason. There is a general legal principle to the 
effect that the courts will not assist wrongdoers: ex turpi causa non oritur 
action (no action can be based on a disreputable cause). This principle has 
traditionally been applied so as to deny claims for restitution brought by any 
party associated with undesirable activities in any of the ways. 
This result is clearly appropriate where the claimant was involved in serious 
wrongdoing. But in other cases, the blind application of the ex turpi principle 
can (as we have already seen) lead to injustice. A contract may be 
unenforceable even if only one of the parties to it was involved in the 
undesirable activity. More generally, the consequences of denying restitution 
are often disproportionate to the gravity of the illegality. Refusing to order 
restitution may have more severe consequences than any penalty the law 
attaches to the activity and at the same time may give the other party (who 
may be more guilty) a wholly undeserved windfall. In response to such 
concerns, the courts have developed three exceptions to the general role. 
The first exception is that restitution may be allowed where the claimant and 
defendant are not in pari-delicta (not equally guilty). For example, if only the 
defendant was aware of facts that made performance illegal or had 
fraudulently misrepresented that performance was legal, or if the statute that 
was infringed was designed to protect the claimant, then the claimant would 
normally be able to get back any money paid under the agreement. This 
principle is often applied to cases involving technical illegalities. In Shelley v. 
Puddock55  a buyer of a house overseas who paid the price in breach of 
exchange control regulations was permitted to recover it from a fraudulent 
seller who failed to convey the house The buyer was found (perhaps 
generously) not to know anything about the exchange control regulations, and 
                                                 
55 (1990)  I All ER 1009. 
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in such circumstances, the technical illegality committed by one party is 
grossly outweighed by the fraud of the other. 
The second exception is that the claimant may be awarded restitution if he 
‘withdraws’ from the transaction before it has been substantially performed. 
In such a case, restitution is not strictly awarded on the basis of failure of 
consideration (since it may be ordered even where there is a counter- 
performance), but rather on the basis of a policy of encouraging parties to 
withdraw from illegal or otherwise undesirable activities. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, both the meaning of ‘withdraw’ and ‘performance’ are not 
easy to define, but it has recently been held that claimants need not genuinely 
‘repent’ of the transaction: it is sufficient that they withdraw from it.56 
The third exception is where claimants can establish their right to the money 
or property without ‘relying’ on the unenforceable agreement. The leading 
case on this difficult area of the law is the House of Lords’ decision in Tinsley 
v. Milligan.57  The claimant and defendant bought a house together as a joint 
venture, each contributing to the purchase price. The house was conveyed into 
the sole name of the defendant to facilitate a fraud on the social security 
authorities, but it was held that this illegality did not prevent the claimant 
claiming a share in the house when the parties split up. While it is clear that 
the court will not enforce an executory contract designed to facilitate such 
frauds, the court will recognize a transfer of property where the contract is 
executed, as it was here, and the claimant does not need to rely on the 
illegality to make good her claim. Here, the claimant was able to make good 
her claim by relying on the normal equitable rules that a person contributing 
part of the price of a property is presumed to be entitled to a share in the 
property. 
The exceptions just described undoubtedly allow the courts to take a more 
nuanced approach to determining whether parties to an unenforceable 
                                                 
56 Tribe v. Tribe (1996) ch.107. 
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agreement can obtain restitution. But the law in this area is still far from ideal. 
The main difficulty is that it is still often the case that the consequences of 
denying restitution are out of proportion to the nature of the illegality. As we 
have seen, many agreements are unenforceable for what are essentially 
technical breaches of minor regulations.  
The in pari delicto exception is of no help in such cases if, as frequently 
happens, both parties are ignorant of the regulation while the third exception 
applies regardless of relative guilt. It was also suggested that this and other 
problems in this area of the law are probably best approached by a careful 
consideration of all the circumstances of a case rather than by a mechanical 
application of general rules, and there were a number of lower court decisions 
which favoured this approach. But in Tinsley v. Milligan, the House of Lords 
rejected this approach, and insisted that, at least where proprietary claims are 
at stake, they must be judged by fixed rules. 
2.10 Conclusion 
When we take all these remedies together the main source of our present 
difficulties becomes quite evident. It is the multiplicity of our procedural 
resources for prevention of unjust enrichment, a multispecialty which greatly 
exceeds those in any other legal system. But the multiplicity of remedies is 
complicated further by diversity of origins. Each remedy has come to us from 
a separate source, with its own mode of tradition. Each function is somewhat 
different and prevents enrichment by different means. 
This embarrassment with remedial riches complicates claims of the modern 
law of restitution Successful actions must be argued by reference to, and by 
analogy from, historically derived principles and techniques. However, it is 
likely that future years will see some rationalisation of the techniques needed. 
First, there is likely to be an elimination of inconsistency and overlap between 
the approaches of common law and equity, especially in the field of tracing. 
Secondly, the recognition that tracing is a process or means of identification 
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should simplify the debate as to when it is appropriate, if ever, to award a 
restitutionary proprietary remedy. Thirdly, where possible antiquated and 
easily misunderstood language should be jettisoned in favour of the more 
analytically exact language of juristic writings and more recent judicial 
pronouncements. 
B. Restitutionary Techniques under Specific Relief Act 
2.11 Introduction 
Specific relief, as a form judicial redress, belongs to the Law of Procedure,’58 
and, in a body of Written law arranged according to natural affinities of the 
subject matter, would find its space as a distinct part or other division of the 
Civil Procedure Code. This did not happen in India because of the 
development of these remedies under the English law.  
2.11 Development of Law under Specific Relief Act 
In England, sonic centuries ago, the King’s ordinary civil courts of law had in 
general no other instrument of coercion than distant on property (though by 
the series of statutes, many of them early, imprisonment was authorised in aid 
of the preliminary stages of process; hence the so called imprisonment for 
debt which makes a large figure in English prose fiction down to the middle 
of the nineteenth century).  
The earlier medieval actions for the recovery of land were practically obsolete 
after the restoration at latest; the action of ejectment which took their place 
has a peculiar history; the action of detinue professed by- the form of the 
judgment to give specific relief, with the value of the goods and damages as 
an alternative but specific delivery could not be enforced; nor of these actions 
were founded on contract. 
Payment of Jones was only satisfaction the suitor could obtain from the court 
of common pleas, or other courts winch shared or imitated its jurisdiction, in 
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the regular course of justice. Therefore, in many cases where money 
compensation, even if available, was not an adequate satisfaction, the King’s 
Justice was in default. As is well known, in the early stages of judicial 
institutions, the power of courts to enforce decisions to even to compel the 
appearance of parties was rudimentary, if not wholly wanting and scope of the 
common law remedies in the Middle Ages was limited. 
The reason why it was not enlarged until the latter part of the nineteenth 
century is that down to the eighteenth century any such proposal, at any rate 
coming from official quarters, would have been looked on with suspicion. 
Meanwhile, the Chancellor, exercising the King’s reserved power of doing 
justice in an extraordinary way where the ordinary means failed, had under 
taken to make the defect good. The Chancellor’s justice, in a proper case, 
would compel a person actually to perform what he had undertaken, not 
merely to pay damages for breaking his promise. Disobedience to the 
Chancellor’s order was contempt of the King, a personal offence punishable 
by imprisonment until the command in theory a special royal command, was 
obeyed. This was the sanction of all equitable jurisdictions. A very obstinate 
party might choose to remain in prison rather than execute a conveyance, and 
sometimes did. It is much later that the courts acquired power to do, without 
any concurrence of a party in default, which he ought to have done. 
Courts of common law could not give specific relief in their ordinary civil 
jurisdiction till after the middle of the nineteenth century, so courts of equity 
had no power to award damages. According to plaintiff who sought specific 
relief might not claim damages in the alternative; if he failed, his only remedy 
was to commence an action in the appropriate common law jurisdiction. He 
may make what he can of it at law; was a current phrase. 
The Specific Relief Act, 1877 ‘was originally drafted on the lines of the Draft 
New York Civil Code, 1862 and its main provisions embody the doctrines 
evolved by the Equity Courts of England; and it was amended from time- to- 
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time. 
Hence, the Indian law derived both the strength and the weakness of courts of 
equity. They could do; much that a court of common law could not do; but 
they had to justify their action on the ground that the suitor showed some 
special cause for seeking a kind of relief which was originally conceived as 
extra ordinary. This was especially so, in cases where the plaintiff had a legal 
right, a right for which the common law provided some remedy, but the 
common law was inadequate in the sense of not being fitted to do full justice 
in the case. The doctrine and practice of specific performance belongs to this 
class. Although the Act of 1877 had worked well, there was scope for 
improvement in the expression of the language, and the substance of the 
provisions. 
The Law Commission of India submitted its Ninth Report in July 1958.59 The 
Law Commission was of the opinion that the Act contained certain able 
principles and remedies which stand apart, both historically as well as 
intrinsically from the ‘common law rules embodies in the Code of civil 
Procedure and chose not to disturb the existing arrangement of  having a 
separate law on the subject. The report was acted upon, and the specific Relief 
Act, 1963 was enacted. Its recommendation formatting a examples in the act, 
of 1877 was accepted in the Act of 1963, since the Indian Legislature had 
given up the practice of inserting examples in Acts, and the Law Commission 
of India were of the view that the examples in the repealed Act had not, on the 
whole, served to clarify the provisions of that Act. 
The researcher is having of the view that the law relating to specific relief 
could well be part of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Transfer of Property 
Act, but such a drastic reform was not worth the labour. Accordingly, the Act 
of 1877 was repealed and by the Specific relief Act, of 1963 with suitable 
modifications and alterations. 
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Chapter III 
DEFECTIVE TRANSFERS 
A. MISTAKE 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The dictionary meaning of ‘mistake’ seems to encompass the wider view, 
including ‘an error or blunder in action, opinion or judgment’, ‘a 
misconception or misunderstanding’ and also ‘to choose badly or incorrectly.’ 
A person who transfers wealth to another because he is laboring under a 
mistake can argue that the other has been unjustly enriched at his expense. The 
rationale for recovery is that the transferor’s apparent intention to benefit the 
other was defective because he was not apprised of all the material facts. He 
would not have made the transfer had he been aware of the true state of affairs. 
According to Birks, mistake belongs within non-voluntary transfer, as an 
example of vitiated intention.1 
There have been attempts to assimilate the mistake with the ground of recovery 
termed failure of consideration.2 In the majority of cases supposed contractual 
liability is the motive for payment, and when it transpires that there is no such 
liability the consideration for the payment wholly fails. Moreover it may be 
stated that the basic principle for the recovery of mistaken payments is the 
failure of the purpose for which the payment is made. This is to be judged by an 
objective assessment of the purposefulness or intentionality of the payment. 
These arguments are, however, flawed, resulting in oversimplification. 
Sometimes recovery will be possible on either ground, especially where there is 
partial performance of void contracts. However, though they may overlap, 
often they do not. It is central to Birks’s scheme that mistake involves vitiation 
                                                          
1 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the law of Restitution, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
  1989 at p. 232.  
2 P. Matthews, ‘Money Paid under Mistake of fact’ (1980) 130 NLJ at pp. 587-589.  
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of intention, whereas failure of consideration involves qualification of 
intention. A misprediction is not a qualifying mistake. If I pay money to a 
charity hoping that my good works will receive recognition, I cannot recover 
when my uncommunicated intentions are frustrated. However, if I specify the 
terms of my payment, perhaps my name on a new hospital wing, and those are 
accepted by the recipient, there is a conditional (and potentially reversible) 
transaction. Birks insightfully observes: ‘The typical claim for failure of 
considerations …a misprediction with the element of risk-taking eliminated by 
the recipient's having accepted the basis of the transfer and hence its 
conditionality.’3 
Cases concerning mistaken payments of money constitute a significant concern 
of the law of restitution. Instances of recovery in cases of non-monetary 
benefits are more rare, and difficulties in satisfying the tests for enrichment 
require their separate treatment. A number of issues need to separated out. 
First, it is necessary to consider the arguments about the existence of a distinct 
cause of action in unjust enrichment termed ‘ignorance’. Secondly, it is 
necessary to distinguish the wholly distinct regime where the mistaken transfer 
takes place pursuant to an apparently binding contract or similar dispositive act, 
thirdly, for two centuries English law drew a significant distinction between 
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. The former rendered a payment 
recoverable; the latter did not. That bifurcation has now been rejected in a 
landmark House of Lords case. However, mistakes of law still demonstrate 
some peculiar difficulties of their own. Lastly, given the liberality of the regime 
of recovery in respect of extra-contractual transfers, attention is necessarily 
shifted to the work of defences such as good faith purchase and change of 
position which protect security of receipt, and mitigate what might otherwise 
be a peril to the stability of transactions. 
  
                                                          
3. Supra note 1 at p.235.  
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3.1.2 Mistake and Ignorance 
Is recovery on the ground of mistake confined to situations where the transferor 
actively considered the factual and legal matrix surrounding the proposed 
transfer but reached the wrong conclusion, or does it extend to situations where 
no thought is given to the issue? Consider through two slightly different 
hypothetical examples. First, a clerk feeds incorrect information into a 
computer upon which basis payments are made. Secondly, a computer 
responsible for effecting payments is programmed correctly, but because of a 
malfunction makes incorrect distributions, of which its operators are blithely 
unaware. 
Birks characterizes mistake as limited to situations where some responsible 
human agent commits an error of deliberation in some active reasoning 
process. He therefore suggests that recovery on the ground of mistake should 
be supplemented by a cause of action which he terms ‘ignorance’, where the 
transferor is unaware that wealth is hemorrhaging from his assets:4  Mistake is 
an example of vitiated voluntary intent. In contrast, ignorance of the transfer 
evidences the absence of any transmissive consent. Birks accordingly argues 
that recovery on the ground of ignorance is a fortiori recovery based on 
mistake.  
However, the need for a distinct category of ignorance has been doubted and 
the prevailing judicial view appears to be that mistake as recognized in the case 
law encompasses the wider commonsense view covering both instances of 
ignorance and of mistake.5 In the leading House of Lords case on mistaken 
payments, Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council,6  Lord Hope of 
Craighead, citing David Securities, insisted: ‘the concept of mistake includes 
cases of sheer ignorance as well as positive but incorrect belief.’ 
                                                          
4 Supra Note 1 at pp. 140-146.   
5 David Securities Ptd. Ltd. v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353,  
  at pp 369, 374.   
6 (1999) 2 AC 349.   
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3.1.3 Fact and Law 
3.1.3.1 Origins of the Distinction 
Until 1998 the law governing the recoverability of mistaken payments was 
dominated by the distinction between mistakes of fact, which prima facie 
grounded recovery, and mistakes of law, which did not. The line between the 
two was difficult to draw, proved malleable in practice and was finally 
abrogated by the House of Lords in the landmark case of Kleinwort Benson Ltd 
v Lincoln City Council.7 The plaintiff bank and the defendant local authority 
entered into an interest rate swap agreement. Subsequently, in another case it 
was decided that such contracts were ultra vires and beyond the capacity of 
local authorities, and accordingly void. The transaction was fully performed. 
The bank sought restitution of the net sums paid under the transaction on the 
basis of a mistake, and sought to rely on Section 32(l)(c) of the Limitation Act, 
1980. Langley J held that he was bound by Court of Appeal authority to hold 
the mistake was one of law and accordingly irrecoverable. A leap-frog appeal 
was allowed to the House of Lords under section. 12 of the Administration of 
Justice Act, 1969. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff could recover, 
although the mistake was one of law, abrogating the common law mistake of 
law bar. It made no difference that the transaction was fully performed, as 
opposed to partially performed. Accordingly the bank could rely on Section 
32(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1980. Time began to run once the bank 
discovered its mistake, which was not until the decision of the courts holding 
that such transactions were ultra vires and void. 
There is now a unitary law of mistaken payments which can be shortly stated: a 
mistake which causes a transferor to make a payment is prima facie 
recoverable. The consequence is that much of the attention has switched to 
defences. However, before turning to the modern law the reasons for 
abrogating the traditional distinction between facts or law should be briefly 
                                                          
7 Ibid.   
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examined. Evidence of the arbitrariness of the distinction is often sought by 
contrasting the decisions in the two leading early nineteenth-century 
authorities. In Kelly v Solari,8 an insurer paid out on a life policy overlooking 
the fact the policy had lapsed by reason of non-payment of a premium. The 
insurer was held entitled to restitution on the basis of mistake of fact. And in 
Compare Bilbie v Lumley 9, where an insurer met a claim on a marine policy, 
apparently unaware that the policy was voidable for the non-disclosure of a 
material letter relating to the time of the sailing of the vessel. The letter was in 
fact disclosed before the payment was made. The insurer claimed to recover the 
money on the express basis of mistake of law, namely that he was not aware at 
the time of payment that he had a complete defence of non-disclosure. The 
claim was summarily rejected. 
The policy reasons for the old mistake of law bar were eloquently set out by 
Gibbs CJ in Brisbane v Dacres.10 They are three-fold. First, floodgate fears 
that such a claim would be urged in every case, secondly, the principle of 
finality which applies where the party has the choice to litigate the question or 
to submit to the demand. Accordingly any payment made in such 
circumstances operates to close the transaction between the parties. Thirdly, the 
interest in security of receipts, and in particular a desire to protect defendants 
who have changed their position upon the faith of a payment. 
These are powerful arguments. However, they were ultimately rejected by the 
Law Commission and the House of Lords on the grounds of principle. First, the 
principle of unjust enrichment requires that where payment was made as a 
result of the payer's mistake, the money should be prima facie recoverable 
unless there were special circumstances to justify retention. Secondly, the 
distinction between fact and law was ‘capricious’. Thirdly, this led to the 
development of numerous exceptions and qualifications which undermined the 
                                                          
8 (1841) 9M & W 54, 152 ER 24.   
9 (1802) 2 East 469, 102 ER 448. 
10 Restitution: Mistakes of Law and Ultra Vires Public Authority Receipts and Payments, 
  Law Com. No. 227, 1994.  
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generality of the non-recovery rule. As a result of the difficulty of stating the 
law and the heterogeneous exceptions, the area of law was ripe for judicial 
manipulation to achieve practical justice, which had resulted in uncertainty and 
unpredictability for the application of the rule.11 The distinction between fact 
and law had been rejected in other jurisdictions12 and its rejection in English 
law was long overdue. However, the facts and decision of the majority in the 
Kleinwort Benson 13  case create particular difficulties concerning what 
constitutes a mistake of law. 
3.1.3.2  The Former Exceptions to the Mistake of Law Rule 
It is necessary briefly to review the former exceptions to the mistake of law 
rule. The abrogation of the rule may not be as significant in practice as some 
had anticipated, because of the large number of exceptions where recovery was 
allowed, before Kleinwort Benson.14 
First, it did not apply to payments made to or made by an officer of the court, 
such as a liquidator or a trustee in bankruptcy.15 Secondly, it did not apply to 
claims made by the beneficiaries after payments had been made by personal 
representatives or trustees under a mistake of law.16 Thirdly, mistakes of 
foreign law were treated as mistakes of fact.17 Fourthly, the mistake of law rule 
was never stringently applied in. 18  Fifthly, the courts were reluctant to 
categories mistakes as being ones of law. In Cooper v Phibbs,19 where the 
plaintiff mistakenly bought property which he already owned, the House of 
Lords granted restitution. They distinguished the general law and private rights 
of ownership. The latter were categorized as matters of fact. Sixthly, the 
mistake of law rule did not operate as a bar to recovery, but simply did not 
                                                          
11 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council (1999) 2 AC 349 
12 Air Canada v British Colombia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 
13 Supra note 6 at p. 349. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Expane James (1874) LR 9 Ch at p. 609. 
16 Re Diplock (1948) Ch 465; (1951) AC 251. 
17 Lazard Brothers & Co. v Midland Bank Ltd (1933) AC 239. 
18 Equity Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149. 
19 (1867) LR 2 HL 149. 
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ground recovery. Accordingly, if a separate unjust factor could be established 
such as duress, recovery would follow despite the mistake of law.20 Seventhly, 
public authorities were not entitled to take advantage of the mistake of rule of 
law when exercising a statutory discretion to award restitution.21 Eighthly, the 
mistake of rule law did not apply where there was an unequal relationship 
between the parties, such that the plaintiff was not in pari delicto22 ‘These 
exceptions and qualifications are heterogeneous and in truth betray an anxiety 
to escape from the confines of a rule perceived to be capable of injustice.’ 
It seems safe to say that all these exceptions to the former rule of irrevocability 
now constitute examples of the new general principle of recoverability. There 
is however one case, namely the Re Diplockclaim.23 In such a case the mistake 
of law is not that of the claimants, but of the executors. It remains unclear, in 
the wake of Kleinwort Benson,24 whether the traditional restrictions upon the 
Diplockaction still persist. The restitutionary claim of the unpaid beneficiary is 
limited by a requirement that the next of kin's remedies must have been 
exhausted against the executors.25 
3.1.4 The Ground for Restitution 
Leaving aside particular difficulties thrown up by the Kleinwort Benson 
decision, the law governing mistaken payments, whether of fact or law, can be 
concisely stated. The court concerned with payments not made pursuant to an 
apparently binding contractual arrangement. Where the case that a payment is 
made which is expressly or impliedly governed by an apparently binding 
contract, but that contract was entered into as a result of a mistake, the 
principles differ. This is in accordance with the contractual or transactional 
matrix question and the associated principle of the primacy of contract. As 
Robert Goff J observed in Barclays Bank Ltd v W. J. Simms, Son & Cooke 
                                                          
20 Maskell v Horner (1915) 3 KB 106. 
21 R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council ex parte Chetnik Developments Ltd (1988) AC 858. 
22 Kiriri Cotton Co. Ltd v Dewani (1960) AC 192). 
23 (1948) Ch. 465, 503-504. 
24 Supra Note 6. At p. 349. 
25 Supra Note 17 at pp. 503-504.  
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(Southern) Ltd 26 ‘if the money was due under a contract between the payer 
and payee, there can be no recovery on this ground unless the contract itself is 
held void for mistake... or is rescinded by the plaintiff.’ In contrast, the 
paradigm instances of autonomous restitutionary recovery are situations where 
a party makes a payment supposing himself to be under a contractual or other 
legal liability to pay, when in fact there is no such liability. Restitution was first 
authoritatively granted in respect of such mistakes as to liability.27 However, 
the notion of a liability mistake was extended to cases where the liability was to 
a third party,28 where the liability was anticipated rather than actual,29 and 
even where the liability arose under a moral obligation rather than legal one.30 
In the first half of the twentieth century it was proposed that the ground of 
recovery should be limited to cases of ‘fundamental’ mistake.31 However, the 
leading discussion rejects the test of fundamentality and instead substitutes a 
simple causation-based strategy. The seminal first instance decision of Robert 
Goff J in Barclays Bank Ltd v W. J. Simms, Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd32 
established the casual approach. The defendant entered into a written building 
contract with a housing association. The housing association drew a cheque for 
£24,000 upon the plaintiff bank, in favour of the defendant. The next day the 
defendant was placed in receivership. The housing association, learning of this, 
instructed the bank not to pay the cheque when presented, in the belief that it 
was entitled to do so under the building contract. The receivers, who did not 
know of the stop instruction, presented the cheque at the company's bank for 
aided special clearance. An employee of Barclays overlooked the stop 
instruction and raid the cheque. Barclays, learning of its error, sought 
restitution from the company or the receiver on the basis of a mistake of fact. It 
was held that they were entitled to recover, and there were no applicable 
defences. Robert Goff J stated the law in two propositions: one establishing the 
                                                          
26 1980 QB 677, at p. 695. 
27 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54, 58, 152 ER 24 
28 R. E. Jones Ltd v Warring & Gillow Ltd (1926) AC 670. 
29 Kerrisonv Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. (1911) 81 LJKB 465. 
30 Lamer v London County Council (1949) 2 KB 683. 
31 Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v W. H. Price Ltd (1934) AC 455 
32 Supra Note, 22 at p. 677. 
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principle of recovery; the other elaborating exceptions. The first proposition 
provides that: ‘If a person pays money to another under a mistake of fact which 
causes him to make the payment, he is prima facie entitled to recover it as 
money paid under a mistake of fact.’ It is not necessary to show that the mistake 
was ‘as between’ payer and payee, or that it was shared by both,33 where 
Neuberger J suggested that the mistake must be directly connected to the 
payment or else connected to the relationship between payer and payee. 
The Barclays Bank v. Simms34 approach has been held to be appropriate for 
cases of mistake of law, as well as mistake of fact, by the High Court of 
Australia in David Securities Pvt Ltd. v Commonwealth Bank of Australia.35 
This approach is likely to be followed by the English courts, despite the curious 
failure of the House of Lords to do little more than allude to the applicable test 
of recovery in the Kleinwort Benson case.36 The causation-based strategy is 
assumed by the second question in Lord Hope’s three-stage test for mistaken 
payments. Confirmation that this is likely to be the approach of the English 
courts is provided by Nurdin & Peacock plc v D. B. Ramsden & Co. Ltd,37 
where Neuberger J concluded:whether one looks at it as a matter of logic, as a 
matter of authority, or as a matter of common sense, it seems to me that the test 
propounded by Robert Goff J in the Barclays Bank case38 should apply equally 
to a case where the money was paid under a mistake of law. 
3.1.5 Restrictions on Recovery 
Such a liberal regime of restitution must necessarily be curtailed by appropriate 
defences which are characteristic of restitutionary recovery. The second 
proposition of law in Barclays Bank v Simms 39  establishes three key 
limitations on recovery in mistake cases. Robert Goff J stated that a claim may 
                                                          
33 Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd (1926) AC 670. 
34 Supra note 26 at p. 695. 
35 (1992) 175 CLR 353. 
36 Supra note 6, at p. 349 
37 (1999) 1 All ER 941. 
38 Supra note 26 at p. 677. 
39 Supra Note 26 at p. 695. 
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fail where: 
(a) The payer intends that the payee shall have the money at all events, 
whether the fact be true or false, or is deemed in law so to intend. 
(b) The payment is made for good consideration, in particular if the money 
is paid to discharge, and does discharge, a debt owed to the payee (or a 
principal on whose behalf he is authorized to receive the payment) by 
the payer or by a third party by whom he is authorized to discharge the 
debt. 
(c) The payee has changed his position in good faith, or is deemed in law to 
have done so. 
3.1.6 Submission to an honest claim: Proposition (2)(a) 
The liberalisation of the ground for recovery by the House of Lords in 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council,40 appeared to some commenta-
tors to constitute too great an interference with the stability of transactions. 
However, it is submitted that this is not necessarily the case. It clear from a 
close reading of the speeches of the majority of the House of Lords that the 
intention of their Lordships was to switch attention from unprincipled 
restrictions on the cause of action to a more sensitive regime of appropriate 
defences. What will prove crucial in the context of claims for the return of 
money paid under a mistake, especially one of law, is the policy upholding 
compromises entered into in good faith and payments made in submission to an 
honest claim. The concept of the settlement of or submission to an honest claim 
has been prominent in the work of Goff and Jones41 in establishing restrictions 
on the reach of restitution. In particular, Goff and Jones have consistently 
argued that the cases on payment under a mistake of law should be 
reinterpreted on the basis that the courts were upholding payments made in 
                                                          
40 (1999) 2 AC 349. 
41 Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 5th edn. 1988 London: Sweet and Maxwell at p. 214 
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submission to a honest claim. Goff and Jones stated42: 
In so far as the rule in Bilbie v Lumley43 lays down that a payment made to 
close a transaction in settlement of an honest claim is irrecoverable, it embodies 
a sound rule of policy. Such settlements should not be lightly set aside. The 
payer has had his opportunity to dispute legal liability in court and has chosen 
to forego it. 
Goff and Jones suggest that the only practical consequence of the distinction 
between facts and law is the greater likelihood of the payer under a mistake of 
law assuming the risk that he is mistaken, whereas this is uncommon in relation 
to mistakes of fact. The principle is well established. Robert Goff J explicitly 
based his proposition 2(a) in Barclays Bank v Simms upon the dictum of Parke 
B in Kelly v Solari.44  There, the learned Baron suggested the following limit 
on recovery for a mistake of fact: 
If, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to 
the truth or falsehood of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive 
all enquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the 
money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter 
is certainly entitled to retain it. 
The practical problem remains that while it appears that the law now recognizes 
the defense of submission to an honest claim, it has never been explicitly 
applied in the cases. Therefore it is hard to state with certainty the 
circumstances in which it will be established. Goff and Jones are agnostic 
whether submission to an honest claim is properly described as a defence or a 
limit upon the availability of restitution: Goff and Jones. It is submitted on the 
basis of the ordinary principle that he who asserts must prove, that it is best 
recognised as a defence. Accordingly the burden of proof for establishing a 
binding settlement on payment and submission to an honest claim is upon the 
recipient. This would also be consistent with Robert Goff J’s classification of 
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43 (1802) 2 East 469, 102 ER 448. 
44 (1841) 9 M & W 54, 152 ER 25. 
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submission to an honest claim alongside the defences of good faith purchase 
and change of position in Barclays Bank v Simms45 If it were considered that 
the security of transactions requires more protection, the courts could adopt the 
position that good faith is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
These matter could not yet be said to be settled. Furthermore  
Lord Hoffmann pointed out that: 
“I should say in conclusion that your Lordships’ decision 
leaves open what may be difficult evidential questions over 
whether a person making a payment has made a mistake or 
not. There may be cases in which banks which have entered 
into certain kinds of transactions prefer not to raise the 
question of whether they involve any legal risk. They may hope 
that if nothing is said, their counter-parties will honor their 
obligations and all will be well, whereas any suggestion of a 
legal risk attaching to the instruments they hold might affect 
their credit ratings. There is room for a spectrum of states of 
mind between genuine belief in validity, founding a claim 
based on mistake, and a clear acceptance of the risk that they 
are not.” 
However, it may be that Lord Hoffmann’s formulation goes to the question of 
what is an operative mistake, rather than envisaging a distinct defence of 
submission to a honest claim. 
The third member of the majority in Kleinwort Benson46 identified three 
distinct restrictions on recovery which are relevant here. Lord Hope of 
Craighead stated that ‘a payment made in the knowledge that there was a 
ground to contest liability will be irrecoverable’. This formulation was 
explicitly based upon the judgment of Lord Abinger CB in Kelly v Solari:47 
‘there may also be cases in which, although he might by investigation learn the 
state of facts more accurately, he declines to do so, and chooses to pay the 
money notwithstanding’. Lord Hope treated this restriction as an additional 
ingredient of the cause of action. Subsequently, Lord Hope identified several 
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46 Supra note 6, at p. 349. 
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defences of general application. Leaving aside estoppel and change of position, 
his Lordship clearly accepted that 'there is the defence that the money was paid 
as, or as part of, a compromise’. This can be explained as a matter of a 
principle, the payment resulted in a binding contract supported by 
consideration (accord and satisfaction) which could not be easily re-opened (as 
explained by Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia 48  (1992) 175 CLR 353). Alternatively the defence could be 
explained as a matter of policy, promoting the validity of freely entered into 
compromises (as explained by Dickson J in Hydro Electric Commission of 
Township ofNepean v Ontaria Hydro,49 In addition, Lord Hope acknowledged 
Goff and Jones's suggestion that settlement of an honest claim should be a 
defence. Its existence had been acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada 
by Dickson J in the Ontario Hydro case and by Le Forest J in Air Canada v 
British Columbia, 50  and by the High Court of Australia in the David 
Securitiescase.51 Returning to the facts of Kleinwort Benson,52 Lord Hope 
gave the most detailed guidance of any of the members of the court as follows: 
In the Westdeutsche Case53 Hobhouse J said that:  
“the principle of voluntary payments could not be applied 
unless there was a conscious appreciation by the payer that the 
contracts were or might be void, and that on the evidence in 
the Islington case there clearly was no voluntary assumption of 
risk in any respect that was relevant. It is not clear, as there 
has been no evidence, whether there was a voluntary 
assumption of risk in any of the cases which are before us in 
these appeals. So I would not be prepared to say that it was a 
defence which in these cases was available. It is sufficient for 
my purpose that, while the precise limits of it have still to be 
clarified, it is a defence which applies generally irrespective of 
the nature of the mistake.” 
 
                                                          
48 Supra Note, 30 at p 395. 
49 (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 193, at 218.  
50 (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161,191. 
51 (1992) 178 CLR 353, at pp. 373-374. 
52 Supra note 6, at p. 349. 
53 (1994) 4 al ER 890, 934. 
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Accordingly it is for the recipient who seeks to rely upon the principle of 
submission to an honest claim to plead and lead evidence of the nature of the 
risk which would materialize if it transpired that the payer was mistaken, and 
that the payer nevertheless made the payment with a conscious appreciation of 
that risk. It may be that such evidence is difficult to garner. It is likely that a 
judge will have to take a commonsense view of the nature of the transaction, 
how parties in that context understood it and the relative sophistication of the 
players. The kind of documents which might support such an allegation may 
occasionally turn up upon disclosure, but it seems more likely than not that any 
such explicit discussion of the risk in a mistaken payments case would be found 
in documents with the benefit of legal professional privilege.  
3.1.7 Good Faith Purchase: Proposition 2(b) 
Robert Goff J’s second proposed defence reflects the primacy of contractual 
reasoning in determining whether a payment was properly made. Aiken v 
Short, 54  the facts of the case have a passing resemblance to Victorian 
melodrama, centering on the discovery of a later will. George Carter, who was 
not a party to the action, owed money to Short. Carter acknowledged his debt 
under a bond and further mortgaged his interest in property, which he believed 
he was entitled to receive under the will of his brother, Edwin Carter, to secure 
the debt. Subsequently the same interest was mortgaged to the plaintiff bank as 
second mortgagee. When Short’s widow and executrix applied to George 
Carter for payment, he suggested she approach the bank. The bank, supposing 
itself to be the second mortgagee, paid the executrix in order to improve the 
quality of its security. Only then was a later will of Edwin Carter discovered, 
under which it transpired that George Carter had no substantial interest under 
the will. The plaintiff bank sought to recover the money from the executrix on 
the basis of mistake of fact. 
Bramwell B stressed that the bank had the option to pay, and would have 
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limited the ground of recovery to mistakes as to liability. This is no longer a 
reason which would preclude restitution today given the liberalisation of the 
ground for recovery. More significantly, Pollock CB and Platt B stressed that 
the defendant had a valid debt and a clear right to the money as against Carter. 
Given that the defendant had approached Carter first and he had referred her to 
the bank, Pollock CB concluded: “The money was, in fact, paid by the Bank, as 
the agents of Carter”. Pollock CB stressed that the defendant had not 
contributed to the plaintiff's mistake. The plaintiff was itself at fault in paying 
the money without more careful investigation. On the latter point, it would not 
in view of Kelly v Solari55 be correct to suggest that contributory negligence 
would bar a claim to recover money now on the grounds of mistake of fact. 
Pollock CB sketched the following hypothetical which clearly illustrates the 
operation of good faith purchase in this context. The learned Chief Baron asked 
rhetorically: 
“Suppose it was announced that there was to be a dividend on 
the estate of a trader, and persons to whom he was indebted 
went to an office and received installments of the debts due to 
them, could the party paying recover back the money if it 
turned out that he was wrong in supposing that he had funds in 
hand” 
Goff and Jones, had accepted the characterization of this defence as good faith 
purchase, now treat Aiken v Short56 as an example of change of position: The 
concern appears to be that the ground of restitution is mistake, not a claim 
based on title. The strict view is taken that good faith purchase should be a 
defence only where a claim is based upon title either at common law or in 
equity. This reasoning should not be accepted. First, it is clear from Aiken v 
Short57 and dicta in the subsequent House of Lords case of Kerrison v Glyn, 
Mills, Currie & Co.,58 that good faith purchase is an autonomous defencehere. 
Secondly, good faith purchase extinguishes a restitutionary claim in full, and 
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110 
 
not merely pro tantoas is the case with change of position. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, payment in such circumstances amounts to a valid accord and 
satisfaction, which can be set aside only in accordance with the rules of contract 
law. The primacy of contract ousts the possibility of restitutionary recovery 
here, unless the contractual matrix can be set aside. As Robert Goff J said in 
Barclays Bank v Simms:59 
However, even if the payee has given consideration for the payment, for 
example, by accepting the payment in discharge of a debt owed to him by a 
third party on whose behalf the payer is authorized to discharge it, that 
transaction may itself be set aside (and so provide no defence to the claim), if 
the payer's mistake is induced by the payee, or possibly even where the payee, 
being aware of the payer's mistake, did not receive the money in good faith. 
This suggests that the contractual matrix could be side-stepped in at least two 
cases. First, where it can be rescinded because of a misrepresentation by the 
payee. Secondly, where there is no contract in accordance with the objective 
principle of construction of contract formation. As a matter of principle, other 
contractual vitiating factors could equally result in the contract being set aside. 
Returning to the facts of Barclays Bank v. Simms60, the crucial question was 
whether the bank had acted with authority in making the payments. If it had the 
recipient could rely upon the defence of good faith purchase. Robert Goff J held 
that where a bank overlooks a countermand and pays a cheque it acts outside its 
mandate or authority. Accordingly it is not entitled to debit its customer's 
account and the debt owed to the payee is accordingly not discharged. 
Robert Goff J’s reasoning in Barclays Banks v Simms,61 has been criticized by 
Goode J. He states that it concentrates too much upon the actual authority of the 
bank, and neglects to consider the apparent authority of the bank. In the law of 
agency, authority is either actual (whether express or implied) or apparent. In 
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the former category the principal manifests his consent to the agent acting on 
his behalf to the agent. In the latter species of authority the principal manifests 
his consent that the agent represents him, directly to the third party who deals 
with the agent. The principal represents that the agent is empowered to act on 
his behalf, or in the usual parlance ‘holds out’ the agent as his representative, 
and the third party relies upon that manifestation of consent by entering into the 
transaction proposed by the agent. Goode argues that the consequence of the 
reasoning is that ordinary transactions would be upset by allowing the bank to 
recover in such circumstances. Suppose a customer pays for goods with a 
cheque, and despite the goods being wholly satisfactory, subsequently instructs 
his bank to stop the cheque. If the bank overlooks the countermand and pays, 
why should it be entitled to recover from the seller. 
The view of Robert Goff J was that by granting restitution to the bank, the 
result was that the parties could concentrate on the proper dispute between 
debtor and creditor. It is not clear what the true dispute here was. The bank’s 
customer appeared concerned that its creditor had been placed in receivership. It 
should be noted that in my dispute between the customer and the defendant, the 
defendant may be able to rely upon the ‘cheque rule’ by which payment under a 
bill of exchange constitutes a specially insulated payment upon which summary 
judgment can be readily obtained. It seems difficult to see what defence the 
bank’s customer would have to a claim upon the cheque, unless there was a total 
failure of consideration. For example, if there had been no work done in respect 
of the payment. This appears unlikely on the facts, as the payment was pursuant 
to an interim certificate issued by the architect.  
It is a further curious feature of Barclays Bank v Simms62 that the insolvency of 
the defendant company did not appear to be a problem. The receiver had 
requested special clearance for the cheque, although it was not suggested that this 
indicated he was aware of the stop instruction. The bank soon demanded return of 
the money, and brought its claim against the company and/or the receiver, who 
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from the date of the writ kept the £24,000 in dispute in a separate account 
pending the outcome of the proceedings. Presumably the receiver having notice 
of the dispute over the £24,000 was unable to use the money validly to discharge 
obligations of his appointing bank. 
A restrictive approach to the question of the bank's authority could work injustice 
where the bank's customer became insolvent and a defendant recipient was made 
to disgorge money to the bank, with little prospect of ever recovering from the 
now insolvent customer. This was the situation in Lloyds Bank plc v 
Independent Insurance Co. Ltd.63 Insurance agents owed some £162,387.90 of 
premium income to the defendant insurance company. The agents had 
cashflow problems. A director of the insurance agents paid cheques into its 
bank account, including one for £168,000, and these were credited to the agents’ 
account with the plaintiff as uncleared effects. The director informed the bank 
manager that he would like payment to be made to the defendant insurance 
company of the debt as soon as possible. The payment was to be made by a Chaps 
transfer which is an irrevocable instantaneous electronic inter-bank payment. The 
manager informed the director that payment would take place once the cheques 
had cleared. However, two of the bank’s other employees, mistakenly believing 
that the state of the account represented cleared funds, made the payment. 
Subsequently the cheque for £168,000 was dishonoured pushing the agents’ 
account into overdraft. 
The Court of Appeal held that although the money was prima facie recoverable by the 
bank as paid under a mistake of fact, here the money was paid for good 
consideration and was accordingly irrecoverable. The payment had discharged a 
debt owed to the payee. The payment by the bank, made with the actual authority to 
do soon behalf of its customer, was effective to discharge the debt. The crucial 
fact was the director of the agents’ insistence on speedy payment to the 
defendant. When the bank manager had told the agents’ director that payment 
would not be made until the cheques had cleared, this was simply the bank 
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manager telling the customer that it was not obliged to make the Chaps transfer 
until it was satisfied as to its own receipt. It could not be said that the insurance 
agents had qualified the bank’s authority by insisting it did not make the 
payment until the funds had cleared. Accordingly, though it was not obliged to 
do so, the bank was entitled to make the payment within the scope of its actual 
authority. 
Curiously the Court of Appeal did not accept in the alternative that the bank 
had apparent authority to make the payment. It seems there was no holding out 
by the agent of its bank in relation to this particular transaction. Further, the 
Court of Appeal found it difficult to identify any reliance by the defendants 
upon such holding out or representation. It may seem curious, at first sight, that 
the courts are reluctant to recognize apparent authority in this context. The 
reason appears to be that if it were held that the bank had no actual authority, 
but only apparent authority, the payee would be entitled to keep the money. In 
this situation the bank, having acted outside its mandate, would not be entitled 
to debit its customers account. Accordingly the bank would be the loser and its 
customer would have its debt paid off without having to make any contribution. 
It is the perceived unfairness of this which makes the courts unwilling to 
recognize apparent authority, in the absence of underlying actual authority. On 
the particular facts of the Lloyds Bank case the holding that the bank paid with 
actual authority appears to be correct. However, given the insolvency of the 
customer and the fact that the bouncing cheque pushed the account massively 
into overdraft, the bank was the eventual loser in this scenario. Lastly, in Lloyds 
Bank plc v Independent Insurance Co. Ltd64, Peter Gibson LJ stated: ‘I cannot 
accept that the defence of bona fide purchase has been overtaken by or 
sub-assumed in the defence of change of position. Both defences may co-exist.’ 
For general discussion of good faith purchase, and in particular the position of 
banks. It seems the autonomy of good faith purchase in the mistaken payments 
context is now entrenched, given it forms the ratio of a modern Court of Appeal 
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decision.  
3.1.8 Change of Position : Proposition 2(c) 
Robert Goff J's proposed defence of change of position in Barclays Bank v 
Simmswas technically premature. The decisions of the House of Lords in R. E. 
Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd65 and Ministry of Healthv Simpson66 were 
obstacles in favour of the recognition of change of position. Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd67  retrospectively legitimates this first instance discussion of 
principle. Change of position existed in prototype form under the guise of 
estoppel. The defence succeeded in Holt v Markham,68 where a First World 
War RAF officer was overpaid a gratuity upon demobilization. It was held that 
he was misled into believing that he was entitled to the money, which he had 
subsequently invested in a company which went into liquidation. Estoppel was 
also successful in extinguishing the claim of a local authority which had 
overpaid sick pay to a teacher in AvonCounty Council v Howlett,69 even though 
the reliance expenditure was only half the value of the sums received.  
However, estoppel had two key disadvantages. First, it required a breach of 
duty: payer or a representation by him that the payment was a proper one. 
Secondly, eared to be an all-or-nothing defence, rather than operating 
proportionately to the expenditure incurred in reliance upon a payment. Lipkin 
Gorman removes these obstacles. Estoppel was most prominent in the case law 
on mistaken payments, and it seems that in the future change of position will be 
most prominent in the same context. 
3.1.9 What Constitutes a Mistake of Law 
Relief for payments made under a mistake of law gives rise to some particular 
problems of their own. We have already considered the importance of 
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submission to an honest claim which appears to have more potential 
application as a defence in respect of payments made under a mistaken 
understanding of the law rather than of the factual context. In addition there are 
intractable problems in determining what amounts to a mistake of law. This is 
an issue on which a number of different opinions are held, as is evident by the 
split in the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the Kleinwort Benson 
case.70 The Law Commission, in proposing the statutory abrogation of the 
mistake of law rule, considered that the characterization of a mistake as one of 
law of itself should not make any difference to whether a claim to restitution 
should succeed. However, they considered the difficult problem of how the 
courts should deal with a judicial change in the law. According to the 
declaratory theory of common law, an authoritative statement of the law is 
deemed always deemed to be the law. This potential retrospective effect was 
viewed as having implications for the security of transactions.  
The majority of the House of Lords in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City 
Council71 took the opposite view. The House of Lords was expressly asked to 
rule on the question of whether a payment made under a settled understanding 
of the law was irrecoverable. Lord Goff of Chieveley in the leading speech 
considered the declaratory theory of judicial decision at length. His Lordship 
concluded: 
The historical theory of judicial decision, though it may in the past have served 
its purpose, was indeed a fiction. But it does mean that, when judges state what 
the law is, their decisions do, in the sense I have described, have a retrospective 
effect. That is, I believe, inevitable. It is inevitable in relation to the particular 
case before the court, in which events must have occurred sometime, perhaps 
some years, before the judge's decision is made. But it is also inevitable in 
relation to other cases in which the law as so stated will in future fall to be 
applied. I must confess that I cannot imagine how a common law system, or 
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indeed any legal system, can operate otherwise if the law is to be applied 
equally to all and yet be capable of organic change. 
In Lord Goff’s view it was not appropriate to hold that the settled 
understanding of the law of defence formed part of the common law. The 
supposed defence was not a true defence, but rather reflected a theoretical view 
that a payment made in such circumstances was not made under an operative 
mistake at all. Lord Goff was emphatic that the mistake in the Swaps cases was 
plainly a mistake of law. When the money was paid, it was the belief of the 
payer that he was under a legal obligation to do so. Once the true legal position 
was declared by the Divisional Court and subsequently by the House of Lords 
in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council,72 the payer 
discovered that, under the law now held to be applicable at the date of the 
payment, there was no such obligation. If one accepts Lord Goff s premise as to 
the impact of the declaratory theory of common law, the conclusion that the 
money is prima facie recoverable does inevitably follow. Lord Goff's view 
should be immediately contrasted with the leading minority of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson that 'the moneys are not recoverable since, at the of 
payment, the payer was not labouring under any mistake’. His Lordship eluded: 
Although the decision in Hazell is retrospective in its effect, retrospection 
cannot falsify history: if at the date of each payment it was settled law that local 
authorities had capacity to enter into Swaps contracts, the bank were not 
laboring under any mistake of law at that date. The subsequent decision in 
Hazell could not create a mistake where no mistake existed at the time. 
In 1990 a payment was made on the basis of the rule in that case. The payer 
received advice that the decision was good law. In 1997 the House of Lords 
overruled the 1930 case. Would the payer be entitled to recover the money? 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson adverted to the rule that the cause of action in 
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restitution vests when the mistake payment is made: Baker v Courage & Co.73 
However, under the hypothetical there would be no cause of action at the date 
of payment. On the majority view the money would, however, be recoverable, 
although the majority did not explicitly discuss when the cause of action arose. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson found this too fanciful: 
It would not have been possible to issue a writ claiming restitution on the 
grounds of mistake of law until the 1997 decision had overruled the 1930 Court 
of Appeal decision. Therefore a payment which, when made, and for several 
years thereafter, was entirely valid and irrecoverable would subsequently 
become recoverable. This result would be subversive of the great public 
interest in the security of receipts and the closure of transactions. 
In Lord Browne-Wilkinson's view the money was irrecoverable whether the 
payment was made where law had been established by a previous judicial 
decision which was subsequently overruled, or where there is settled law in the 
absence of a judicial decision. There was simply no mistake: 
What constitutes the unjust factor is the mistake made by the payer on the date 
of payment. If, on the date of payment, it was settled law that payment was 
legally due, I can see nothing unjust in permitting the payee to retain moneys he 
received at a time when all lawyers skilled in the field would have advised that 
he was entitled to receive them and the payer was bound to pay them. Again it 
is critical to establish the position at the time of payment: if, on that date, there 
was nothing unjust or unmeritorious in the receipt or retention of moneys by the 
payee in my judgment it was not an unjust enrichment for him subsequently to 
retain the moneys just because the law was, in one sense, subsequently 
changed. 
Accordingly Lord Browne Wilkinson would have recognized the defence 
where there was a decision which was subsequently overruled, and where there 
was settled law in the absence of a judicial decision (such as textbook law). 
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Given these complications, Lord Browne Wilkinson preferred to wait for 
statutory reform of the rule pursuant to the Law Commission’s proposal. His 
Lordship suggested that any new law should also regulate the appropriate 
limitation period of this type of action. 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick agreed, stating that ‘for your Lordships to accept half 
the package proposed by the Law Commission and reject the other half, would 
cause me some disquiet’. Lord Lloyd considered cl. 3 of the Law 
Commission’s proposal to be a definitional clause, clarifying and limiting what 
is meant by a mistake in this context Lord Lloyd also clearly articulated one 
policy and one moral reason for this conclusion. First, the policy favouring 
finality in transactions, especially in the commercial context. Secondly, Lord 
Lloyd could see no moral reason why the payee should be obliged to make 
restitution in such circumstances: ‘Where is the unjust factor?’. 
Lord Hoffmann’s speech proved crucial, not least because his Lordship 
candidly acknowledged that he had changed his mind. Lord Hoffmann's first 
thoughts were that not only would a payment on a settled view of the law lead 
to the conclusion that there was no operative mistake, but also a payment on the 
basis of a tenable view of the law. In the context of the retrospectively of 
judicial decisions, the state of mind of the payer should be characterized as a 
misprediction, rather than a mistake. However, Lord Hoffmann's ultimate view 
was in accord with Lord Goff's view. His Lordship considered it important to 
place the right to recover mistaken payments in its wider context of the law of 
unjust enrichment. It did not matter where there was a mistake of fact whether 
or not the payer could have discovered the true state of affairs. Money paid 
under a mistake of fact was recoverable because the payer would not have paid 
if he had known the true state of affairs. The only oddity about mistake of law 
was that the true state of affairs could not be discerned at the time of payment. 
Lord Hoffmann concluded: ‘Retention is prima facie unjust if he paid because 
he thought he was obliged to do so and it subsequently turns out that he was 
not.’ 
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Lord Hoffmann accepted that there was an alternative reason for recognizing 
the settled understanding of the law of defence. However, in reasoning suffused 
with the theory of judicial decision-making of the legal philosopher Ronald 
Dworkin, his Lordship decided that such a policy-motivated defence was not a 
matter for the judiciary: 
“The adoption of the ‘settled view’ rule would be founded 
purely upon policy; upon a utilitarian assessment of the 
advantages of preserving the security of transactions against 
the inevitable anomalies, injustices and difficulties of 
interpretation which such a rule would create. That is not a 
course which I think your Lordships should take.”74 
I accept that allowing recovery for mistake of law without qualification, even I 
taking into account the defence of change of position, may be thought to tilt the 
balance too far against the public interest in the security of transactions. 
While acknowledging strong arguments in favour of leaving the whole matter 
for Parliament, Lord Hoffmann ultimately sided with the majority, urging 
Parliament to take action over the difficult question of limitation. One view of 
Lord Hoffmann's speech is that it is the furthest that English law has gone 
towards the civil law position of presuming that restitution should be awarded 
where a transfer has taken place and it turns that there is no legal justification 
for the transfer. Such an approach would dispense with the need for the 
claimant affirmatively to prove a ground for restitution or just factor. On Lord 
Hoffmann’s view it seems sufficient that as it turned out the payment was 
unnecessary. It is hard to see how this counters the view of the minority that in 
such circumstances it is difficult to identify the moral reason why the payee 
should refund the money. It is submitted that the potential wider interpretation 
and implications of Lord Hoffmann's speech should not be the future path of 
English law. It should always be for the claimant to establish a reason why 
money should be returned. The principle of the finality of transactions and in 
favour of the security of receipt demands this. 
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The final speech of the majority, that of Lord Hope of Craighead, has also 
provoked debate. Lord Hope explicitly adverted to the difference of approach 
between the common law, which demands an unjust factor, and civil law 
systems which look for the absence of the legal justification for the enrichment. 
Lord Hope was clear that under English law a payer had to address three 
questions: ‘(1) Was there a mistake? (2) Did the mistake cause a payment? And 
(3) Did the payee have a right to receive the sum which was paid to him?’ Only 
the first question was in dispute in the present case. Lord Hope would have 
liked to have known more about the circumstances of the mistake, and 
bemoaned the sparseness of the pleadings in the absence of a request for further 
and better particulars. Lord Hope spends more time than any of the other judges 
addressing the question of whether there was a mistake of law on the facts of 
Kleinwort Benson. His Lordship stated: 
On the whole it seems to me to be preferable to avoid being drawn into a 
discussion as to whether a particular decision changed the law or whether it was 
merely declaratory. It would not possible to lay down any hard and fast rules on 
this point. Each case would have to be decided on what may in the end be a 
matter of opinion, about which there may be room for a good deal of dispute. It 
is better to face up to the fact that every decision as to the law by a judge 
operates retrospectively, and to concentrate instead on the question - which I 
would regard as the critical question - whether the payer would have made the 
payment if he had known what he is now being told was the law. It is the state 
of the law at the time of the payment which will determine whether or not the 
payment was or was not legally due to be paid, and it is the state of mind of the 
payer at the time of the payment which will determine whether he paid under a 
mistake. But there seems to be no reason in principle why the law of unjust 
enrichment should insist that that mistake must be capable of being 
demonstrated at the same time as the time when the payment was made. A 
mistake of fact may take some time to discover. If there is a dispute about this, 
the question of whether there was a mistake may remain in doubt until the issue 
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has been resolved by a judge. Why should this not be so where the mistake is 
one of law? 
It appears that this passage is internally contradictory. Whereas the general 
thrust of the argument supports the majority view point, the italicized words 
appear to support the minority view. If the state of law at the time of payment 
governs whether it is legally due, surely the money is irrecoverable and the 
subsequent decision must be overlooked. This contradicts the general tenor of 
Lord Hope's speech. The only way to resolve the conundrum is to read the 
italicized words as implicitly qualified by the declaratory theory. That is, the 
state of law at the time of the payment is only established later, but with 
retrospective effect. Lord Hope, drawing upon the judgment of Hobhouse J in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council,75 decided explicitly that there was an operative mistake here. Lord 
Hope had earlier said that mistake extended to cases of ignorance. This seems 
to be Lord Hope’s view of the state of mind of market participants in relation to 
swaps when the transactions were entered into and payments were made. Such 
parties were blissfully unaware of the legal risk posed by the provisions of the 
Local Government Act, 1972 and the subsequent stringent interpretation 
applied to them by the Audit Commission, the Divisional Court and ultimately 
the House of Lords. This clearly demonstrates the repudiation of the reasoning 
of Bilbie v Lumley,76 in which the mistake of law bar was explicitly based upon 
the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.  
3.1.10   Contributory Negligence 
A mistaken payment is recoverable however negligent the payer may have 
been. This is established by the leading case of Kelly v Solari,77 which held that 
it was no defence that the plaintiff had the means of knowledge of the truth 
within its own records. Lord Abinger CB stated: ‘I think the knowledge of the 
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fact which disentitles the party from recovering, must mean a knowledge 
existing in the mind at the time of the payment.’ Therefore careless 
forgetfulness was no bar to recovery. This principle has been affirmed in Rover 
International Ltdv Cannon Film Sales Ltd,78 where Kerr LJ stated that ‘a 
genuine mistake is not vitiated by carelessness’. Most recently, in Banque 
Financiere de la Cite v Pare (Battersea) Ltd,79 Lord Steyn referred to the 
failure of the bank to take elementary precautions to protect its position (which 
had persuaded Morritt LJ in the Court of Appeal to decline restitution). Lord 
Steyn stressed that restitution was not fault-based and there was no need to 
prove any misrepresentation. The negligence of the bank was ‘akin to the 
carelessness of a mistaken payer: it does not by itself undermine the ground of 
restitution’. 
3.1.11  Non-Money Benefits 
There is a paucity of authority here. Two factors account for this. First, the 
comparative immaturity of the law of restitution. Secondly, even under the 
modern law, it will be difficult to satisfy the test of enrichment in relation to 
non-money benefits. Even so, there is some modern authority, and indeed 
partial statutory recognition of a role for unjust enrichment reasoning here. 
There are cases both at common law and in equity. 
3.1.12   Common Law 
In the rather unsatisfactory, war-time case of Upton-on-Severn Rural District 
Council v Powell,80 Powell’s Dutch barn caught fire. Hetelephoned his local 
police station at Upton to ask for ‘the fire brigade to be sent’. UK police sent for 
the Upton fire brigade who came and dealt with the fire. All the parties were 
unaware that although the barn was in the Upton police district, it was the 
Pershore, not the Upton, fire district. Powell would have been entitled to the 
services of Pershore fire brigade for free, whereas the Upton fire brigade was 
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entitled to make contracts and charge for services performed outside its area. 
The Court of Appeal held that the Upton fire brigade was entitled to 
remuneration for the services performed for Powell upon the basis of an 
‘implied promise’. 
First, the case is irreconcilable with ordinary contractual principles. As was 
argued 21 vain, by counsel for Powell, neither party had any relevant 
contractual intention. The Upton fire brigade thought it was rendering 
gratuitous services in the normal course of its duty. Powell thought he was 
receiving the services of the appropriate fire brigade without charge; Secondly, 
despite the reference in the brief judgment of Lord Greene MR to an implied 
promise, the case is also difficult to reconcile with unjust enrichment 
principles. Powell did not request or accept services which he knew he would 
be expected to pay for. Goff and Jones think it unlikely that Powell was 
incontrovertibly benefited since he was entitled to the Pershore fire brigade 
services for free. The better view is that Pershore fire brigade was the party 
enriched by Upton’s mistaken discharge of its (Pershore’s) duty to extinguish 
Powell’s fire. Accordingly, the wrong person was made liable in this case. 
A more promising authority is Gebhardt v Saunders,81 in which the plaintiff 
tenant discharged the statutory obligation of the landlord to abate a nuisance 
under Section 4 of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891. It was impossible to 
tell at the time when the work was done whether the nuisance was caused by a 
structural defect and accordingly the defendant landlord's responsibility, or by 
improper use by the tenant and accordingly his liability. It turned out to be the 
former. While the case is commonly discussed in chapters on legal compulsion, 
it seems preferable to characterize the unjust factor as mistake: That mistake 
was the appropriate ground for restitution appears faintly in the judgment of 
Day J:  
“If two people are required to do certain work under a penalty 
in case of disobedience, and one does the work, and it turns out 
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afterwards that the other ought to have done it, the expenses 
are properly money paid at the request of the person who was 
primarily liable, but who neglected to do the work.”82 
The most interesting common law authority is Greenwood v Bennett. 83 
Bennett, who managed a garage, required some repairs to be done to a Jaguar 
car before selling it in the course of trade. The car was worth between £400 and 
£500. Bennett entrusted the car to Searle to do the necessary repairs at a cost of 
£85. Searle, while driving the car on a frolic of his own, crashed it and decided 
to sell it in its unrepaired state. Harper bought the car from him for £75, which 
was a fair price in its damaged stated. Harper made good the damage to the tune 
of £226 in labour and materials. He subsequently sold the car to Prattle for 
£450. Later, the police took possession of the car and Searle was convicted of 
theft. The chief constable brought an interpleaded summons to determine title 
to the car. The county court judge ordered the car to be returned to Bennett who 
then sold it for £400. It was accepted on appeal that Bennett's garage owned the 
car, but Harper claimed £226 from Bennett for the improvements to the car. 
Lord Denning MR considered the case as if it had been brought as a claim for 
specific delivery. In such a case his Lordship was of the view that a court of 
equity would order the return of the vehicle only upon condition that payment 
was made to Harper for the work done. The car having been already returned 
here, it was necessary to order the plaintiffs to pay Mr. Harper the £226. Lord 
Denning referred to the individualistic dictum of Pollock CB in Taylor v 
Laird:84‘One cleans another’s shoes; what can the other do but put them on?’ 
Lord Denning MR distinguished that case: 
That is undoubtedly the law when the person who does the work knows, or 
ought to know, that the property does not belong to him. He takes the risk of not 
being paid for his work on it. But it is very different when he honestly believes 
himself to be the owner of the property and does the work in that belief. Here 
we have an innocent purchaser who bought the car in good faith and without 
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notice of any defect in the title to it. He did work on it to the value of £226. The 
law is hard enough on him when it makes him give up the car itself. It would be 
most unjust if the company could not only take the car from him, but also the 
value of the improvements he has done to it - without paying for them. There is 
a principle at hand to meet the case. It derives from the law of restitution. The 
plaintiffs should not be allowed unjustly to enrich themselves at his expense. 
The court orders the plaintiffs, if they recover the car, or its improved value, to 
recompense the innocent purchaser for the work he has done on it. No matter 
whether the plaintiffs recover it with the aid of the courts, or without it, the 
innocent purchaser will recover the value of the improvements he has done to 
it. 
Lord Denning MR accordingly countenanced the possibility not just of a 
passive claim (as a defense and counterclaim where the true owner sought 
specific delivery), but also an active claim which could be advanced by the 
improver as claimant. Phillimore and Cairns LJ agreed that at least the passive 
claim was available. Further, it was appropriate on the instant facts to order the 
plaintiffs to pay for the value of the work done. There was little explicit 
discussion of the issue of enrichment. However, Phillimore LJ said that it was 
‘not seriously disputed in this case that the £226 had improved the value of the 
car, making its value far above what: it was’. There was no possibility of free 
acceptance or request on the facts of this case. Accordingly, Greenwood v 
Bennett constitutes one of the leading examples of the recognition of 
incontrovertible benefit in the English law of unjust: enrichment. It is further 
clear that the ultimate beneficiary of the mistaken improvement is the true 
owner. The appropriate ground for restitution is mistake. In the modern law, it 
seems clear that both an active as well as a passive claim will be friable.  
3.1.13 Statutory Recognition 
The power of the court to grant an allowance to the improver of personal 
property as a condition for an order of the delivery of the goods is now 
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recognized by section 3(7) and section 6 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) 
Act, 1977. The Act is confined to the passive claim which was recognized in 
Greenwood v Bennett,85 and does not explicitly advert to the active claim. 
Section 6 of the 1977 Act explicitly recognizes a significant counterclaim 
where the owner claims his property or its value, based upon the principle of 
unjust enrichment. By section 6: 
1. If in proceedings for wrongful interference against a person (the 
‘improver’) who has improved the goods, it is shown that the improver 
acted in the mistaken but honest belief that he had good title to them, an 
allowance shall be made for the extent to which, at the time at which the 
goods fall to be valued in assessing damages, the value of the goods is 
attributable to the improvement. 
2. If, in proceedings for wrongful interference against a person (the 
‘purchaser’) who has purported to purchase the goods: 
(a) From the improver, or 
(b)  Where after such a purported sale the goods passed by a further 
purported sale on one or more occasions, on any such occasion, it 
is shown that the purchaser acted in good faith, an allowance 
shall be made on the principle set out in subsection.  
For example, where a person in good faith buys a stolen car from the improver 
and is used in conversion by the true owner the damages may be reduced to 
reflect the improvement, but if the person who bought the stolen car from the 
improver sues the improver for failure of consideration, and the improver acted 
in good faith, subsection (3) below will ordinarily make a comparable 
reduction in the damages he recovers from the improver. 
(3) If in a case within subsection (2) the person purporting to sell the goods 
acted in good faith, then in proceedings by the purchaser for recovery of the 
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purchase price because of failure of consideration, or in any other proceedings 
founded on that failure of consideration, an allowance shall, where appropriate, 
be made on the principle set out in subsection (1).By section 6(4) the principle 
also applies to contracts of hire purchase and other purported bailment of 
personal property. 
3.1.14 Other Authority 
In Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd,86 valuable work was 
carried out on behalf of Rover in respect of films belonging to Canon. The work 
was done in the mistaken belief that there was a contractual obligation to do the 
work and a contractual right to reimbursement in the shape of a portion of the 
profits from distributing the films. In fact, the underlying purported contract 
turned out to be void because of the incapacity of Rover at the relevant time. It 
was conceded on appeal that Rover was entitled to a Quantum Meruitin respect 
of the work done.  
Lastly, brief mention should be made of the counterclaim by the defendant 
Ward in the case of Guinness plc v Sounders.87 A director of the plaintiff 
company had been paid £5.2 million in connection with services rendered 
during a takeover bid. However, the underlying contract turned out to be void 
for want of authority. Ward claimed to be entitled to retain the money either on 
a quantum meruitbasis, or as an equitable allowance. The claim must evidently 
have been based upon mistake or failure of consideration. The House of Lords 
gave short shrift to the counterclaim. Briefly, an award to a director in such a 
case would contradict the policy governing fiduciaries, their remuneration and 
the obligation to avoid a conflict between duty and interest.  
3.1.15  Equity 
Similar principles have developed in equity in relation to the mistaken 
improvements of land. The seminal statement is in the speech of Lord 
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Cranworth LC in Ramsden v Dyson.88 A tenant took leases over two plots of 
land in Huddersfield and Bolton, spending in excess of £1,800. The tenant 
knew he had only a tenancy from year to year, or a tenancy at will, but believed 
that by building he became entitled to call for a 60-year lease. The landlord’s 
successor sought to eject the tenant. The House of Lords held that on the 
evidence there was no encouragement or conduct on the part of the landlord 
which would justify equitable intervention, either to resist the ejection or to 
compensate the tenant for his improvement. The case is perhaps better known 
for its recognition of the doctrine of proprietary estoppels in the speech of Lord 
Kingsdown, dissenting. In contrast, the statement of principle by Lord 
Cranworth LC is more akin to unjust enrichment reasoning: 
If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, 
perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to 
persevere in his error, a court of equity will not allow me afterwards to assert 
my title to the land on which he had expended money on the supposition that 
the land was his own. It considers that, when I saw the mistake into which he 
had fallen, it was my duty to be active and state my adverse title; and that it 
would be dishonest in me to remain will fully passive on such an occasion, in 
order afterwards to profit by the mistake which I might have prevented. 
This statement of principle clearly establishes two restitutionary principles. 
First, a defendant may be enriched where he freely accepts a benefit, knowing 
that he has the opportunity to reject it. Secondly, the benefit is an unjust one, 
either on the basis of free mistake by the improver, or again on the basis of free 
acceptance. In the instant so, the tenant made no mistake as to his present rights 
but was simply in error about to future conduct of a landlord. Accordingly it 
was only a miss-prediction rather than a mistake.89 
This doctrine of acquiescence was restated by Fry J in Willmott v Barber.90  
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In the first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. 
Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done 
some act (not necessarily upon the defendant's land) on the faith of his mistaken 
belief. Thirdly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the 
existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the 
plaintiff. Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of 
the plaintiffs mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which 
calls upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of 
the legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money 
or in other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from 
asserting his legal right. 
Fry J, consistently with the principle as it has developed in relation to mistaken 
payments, held the contributory negligence by the mistaken improvement 
would not preclude recovery. Fry J commented: ‘when the plaintiff is seeking 
relief, not on a contract, but on the footing of a mistake of fact, the mistake is 
not the less a ground for relief because he had the means of knowledge’. 
Despite these seminal statements of principle, there has to date been little 
evidence of successful recovery by mistaken improvers of land. The 
subsequent history of proprietary estoppel has been more concerned with the 
doctrine of encouragement, as recognized by Lord Kingsdown in his dissenting 
speech in Ramsden v Dyson,91 rather than the doctrine of acquiescence as 
recognized by Lord Cranworth LC in the same case. The former doctrine 
appears to have more to do with perfection of expectations, rather than the 
reversal of unjust enrichment.  
The burden of proof rests upon the payer or transferor to prove both the mistake 
and the causal efficacy of the error. There is no authoritative guidance in this 
context as yet as to whether the latter enquiry is satisfied where it is shown that 
the mistake was a cause, or whether it needs to be a significant cause. It is 
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submitted that the former should suffice. As explained above, it is no bar to 
recovery that one factor in making the payment was the payer's own 
carelessness. As a matter of principle, and given the modern emphasis upon 
defences, it seems that where the ‘but for’ test of causation is satisfied, the 
claimant can succeed. Authority seems to support the wide formulation of 
mistake to include cases of what has been termed ignorance. 
Does the payer need to give evidence that the person responsible for making the 
payment (if any such person exists or can be identified) did in fact make a 
mistake? In Avon County Council v Hewlett,92 the defendant teacher was 
overpaid by the council while absent from work through sickness. There was 
no evidence from the relevant pay clerk(s), but the Court of Appeal inferred 
that the plaintiff council continued to pay the defendant at a full rate because 
the pay clerks concerned were unaware or had forgotten that the defendant had 
been sick and absent for more than six months. It was held that human error 
gave rise to the mistakes because the incorrect information had been fed into 
the computer. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the plaintiffs had not been 
able to identify the individual person or persons who were responsible for the 
errors. However, the Court suggested that in similar cases the responsible 
individuals should be identified and called as witnesses. Slade LJ stated: 
‘Employers who pay their employees under a computerized system should not 
in my opinion assume from the decision of this court in the present case that, if 
they overpay their employees through some kind of mistake, they are entitled to 
recover it simply for the asking.’ 
It is submitted that this stringent approach to the question of evidence may not 
be good law now. One fact weighing on the Court's mind in the Avon County 
Council93 case was the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of 
law. Given the liberal approach of cases such as Barclays Bank and Kleinwort 
Benson, it is unlikely that the defence will have much to gain from insisting 
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upon evidence as to the nature and quality of the mistake involved. It has been 
submitted that ignorance of a transfer will qualify as an operative mistake, as 
well as an active but an erroneous decision-making process. In modern 
conditions there is little need for detailed probing of the actual conditions 
which generated the mistake. 
 
B. MISREPRESENTATION  
3.2.1 Introduction 
Where the alleged operative mistake takes place in the context of an apparently 
binding contractual arrangement, a distinct regime applies. There is a stark 
asymmetry between the treatment of spontaneous mistakes which result in 
binding contractual arrangements, where relief is rare, and spontaneous 
mistakes which result in extra-contractual payments or other transfers, where a 
liberal regime of recovery obtain section Turning to contractual mistake, it is 
necessary to distinguish between a mistake which is induced by a 
misrepresentation by the transferee, and one which was spontaneously 
entertained by the transferor.94 Since the Judicature Acts English courts have 
followed the liberal regime of the old Courts of Equity, in prima facie granting 
relief where contracts are entered as a result of misrepresentation, whether 
fraudulent negligent or innocent. This leaves little room for the autonomous 
doctrine of mistake in the contractual context. Relief in response to a 
spontaneous mistake is rare. The remedy for an actionable misrepresentation is 
rescission, a cause of action in unjust, enrichment. 
Its juridical nature was examined by Robert Goff LJ in Whittaker v Campbell:95 
“A misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or innocent induces 
a party to enter into a contract in circumstances where it may 
be unjust that: the representor should be permitted to retain 
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the benefit (the chose in action): acquired by him. The remedy 
of rescission by which the unjust enrichment of the representor 
is prevented, though for historical and practical reasons 
treated books on the law of contract, is a straightforward 
remedy in restitution subject to limits which are characteristic 
of that branch of the law.” 
 
Nineteenth century decisions on misrepresentation and non-disclosure by 
company directors and promoters provide a rich seam of case law, yielding 
sophisticated mechanisms for effecting mutual restitution under tainted 
transaction section the details of Act law can be found in the contractual texts 
96and it is proposed here to consider only briefly conditions for the availability 
of rescission and the limits upon its availability. 
3.2.2 Actionable Misrepresentation 
First, it is traditionally stated that there must be a representation of fact, 
although to the extent that this formulation excludes representations of law it 
must be regarded with suspicion in the wake of Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln 
City Council.97 There remain difficulties over whether a non-expert opinion 
can ground relief.98 As Lord Campbell LC famously stated, a representation 
can extend to a ‘nod or a wink, or a shake of a head or a smile’ Walters v 
Morgan.99 However, where the transaction is not one of insurance, nor the 
representor a fiduciary, English law does not grant relief for non-disclosure. 
The representation must be false and causally efficacious. The deceit case of 
Edgington v Fitzmaurice,100 suggests that it is sufficient if the representation 
was a cause and not necessarily the cause of the representee entering into the 
transaction. Where the representation was material, in a sense of being capable 
of inducing a reasonable person to enter into the transaction, the burden of 
proving that the actual representee was not so induced shifts to the 
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representor101 Alternatively, even where the representation was not material, 
the representee will succeed if he can demonstrate that it was calculated to 
induce him to enter into the transaction, and that he was so induced. Where the 
conditions are fulfilled a prima facie right to rescind obtains. 
Where the transaction is executor, rescission simply takes the form of setting 
aside the otherwise binding obligations which the parties have assumed. 
Further, even where the transaction is partly or fully executed.102 The setting 
aside of extant obligations can be supplemented by an order that there be 
mutual restitution of benefits transferred under the contract, including money, 
land and personal property. 
3.2.3 Rescission and Indemnity 
Claims for rescission for misrepresentation have been less common in the last 
three decade section prior to the 1960s, compensatory damages for 
misstatements had been confined to cases where fraud could be proved. 
However, in the wake of section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act, 1967 and 
the common law developments since Medley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd,103 there has been greater focus on compensatory option section 
due to this shift of emphasis, it can be forgotten that rescission can encompass 
the grant of an indemnity against potential future liabilities. 
In Newbigging v Adam,104 the plaintiff was induced to enter into a partnership 
on the basis of misrepresentations as to the state of the business section 
rescission was ordered comprising the return of the net sums which had been 
contributed to the business, together with an indemnity from the remaining 
partner against partnership debts and liabilities which he might be liable to pay. 
Bowen LJ observed: 
There ought, as it appears to me, to be a giving back and a taking back on both 
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sides, including the giving back and taking back of the obligations which the 
contract has created, as well as the giving back and the taking back of the 
advantage. 
Bowen LJ would confine the indemnity to obligations created by the contract. 
Cotton LJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to be ‘relieved from the 
consequences and obligations which are the result of the contract which is set 
aside’; Fry LJ held: ‘the plaintiff is entitled to an indemnity in respect of all 
obligations entered into under the contract when those obligations are within 
the necessary or reasonable expectation of both the contracting parties at the 
time of the contract.’ However, even on the wider formulations of Cotton LJ 
and Fry LJ the entitlement is not equivalent to a right to compensation. The 
question of the indemnity was no longer a live issue before the House of Lords, 
where it was accepted that there were no outstanding liabilities.105 
In Whittington v Seale-Hayne,106 the plaintiff entered into a lease of premises 
for the purpose of poultry breeding. There were misrepresentations as to the 
sanitary conditions of the premise section. It was held that the indemnity did 
not extend to the value of lost poultry, lost profits and other expense section 
However, given the wide availability of damages for misrepresentation, the 
issue is one of pedagogical interest rather than practical importance.  
3.2.4 Limits to the Right to Rescind 
By its very nature rescission is a drastic and stringent remedy the availability 
which is circumscribed by a number of bar section it was at one time thought 
that the remedy was unavailable where a contract was fully executed, but such 
doubts have been removed by section 1 of the Misrepresentation Act, 1967. 
More significant: rescission has often been perceived to be confined to the 
realm of the tangible. The aim of the courts, according to Lord Blackburn, ‘has 
always been to give this relief whenever, by the exercise of its powers, it can do 
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what is practically just thought it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state 
they were in before the contract’.107 However, there has been insistence that 
mutual restitution be possible. Therefore, unless the party seeking relief can 
himself provide counter-restitution in integrum rescission will not be available. 
Birks has written of the regarding the impossibility of counter-restitution as 
being a defense in the law restitution.108 
Certain benefits have been perceived by their very nature to be incapable of 
being restored, for example, service section In Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & 
South-Western railway Company,109 the House of Lords would have denied 
rescission of a railway construction contract on this ground. Lord Shaw of 
Dumferm line stated: 
“The railway is there, the bridges are built, the excavations 
are made, the rails are laid, and the railway itself was in 
complete working two years before this action was brought. 
Accounts cannot obliterate it, and unless the railway is 
obliterated restitution in integrum is impossible.” 
Similarly, a transferee cannot eat a cake and restore it. In contrast, it was 
possible in the sale of a business for the court to order an account of profits and 
make allowances for the deterioration in the subject-matter transferred.110 The 
fact that the transferee can escape a bad bargain, for example, where the value 
of shares had dropped astronomically between the date of purchase and 
rescission, does not bar relief.111 Conversely, where the representee had sold 
shares to the representor following fraudulent misrepresentations as to the 
company’s profitability, and the value of the shares had increased in the 
intervening period, the seller was entitled to be recovery of the shares.112 Lord 
Wright stressed that the court would be more drastic in exercising its powers in 
a case of fraud than in a case of innocent misrepresentation: Though the 
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defendant has been fraudulent, he must not be robbed, nor must the plaintiff be 
unjustly enriched, as he would be if they both got back what they had parted 
with and kept what he received in return. In that case the seller had to give 
credit for the purchase moneys received, but the buyer had to give up dividends 
received while off-setting subsequent loss. 
The approach of the older cases could be utilized in support of the modern 
imperative to disregard difficulties of precise counter-restitution, and rather 
insist on mutual restitution, if necessary by valuing benefits transferred, and 
allowing substitutionary counter-restitution in money. The leading 
twentieth-century authorities concern undue influence. However, in a case 
concerning fee tort of deceit, the House of Lords has signaled its preference for 
the flexible approach. In Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA,113 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson was skeptical of a concession that a share purchase 
contract could not be rescinded simply because the stock that had been 
disposed of: 
If the current law in fact provides (as the Court of Appeal thought) that there is 
no right to rescind the contract for sale of quoted shares once the specific shares 
purchased have been sold, the law will need to be closely looked at hereafter. 
Since, in such a case, identical shares can be purchased on the market, the 
defrauded purchaser can offer substantial restitutio in integrum which is 
normally sufficient. 
A particular incidence of the counter-restitution obstacle, which is stated as a 
separate bar to rescission, is where a third party has acquired rights to the 
subject-matter of the original contract. In addition the remedy must be sought 
promptly (in practice meaning within weeks and months, rather than years) and 
the party seeking relief must unequivocally evince an intention no longer to 
treat the contract as binding, otherwise the right to rescind will be lost on the 
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grounds of lapse of time or affirmation. 
3.2.5 The Misrepresentation Act, 1967 
The stringency of full restitution as a response to what might be a 
comparatively minor or trivial misrepresentation prompted the legislature to 
give the courts an unparalleled discretion in section 2(2) of the 1967 Act to 
disallow restitutionary relief and instead substitute compensation. Section 2(2) 
counter-balances the liberating influence of section 1 which removed bars to 
rescission. It applies only in cases of non-fraudulent misrepresentation.  
Given what little authority there has been on rescission in the last three decades, 
there is accordingly even less on this sub-section. The discretion is explicitly 
stated to be equitable. The court must have regard to: 
a) The nature of the misrepresentation; 
b) The loss that would be caused by it if the contract were upheld; and 
c) The loss that rescission would cause to the representor. 
Section 2 (3) seems to anticipate that damages under section 2(2) would be in a 
lesser amount than damages under section 2(1). In William Sindall plc v 
Cambridgeshire County-Council,114 it was alleged that a valuable piece of land 
had been purchased as a result of misrepresentation concerning the 
non-existence of a sewer crossing the property. The allegation was not made 
out, but Hoffmann LJ indicated that if it had, he would have exercised the 
discretion under section 2 (2). In valuable guidance Hoffmann LJ stated that the 
measure of recovery under the subsection could never exceed recovery for 
damages for breach of warranty. Ordinarily the measure would be the 
difference between the property as it was represented to be an: the property as it 
actually was section it will not encompass consequential losses.115 
                                                          
114 (1994) 1 WLR 1016.  
115 Thoma Witter Ltd v TBp Industries Ltd (996) 2 ALL ER 573 at PP 588-91.  
138 
 
3.2.6 Rescission for Mistake 
3.2.7 Common Law Mistake  
The English jurisdiction to relieve against even innocent misrepresentations 
leaves little room for relief for mistake. It appears inapt to speak of weak 
streams of case law where there has been only a trickle of authority, but what 
little there is suggests a different approach at common law to that which obtains 
in equity.  
The common law case is Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd,116 supplement by the 
influential discussion of Steyn J in Associated Japanese Bank International v 
Credit du Nord SA.117 Where a contract governs the transfer of benefits there is 
no room for the operation of the law of unjust enrichment, but where the 
contract is held to be void relief may be available. In Bell, Brothers sought 
restitution of generous golden handshakes paid to the plaintiff who were the 
management team of one of its subsidiary companies. The plaintiff cooperated 
in the merger of this subsidiary company with its nearest and had given up 
valuable service contracts. However, Lever Brothers subsequently discovered 
that earlier, in breach of duty, the plaintiffs had made small profits on their own 
account by speculating on the cocoa market. Lever Brothers I to establish fraud 
or non-disclosure. The House of Lords held that the contract would have been 
void where both parties were labouring under a mistake, and subject-matter of 
the contract was essentially different to that which the parties assumed it to be. 
However, by a majority, it was held that the mistake was not of that magnitude. 
The case is authority for a narrow doctrine of mistake at common law. A 
contract will be held to be void at common law if the subject-matter no longer 
exists or where the subject-matter already belongs to the purchaser (res sua). 
Where the mistake is only as to a quality of the subject-matter of the contract it 
will be void only where, first, the mistake is common to both parties, secondly, 
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the difference render the subject-matter essentially and radically different from 
what both parties through it to be, and thirdly, there were reasonable grounds 
for that belief in Associated Japanese Bank International v Credit du Nord 
SA.118 In that case an accessory guarantee contract for the obligations under a 
sale-and-leaseback transaction in respect of non-existent engineering 
machines, was held to be void as closely analogous to the res extincta case 
section once the contract is void, in accordance with the third question, the 
contractual matrix is inapplicable, and claims may be brought for restitution of 
any money or property transferred. It was assumed in Bell that had the contract 
been void for mistake, the £50,000 golden handshakes would be recoverable, 
presumably on the ground of mistake or total failure of consideration. 
3.2.8 Equitable Mistake 
There was some authority for equitable relief on the grounds of mistake in 
contract before the Judicature Acts (for example, Cooper v Phibbs,119 a res sua 
case), but there was little authority for a coherent doctrine of equitable mistake 
until the bold synthesis of Denning LJ in Solle v Butcher.120 It seems that 
mistake in equity does not render a contract void, but the court may set aside 
the contract where, first, the mistake is common, secondly, the subject matter is 
rendered fundamentally different to what the parties supposed it to be, and 
thirdly, the party seeking relief is not himself at fault. Solle and McGee v 
Pennine Insurance Co. Ltd,121 suggest that the test of fundamentally is less 
stringent than the common law test of ‘essentially and radically different’. 
More recently, however, the Court of Appeal has signaled a return to the 
principle of sanctity of bargain, marginalizing cases,122 which followed the 
equitable route, by insisting on greater respect for the contractual allocation of 
risks in assessing allegations of mistake.123 What is clear about the equitable 
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doctrine is that the relief available to the court goes beyond simply awarding 
restitution, but can encompass setting aside contractual obligations and 
imposing new terms upon the parties. Therefore, these cases are of only 
marginal significance to the law of restitution. 
Thus, if one party acting innocently sues another party to a make mistake as to 
the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement, these is said to 
be misrepresentation. 
In cases of misrepresentation the person making the statement is innocent and 
he makes the statement without any intention to deceive the other party, this 
statement is false although he himself believes that the brand where the person 
making a false statement knows that the same is false but makes the same 
intentionally to deceive the other party and to make him enter into an 
agreement which he would not have done otherwise. 
C. DURESS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A contract procured by duress i.e. by actual violence or the threat of violence or 
dishonour is voidable at the option of the person who has been forced to enter 
into it. The apparent consent of a party who has acted under duress is clearly 
not his real consent and therefore, he is entitled to avoid the contract. 
3.3.2 Coercion under Indian Contract Act, 1872 
Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, defines coercion which provides: 
“Coercion” is the committing, or threatening to commit, any 
act, forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) or 
the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any 
property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the 
intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.” 
Explanation to Section 15 further provides that: 
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“It is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 
1860) is or is not in force in the place where the coercion is 
employed.” 
A, on board an English ship on the high seas, causes B to enter into an 
agreement by an act amounting to criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal 
Code (Act XLV of 1860). A afterwards sues B for breach of contract at 
Calcutta. Here A has employed coercion, although his act is not an offence by 
the law of England, and although Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code was not 
in force at the time when or place where the act was done.124 
3.3.3 Scope of Section 15 
As pointed out by Pollock and Mulla125 “The words of this section are far wider 
than anything in the English authorities….. In England the topic of duress126 at 
Common Law has been almost rendered obsolete partly by the general 
improvement in manner and morals, and partly by the development of equitable 
jurisdiction under the head of undue influence. Detaining property is not 
duress.” 
3.3.4 Essential Ingredients of Coercion 
Following are the essential ingredients of coercion: 
a) Committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian 
Penal Code; or 
b) The unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property to the 
prejudice of any person whatever; or 
c) With the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. 
It may be noted here that even if there be coercion, but it does not appear that it 
was instrumental in making the promisor to do the act in question, the existence 
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of coercion would be of no avail. The word “cause” is not a term of art; but it is 
a term of science. Nothing can be said to be the cause of a particular effect, 
unless it is the proximate and immediate cause of the effect. If the alleged cause 
is remote and not proximate, is distant and not immediate, such a cause cannot 
be said to be the cause in legal parlance. It is also to be noted that a factor that 
would cause a particular effect with a particular man, may not be able to 
achieve that result in the case of another man. In other words, the casual 
relationship can be said to the established, only if it is proved that in the facts 
and circumstances of a particular case, the said factors had weighed with the 
promisor and that but for those factors, the said promisor would not have acted 
in the manner he is found to have acted. Thus the totality of circumstances is 
required to be viewed before a decision one way or the other is reached in this 
regard.127 
For example, in M/s. Gunjan Cement Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan State Industrial 
Development and Investment Corporation Ltd.,128 a loan of Rs. 90.00 lacs as 
financial assistance was sought by the petitioner from the respondent, 
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. 
(RIICO). The loan was sanctioned subject to Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI) and Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), 
agreeing to refinance the loan to the RIICO. Loan agreement was entered into 
on 12th March 1991 between the petitioner arid RIICO. Subsequently on 
13.12.1991 a deed of modification was signed by the petitioner on mutual 
agreement of both the parties. In this deed of modification, the petitioner 
voluntarily agreed for change of rate of interest to be charged from 12.5 per 
annum to 18.75% per annum. In the instant writ petitions, the petitioner 
challenged the enhanced rate of interest on the ground that, the deed of 
modification was got signed by the petitioners under duress. Rejecting the 
contention of the petitioners the Rajasthan High Court held, that the petitioner 
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knowing fully well the legal implication of the contract has signed the ‘deed of 
modification.’ It was not a case of an illiterate person signing the deed without 
understanding the contents thereof. The theory of coercion and duress 
submitted by the petitioner is therefore, not acceptable. Dismissing the writ 
petition, the court held that unless the ‘deed of modification’ is set aside or 
cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction on the ground of duress or 
Coercion, it is binding between the parties as they have signed it with their eyes 
wide open. The petitioner has failed to make out a case and the writ petitions 
are devoid of merit.129 
3.3.5 Coercion under English Law 
As pointed earlier, the scope of the term “coercion” under Section 15 of the 
Contract Act is much wider than the term “duress” under English Law. Under 
English Law, a contract obtained by duress is voidable because it lacks the 
element of free consent which is deemed essential for it. As pointed out by 
Cheshire and Fifoot “Duress at Common Law, or what is sometimes called 
legal duress, means actual violence or threats of violence to the person i.e. 
threats calculated to produce fear of loss of life or of bodily harm. Cheshire and 
Fifoot, however, add, “that a contract Should be procured by actual violence is 
difficult to conceive, but a more probable means of inducement is threat of 
violence. The rule here is that the threat must be illegal in the sense that it must 
be threat to commit a crime or a tort. Thus to threaten an imprisonment that 
would be unlawful if enforced constitutes duress, but not if the imprisonment 
would be unlawful.”130 It may also be noted that “For duress to afford a ground 
of relief, it must be duress of a man’s person, not of his goods.”131 
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3.3.6 Distinction between English Law and Indian Law 
Under Indian Contract Act, coercion consists of (1) committing or threatening 
to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or (2) the unlawful 
detaining or threatening to detain any property to the prejudice of any person 
whatever, and (3) with the intention of causing any person to enter into an 
agreement. Thus as provided under Section 15, coercion can be aimed not only 
against a person but also against his property. Moreover, it is not necessary that 
coercion be caused by a party to the contract. It may be caused by a third person 
or a person who is not a party to the contract. “Coercion differs from duress in 
that it can be aimed (1) against a stranger to the Contract, (2) against goods, (3) 
and it can proceed from any person (4) immediate violence is not necessary, it 
need not be such as to affect a man with ordinary firmness of mind.”132 Thus it 
is obvious that the scope of the term coercion is far wider than the term duress 
under English Law. 
For example, where the plea was made that the plaintiff was dispossessed of 
premises forcibly under threat that he would be arrested and detained under 
Maintenance of internal Security Act (MISA), such a threat, would clearly fall 
within the mischief of Section 15 of Indian Contract Act.133 
3.3.7 Act Forbidden by the Indian Penal Code 
According to Section 15, coercion is the committing or threatening to commit 
any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. It will, therefore, be necessary to 
understand the import of these words. The words act forbidden by the Indian 
Penal Code make it necessary for the court to decide in a civil action, if that 
branch of the section is relied on, whether the alleged act of coercion is such as 
to amount to an offence.134 A leading case on the point is Rangnayakarnma v. 
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Alwar Setti,135 a Madras case. In this case, the husband of a girl of 13 years dies 
and the relations of the deceased did not allow the corpse to be removed unless 
she adopted a child of their choice. The Madras High Court held that since the 
adoption was not made by free consent and the act was prohibited under the 
Indian Penal Code, it was not binding on her. Although the decision of the 
Court is correct yet the reasoning’s given for the same are not convincing. That 
is why this decision has been subjected to criticism. As a matter of fact, this 
case should come under Section 16 rather than Section 15 of the Act. 
“The decision errs in the reasoning given. May be the option 
is invalid as having been obtained by undue influence under 
Section 16 but there appears to be no ‘coercion within the 
meaning of Section 15. It will be difficult to bring the act of 
the relatives under Section 297 which penalises persons 
offering any indignity to a human corpse with the intention of 
wounding the religious feelings of any person;136 Pollock 
and Mulla137 also subscribe this view. Section 297 of the 
Indian Penal Code provides as follows: ‘Whoever, with the 
intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or of 
insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge 
that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded, or 
that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted thereby, 
commits any trespass in place of worship or any place of 
sculptor, any place set apart for the performance of formal 
rites or as a depository of the remains of the dead, or offers 
any indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance to 
any person assembled for the performance of funeral 
ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, or with both.” It is clear from the above provision that in 
the above noted case offence alleged to have been committed 
did not fall within the scope of Section 297 and in fact should 
have been taken to be under Section 16 of the Indian Contract 
Act”. 
3.3.8 Threat to Commit Suicide, Whether Coercion 
There is some controversy regarding the question whether an attempt to 
commit suicide constitutes coercion within the meaning of Section 15. 
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According to Section 15, an offence to constitute coercion should be an act 
forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. Under the Indian Penal Code, attempt to 
commit suicide is punishable and not the threat to commit suicide. In a Madras 
case, Ammiraju v. Seshamma,138  a man gave a threat to his wife and son to 
commit suicide if they did not execute a release bond regarding some properties 
which the wife and son claimed as their own. By a majority of 2 to 1, the court 
held, the release deed was vitiated by coercion within the meaning of Section 
15. The majority decision pointed that to threat to commit suicide must b 
deemed to be forbidden since the attempt to commit suicide was punishable 
under Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. But in his dissenting judgment 
Oldfield, J., rightly argued that Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act must be 
interpreted strictly. An act could be said to be forbidden by the Indian Penal 
Code only when it was punishable under it. Since the threat to commit suicide 
was not punishable, it could not be said to be forbidden. 
3.3.9 Recommendations of the Law Commission 
As regards the words “any act forbidden by Indian Penal Code,” the Law 
Commission139 recommended the following the words ‘any act forbidden by 
the Indian Penal Code’ should be deleted and a wider expression be substituted 
therefore, so that the Penal Laws other than the Indian Penal Code may also be 
included. The explanation should also be amended to the same effect.” The 
Law Commission has made this recommendation because in its view,” The 
proper function of the Indian Penal Code is to create offences and not merely to 
forbid. The Penal Code forbids only what it declares punishable. There are 
other laws other than the Indian Penal Code performing the same function.”140 
3.3.10  Whether an Act done under Compulsion of Law constitutes   
Coercion 
An act done under the compulsion of law is no coercion within the meaning of 
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Section 15 of the Contract Act. This was clearly laid down by the Supreme 
Court in Andhra Sugar Ltd. v. State of Andhra.141 In this case the Supreme 
Court had to decide the validity of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar 
(Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act which provides that the sugar factory 
is bound to accept sugarcane if offered by a cane grower to the factory but the 
cane grower is not bound to offer the cane to the factory of the area. The 
Supreme Court held that under Section 14, compulsion of law is not coercion 
within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act, and as such, the said agreement 
was not caused by coercion. 
3.3.11  Unlawful Detaining of Property 
As pointed out earlier, coercion as defined under Section 15 of the Act includes 
“the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property, to the prejudice 
of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into 
an agreement.” 
But it has been held that if a mortgage imposes certain conditions for conveying 
the equity of redemption, it may not amount to an unlawful detaining or 
threatening to detain any property under Section 15 of the Contract Act.142 
3.3.12 Difference between Coercion and Duress 
1. Coercion in India means committing or threatening to commit an act 
forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. Duress, under Common Law, 
consists in actual violence or threat of violence to a person. It includes 
doing of an illegal act against a person, whether it be a crime or a tort. 
Thus unlike coercion, duress is not confined to unlawful acts forbidden 
by any specific penal law like the Indian Penal Code in India. 
2. In India, coercion can also be there by detaining or threatening to detain 
any property. In other words, in coercion an act may be directed against 
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a person or his property. In England, duress is constituted by acts or 
threats against the person of a man and not against his property. 
3. In India, coercion may proceed from a person who is not a party to the 
contract, and it may also be directed against a person who, again, may be 
a stranger to the contract. In England, duress should proceed from a 
party to the contract and is also directed against the party to the contract 
himself or his wife, parent, child, or other near relative. 
So we can say that duress consists in actual violence or threat of violence to a 
person. It only includes fear of loss to life or bodily harm including 
imprisonment but not a threat of damage to goods.143 The threat must be to do 
something illegal, i.e., to commit a tort or a crime.144 There is nothing wrong in 
threat to prosecute a person for an offence, 145 or to sue him for a tort146 
committed by him, although threatening illegal detention would be duress.147 
Moreover, duress must be directed against a part in the contract or his wife, 
child, parent or other near relative,148 and can also be cause by the party to the 
contract or within his knowledge.149 
D. UNDUE INFLUENCE 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The doctrine of undue influence under the common law was evolved by the 
courts in England for granting protection against transactions procured by the 
exercise of insidious forms of influence, spiritual and temporal. The Indian 
Contract Act, 1872, is founded substantially on the rules of English Common 
Law. The general principles enunciated in English Law are applicable subject 
to the provision in Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act. The law of undue 
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influence has grown in its application to numerous cases in which pardenashin 
woman’s are concerned.150 There are also cases of guardian and ward,151  
trustee and cities que trusty,152   mentally deficient persons,153 extravagant 
profligates,154 expectant heirs155 etc. 
3.4.2 Applicability of English Equity Principles in India 
A caution is urged that the eng1ish Law is not applicable when Section 15 
clearly controls the law of undue influence. 156 The Madras High Court in Ram 
Patter v. Manikishan157 held that principles followed by the guilty Courts in 
England in respect of transaction flowing from fiduciary relationship are quite 
applicable in India. It was also printed out in the same case that a gift rescinded 
on the ground of undue influence must fail in one of the following 
categories:158 
(a) Cases where some unfair and improper conduct, some 
coercion from outside, some over-reaching, some form of 
cheating and generally though can always some personal 
advantage obtained by a donee placed in seine confidential 
and close relation to the donor. In these cases the court has 
to be satisfied that the gift was the result of influence 
expressly exercised by the donee for the purpose. The court 
will be guided by the principle that no one shall be allowed 
to retain any benefit arising from his own fraud. 
(b) The other group of cases arises in donor-donee 
relationship where it was the duty of the donee to advise the 
donor or even to manage his property for him. The burden 
is cast on the donee to prove that he has not abused his 
position and that the gift to him was untainted by undue 
influence. In such cases it has further to be shown that the 
donor had independent advice and was thus removed from 
the Influence when the gift to him as in fact made. 
 
                                                          
150 Tera Kumari v. Chandra Manleswar 134 IC 1976. 
151 Toolsegdoss v. Premji, 13 Bom. 61. 
152 Balgangadhar Tilak v. Srinivas Pandit, 39 Bom. 441. 
153 Abdur Rauf v. Aymona Bibi. 174 IC 134. 
154 Motigulab Chand v. Md. Mehdi, 20 Bom. 567. 
155 Balkishan v. Madanlal, 29 All. 303.   
156 Dhanipal Das v. Maneshwar Baksh Singh. (1985)  1 All ER 303. 
157 AIR 1938 Mad. 726. 
158 Ibid.  
150 
 
The Allahabad High Court gave relief in a case of hard and unconscionable 
bargain on principles of equity though no question of undue influence arose in 
that case.159 
The Law Commission of India in its 13th Report160 has examined the position 
and states: 
“There are some cases in which on principles of equity, relief 
has been given against a hard and unconscionable bargain, 
even though there was no question of undue influence 
involved. We favour the view taken in Kesevala v. 
Arithulaiammal161 that unless undue influence is proved no 
relief can be given on the ground of unconscionableness of 
the Contract”. 
We, however, are of the view and submit that such a rigid attitude may not 
serve the ends of justice. The judgment of A.L. Rama Patter’s case162 still 
stand good and due weigh should be given. There can be an unconscionable 
bargain outside the ambit of section 16 (where undue influence has to be 
proved) which can invoke the court’s intervention. To be an unconscionable 
transaction there ought to be proof of fraud or misrepresentation or proof that 
the creditor took an improper advantage of his position or of the difficulties of 
the defendant. 
The judgment of Varadachari and Burn JJ. of the Madras High Court in A.L. 
Rama Patter v. Manikkam163 already referred to lends support to the view that 
unconscionable bargains can be struck down even outside the statutory 
provision in Section 16 on the principles of English equitable rules. 
Their Lordships observe:164 
“It may be conceded that Section 16 of the Contract Act deals 
in terms with the exercise of undue influence by one party to 
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the contract on the other. Indeed this is the ordinary type of 
cases of undue influence. The question of the effect of undue 
influence exercised by somebody other than the grantee or 
promises, does not seem to have arisen in cases that went up 
to the judicial committee from India except in Possithurai v. 
Kannappa Chettier. 165  We are not sure whether the 
observation of Lord Shaw in that case, about the exercise of 
influence, ‘in conspiracy with or through the agency of other’ 
is not wide, enough to take in the full scope of the doctrine as 
illustrated by the eng1ish cases, far ‘agency’ may in such 
cases well undue instance in which the creditor or transferee 
knowingly or intentionally 1eaves everything in the hands of 
the principal debtor”. 
Their Lordships in the next para add: 
“Confining ourselves, however, to the statute law of India, it 
is clear that the principle of the English cases referred by 
Venkatasubba Rao, J.166 has been made applicable in this 
country by section 89, Trust Act.” 
It is interesting to note that in the foot note to Section 89 of the Trust Act in 
Stoke’s Anglo Indian Codes the reference given in Maitland v. Irving,167 an 
English case. In that case A and B consented to postpone the payment of £5,000 
due to then from C in consideration of C procuring and giving them the 
plaintiff’s guarantee for that sum; and C at the same time informed A and B that 
the plaintiff was his niece and possessed considerable property, that she had 
resided with him for sometimes, that he had been her guardian and that he had 
been of age for about a year and a half, The guarantee given by the plaintiff was 
held unenforceable. The Vice-Chancellor observed in that case: 
“It seems extra-ordinary that with the full knowledge of those 
circumstances, they (creditors) hold at once acceded to the 
proposal without making any inquiry or taking any pains to 
ascertain whether the young lady was a free agent and 
perfectly willing, with a full knowledge of the consequences 
to do what the guardian he would invite her or propose to her 
to do……” 
They must have perceived that by accepting the suggestion of Maclean (the 
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debtor), they relied on the influence that he had over the young lady.....knowing 
the defenseless situation of the young lady, they combined with Maclean who, 
disclosed it to thee, in order that advantage might be taken of her defenseless 
situation for the benefit of all the three, and my opinion is that they must all 
three be considered as standing in the same situation”. 
The Judges of Madras High Court in Rena Patter & Brothers case, 168 
therefore, added: 
“When it is found that the principle of this decision (Maitland 
v. Irving) has been adopted by the Indian Legislature in 
enacting Section 89, Trust Act, there is no substance in the 
contention that later English authorities of the same type 
furnish no guidance to us in the application of the rule”. 
They relied on Lancashire Loans v. Black169  where a married daughter’s 
guarantee to the mother for her debts was rescinded on the ground that young 
person should be protected from the undue influence inherent in the mother- 
daughter relationship and that in that case the creditor had notice of the relevant 
facts. In Ram Patter’s case the facts were similar to Maitland case, for here the 
plaintiff creditor unsuccessfully sued to recover monies due to him by 
defendant I and 2 even against the third defendant who was their nephew and 
ward inveigled to stand guarantee for their past, present and future debts. Their 
Lord ships concluded:170 
“It does not seem to wrong to say that where a third party 
stands in no confidential relation to the prisoner or grantor, 
the onus does not in the first instance lie on the former, to 
show that no undue influence was used. It is only when he is 
found or could be assumed to have had notice of the exercise 
of undue influence by another, or at least of circumstances 
raising a presumption or probability of undue influence that 
the onus will be shifted. We are of the opinion that the 
principles followed by courts of equity in England in dealing 
with similar transactions are equally applicable in this 
country and budging the suit transaction by those principles 
                                                          
168 Supra Note 8. 
169 (1934) 1 K.B. 380.  
170 Supra Note 13. 
153 
 
the plaintiff cannot hold the third defendant liable.” 
It would thus seem to be clear that in India the equitable principles of English 
Law can be applied in appropriate cases where there is unconscionable bargain 
though there may not be ‘undue influence’ such as defined in section 16 of the 
Act. Equity never hesitated to interfere in the cage of fraud and as Lord 
Hardwicke put it171 ‘the equitable jurisdiction based on undue influence is only 
a development of the principle of relief on the ground of fraud’. 
The Law Commission of India in its 13th Report, however, felt no need to 
make any change in Section 16 of the Act, and refuses to recognize that there 
can be court’s intervention in the matter of unconscionable bargain even 
though undue influence is not proved. 
In Balkishan v. Madanlal172  case the son of a wealthy father aged 28 but 
profligate in habits, executed a bond at a high rate of interest, as his father 
refused to supply him, the bond contained unconscionable stipulations, there 
was, of course, no undue influence exercised but yet the court held that the 
bargain was definitely unconscionable, oppressive and extortionate and 
therefore, unenforceable in law. 
The Kesavalu case173 preferred by the law commission in its report does not 
eschew altogether the application of the equitable doctrine. The decision can be 
authority for the proposition that mere high rate of interest which may be hard 
and unconscionable is not enough for equity intervention. In addition there 
ought to be some disparity in the position of parties such as surprise, ignorance, 
distress or even poverty which prevented the parties from dealing on equal 
terms. 174 After the passing of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, it is unnecessary 
for courts to invoke equitable doctrine in cases of excessive interest since under 
section 3 of the said Act unfairness and excessiveness in the matter of interest 
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can be put down by the court even if no undue influence is established.175 So 
the Kesavalu case decided in 1913 is covered by the statutory protection in 
Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act 1918. As stated already the Rama Patter 
Bros case176 covers a wider and different field where a young nephew was 
induced to guarantee for the uncle’s debts past, present and future so 
unconscionable in the nature of it, that the creditor who had notice of the 
relationship was refused a decree against the nephew. So the Law Commission 
statements in its report that in no case relief can be given on the ground of 
unconscionableness of the contract unless undue influence is provided appears 
too wide for acceptance, one can agree that Kesayalu’s177 case in so far as high 
rate of interest be accepted but that is no authority for cases like Rama Patter & 
Bros,178 where infect no undue influence or pressure was used. The nephew 
was living with his uncle and was well to do and so he put his signature to the 
document at the suggestion of the uncle. No undue pressure, force or cajolery 
was exercised. The bargain was clearly unconscionable, the additional factor 
being the intimate fiduciary relationship of the parties and the amiability of the 
nephew to the uncle. 
In Kesavalu Naidu case179 it was pointed out that since the plaintiffs endorser 
ended the ladies negotiated only through a power of Attorney, in the absence of 
proof that the agent himself was subjected to domination at the hands of the 
original holder, a mere herd stipulation of 60% interest does not by itself render 
it a voidable transaction in equity. 
This proposition so stated cannot in any way affect the applicability of the 
English doctrine of equity in unconscionable bargains to India. Even in 
Dhanipal Das case,180  the Privy Council had stated: 
“Apart from a recent statute an eng1ish court of equity could 
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not give relief from a transaction or contract merely on the 
ground that it is a hard bargain, except where the extortion is 
so great as to be itself evidence of fraud, which is not in this 
case. In other cases there must be some other equity arising 
from the position of the parties or the particular 
circumstances of the case”. 
What emerges from the above discussion is that not only the term of the 
impugned contract should be harsh and unconscionable but the nature of the 
transaction and the relationship of the parties must be such that the presumption 
of domination in such contract is not rebutted. Thus stated even then it will be 
not exactly applying section 16, except to suggest that the domination of the 
will of one party is so patent in the unconscionableness of the transactions that 
undue influence should be presumed. Without proof of actual undue influence 
such a contract can be set aside, in accordance with rules of equity. This is what 
was done in the Rama Patter & Bros case of Madras181 where the relationship 
of the parties and the circumstances of the transaction made it clear that the 
transaction was so unconscionable that the Court had to intervene, whether 
section 16 applied to the case or not, so the Law Commission’s view182 that 
unless influence is actually proved an unconscionable bargain cannot by itself 
be set aside, seems to be wide off the mark. 
In cases of unconscionable bargain even in England a theory of constructive 
fraud was developed which included cases of undue influence strict1y so called 
of which Huguenin v. Basely183  was the type and cases of unconscionable 
bargains of which Barly of Chesterfield v. Janson184 was the type. In a Madras 
case the judges referred to these cases and added: 
“But these cases were based on the common principle that 
where one person is in a position to dominate the will of 
another either on account of antecedent relationship or 
because of the circumstances attending a particular 
transaction so as to prevent that other from giving an 
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intelligent or free consent to the bargain, the person who 
obtained an undue advantage by using his position should not 
in justice be allowed to return it. What those circumstances 
were the court declined to define, To the substantive doctrine 
there were added certain rules of evidence or presumption 
which in some cases subsequently crystallized into rigid rules 
of law as in the cases of alps of reversions and certain other 
dealings with expectant heirs necessitating the interference 
of the legislature. The Indian Legislature has included all 
these matters in the comprehensive definition or explanation 
under the head of undue influence in section 16 of the Indian 
Contract Act. The section is originally enacted was found 
inadequate to meet all cases and has, therefore, been 
amended and re-enacted in 1899. Clause 3 of Section 16 is in 
substantive accord with the Eng1ish doctrine of 
unconscionable bargains, though in its application the 
different circumstances of this country will have to be taken 
into account; for instance as the eng1ish courts invented the 
class ‘expectant heirs’ we have developed the class of 
pardanashin women. At the same time in as courts of equity 
in England and following them the court here did not in this 
class of cases wholly set aside the transaction, but gave relief 
only on terms, a new section 19-A was added to this rule”. 
3.4.3 General Principles: Section 16 
Section 16 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with the law relating to undue 
influence gives the elements of undue influence a dominant position and the 
use of it to obtain an unfair advantage, the words “unfair advantage” must be 
taken with the context. They do not limit the jurisdiction to cases where the 
transaction would be obviously unfair as between persons dealing on an equal 
footing. 
“The principle applies to cases where influence is acquired 
and abused, where confidence is reposed and betrayed185 or, 
as Sir Samuel Romilly expressed it in his celebrated 
argument in Huguenin v. Baseley, which has been made 
authoritative by repeated judicial approval, 186 “to all the 
variety of relations in which domination may be exercised by 
one person over another”. “As no court has ever attempted to 
define fraud, so no court has ever attempted to define undue 
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influence, which includes one of its many varieties.” 187 
Some forms of pressure which the law would regard as improper would be 
undue influence. An unconscientiously use of pressure exercised under certain 
circumstances and conditions whereby the defendant was victimized by the 
plaintiff’s unfair and improper conduct,188 the nature of benefit gained by the 
plaintiff, or the age or capacity or health and surrounding circumstances of the 
defendant are to be taken into account. The doctrine of undue influence does 
not protect persons who deliberately and voluntarily agree to the terms out of 
folly, Imprudence or lack of foresight. 
The general purport of the entire section and the principles emerging from them 
have been succinctly envisaged by the Privy Council in Raghunath Prasad v. 
Surya Prasad189 thus: 
By that section three matters are dealt with. In the first place the relations 
between the parties to each other might be such that one is in a position to 
dominate the will of another, once that position is substantiated, the second 
stage has been reached, viz the issue whether the contract has been induced by 
undue Influence upon the determination of this issue, and third point emerges, 
which is that of the onus probandi. If the transaction appears to be 
unconscionable, the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by 
undue influence is to lie on the person who was in a position to dominate the 
will of the other. Error is almost sure to arise if the order of these propositions 
be changed. The unconscionableness of the bargain is not the first thing to be 
considered. The first thing to be considered is the relations of the parties. Were 
they such as to put one in a position to dominate the will of the other? 
So it would appear that these are 3 elements to bring the doctrine of undue 
influence into operation: 
1. One party dominates the will or the other due to some special 
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relationship or otherwise. 
2. He used such power to obtain an unfair advantage over the other 
3. That in fact the unfair advantage was obtained thereby 
Clause (1) of Section 16 postulates: 
1. Undue influence as between parties to the contract (third parties are not 
mentioned) 
2. The relationship between the parties is such that one of them is in a 
position to dominate the will of the other 
3. And use that position to obtain unfair advantage over the other. 
3.4.4 Parties to the Contract 
The clause (1) in Section 16 adverts to ‘undue influence’ where relations 
subsisting between the parties are such that there is domination of will and 
obtaining of unfair advantage by one over the other. The term parties clearly 
mean parties to the contract. The question, therefore, arises of persons other 
than parties can exercise undue influence over any of the parties to the contract 
so as to render the same voidable. The section strictly construed clearly shows 
that the undue influence must be exercised by a party to the contract and not by 
a third party. 
The case of Cobett v. Brook190 is sometimes cited to show that it may be 
possible that a contract may be avoided on the plea of undue influence 
exercised by a third party. In such a case it would appear that the other party 
should be proved to be aware at the time of entering into the contract that such 
undue influence had in fact been exercised. 
In Rhodes v. Bate191 the plaintiff was a lady about fifty year’s old living with 
                                                          
190 (1855) 52 E.R. 706: 109 R.R. 523. 
191 (1886) 1 Ch. 252: 13 LT 778. 
159 
 
her brother-in-law Codrington who became greatly indebted to Bate. For this 
debt the plaintiff along with Codrington signed bonds in favour of Bate and 
further charged almost the whole of her estate with the payment of the debt. 
The plaintiff brought an action that the documents and securities were obtained 
by undue influence exercised on her by Codrington and Bate, both were alleged 
stood in confidential relation to her. Lord Justice Turner accepted the 
contention and set aside the transaction, postulating, as settled principles of law 
in the following manner: 
(a) Where confidential relations exist those standing in such relations 
cannot entitle themselves to hold benefits unless they can show that the 
persons who have conferred the benefits had competent and independent 
advice. 
(b) Age and capacity are considerations which may be of importance in 
cases where no confidential relation exists. 
In Espy v. Lake192 case where a young lady, the plaintiff, just come of age 
joined in making with her stepfather speak man at his surety a Promissory Note 
in favor of Lake to whom speak man owed a sum of money, The plaintiff was 
living with her mother and step-father from infancy. They received no 
consideration for the note end so challenged the same, Turner V.C. set aside on 
the ground that speak men stood to the plaintiff in a relation which gave rise to 
confidence between the parties. The step-father, too, stood in loco-parentis to 
the plaintiff which was held as sufficient reason. It will be seen that the 
relationship in this case was not in the nature of a trust nor was it strictly that of 
guardian and ward. It was a case of influence arising by inference from the 
situation of parties. No direct evidence of deception or fraud was necessary. It 
was held that speak man being in confidential position it wag incumbent on him 
affirmatively prove that he did not take advantage of the position of influence 
which subsisted between the parties. Lake had notice of the equities arising 
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from the position of the parties and so judgment was given against them both. 
As the learned Vice-Chancellor made an oft quoted observation that the 
creditor the third party though not guilty of moral fraud nor had he knowledge 
of the principles which guide a court of equity in such cases and yet he was 
liable to surrender the benefit on account of the relation of confidence he stood 
in and he had proved that he had taken any advantage of such a situation. 
Discussing the above English case193 Justice Venkatasubba Rea of the Madras 
High court observed in Naravandas v. Buchraj.194 
There is a close resemblance between this (Espey v. Lake) and the present case. 
If it is shown that the parties stood in such a situation as to give rise to 
confidence between them and that the third party who derives the benefit was 
aware of the existence of this relation, if this is shown the third party is not 
entitled to retain the security unless he shows that the party conferring the 
benefit was a free agent and had independent and disinterested advice. It is not 
necessary for the party impeaching the transaction to prove that he was 
deceived by the person who put himself in loco-parentis towards him, nor is it 
necessary for him to make out that the third party connived at any actual fraud, 
The doctrine is the result of the jealousy and solicitude with which courts of 
equity watch the interest of weaker party where a special confidential or 
fiduciary relation is established. On the basis of the above discussion it can be 
concluded that: 
(1) If there is a relation which gives rise to confidence between the parties 
and if the person in fiduciary position obtains an advantage, where this 
alone is established and nothing further, the court gives relief to the 
party conferring the benefit unless the other party shows that he did not 
avail himself of the confidence which subsisted between the parties. The 
burden is; therefore, upon him and .If he does not discharge the burden 
of the plaintiff succeed. 
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(2)  Where there is a third party involved the position is not dissimilar. If it is 
shown that he was aware of the existence of such confidential or 
fiduciary relation, he is under the same disability as the party who 
occupied the position of confidence, that is to say, the court gives relief 
to the plaintiff without proof of fraud or imposition or any specific act of 
undue influence. It is enough that the third party was aware of the 
existence of the confidential relation and the court do not insist on proof 
that he was further aware of the actual exercise of undue influence. 
These two propositions are well settled and both these principles have been 
applied in the case discussed below: 
In Narayandas v. Buchraj195 the plaintiff impeached a mortgage executed by 
him to the first defendant for a debt due by his maternal uncle the second 
defendant in whose loco-parentis he was brought up after the demise of his own 
father. Purshothamdas the maternal uncle was on the verge of bankruptcy and 
the creditor brought such pressure on him that he prevailed upon the plaintiff, 
then only 20 years of age, to mortgage his (plaintiff’s) share of the properties to 
liquidate the debts. The first defendant’s creditor did not persuade the plaintiff 
though he was fully aware of the special relationship between his debtor and 
the plaintiff, The plaintiff besides have been a ward of the second defendant, 
the later was also a Trustee of the former’s property under a trust deed, The 
court held that the plaintiff was not a free agent equal to protecting himself, was 
persuaded to enter into this transaction b’ the second defendant, the first 
defendant being quite aware of this had in a measure contributed to the undue 
influence. The judge concluded this on the principle: 
“......When a stranger takes the gift tainted with undue 
influence of the person in fiduciary position, with notice of 
the circumstances giving rise to the equity, the court will 
compel him to give up the benefit”. 
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The stranger creditor in the three English cases196 claimed immunity on the 
ground that he took no part in the transaction but left it entirely to the person in 
fiduciary position. But a mere knowledge of the situation of the parties in law 
gives rise to a presumption of undue influence and this was affirmed in the 
Madras case.197 Justice Venkatasubba Rao198 dissented from the view of the 
Calcutta decision Raj Coomar Roy v. Alfuzaddin Ahmed 199 where the court 
said: 
“But I do not find any authority for holding that a third party 
who stands in no confidential relation to the grantor, is 
bound in the first instance to show that no undue influence 
was used”. 
In Rama Patter v. Manikkam200 already adverted to clearly states that the 
decision in Maitland v. Irving201 has been adopted in enacting section 89 of the 
Indian Trusts Act, that the principles followed by the courts of equity in 
England in dealing with third party who have notice of the fiduciary or 
otherwise special relationship between the parties will equally apply in India. 
Such a third party cannot retain any benefit in such circumstances unless he 
shows that the affected party was sufficiently protected by independent advice. 
From the above discussion we may state that on a strict interpretation of the 
wording of section 16, clause(l), it refers to undue influence as between parties, 
i.e., the influence should have been unduly exercised by one party to the 
contract over the other but a stranger who is aware of such influence or who is 
aware of the special relationship of the parties as would lead to a presumption 
of such influence, would equally be affected if he had derived any benefit out of 
the transaction as per the Madras decision. 202 Even if the influence was unduly 
exercised by the third party, if the latter was in same special relationship with 
the affected debtor party and the creditor was aware of the relationship, the 
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burden as on the creditor to prove, that there was no undue influence. 203 Even 
if the influence was unduly exercised by the third party, if the later was in same 
special relationship with the affected debtor party and the creditor was aware of 
the relationship, the burden is on the creditor to prove, that there was no undue 
influence. This proposition is, however, questioned in the Calcutta case.204 
Shri T.R. Desai205 appears to be of the view that the Madras decision in 
Narayan’s cases206 is not sound and prefers the Calcutta decision.207 It is 
submitted that the Madras decision in no way contradicts section 16. Section 16 
defines undue influence as between parties. Undue influence from third parties 
not specifically dealt with the section. All that the Madras decision208 says is 
that if third party’s influence is unduly exercised so as to affect a contract, it is 
voidable. The third party in that case was the uncle of the plaintiff and the 
creditor of the uncle knew of this relationship and so he allowed the uncle to get 
his nephew execute the mortgage in liquidation of the uncle’s debt. The 
creditor need not exercise undue influence but it is enough he knew it was so 
exercised by he uncle on he nephew, the plaintiff. This is quite just and 
equitable and the High Court was right in setting aside the mortgage. 
“The case, of course, would be different if any connivance of 
connection between the person using undue influence and the 
party benefiting by the contract is established”. 
In fact in the Madras case the court found that the creditor to some extent aided 
the uncle. Even otherwise the fact he knew of the strength of the uncle-nephew 
relationship and that the uncle was the real debtor but the nephew just come of 
age was prevailed upon to execute the deed in discharge of the uncle’s debt is 
enough to make the creditor’s hand unclean. He must be deemed to have 
acquiesced in the matter to get a benefit for himself and Mr. Desai’s phrase 
“connivance or connection between the peon using undue influence and the 
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party befitting by the contract” is amply proved by implication if not expressly. 
There is clear authority of the Privy Council in Poosathurai’s case209 that “in 
the category of cases of undue influence might be covered cases where the 
party to a transaction exercised that influence in conspiracy with or through the 
agency of heirs”. That would in effect mean influence can proceed from a third 
party who may act in collusion with the benefited party or be his agent. In 
Tungabai Bhrator v. Yeshwant Dinkar210 Privy Council (Lord Croddard) said 
clearly: 
“When a third party who benefits by a transaction has notice 
of the facts which raise the presumption of undue influence, 
he is in no better position than the person who exercised the 
influence.” 
In that case the wife was acting under the influence of the husband who was 
heavily indebted and who manages her properties. The wife executed a 
mortgage at his bidding to liquidate his debt, the creditor having full knowledge 
of the position of the parties. The court further was of the opinion no proof of 
actual fraud by the husband was necessary. It was enough to show that the wife 
was acting under his influence and not as a free agent. 
In Lingo Bhimrao Naik v. Dattatraya Shripad211 a widow made certain gifts 
before adopting the plaintiff to his natural father to be ratified by adoptee on 
attaining majority. After adoption confirmation deeds were executed by the 
plaintiff, under threat from the widow that the adoption will be set aside, and no 
funds given to him for education. The deeds were in favour of his natural father 
in his absence, who, however, had knowledge and had given preconsent for a 
deed to his own benefit. The High Court set aside the confirmation deeds as 
vitiated by undue influence proceeding from a third party to the deed, the 
widow, i.e., adoptive mother. An early Madras case Lakshmi Dass v. Roop 
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Laul212 states the position tensely that if an alienation by son to a parent himself 
or to a third party at the instance of the parent is made to the detriment of the 
son’s interest, courts will render Justice to the son in equity, even if the 
limitation barred the son, a remedy to an action to set aside the deed. Be can 
raise the pin of undue influence successfully by way of defence. For in the 
instant case beyond signing the deed the defendant (son) did not do anything to 
show that he considered the deed effectual. He was hence not barred by lapse of 
time from setting up the invalidity of the deed. 
So from the catena of authorities above discussed it would appear that undue 
influence by a third petty is a good defence provided the other party had 
knowledge of the special relationship of the third party with the opposite party. 
The stray decision of the Calcutta213 or Lahore High court214 to the contrary do 
not appear to be sound in law. 
The above statement of the law is when third parties are the person to exercise 
their influence unduly and the party to the contract to benefits cut of it is aware 
of such influence. The implication is that the party then gets into the shoes of 
the third party and has to suffer all the disabilities arising from the undue 
influence. 
In so far as the application of the section 16 itself, strictly speaking, one of the 
parties should have dominated over the will of the other.215 Further only a party 
to the contract can raise the plea of undue influence and not a third party. 
3.4.5 Special Relationship and Domination of Will 
The 1st clause of Section 16 further postulates that the relations subsisting 
between the parties should be such that one of them is in a position to dominate 
the will of the other. 
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In Raghunath Prasad V. Sarju Prasad216 the judicial committee laid down the 
first essential that the relationship of the parties should lead one of them to 
dominate over the will of the other. Then follows the enquiry as to whether 
there was undue influence. Next is the question of onus which would naturally 
fall on the dominating party to prove that there was no such undue influence, 
that the other party has independent advice and gave his free consent to the 
contract unconscionableness of the contract apart, the first query should be 
about the relationship of the parties and the domination of the will of one party 
over the other. 217 Domination of will has first to be found before any finding 
even as to unfair advantage over the promisor is given.218 If there is proof of 
over-powering influence and the transaction itself is immoderate and irrational, 
it is a clear case of undue influence.219 
In Possathurai v. Kannappa Chettier220 the Privy Council laid down that it 
must be established that the person in a position of domination has used that 
position to obtain an unfair advantage for him and so to cause injury to the 
person relying upon his authority or aid. And where the relation or influence as 
set forth, has been established and the second thing is also made clear viz, that 
the bargain is with the ‘influencer’ and in itself unconscionable than the person 
in a position to use bidominating power has the burden upon him, and it is a 
heavy burden of establishing affirmatively that no domination was practiced so 
as to bring about the transaction but the grantor of the deed was scrupulously 
advised in the independence of a free agent. 
3.4.6 Obtains an Unfair Advantage over the Other 
It is incumbent that as a result of the undue influence, the dominating party 
should have obtained an unfair advantage over the other. The unfair advantage 
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may consist in obtaining an exorbitant rate of interest221 or in getting a purchase 
of property at a very low value. 222  In the case of a donor and donee or settler 
and settle, their relationship was such that a presumption of dominant influence 
on the part of donee or settlee could be made, the gift or settlement could be set 
aside unless there was clear proof of free and independent consent.223 But a fair 
end proper bargain intelligently made by a Hindu lady freely or voluntarily to 
benefit her husband can be sustained in law.224 The test of good faith should be 
the fairness of the bargain. Hard bargaining evidenced by a grossly inadequate 
conversation is sufficient to make whole thing suspect in the eye of law and 
condemn the transaction.225 
3.4.7 C1ause (2)-Types Domination of Will 
The clause (2) of section 16 affirms the principle stated in clause (l) as to undue 
influence and unfair advantage and posits what is domination of will by one 
over another. The domination may be 
(a)  (i) By a person who holds real or apparent authority over the other, 
(ii) Or where he is in fiduciary relation to the other; 
(b)  Or where he makes a contract with a person of weak menta1 capacity 
(temporary or permanent). This may be due to age, illness or mental or 
bodily distress. 
The law does not require that there should be direct evidence of actual exercise 
of undue influence. Having regard to the relationship of the parties, the course 
of dealing, the position of advantage occupied by the person who is alleged to 
have exercised undue influence, the undue benefit derived by him in 
consequence of that position and from the consideration of the further 
circumstances adverted to in section 16, the court can draw a presumption in 
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favour of the exercise of undue influence.226 
According to Section 16(2)(a) a person is deemed to dominate the will of 
another where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other. It has to be stated 
that a person who is not in loco-parent is to another may still stand in a 
fiduciary relation to him. The term ‘fiduciary relation’ is a broad one and not 
susceptible of precise definition, In cases in which a person acquires an 
influence and then abuses it, or confidence is reposed which is subsequently is 
betrayed, a fiduciary relationship is said to exist regardless of the origin of 
confidence and the source of influence.227 
Thus we can say that a party to a transaction, though consenting to it, may not 
give a free consent because he is exposed to such influence from the other party 
as to deprive him of the free use of his judgment. In such a case, the transaction 
will be set aside. If property has passed, equity will order restitution, and, if 
necessary, follow the property into the hands of third parties. 
‘Influence’ has been defined as the ascendancy acquired by one person over 
another; it may be used wisely, judiciously and helpfully. 228   ‘Undue 
influence’ is improper use by the ascendant person of such ascendancy for the 
benefit of himself or someone else, so that the acts of the person influenced are 
not, in the fullest sense of the word, his free, voluntary acts. It is any influence 
brought to bear upon a person entering into an agreement, which having regard 
to the age and capacity of the party, the nature of the transaction and all the 
circumstances of the case appears to have been such as to preclude the exercise 
of free and deliberate judgment.229 It means the domination of a weak mind by 
a strong mind to an extent which causes the behavior of the weaker person to 
assume an unnatural character. 230 The person influenced- is constrained to do 
against his will that which but for the influence he would have refused to do if 
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left to exercise his own judgment.231 
It is said to be a subtle species of fraud, whereby mastery is obtained over the 
mind of the victim, by insidious approaches and seductive artifices. 
Sometimes, the result is brought about by fear, coercion, importunity or other 
domination, calculated to prevent expression of the victim’s true mind. It is a 
constraint undermining free agency overcoming the powers of resistance, 
bringing about a submission to an overmastering and unfair persuasion to the 
detriment of another.232 
 
E. INEQUALITY AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
3.5.1 Introduction 
If a contract or clause in a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or irrational, 
one must look to the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. In 
contracts there would be no occasion for a weaker party to bargain or to assume 
to have equal bargaining power. His option would be either to accept the 
unreasonable or unfair terms or forego the service for ever. An unfair and 
untenable or irrational clause in a contract is unjust and amenable to judicial 
review. In U.S.A., the standard forms of contracts are called ‘Contracts of 
Adhesion’. Whether the presence of the correlative social role of the drafting 
party and adherent is available in equal terms in the test.233 
3.5.2 Unconscionable Bargains 
Law relating to hard and unconscionable bargains has been codified in the form 
of Contract Act and the Courts cannot go outside the statutory provisions and 
follow some rules or supposed rules that have been applied in certain cases by 
the Courts of Equity in Englan.234 Mere pecuniary inadequacy of consideration 
                                                          
231  Amir Chand Tota Ram v. Sucheta Kripalani, AIR 1961 Punj. 383. 
232  Mahboob Khan v. Abdul Rahim, 1964 AIR Raj.250. 
233 LIC of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811:  
  (1995) 5 SCC 482.  
234 Harish Chandra Nandi v. Keshav Chandra Das, AIR 1929 Cal. 334: 31 CLS 369 (DB).  
170 
 
will not generally make the terms of a contract seem too familiar for 
enforcement unless the degree of inadequacy is extreme.235 
Professor Ellinghaus “In Defence of Unconscionability”236 agrees that, it is 
very difficult to lay down any guideline to determine whether a particular 
agreement suffers from unconscionability but finds in this very vagueness a 
frank and purposeful invitation to the Courts to fashion a new body of law, in 
time, honoured common law fashion, by “reasoned and creative exegesis and 
implementation.” 
Where the transaction is undoubtedly improvident in the absence of any 
evidence to show that the money-lender had unduly taken advantage of his 
position, it is difficult for a Court of justice to give relief on grounds of simple 
hardship.237 
When a deed of perpetual lease was executed in consideration of large sum of 
money alleged to have been advanced by the agent and it was highly unlikely 
that the agent, who was a man of ordinary means and there was no expressly 
reserved right of re-entry in the lessor, it was held that the contract was 
unconscionable.238 
A Court should look at the transaction at its inception and see if at that time it 
was so hard and unconscionable that a Court of justice would not enforce it.239 
The mere fact that the principal sum claimed in suit exceeds enormously, the 
amount originally advanced would be no ground for holding the transaction 
unconscionable.240 
In order to establish undue influence, it must appear that there was something 
unconscionable either in the original dealing or in the subsequent stages of the 
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transaction.241 The mere fact that the rates of interest are somewhat high 
affords no evidence that there was any undue influence or that there was 
anything unfair or unconscionable about the transaction.242 
Where the donor was an old man of 100 years of age and was very intimate 
with the donee and had lent money, that the old man not only disinherited his 
son and his wife of all the property which he was possessed, it was held that the 
donor’s son had merely to prove that the donee was in a position to dominate 
the will of the aged donor and that the gift was unconscionable.243 
When the property valuing over rupees two lakhs was gifted by the donor, an 
illiterate old lady, to her advocate who was in no way related to her and both of 
them were living in separate villages, the transaction could by no means be said 
to be conscionable.244 
In law of contract by G.H. Treitel,245 it is stated: 
“It is sometimes said that one party should be entitled to relive 
if the other has taken unfair advantage of the fact that there is 
a marked inequality of bargaining power between them. The 
first group of such statements is concerned with the special 
problem of the Validity of covenants in restraint of trade. This 
depends on whether the covenant is ‘reasonable’, and the 
adequacy of consideration is taken into consideration in 
determining the issue of reasonableness. The fairness of the 
bargain (which to some extent depends on the relative 
bargaining positions of the parties) is therefore obviously 
relevant to the validity of the restraint. The fact that it is for 
this purpose taken into account scarcely supports a general 
principle of relief against harsh bargains on the ground of 
inequality of bargaining power.”  
3.5.3 Concept of Unconscionability 
The doctrine of unconscionability differs from the doctrine of undue influence, 
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is that the former depends on the defendant’s unconscionable conduct. The 
former is seen as ‘defendant-sided’ and concerned with the defendant’s 
exploitation of the plaintiff’s vulnerability. The latter is seen as 
‘plaintiff-sided’, being concerned with the weakness of the plaintiff’s consent 
owing to an excessive dependence upon the defendant. In Morrison v. Coast 
Finance Ltd.,246 it was stated: 
“The equitable principles relating to undue influence and 
relief against unconscionable bargains are closely related, but 
the doctrines are separate and distinct. A plea of undue 
influence attacks the sufficiency of consent; a plea that a 
bargain it is unconscionable invokes relief against an unfair 
advantage gained by the unconscientious use of power by a 
stronger party against a weaker.”  
Again in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. v. Amadio, Deane J stated:247 
“Undue influence, like common law duress, looks to the 
quality of the consent or assent of the weaker party. 
Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger 
party in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, a 
dealing with a person under a special disability in 
circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good 
conscience that he should do so.” 
In the same case, Mason J put the difference as follows: 
“Although unconscionable conduct in this narrow sense bears 
some resemblance to the doctrine of undue influence, there is a 
difference between the two. In the latter the will of the innocent 
party is not independent and voluntary because it is overborne. 
In the former the will of the innocent party, even if independent 
and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in 
which he is placed and of the other party unconscientiously 
taking advantage of that position.”248 
It has been suggested that the doctrine of undue influence and 
unconscionability are sufficiently similar in their objectives; that the two share 
the main features of relational inequality, transactional imbalance and 
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unconscionable conduct of the defendant, and therefore can profitably be 
merged into one.249 
3.5.3.1 Position in United Kingdom 
Two English cases provide support for recognition of a general principle 
entitling a court to intervene on the grounds of unconscionable bargains,250 
where arguments to set aside transactions on the grounds of their being 
unconscionable bargains was not accepted, but both judgments support a 
recognition for a general principle. The elements of unconscionability were 
formulated in Alec Labb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil GB Ltd.251 as: 
(i) One party must be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the other; 
(ii) This weakness must be exploited by the other party in a morally 
culpable manner; and 
(iii) The transaction must be; not merely hard or improvident, but oppressive 
and overreaching. 
The judgment hints at requiring subjective knowledge on the part of the 
stronger party both of the weakness of the other party, and of the fact that a 
bargain was obtained. The general principle has not been accepted in the 
English law, because the doctrine of undue influence has been considered as a 
preferable technique, and it was desirable to bring about this change by 
legislation.252 
The law in the UK about unconscionable bargains has been stated thus:253 
Where by reason of the unfair manner in which it was brought 
into existence (procedural unfairness) as where it was induced 
by undue influence, or where it came into being through an 
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unconscientious use of the power arising out of the 
circumstances and conditions of the contracting parties:254 in 
such cases equity may give a remedy; but where by reason of 
the fact that the terms of the contract are more unfavourable to 
one party than to the other (contractual imbalance); 
contractual imbalance or inadequacy of consideration is not, 
however, in itself a ground for relief in equity,255 but it may be 
an element in establishing such fraud as will avoid the 
transaction256 or the transaction may be so unconscionable as 
to afford in itself evidence of fraud.257 A bargain cannot be 
unfair and unconscionable, however, unless one of the parties 
to it has imposed the objectionable terms in a morally 
reprehensible manner, that is to say in a way which affects his 
conscience, as by taking advantage of the weakness or 
necessity of the other.258 
3.5.3.2 Position in India 
The Law Commission of India in its 13th Report259 considered whether relief 
ought to be given against hard and unconscionable bargain, even though where 
no question of undue influence was involved. The Law Commission preferred 
the view in U Kesavulu Naidu v. Arithulai Ammal 260  that unless undue 
influence was proved, no relief should be granted on the ground of 
unconscionablenss of a contract. 
In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly,261 the 
Supreme Court considered the question whether relief could be granted for an 
unconscionable bargain, and under which head should it fall. A question arose 
whether a court would have the power to strike down an unfair and 
unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract 
between parties, who were not equal in bargaining power. In this case, undue 
influence was neither alleged nor pleaded. The court recognized that all such 
contracts may not fall within the definition of undue influence. After discussing 
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the development of law in a number of countries, it held that the courts 
adjudged such contracts void as contrary to public policy under Section 23 of 
this Act 262  The judgment gives stress on the procedural test of 
unconscionability, when it refers to the requirements of ‘great disparity in the 
economic strength of parties’, whether inequality arises as a result of 
circumstances or is the creation of the parties; that weaker party has no 
meaningful choice but to give assent to the contract, or to sign it.263 But it also 
suggests that the substantive test must be satisfied; that contracts which contain 
‘terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of 
the court’ are opposed to public policy.264 
3.5.4 Report of the Law Commission 
In its Report on the Unfair Terms of Contract,265 the Law Commission of India 
was concerned with standard form contracts imposing unfair and unreasonable 
terms upon unwilling consumers or persons who had no bargaining power. It 
considered the inadequacy of the present statute law to give justice to the 
weaker party. Although, the discussion in the report focuses on standard form 
contracts, its recommendation is wide, and does not restrict itself to any 
particular type of contract. It recommended adding a new chapter and section 
into this Act. Chapter IVA, Section 67A:  
(1) Where the court, on the terms of the contract or on the evidence adduced 
by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the contract or any part of it 
is unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce the contact or the part that it 
holds to be unconscionable. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this section, a 
contract or part of it is deemed to be unconscionable if it exempts any 
party thereto from- (a) the liability for wilful breach of the contract, or 
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(b) the consequences of negligence. 
3.5.5 Statutory Intervention in Unfair or Unconscionable Transactions 
The Usurious Loans Act, 1918 empowers the courts to reopen transactions of 
money or grain loans to revise the transaction between the parties, and if 
necessary, to reduce the amount payable to such sum as the court, having 
regard to the risk and all the circumstances of the case, may decide to be 
reasonable. 
It gives the power to the court to go behind the particular transaction and 
examine antecedent agreements and attendant circumstances. The enactment 
was necessary because even after the amendment to section 16 of the Indian 
Contract Act, where undue influence was not established, the court could not 
grant relief, however, exorbitant the demand, and however, unconscionable the 
bargain. Under the Act, the court can reopen the transaction of the loan, reopen 
any account taken between the parties, or set aside or alter any security given 
for a loan if: 
1. Interest is excessive; and 
2. The transaction was substantially unfair. 
3.5.6 The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power 
There are cases under the English law, where equity intervened not because the 
terms were harsh or oppressive, but because it refused one party to take 
advantage of the other’s weakness or need. The pressure in these cases was not 
of undue influence or personal pressure, but arose because the other party took 
advantage of its economic power and necessity of the vendor or the borrower 
which has been termed as pressure resulting from an inequality of bargaining 
position.266 This doctrine has been applied as an independent principle.  
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In Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy,267 a further guarantee and a charge were given by 
the father to a bank on the advice of the bank manager in regard to the debt of 
his son. The father was held to have complete faith and did not get out of his 
son. The father was held to have complete faith and did not get outside advice. 
The court of appeal held that a special relationship of confidence existed 
between the bank and the father, and the last guarantee and charge were liable 
to set aside for undue influence. Lord Denning MR considered them voidable 
on the larger ground of inequality of bargaining powers. He stated: 
There are cases in our books in which the courts will set aside 
a contract, or a transfer of property, where the parties have 
not met on equal terms-when one is so strong in the bargaining 
power and the other so weak that, as a matter of common 
fairness, it is not right that the strong should be allowed to 
push the weak to the wall. And later, by virtue of it the concept 
of inequality of bargaining power), the English law gives relief 
to one who, without independent advice, enters into a contract 
upon terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a 
consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his 
bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own 
needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled 
with undue influence or pressure brought to bear on him by or 
for the benefit of the other. 
He also stated that no bargain should be upset which was ‘the 
result of ordinary interplay of economic forces’, but the court 
should interfere only ‘where there has been inequality of 
bargaining power such as to merit the intervention of court’.  
Inequality of bargaining powers has not been accepted as a general principle in 
the English law, and its need has been doubted in later cases, the principle has 
not been accepted as a general doctrine for setting aside a contract, unless it fell 
within one of the recognised categories of ‘victimisation’ such as duress, undue 
influence and unconscionable advantage. 
The principle, established by a series of English decisions, that ‘where a 
purchase is made from a poor and ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, 
the vendor having not independent advice, a court of equity will set aside a 
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transaction’, by raising the presumption of undue influence. This section does 
not recognise a general principle of inequality of bargaining powers of striking 
down contracts.     
3.5.7 Inequality of Bargaining Power and Public Policy 
In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly,268 a 
company entered into a scheme of arrangement with the corporation, a 
government company, with the approval of the High Court. Under the scheme, 
an officer of the company could accept the job of the corporation or in the 
alternative, leave the job and receive a meagre amount by way of 
compensation. The rules of the corporation provided that the services of 
officers could be terminated by giving three months notice. The petitioner’s 
service were terminated in this manner. The petitioner challenged this rule as 
arbitrary under art. 14 of the constitution, and alleged that a term in a contract 
of the employment entered into by a private employer, which was unfair, 
unreasonable and unconscionable was bad in law. This rule formed part of 
contract of employment and its validity fell to be tested by the principles of the 
law of contracts. The petitioners did not make out a case of coercion, fraud or 
misrepresentation. After discussing the judgements of English courts, and the 
law in the UK, USA and Germany, the Supreme Court observed: 
“…the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do 
so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an 
unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into 
between parties who are not equal in bargaining power.” 
Observing that the different situations in this would occur could not be 
visualized, it stated: 
“……the above principle will apply where the inequality of 
bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the 
economic strength of the contracting parties,…where the 
inequality is the result of circumstances whether of the 
creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in 
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which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain 
goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms 
imposed by the stronger party or go without the. It will also 
apply where the man has no choice, or rather no meaningful 
choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the 
dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set 
of rules as part of the contract. However unfair, unreasonable 
and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules 
may be. This principle, however, will not apply where both 
parties are businessman on the contract is a commercial 
transaction.” 
There is another class of cases analogous to those undue influence, but with the 
element of personal influence wanting, in which equity also throws the burden 
of justifying the righteous of a bargain on the party who claims the benefit of it. 
According to the language of Lord Hardwick’s, raise, ‘from the circumstances 
or conditions of the parties contracting- weakness on one side, usury on the 
other, or extortion, or advantage taken of that weakness’ - a presumption of 
fraud. Fraud does not here mean deceit or circumvention; it means an 
unconscientious use of the power arising out of these circumstances and 
conditions; and when the relative position of the positions of the parties is such 
as prima facie to raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the 
person claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by contrary 
evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair, just and reasonable. 
F. NECESSITOUS INTERVENTION 
3.6.1 Introduction 
There is no general principle of English law that those who render necessary 
services, or confer other necessary benefits in an emergency or other 
necessitous circumstance to the advantage of another, have a right to 
reimbursement for their efforts. However, there are pockets of case law from 
disparate contexts - maritime salvage, burial of the dead, care of the mentally 
incompetent and agency of necessity - where something akin to restitution has 
been awarded. Scholars have sought to generalise these single instances, but 
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the current law forms an uneven patchwork. Often-cited judicial dicta express 
the robust individualism of the common law. Most famous, Bowen LJ stated in 
Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.269 
The general principle is, beyond all questions, that work and 
labour done or money expended by one man to preserve or 
benefit the property  of other do not according to English law 
create ant lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even 
if standing alone, create any obligation to repay the 
expenditure.  Liabilities are not to be forced upon people 
behind their backs any more than you can confer a benefit 
upon a man against his will. 
In Falcke the owner of the equity of redemption in a life insurance policy paid a 
premium in order to ensure the policy did not lapse. His claim for a lien against 
the mortgagee of the policy failed. There was no evidence of any request or free 
acceptance of his intervention. Further, it could be observed there was no 
necessity, and that he acted out of self-interest. Lord Diplock in China Pacific 
SA v Food Corporation of India,270 it is, of course, true that in English law a 
mere stranger cannot compel an owner of goods to pay for a benefit bestowed 
upon him against his will.’ 
There are twin concerns. First, the characteristic difficulties of establishing 
enrichment where the intervention takes the form of transferring property or 
rendering services. Recourse to an objective measure of benefit will be possible 
only where the conditions for free acceptance or incontrovertible benefit can be 
satisfied, though the later test would appear more appropriate in such 
circumstances. It is interesting to speculate whether such an argument would 
now succeed on the facts of the Flack case. Secondly, prior to the development 
of the modern law of restitution there was no explicit recognition of an unjust 
factor or ground for restitution based upon necessitous intervention, outside of 
the maritime context. The thrust of modern scholarship promotes such 
development. For the future, a party wishing to argue for wider relief on the 
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grounds of necessity may find comparative material of more assistance than 
domestic developments to date. 
3.6.2 Maritime Salvage 
The details of the law of maritime salvage are beyond the scope of this book. Its 
concerns are rewarding necessitous interventions at sea where they preserve 
life and property. It has been rationalised as being concerned with the reversal 
of unjust enrichment:271 however, the calculation of salvage awards in practice 
reflects more diverse policies. For a useful survey from a restitution 
perspective.272 
The courts have had the opportunity of extending the principles of salvage, but 
to date have confined it within its original context. In Nicholson v Chapman,273 
a quantity of timber was secured in a dock by the Thames, but broke loose from 
its ropes and was carried by the tide to Putney where it was left at low water 
upon a towpath. Chapman carried the timber to a nearby place of safety beyond 
the reach of the tide. He then refused to deliver the timber to Nicholson, its 
owner, unless he was remunerated for his efforts. It was held that Chapman had 
no lien and was guilty of wrongful interference with Nicholson’s goods. Eyre 
CJ stated that the question was whether this could be equated with salvage. He 
concluded:  
Goods earned by sea are necessarily and unavoidably exposed 
to the perils which storms, tempest and accidents (far beyond 
the reach of human foresight to prevent) are hourly creating, 
and against which, it too often happens that the greatest 
diligence and the most strenuous exertions of the mariner 
cannot protect them. When goods are thus in imminent danger 
of being lost, it is most frequently to the hazard of the lives of 
those who save them, that they are saved. Principles of public 
policy dictate to civilised and commercial countries, not only 
the propriety, and even the absolute necessity of establishing a 
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liberal recompense for the encouragement of those who 
engage in so dangerous a service. 
The Court of Common Pleas held that property going astray on a navigable 
river far from the sea did not fall within the scope of this policy. In dicta the 
court suggested that it might uphold a claim for recompense by the finder and 
preserver of another’s property if it was brought as a personal claim. However, 
the claim to a lien (a proprietary remedy), which is available in true maritime 
salvage, was not available in land-based cases.274 The court further adumbrated 
two public policy reasons why a lien should be denied the land-based finder 
and preserver of property. First, concern about the ‘wilful attempts of 
ill-designing people to turn their floats and vessels adrift, in order that they 
might be paid for finding them’. That is, the existence of a proprietary remedy 
might endanger as much as preserve property in the long run. Secondly, if a lien 
was available there was a danger that the owner of property would always pay 
too much in order to secure its release. 
The boundaries of maritime salvage were preserved by the House of Lords 
in,275 where classic salvage services were performed again on the Thames near 
Reading Bridge for the eponymous vessel. Lord Brandon held that the salvage 
jurisdiction did not extend to non-tidal inland waters. Further, he rejected the 
suggested extension by way of analogy and for reasons of public policy put 
forward by Sheen J and Sir John Donaldson MR in the lower courts.276 In 
Falcke v Scottish imperial Insurance Co.,277 Bowen U observed of the doctrine 
of maritime salvage: ‘No similar doctrine applies to things lost upon land, nor 
to anything except ships or goods in peril at sea.’ 
3.6.3 Agency of Necessity 
The principles of agency of necessity originated in the law merchant in two 
particular situations. First, the power of the master of a vessel in an emergency 
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to dispose of the cargo and perform other necessary actions. Secondly, the right 
of reimbursement of the acceptor of a bill of exchange for the honour of the 
drawer. There is respectable authority that the principle is confined to such 
exceptional cases. 278  In contrast, in cases where there is a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties, commonly bailment, there has been some 
judicial support for an expansion of doctrine. In Prager v Blatspiel, Stamp and 
Heacock Ltd,279 McCardie J stated that agency of necessity would arise if three 
conditions were satisfied; 
(a)  The agent must be unable to communicate with the principal in order to 
obtain instructions as to what to do to safeguard the latter’s interests; 
(b)  The action taken must be commercially necessary; 
(c)  The agent must act bonafide and in the best interests of the principal. 
It is controversial whether there is anything particularly agency-orientated 
about many of the authorities where agency of necessity is adverted to. It is 
necessary to distinguish two distinct situations. In China Pacific SA v Food 
Corporation of India,280 observed: 
“Whether one person is entitled to act as agent of necessity for 
another person is relevant to the question whether 
circumstances exist which in law have the effect of conferring 
on him authority to create contractual rights and obligations 
between that other person and a third party that are directly 
enforceable by each against the other. It would, I think, be an 
aid to clarity of legal thinking if the use of the expression 
‘agent of necessity’ were confined to contexts in which this was 
the question to be determined and not extended, as it often is, 
to cases where the only relevant question is whether a person 
who without obtaining instructions from the owner of goods 
incurs expense in taking steps that are reasonably necessary 
for their preservation is in law entitled to recover from the 
owner of the goods the reasonable expenses incurred by him in 
taking those steps.” 
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Only the former, triangular configuration raises agency issues. The latter, linear 
configuration raises no issues of legal representation, but only of a direct right 
to restitution. The facts of The Winson involved a linear claim. Salvors 
off-loaded wheat from a stranded vessel and arranged and paid for its storage 
pending collection by the cargo-owners. They were held entitled to 
reimbursement. Lord Diplock stated that, as regards two-party cases, 
impossibility of communication with the owner was not a condition precedent 
to the claim. The owner’s failure to give instructions when apprised of the 
situation sufficed. Note that the triangular situation would have arisen with a 
variation of the facts if the warehouses in which the cargo was stored had sued 
the owner directly on a contract purportedly made upon the owner’s behalf by 
the salvor. The determination of this question was expressly left open. In obiter 
dicta in In re F (Menial Patient: Sterilisation), 281 Lord Goff of Chieveley 
stated that the intervener must act prudently, and must not be acting officiously. 
Lastly, it is worth citing Lord Diplock’s observation in The Winson that 
‘English law is economical in recognising situations that give rise to agency of 
necessity’. 
3.6.4 Principle of Necessitous Intervention  
The origin of the principle of necessitous intervention rests in the idea of 
agency of necessity, where an agent exceeds his authority by acting on behalf 
of the principal in an emergency situation. As a result of the conditions of the 
necessity, especially the impracticality of the agent’s contact with the principal, 
the courts were taking the role of the agent as if he had the authority to do what 
was logically necessary to safeguard the principal's property. If an agency of 
necessity was found, the agent could be compensated for the expenses resulting 
from rescuing or saving the principal’s property.  
Indeed, the idea of agency of necessity was primarily applicable for only those 
cases in respect to carriage of goods by sea, as the captain or master took action 
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to save a ship or cargo in critical conditions. Then, the doctrine was extended to 
cover conditions and cases that are related to the carriage of goods by land.  
3.6.5 Requirements for Validity of Necessity  
1. Communication with the Principal must have been impracticable or 
impossible.  
2. The action must have been for the benefit of the Principal.  
3. It must have been for the benefit of the Principal  
4. Competency of the person the agent is acting on behalf of must not be in 
doubt.  
5. Authority cannot be upheld where an earlier express contrary instruction 
of Principal was received.  
3.6.6 A Critique of the Doctrine of Necessity  
The dichotomous dilemma of courts to approach this doctrine from a purely 
legal perspective or a philosophical one has been a serious subject of debate. 
Bowen L.J. explained in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance282 “The general 
principle is, beyond all question, that work and labor done or money expended 
by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another do not, according to 
English law, create any lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even if 
standing alone, create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Liabilities are 
not to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than you can confer a 
benefit upon a man against his will”.283 
The requirement of the doctrine to extreme situations of the inability of the 
agent to communicate with the principal is also under serious challenge by the 
21st century’s modern technology, as Bowstead observed; Markesin is and 
Monday similarly commented, “with today’s improved communications, it 
may be difficult for the agent to establish that communication was practically 
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impossible”.284 Professor Friedman further suggests, “it must be impossible for 
the master to be able to communicate with the owners of the ship or cargo and 
ask for instructions  (which seems severely to limit the operation of this form 
of agency in the light of modern communications although it may be relevant 
where there are numerous cargo owners).” 285 
With global improvement in financial services “provision by several private 
and public institutional bodies, not to mention the ever increasing competitive 
banking environment, the assertion of disposing goods to raise money for a 
justification of necessitous intervention will surely be put to rest. This is 
because the same ease of communication achieved in today’s modern world is 
reflected in the speed at which money can now be freely transferred from one 
end of the globe to another. Vollans observed, “if communications have all but 
eliminated the impossibility of obtaining instructions, those communication 
systems have also facilitated global money transfer almost to the extinction of 
agency of necessity”.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that the agency of necessity is seen as a rare 
exception to the rule developed for, policy ‘reasons, which might eventually go 
the way of other similar exceptions, as seen in, salvage and acceptance of a 
bill’. 
3.6.7 Bailment 
The linear restitutionary claim traditionally discussed in terms of agency of 
necessity most commonly involves a pre-existing bailment. Bailment involves 
the transfer of possession of tangible personal properly. In Prager v. Blatspiel, 
Stamp and Heacock Ltd, 286  London fur merchants acted on behalf of a 
Bucharest furrier in buying and dressing skins. World War I intervened. After 
Romania was invaded by Germany, the London agents sold skins belonging to 
the Bucharest furrier on their own account. A plea of agency of necessity was 
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rejected as a defence to a claim for wrongful interference with goods when the 
war was over. There was no factual necessity: dressed furs were not perishable 
goods and the sellers, who had sold the skins alter a great increase in value, had 
not acted bonafide. 
The clearest authority granting restitution in a case of pre-existing bailment is 
Great Northern Railway Co. v Swaffield.287 The railway company carried a 
horse on behalf of the defendant to a station, but the horse was not collected 
from the station. The company accordingly arranged for this horse to be looked 
after by a stable. The defendant refused to pay for the charges incurred, and 
eventually the plaintiffs met the sum themselves, delivered the horse, and made 
a personal claim for the stabling charges. The Court of Exchequer held that they 
were entitled to reimbursement. The court stressed that the railway company as 
a carrier had a duty to take reasonable care of the horse such as a man who 
would take reasonable care of his goods. By analogy with maritime 
authority,288 it was held that there was a correlative right to reimbursement for 
necessary expenses incurred. This is consistent with the dicta in Nicholson v 
Chapman,289 favouring a personal claim, but rejecting a proprietary claim in 
the form of a lien. Further, the House of Lords in China Pacific SA v Food 
Corporation of India,290 The Winson stressed the relationship between the 
salvors and the cargo-owners gave rise to a direct relationship of bailment. 
Salvage services required the off-loading .of the cargo and its conveyance to a 
place of safety. Thereafter, according to Lord Diplock: 
“The bailment which up to the conclusion of salvage services 
had been a bailment for valuable consideration became a 
gratuitous bailment; and so long as that relationship of bailor 
and bailee continued to subsist the salvors, under the ordinary 
principles of the law of bailment too well known and too 
well-established to call for any citation of authority, owed a 
duty of care to the cargo owner to take such measures to 
preserve the salved wheat from deterioration by exposure to 
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the elements as a man of ordinary prudence would take for the 
preservation of his own property. For any breach of such duty 
the bailee is liable to his bailor in damages for any diminution 
of the value of the goods consequent upon his failure to take 
such measures; and if he fulfils that duty he has, in my view, a 
correlative right to charge the owner of the goods with the 
expenses reasonably incurred in doing so.” 
Burial of the dead provides another pocket of case law from which the inchoate 
general principle of relief for necessitous intervention might be developed. In 
Jenkins v Tucker,291 a father paid the funeral expenses of his married daughter 
while her husband, who was primarily liable for the expense, was abroad on his 
estate. The Court of Common Pleas allowed the father, as a proper person to 
interfere, to recover his expenses in an action of money paid. This supports the 
requirement that the intervention should not be officious. The style of funeral 
should be suitable to the standing of the person. Similarly in Rogers v Price,292 
the plaintiff undertaker who was called to attend the deceased, who had died at 
his brother’s house, succeeded in quantum meruit against the estate of the 
deceased. It was admitted that the funeral was suitable to the degree of the 
deceased. The policy underlying recovery was stated by  Justice Garrow J: 
“Suppose a person to be killed by accident at a distance from 
his home; what, in such a case ought to be done? The Common 
principles of decency and humanity, the common impulses of 
our nature, would direct every one as a preliminary step, to 
provide a decent funeral, at the expense of the estate; and to do 
that which is immediately necessary upon the subject, in order 
to avoid what, if not provided against, may become an 
inconvenience to the public.” 
This case appears to allow any appropriate person to make a claim (including 
professional undertakers) provided the action was not officious. 
In In re Rhodes293 the Court of Appeal held that a brother who had provided for 
his sister’s confinement in a private asylum was prima facie entitled to 
reimbursement for the expenses incurred. It was held that the mental of her was 
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liable. The court emphatically enunciated that the obligation was one imposed 
by law, and rejected an earlier Court of Appeal’s reliance on the implied 
contract fallacy. 294  However, the decision is marred by an additional 
requirement that money must have been paid with intention on the part of the 
intervener that it should be repaid. There being little evidence of this, the claim 
was rejected.295 
We have seen the global importance of common law in solving difficult and 
complicated socio-economic relations among people. The expectations upon it 
are enormous in that it shapes and guides our collective behavior towards a just 
and free society. It is inevitable that the English Law has come to be integrated 
within almost all legal systems throughout the world. As a society is never 
static, the law needs to keep up with changing circumstances, or face an 
undignified loss of relevance. It is in response to this that the agency of 
necessity resolved issues pertaining to problems, as articulated by Lynskey J. in 
Munro v. Willmott,296 where masters of ships found themselves in foreign parts 
and unable to get immediate instructions from their owners when they needed 
money for expenses which had not been provided for. While different 
jurisdictions were only able to handle the issue by extending implied authority 
in an emergency, 297  the English law was able to adequately address the 
loop-hole through the doctrine of, Agency of Necessity, “an offshoot of the law 
of salvage, where sale of cargo or the pledging of a vessel to raise funds was 
permitted to enable a voyage to proceed.298 Whilst the courts sought for the 
establishment of existence of pre-existing contractual obligations between 
principals and their agents, and proof that the goods are perishable, instances 
abound that enabled the doctrine’s application despite the absence of either (or 
both). Nevertheless the doctrine “sought to accommodate commercial realism 
within the constraints of a strict legal doctrine; and consequently, the doctrine 
                                                          
294 Cf In re Weaver (1882) 21  Ch D 615. 
295 Birks, Negotiorum Gestic and the Law (1971) CLP 199. 
296 (1949) 1 K.B. 295 at p 297. 
297 Munro v Willmott (1949) 1 K.B. pp. 295-297. 
298 Arthur v Barton (1840) – 6 M & W pl 38. 
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has, over the years, unwrapped a number of separate (and disparate) sub 
doctrines, some of which (such as the wife’s agency of necessity) have been 
abolished.” 299 
 
 
                                                          
299 Ibid. 
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Chapter-IV 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT UNDER INDIAN  
CONTRACT ACT, 1872: AN ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what 
has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man 
from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is 
against conscience that he should keep.1 These are different from remedies in 
contract or in tort. Under the English Law they now fall within a distinct third 
category of restitution.2 
A quasi contract belongs to an entirely different legal category, having 
nothing to do with genuine contracts, express or implied. These are a 
heterogeneous collection of cases having little in common than the fact that 
one person is entitled to recover money or property from the other in order 
that a just result should be reached. Such a right does not depend upon 
agreement or promise. 
A contract implied in law or a quasi contract is not a real contract or as it is 
called, a consensual contract. A quasi-contractual cause of action involves an 
alleged promise to pay, which is purely fictitious. This promise is imposed by 
implication of law, apart from and without regard to the probable intention of 
the parties, and sometimes even against the clear expression of dissent. 
Strictly these ‘constructive contracts’ are not true contracts at all, since the 
essential element of consent is absent. The expression quasi-contract is truly a 
misnomer; for it has little or no affinity with the contract. The Roman lawyers 
explained these as misfits. Justinian refers to ‘those obligations which do not 
originate, properly speaking in contract but, which as they do not arise from a 
                                                 
1 Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1943) AC 32.   
2 Ibid.  
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delict, but seem to be quasi-contractual.’ This Act has avoided the expression, 
and simply calls these relations ‘certain relations resembling those created by 
contract.’ Such ‘constructive contracts’ do not have any real similarity to 
terms implied into contract by law; the latter are only implied into an actual 
contract brought into existence by the ordinary principles for formation of 
agreements. 
In such cases the liability is said to exist independent of the agreement, and 
rests upon the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Quasi contracts give 
rise to a situation where an obligation or duty is cast upon the parties by law, 
but not by the terms of the contract to which they have given assent.3 Quasi 
contracts or restitution has been placed as a third category of law not founded 
upon contract or tort.4 
4.2 Theoretical Bases of Quasi-Contractual Liability 
The two main theoretical bases of quasi-contractual liability are: (i) implied 
contract; and (ii) unjust enrichment 
4.2.1 Implied Contract  
These causes of action being based on the common remedy of indebitatus 
assumpsit, the courts treated the alleged promise to pay as purely fictitious. 
The promise was imposed by law. As was stated: 
“… it was necessary to create a fictitious contract: for there 
was no action possible other than debt or assumpsit on the 
one side and action for damages for tort on the other. The 
fiction was so obvious that in some cases the judge created a 
fanciful relation between the plaintiff and the defendant… 
The law, in order to do justice, imputed to the wrongdoer a 
promise which alone as forms of an action then existed 
could give the injured person a reasonable remedy. These 
fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to 
meet requirements of the law as to forms of action which 
                                                 
3 State of Punjab v. Hindustan Development Board Ltd. (1960) 2 Punj. 676.   
4 Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 214.  
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have now disappeared should not in these days be allowed 
to affect actual rights.5 
The implied contract theory found judicial support,6 but was also criticized,7 
until it was finally rejected in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. 
Islington London Borough Council.8 
4.2.2 Unjust Enrichment 
The view that quasi-contractual claims are based on unjust enrichment also 
found sound support.9 It is now also recognized as the basis of restitutionary 
obligations under the English Law.   
4.3 Quasi-Contracts under English Law 
The variety of quasi-contractual obligations recognized by English Law may 
be noted below: 
4.4 Payments to the defendant’s use 
Two principles seem to govern this kind of quasi-contractual liability. One of 
them is that the payment should have been made under pressure and not 
voluntarily and the other is that the defendant should have been bound to pay 
and has been relieved of his liability by the payment made by the plaintiff. 
An expenditure or payment made purely voluntarily will not do. If, for 
example, a person pays premiums due upon the policy of another without his 
request and without any compulsion, he cannot recover.10 Similarly, where a 
municipal corporation, having no legal liability to do so, carried out repairs of 
a canal bridge, which it was the obligation of the canal authority to maintain, 
the corporation could not recover, although the bridge was, for want of repair, 
endangering the road and although the corporation had without success 
                                                 
5 United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1941) 1 AC 1 at pp. 27-29. 
6 Holt v. Markham (1923) 1 KB 504, (1922) All ER Rep 134. 
7 Re Rhodes, Rhodes v. Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch D 94, 105. 
8 (1996) AC 669, (1966) 2 All ER 961. 
9 Brooks Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v. Goodman Brothers (1937) 1 KB 534. 
10 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch D 234. 
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requested the defendant to carry out the repairs. They were still 
volunteers.11There was no legal compulsion on them to carry out the repairs. 
The only compulsion was the damage being done to the road and the 
expenditure made by them in protecting the road may give remedy under 
some other principle but definitely not under quasi-contract. 
The kind of compulsion or pressure that the law recognizes for the purposes 
of this remedy is evidenced by Exall v. Partridge.12 Here the plaintiff had left 
his carriage upon the premises in which the defendant was living us a tenant. 
The landlord lawfully seized all the goods on the premises including the 
carriage for non-payment of rent and would have sold them in execution of 
his claim. The plaintiff paid the outstanding rent to get back his carriage and 
then sued the defendant for the amount. He was held entitled to it. 
Another example is Brook’s Wharf & Bull Wharf Ltd v. Goodman 
Brothers.13This was a case in which the plaintiffs, who were warehousemen, 
had taken into their bonded warehouse furs which were imported and were 
liable to duty. A man keeps a bonded warehouse on the terms that he will be 
responsible to the Commissioner of Customs and Excise if those goods go out 
of his bonded warehouse before the duties has been paid. The defendants had 
imported skins and put them in the plaintiff’s warehouse. The goods were 
stolen from the warehouse and the Commissioner recovered the duty from the 
warehousemen. “They had no answer, they had held the bonded goods, the 
bonded goods had left their warehouse and could be made available by the 
thieves on the home market, and the bonded warehousemen had to pay. They 
were held entitled to recover from the importers the amount which they had 
paid because it was primarily the importer’s duty to have paid the import 
duties as soon as the goods were imported into this country.” 
                                                 
11 Macclsfield Corpn v. Great Central Railway, (1911) 2 KB 528. 
12 (1799) 8 Term Rep 308. 
13 (1937) 1 KB 534. 
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This action were restated by Lynskey J in Monmouthshire County Council v. 
Smith.14 
“The essence of the rule is that there must be a common 
liability to pay money to a particular person; that the plaintiff 
has been compelled to pay it by law; that the defendant is 
liable to pay that money; and that the defendant’s debt or 
liability has been discharged by the plaintiff’s payment.” 
This statement was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard 
along with Metropolitan Police District Receiver v. Croydon Corpn.15 The 
two appeals raised exactly the same point. In each case a police constable was 
injured through the negligence of the defendants and had to remain off duty 
during the period of illness and the police authorities had under the duties to 
pay him off-duty wages. The action in each case was to recover the amount so 
paid away as off-duty wages. The contention was that if the police authorities 
had not paid them, the constables could have recovered from the defendants 
the loss of wages and that the liability of the defendants was thereby reduced. 
But the Court of Appeal did not allow any remedy under quasi-contract. In 
each case the defendant was liable to pay compensation to the injured 
constable and the liability to compensation did not include loss of wages 
because the constable had not suffered that loss. Thus the payment by the 
plaintiff did not relieve the defendant of any liability. 
4.5 Payments made under Mistake of Fact 
Payments made under a mistake of fact can he recovered provided that the 
party paying would have been liable to pay if the mistaken fact were true. 
Thus where money was paid under a life insurance policy which to the 
knowledge of the company had lapsed, but the fact of lapse having been 
forgotten at the moment. The company was held entitled to recover back the 
money.16Parke B pointing out that it would be against conscience for a person 
                                                 
14 Monmouthshire County Council v. Smith, (1957) 2 QB 154. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kelly v Solary, (1841) 9 M &W 54. 
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receiving such payment to retain it. The principle of this case was applied 
subsequently to a case where payment was made under a policy of marine 
insurance under the mistaken knowledge that the cargo of lemons had 
perished whereas in fact it was only sold en route, the Privy Council held that 
the money was recoverable.17 
One of the essential conditions of this action is that “the mistake must be as to 
a fact which, if true, would make the person paying liable to pay the money”. 
This suggestion was made in Aiken v. Short18 and was approved by the Court 
of Appeal in Morgan v. Ashcroff.19 The facts as summarized by the court were 
as follows: 
The respondent is a book-maker. The plaintiff is a publican who was a regular 
customer of the respondent for betting transactions. The nature of the 
mistakes which led to the alleged overpayment of about £24 upon which the 
action was brought, vas proved in evidence to have been a clerical error by the 
respondent’s clerk which led her to give the appellant credit for the sum of 
about £24 twice over; thus causing the respondent to pay to the appellant £24 
too much. 
The action was to recover back the overpayment, and it was lost on two 
grounds. Firstly, the court was forbidden by the Gaining Act, 1845, from 
looking into betting transactions and, secondly, even if the mistaken over 
credit were taken to be true. There would have been no liability to pay. 
In the subsequent case of Lamer v. London County Council20 the Court of 
Appeal relaxed the principle to this extent that a belief that there is a moral 
liability to pay is sufficient to prevent the payment from being regarded as 
purely voluntary. In that case an employer whose servants were called up for 
military service proposed to pay them the difference between their pay and 
                                                 
17 Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society Ltd. v. Price (W.H.) Ltd., (1934) AC 455. 
18 (1856) 1 H & N 210, 215. 
19 (1938) I KB 49: (1937) 3 All ER 92. CA. 
20 (1949) 2 KB 683. 
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the pay given to them by the military authorities, The plaintiff to whom such 
difference had to be paid did not inform the employer of the difference and 
consequently he was overpaid. When he came back the employer began to 
deduct from his pay the extra payment which he tried to stop. But the 
employer was allowed to recover the extra payment. The scheme was no 
doubt voluntary, but once announced, the payments made under it could not 
be regarded as voluntary. 
It is also necessary for this kind of action to succeed that the mistake must he 
one of fact and not of law. The distinction may often be difficult to draw and 
the rule may for this reason have often been criticized, it is still a part of the 
law. Thus, payment of extra rent made under an agreement to increase rent 
made in violation of a Rent Control Act could not be recovered.21 Similarly, 
the duty paid on an item which the House of Lords had held in another case to 
be riot dutiable, could not be recovered.22 So was true of an extra gratuity paid 
on a mistaken view of the relevant regulations.23 
Where a private document has been construed by a court of law, that 
interpretation becomes a part of the law. Thus, where an undertaking in a 
separation deed to pay the wife an annual sum of money “free of any 
deductions whatever” had already been construed as excluding deduction for 
income tax, a payment in ignorance of this interpretation without deducting 
income tax could not he recovered.24 
4.6 Payments made under an Ineffective Contract 
Three kinds of situation are generally considered under this head, namely, 
total failure of consideration, money paid under a void contract and money 
paid under an illegal contract. The effects of void and illegal contracts have 
already been considered; only the effect of total failure of consideration will 
                                                 
21 Sharp Bros & Knight v. Chant, (1917) 1 KB 771, CA. 
22 National Pari-Mutual Assn Ltd. v. R., (1930) 47 TLR 110. 
23 Holt v. Markham, (1923) 1 KB 504. 
24 Ord v. Ord., (1923) 2 KB 432. 
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be taken up here. Where one of the parties to a contract has paid money in the 
performance of his part but the other party fails to do his part, the former has 
an option, namely, either to sue the other for the breach of contract or to treat 
the contract as at an end and recover back his money under quasi-contract. 
Quasi-contractual remedy arises when there has been a total failure of 
consideration as opposed to partial. For example, where a shareholder of a 
company transferred his shares to the plaintiff for which the price was paid, 
but the company on account of certain conduct on the part of the transferor 
himself refused to register the transfer of his shares, this was held to be a total 
failure of consideration enabling the plaintiff to recover back his price.25 
Other instances can be seen in transactions relating to sale of goods. If the 
buyer has to return the goods on account of there being no title on the part of 
the seller to sell, the buyer can recover the whole of his price without any 
deduction for use value, for there is, in such cases, a total and not a partial 
failure of consideration.26 The same principle shall apply where the goods 
have been taken under hire-purchase and the buyer had to return them to the 
true owner.27 
Partial failure of consideration will not have the same effect. Thus, where a 
boy was registered as an apprentice with a watchmaker for a period of six 
years on payment of a premium and the master died when the boy had learned 
only for one year, he could not recover any part of his premium, there being 
only a partial failure of consideration.28 The same result followed where a 
party occupied premises on paying the agreed rent but left soon thereafter on 
account of the landlord’s failure to carry out his part of the promise, he could 
not recover back the rent.29 
                                                 
25 Wilkinson v. Lloyd, (1845) 7 QB 27: 4 LT (OS) 432 
26 Rawland v. Divall, (1923) 2 KB 500. 
27 Warman v. Southern Counties Car Finance Corpn Ltd., (1949) 2 KB 516. 
28 Whincup v. Hughes, (1871) LR 6 CP 78. 
29 Hunt v. Silk, (1804) 5 East 449. 
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4.7 Payments made under compulsion 
Where the owner of a market realized tolls from a shopkeeper by seizing his 
goods and it being subsequently held that he had no such authority, the 
shopkeeper was allowed to reclaim the toll money.30 But where any such fee 
or toll is paid without improper pressure or compulsion, there would be no 
right of recovery.31 So also where the payment is in response to summons 
issued by a court of law.32Payments extorted under colour of authority which 
is unfounded are recoverable.33 
4.8 Quantum Meruit 
Where a party has in the performance of his contract done some work or 
rendered some service and the further performance has been made useless by 
the other party, he may recover reasonable compensation for the work or 
service. Plinche v. Colburn34is an authority for this principle. 
The plaintiff was the author of several dramatic entertainments. He was 
engaged by the defendants, who were the publishers of a work called “The 
Juvenile Library” to write for that work an article to illustrate the history of 
armour and costumes from the earliest times, for which he was to be paid 100 
guineas. The plaintiff made various drawings and prepared a considerable 
portion of manuscript when the defendants discontinued the Juvenile Library. 
The plaintiff claimed a sum of 50 guineas for the part which he had prepared, 
and the trouble he had taken in the business. He was held entitled to it. 
Similarly, where a printer, having printed most of the work, refused to 
complete it because the dedication was libellous, he was held entitled to 
recover on quantum meruit.35A similar recovery is allowed where a person 
                                                 
30 Maskell v. Harner, (1915) 3 KB 106, CA. 
31 Twyford v. Manchester Corpn. (1946) 1 Ch 236. 
32 Moore v. Vestry of Fulham, (1895) 1 QB 399. 
33 Newdigate v. Davy, (1694) 1 Lord Ragm 742. 
34 (1831) 5 C & P 58: 1 Moo & S 51. 
35 Clay v. Yates, (1856) 25 LJ Ex 237. 
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has rendered services under a supposed contract which turns out to be a 
nullity. Craven-Ellis v. Canons Ltd,36is an authority for this. 
The plaintiff was appointed managing director of a company. The 
appointment was made by the other directors who were disqualified by reason 
of having not taken their qualification shares. The plaintiff also did not take 
his qualification shares. But he continued to act as managing director and 
sued the company for his agreed remuneration or for a reasonable 
remuneration on the basis of quantum meruit. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the claim for the agreed remuneration, the 
contract of appointment being void, but allowed him to recover on the basis of 
quantum meruit. 
Greeh LJ emphasized that a claim of this kind does not depend upon implied 
contract arising by virtue of the services having been accepted or upon 
inference of law, but upon a rule of law. 
“The obligation to pay reasonable remuneration for the work 
done when there is no binding contract between the parties is 
imposed by a rule of law, and not by an inference of fact 
arising from the acceptance of services or goods. It is one of 
the cases which are referred to in books on contract as 
obligations arising quasi ex contractu of which a well-known 
instance is a claim based on money which had been 
received.”37 
Though the remedy is independent of contract, but the contract, if any, shall 
nor be wholly irrelevant. Thus where a ship was delivered for repairs and the 
contractor used more expensive material than that authorized by the contract, 
he could not recover under the contract because he had not carried it out 
precisely, nor under quasi-contract, because the ship-owner had no chance to 
reject the expensive material. He could not have rejected the ship after it was 
                                                 
36 (1936) 2 KB 403: (1936) 2 All ER 1066, CA. 
37  Pavey and Matthews Proprietary v. Paul, (1990) 6 Const. LJ 59, High Court of Australia,    
   (1990) CLY 662. 
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already repaired and the mere taking of his own property was not the same 
thing as acquiescence in or acceptance of the work done.38 
Where adequate relief is available under the contract itself, the court may not 
provide any relief under quasi-contract. 
In the course of the performance of a contract to construct a power dam, the 
owner was in several important respects in breach of the contract. The breach 
was so fundamental as to justify termination of the contract. However, the 
contractor continued to work and completed the project. He claimed 
compensation for the owner’s breach on quantum meruit basis. 
It was held that the contractor, having continued to work the contract in the 
face of the owner’s breach, was entitled to recover under the contract. Since 
the contractor had completed the contract, and had adequate remedy under the 
contract, there was no need for law to fashion a restitutionary remedy nor 
would it be right for the contractor to obtain a possibly higher rate of 
compensation than that under the contract.39 
As aptly remarked by Anson,40Circumstances must occur under any system of 
law in which it becomes necessary to hold one person to be accountable to 
another, without any agreement on the part of former to be so accountable, on 
the ground that otherwise he would be retaining money or some other benefit 
which come into his hands to which the law regards the other person as better 
entitled, or on the ground that without such accountability the other would 
unjustly suffer loss. The law of quasi-contract exists to provide remedies in 
circumstances of this kind. Thus “the basis of quasi-contractual liability is 
unjust enrichment and the liability arises by implications of law, and not out 
of any agreement as in the case of contract. Hence, apparently the term quasi-
contract is rather misleading and is apt to confuse.”41 
                                                 
38 Farman & Co Ltd v. The Liddesdale, (1900) AC 190 PC. 
39 Morrison Knudsen & Co v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, (1978) 85 DLR (3rd) 186 
40 Anson’s Law of Contract, 23rd edn 1971 at p. 589. 
41 G.M. Sen, Case Book on the Law of Contract, edn, 1970 at p. 205. 
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Anson has written that the term “Quasi-contract” is not a happy term.”42 Sir 
Frederick Pollock has preferred the term ‘constructive contract’.43 Pollock and 
Mulla44have also remarked, ‘The expression quasi-contract is a misnomer. It 
has little or no affinity with contract.” As pointed out by another eminent 
writer, ‘Quasi-contract’ means ‘like contract’. It will not be like a formal 
contract with a promise, acceptance and reduced to writing. You may read an 
implied contract, in a given set of circumstances and where it is to advance 
the ends of justice, a legal theory propounds that it is ‘a relation resembling 
those created by contract.’45 
                                                 
42 Supra note 40. 
43 Id at at p. 11. 
44 Indian Contract Act and Specific Relief Act, 9th edn, 1972 at  p. 433. 
45 V.G. Ramchandra: The Law of Contract in India, Vol. II at p. 1412 
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Chapter-V 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT UNDER THE  
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The evolution of the concept of ‘welfare State’, particularly in India today, 
has resulted in the phenomenon of the State entering into many fields of 
economic activity and undertaking upon itself tasks which were previously 
left to the private commercial organisations. Now, it is a well- known fact that 
a revolutionary change has taken place in every part of the world regarding 
the State’s functions in relation to its own subjects, whatever be the form of 
the government existing therein. of course, the men of the laissez-faire days 
would be prepared to concede to the government only the minimum fictions, 
namely, of defence, administration of justice and police, leaving the rest to 
private enterprise, with the minimum of outside interference in the form of 
controls, regulations and the like. But, regardless of the political philosophy, 
the needs of an increasingly complex society have forced upon one 
government after another, a multiplicity of additional functions. As has been 
put forth by an eminent jurist, “it is one of the great contentious issues of the 
modern economics and political science as to new far and to what extent state 
intervention should be carried out in our daily lives”.1 
India as one of the modern states is essentially a social welfare state and is 
concerned with multitude of active administrative and managerial functions 
towards the attainment of social welfare state. While discharging these 
functions the government departments, and legally constituted public 
authorities, as well as independent public corporations have to make 
contracts, buy and sell large quantities of equipments and other goods, engage 
and dismiss staff and undertake a multitude of ether activities regulated by the 
                                                 
1  Parry, The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law, (Hamlyn Lectures) 1959 at p. 73 cited by Sen,  
G.M. in Public Law Contracts, J.I.L.I. Vol. 15 1973, No. 3, at p. 487. 
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law of contract. Apart from it, even government departments and incorporated 
public authorities themselves often deal with each other in transactions 
scarcely distinguishable in rem from the contracts entered into between 
private parties. These types of contracts are, in modem jurisprudence, known 
as government contracts, public law contracts, executive contracts, 
administrative contracts, etc. 
The notable feature of the government contracts is that in these contracts, one 
of the parties is always the Government. It is, no doubt, true that these 
contracts have some similarities with the ordinary contracts entered into 
between one individual and another, but at the same time have some 
differences too. The points of similarity between these contracts may be 
summed up thus: 
Government contracts are generally subject to the same rules of law of 
contract as in the case of contracts between private individuals. When a 
Government enters into a commercial type of transaction it shed its cloak of 
sovereignty and it is treated by the law as a private person in similar 
circumstances, provided the formalities of the law in these contracts have 
been complied with. The following are the instances of the same: 
5.2 Contracts of Lease 
Contracts for the lease of property furnish a good illustration of the 
application of this general principle. It is a fundamental tenet of property law 
that a lessor in the absence of an agreement, is not required to pay the lessee 
the value of improvements to the leased premises which the lessee is unable 
to remove at the expiration of lease. This rule applies to a lease of property 
owned by the Government. If a lessee instals improvements on Government 
premises without an authorisation to do so, be is regarded as a mere volunteer 
and cannot recover his expenditure. 
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Since the Government may validly lease property owned by it, there is no 
legal objection to its performing all of the functions of a private lessor, 
including an abrupt termination of a month to month lease. It can also be 
mentioned that Government can also be a lessee in many transactions and the 
Rent Control Act, govern the transactions.  
5.3 Limitation on Liability 
Another example of similarity may be found in contracts containing 
provisions limiting the amount of liability. In most cases a clause of this type 
is valid and will be enforceable, even though the Government is one of the 
parties. Hence, a statement in a bill of lading limiting a carrier’s liability is 
valid against the Government when the Government as shipper declares the 
value of the goods to be less than they actually are worth in order to get a 
lower rate. 
The points on which a state contract differs from ordinary contracts may be 
summarised thus: 
(1)  A contract made the state is not only aid at securing the performance of 
the duties under it, as in the Case of ordinary contract, but it also 
employed by the state for achieving some objectives of its social and 
economic policy. A Government may impose, for example, on a 
contractor certain fair and reasonable conditions in the employment of 
labour. It may do this by incorporating such conditions in the 
standardised contracts used by it. 
(2)  Perhaps the most important feature of these contracts is that the 
performance of the contract should serve the public interest and is 
intimately inter-twined in the public policy. Herein lies the basic 
reason for treating them as belonging to a separate and distinct 
category. Public interest is the prime concern of the State and the State 
has, therefore, a right, if not a duty, to see to it that no contract made 
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by it, impinges adversely on public welfare. The State must have 
greater freedom than that allowed in the case of an individual, viz., 
freedom to control, supervise, alter or even cancel its contracts and this 
must be allowed regardless of the niceties of the law that governs 
contracts between the individuals. This superior right of the 
Government to supervise, amend or cancel its contracts is inherent in 
the nature of the functions entrusted to it. 
(3)  Another feature that is easily recognised is the variation of the law of 
agency in so far as it relates to the binding nature of contract made by 
Government agents. The Government is not bound by a contract 
purporting to be made on its behalf unless either the agent has actual 
authority of Statute to make it or there is a financial appropriation 
adequate to its fulfilment. The common law principle that an agent can 
bind his principal by contracts within the scope of his ostensible 
authority does not apply to Government as principal. Nor can there be 
an agency of the Government by estoppel. These propositions of law 
are expressly incorporated in statutory provisions in the U.S. and also 
in France. In England it is nowhere stated that rules different from 
those under the ordinary law of agency apply in the case of 
Government agents. But in order to safeguard the finances of the 
Government from depletion in unauthorised engagements, a special 
rule about appropriation has been developed in England. A 
Government contract involving the payment of money by the Crown is 
invalid if Parliament has not made an express appropriation for the 
purpose of the contract, with the result that a contract made by an agent 
of the Crown acting within the scope of his ostensible but not actual-
authority is valid but will become enforceable only if there is a 
parliamentary appropriation, for the purpose of the contract. 
(4)  Government contracts of today are mostly contracts of adhesion- 
standard contracts in which the mental encounter and consensus ad 
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idem exist but in theory. And if insufficient attention has been paid so 
far to the special position of a Government a contracting party it is 
because of innumerable contracts that are usually made by the 
Government. The Government can have several clauses incorporated in 
such contracts which give it peculiar powers in its capacity as a 
contracting party. 
(5)  In the law of France, third parties are given certain rights for securing 
observance of terms in a contract between the State and the individual 
contractor. Such third parties may be those who are contemplated in 
the contract itself as entitled to receive certain benefits and to enforce 
them, for example, employees of the contractor regarding fair wages 
clauses. Such a clause confers an enforceable right upon the 
employees. Third parties in the position of, say consumers, who are not 
specifically contemplated in the contract, have wider the law of France 
a right to proceed against the administration in case of failure to 
enforce implementation of the contract by the contractor with the State. 
(6)  Contracts of service made by the Government with it servants are in 
most countries a misnomer as the supposed contractual rights, if they 
exist at all, are subordinate to, and can ever be negative by, the power 
of the Government to dismiss them at its own will and pleasure, This 
power again is a sine qua non for the efficient performance of the 
essential duty of the Government, namely the protection of public 
interest. No public servant can set up a contract made with him by the 
State as the basis of a claim against the exercise of the State’s 
discretion to dispense with his services in the public interest. 
We may therefore say that the essential thing to note about state, contracts is 
that the State has power to override them in case of necessity and that the 
contract will bind the State so far as no contingency arises for the exercise of 
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such power. The binding force of the contract is thus somewhat of a lesser 
degree than in the case of purely private contracts. 
5.4 Government Contract 
(a) In India no other law governs the personal rights of the parties as a 
contract entered by them as per the provisions of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872 governs. By means of an agreement the parties to it can 
drive their own rights and duties. However the Indian Contract Act is 
not an exhaustive code to govern all kinds of contracts. The Act does 
not deal with the whole law of contracts and therefore, the native law 
of the land may be applicable in cases in which the Act is silent. 
The question whether the act is an exhaustive code with reference to the law 
of contracts and if so what extent, has been considered by the Privy Council 
in Irawaddy Flotilla Co. v. Bugwandas2 their Lordships said: 
“The Act of 1872 does not profess to be a complete code 
dealing with the law relating to contract. It purports to do 
more than define an amend certain parts of the law.” 
Therefore in addition to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, sometimes 
provisions of other laws are also to be considered to determine the validity of 
a contract. For example, while determining the validity of a Government 
Contract the provisions of the Constitution are to be considered. It means in 
addition to the provisions of the Contract Act on the basis of which validity of 
a contract is judged, in determining the validity of a Government contract, the 
following Constitutional provisions are also to be kept in view: 
(1) The principles of equality as contained in Article 14, and  
(2) Provisions of Article 299 
If there is any violation of the above said provisions of the constitution it is 
amenable to judicial review. While exercising the power of judicial review in 
                                                 
2  (1891) 18 Cal 620: 18 IA 121. 
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respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State or Government the 
apex Court held that: 
“The principles of judicial view would apply to the exercise 
of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to 
prevent arbitrariness or favoritism. However, there are 
inherent limitations in exercise of the power of Judicial 
Review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the 
State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the 
state. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is 
always available to the Government. But the principles laid 
down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to kept in view 
while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no 
question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries 
to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to 
choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of 
course if the said power is exercised for any collateral 
purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.”3 
 
5.5 Judicial Review of Contracts of Government or Government 
Bodies 
Judicial review of a contract is concerned with reviewing not the merit of the 
decision in respect of which the application of judicial review is made, but the 
decision making process itself. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police 
v. Evans4 Lord Brightman said “judicial review, as the words imply, is not an 
appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was 
made.” Thus, judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the 
decision making process. 
While exercising the executive power of the Government or Government 
bodies there must be a balance between the administrative discretion to decide 
the matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy. 
If the balance is not maintained and the act is not reasonable then such act 
will be subject to judicial review. The main purpose of judicial review in 
administrative matters is to find the right balance between the administrative 
                                                 
3 Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651. 
4 (1982) 3 All ER 141 (154). 
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discretion to decide matter whether contractual or political in nature or issue 
of social policy and to set right the unfairness, if any.5 
Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for 
the Environment,6 Proclaimed: 
“Judicial review’ is a great weapon in the hands of the 
Judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits 
set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this 
beneficent power.” 
Observance of Judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial 
power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. 
The restraint has to contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial 
intervention; the other covers the scope of the Court’s ability to quash an 
administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of 
judicial control over administrative action. Judicial review is concerned with 
reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application of 
judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself.7 
Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or 
particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only 
concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The 
extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put the 
grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial 
review can be classified as under: 
1. Illegality 
2. Irrationality 
3. Procedural impropriety 
4. Proportionality 
                                                 
5 Supra note 3. 
6 (1986) 1 All ER 199: (1986) 2 WLR 1 (HL): 1986) AC- 240 (251). 
7 Supra note 3 at p. 25. 
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1. Illegality means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law 
that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. 
The duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality’. Its 
concern should be: 
(a)  Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 
(b)  Committed an error of law. 
(c)  Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice. 
(d)  Reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached, 
or 
(e)  Abused its powers. 
2.  Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness means that a 
decision of public authority will be liable, to be quashed or otherwise 
dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where 
the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly 
directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have 
reached it. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. 
Wednesbury Corpn.8 
Two other facets of irrationality, namely, (a) whether the decision-maker’s 
evaluation of facts logically reflects the proper conclusion; and (b) whether 
the decision is impartial and unequal in its operation between different 
classes, have also to be taken into account.’ 
3.  Procedural impropriety-In Union of India v. Hindustan Development 
Corporation9it was held that: 
“...the Government had the right to either accept or reject the 
lowest offer but that of course, if done on a policy should be 
on some rational and reasonable grounds.”  
                                                 
8 (1948) 1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680. 
9  (1993) 3 SCC 499 (515). 
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In Erusian Equipment and Chemical v. State of West Bengal10 the Supreme 
Court observed that: 
“When the Government is trading with the public the 
democratic forum of Government demands equality and 
absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such 
transactions. The activities of the government that a public 
element and therefore, there should be fainess and equality. 
The state need not enter into any contract with any one, but if 
it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and 
without unfair procedure.”11 
4.  Proportionality- As a matter of fact, in R.V. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex-parte Brind,12 Lord Diplock refers specifically to 
one development namely, the possible recognition of the principle of 
proportionality. 
(b)  In French jurisprudence they have developed a concept of contract 
administrative, that is, administrative contract whereby an inherent 
distinction in the position of the government and the governmental 
authorities and private individuals in the matter of liability in contract 
is recognised and given effect to.13Public authorities are now held in 
French law to be able to engage in transactions either on a private law 
basis-in which case they are subject to civil jurisdiction and the 
principles of private law- or by way of a private law contract, a 
contract administrative, which is compounded of elements of contract 
and inequalities held to be inherent in the concept of public service. 
It is merely a matter of interpretation when in a specified case the question is 
whether it is a government contract or a private-law contract, when one of the 
parties to it is a governmental agency. A public authority may, for example, 
contract for the services of radio performers or the supply of uniforms in the 
form of a civil or administrative contract. But, the contracting for the 
                                                 
10 AIR 1975 SC 266 
11 Erusian Equipment and Chemical v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70. 
12 (1991) 1 AC 696. 
13 Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, 2nd edn.,1872, Columbia Press at p. 291. 
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execution of typical public-service functions, such a transport service or water 
supply will indicate an administrative contract. 
The notable category of this type of contracts is the undue preference given, 
and the specific privileges enjoyed, by one of the parties, viz., the 
governmental authority, as against the other, viz., the private individual, 
which it is submitted is against the fundamental and basic principles of the 
mutuality of the contract law of the common law. An observation of 
Friedmann; a distinguished author, would not be out of place to quote here in 
this connection. He states: 
“The fundamental characteristic of a contract administrative 
is the recognition of certain unilateral powers of control by 
the administration in the public interest. The demands of the 
public service empower the administrative authority to carry 
out continuous supervision over the execution of the contract. 
To ensure this continuity of execution the administration has 
certain unilateral powers: to suspend, vary or rescind the 
contract, to transfer it to another party or to take it to over 
itself. Not only does the administrative authority have the 
right to interfere unilaterally in the contract; it has the duty to 
do so, because it is responsible for the public service 
...Moreover, the contract is always subject to the changing 
needs of public service. Thus, a long term concession for 
street lighting by gas may be converted into a demand for 
lighting by electricity, if this required by modern technical 
developments and public needs. If the contractor is unable to 
fulfil the changed conditions the contract may be terminated 
or transferred to another contractor.”14 
In American law, too, there is a growing recognition of ‘government contract’ 
as a distinct category although the disinclination to recognise the dualism of 
private and public-law contract still persists. The obvious reluctance to 
formally recognise it as a distinct category is evident in the observation of 
Williston in his classical treatise in contract when he states: 
“The law governing contracts with the United States is, to a 
great extent, not unlike that prevailing between private 
                                                 
14 Id, at p. 292. 
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parties, Here and there, the Federal Courts have drawn some 
slight or substantial distinctions due principally to the fact 
that one of the parties to such contract is a sovereign and 
sometimes, to the fact that a special statute had to be 
observed or was violated.”15 
However, it is submitted that a clear-cut distinction is discernable even from 
what has been stated. This is all, the more so when it is further stated: 
“It has also been firmly established that the United States is 
not liable for damages caused by acts performed as an 
integral part of its sovereign character. Just when it is not 
liable because the act causing the damage constituted or 
Governmental function is not entirely clear in many 
instances.”16 
The history of the governmental liability in contract in the U.S.A. is of course 
interesting. It is a fact that the United States did not permit itself to be 
generally sued for damages caused by its breaches until after the enactment of 
the Act of 1855, which established the Court of claims of the United States. 
Prior to such date the only remedy available was by petition to Congress for 
special relief. Under this statute, claims “upon contract express or implied 
were permitted. Subsequently Congress enacted the famous “Tucker Act” of 
1887 which permits suits for claims “upon contracts express or implied, or for 
damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not counting in torts. Thus the 
basis of Governmental liability for breach of contract was firmly written into 
general law. Without this general law, no one can say how great a hardship or 
inconvenience might have resulted to persons contracting with the 
government under various circumstances. 
The English common law, in the same manner, also recognised in theory only 
one type of contract. There the problems of government contracts are still to a 
large extent sought to be solved by applying the recognised principles of 
contract law. However, in England while there is a denial of any special status 
to the government in respect of its liability in contracts there is also on the 
                                                 
15 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contract, 4th edn. 2009-10 at p. 195. 
16 Ibid. 
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other hand an affirmation of the overriding principle of freedom of executive 
action. Thus, in R.Amphitrite v. The King,17Rowlatt J., rejected the claim for 
damages by the owners of a Swedish ship upon the breach of an undertaking 
given by the British Government that the ship would ‘earn her own release ‘ if 
she carried cargo of which at least 60% was approved cargo. Rowlatt J., 
interpreted the undertaking as an expression of ‘intention to act in a particular 
way in a certain event’ which could never be binding on the Government 
which had to ensure the welfare of the State. 
Street, an eminent author, has expressed the opinion that government 
contracts differ from ordinary contracts and should to some extent, be 
governed by different legal rules. 
5.6 Government Liability in Contracts 
 The extent of the liability of the Government in tortous as well as contractual 
cases has been provided for in article 300 of the Constitution. Article 300 
covers the field of suability of the state generally as equal to that under the 
Previous Constitution Acts- 193518 – 191919 – 185820. The Article runs thus: 
(1)  “The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union 
of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name 
of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by 
Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of such State enacted by virtue of 
powers conferred by the Constitution sue or be sued in relation to their 
respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the 
corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian States might have 
sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted.” 
                                                 
17 (1921) 3 K.B. 500. 
18 Section 176. 
19 Section 32. 
20 Section 65. 
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Since this Article is declaratory of contractual liability of the Government 
under the existing law saved by the Constitution21, it is pertinent to explore 
the authority therefore. 
It is clear that whole question turns upon a proper construction of Section 65 
of the Imperial Government of India Act, 1858 by virtue of which the extent 
of governmental liability has got to be determined. After providing for 
transfer of Paramountcy of the East India Company upon the territories to the 
Crown of England the Act by Section 65 provided: 
“The Secretary of State in Council shall and may sue and be 
sued as well as in India as in England by the name of the 
Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate and all 
persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the 
same suits, remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable, 
against the Secretary of State in Council for India as they 
could have done against the same Company.” 
It is to be noticed that this important provision has two facts. The first clause 
specifies that suability shall be vested in the Secretary of State which in 
England is vested in different corporate bodies Ministers, Post Master 
General, Attorney-General and the like. This clause has nothing to do with 
extent of liability of the Government or rights and remedies of the individual 
shall be equal to those as possessed by the preceding East India Company. 
The extent of liability of East India Company can be ascertained judicially. 
The judicial decisions determining liability of the East India Company or the 
Government though numerous in the field of Torts were meagre in the field of 
Contract. One reason may be that even in the Government circles throughout, 
barring one or two whispers of useless dissent, contractual liability of the 
Indian Government was regarded as equal more or less to that of a private 
individual under the ordinary law of the land. Even a legislation contrary to it 
would be ultra vires as violative of section 65 of the Constitution Act, 1858, 
                                                 
21 Article 372 of the Constitution of India. 
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was the outcome of Privy Council Judgment in Secretary of State v. Moment22 
where the Burma Act tried to take away right to sue, Lord Haldane stated the 
rule finally: “Their Lordships are of the opinion that the effect of section 65 of 
the Act of 1858 was to debar the Government of India from passing any Act 
which could prevent a subject from suing the Secretary of State in Council in 
a civil contract in any case in which he could have similarly sued the East 
India Company”. The implied Burma Act was held ultra vires. The purpose of 
1858 Act as riot indiscriminate adoption of the archaic common law rule of 
immunity but to adopt it in a refined shape, for the preamble to the “Act itself 
says that it is ‘An Act for the better Government of India.” 
That being so, the cases which have adjudicated and established the liability 
of the East India Company in contract, must be taken as part of substantive 
law on the question. The earliest judicial authority which granted exemption 
to the Government in respect of the acts of the Government was an 
observation of Peacock, C.J., in Pand O Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of 
State,23 as follows: 
“Where an act is done or a contract entered into in the exercise of powers 
usually called sovereign rowers by which we mean powers which can not be 
lawfully exercised except by a sovereign or a private individual delegated by 
a sovereign to exercise them, no action will lie.” 
This principle was once again enunciated by the Calcutta High Court in Nobin 
Chunder Dey v. Secretary of State.24The facts of the instant case were that 
under certain regulation the license for sale of ganja was to be given to 
highest bidder at the auction to be conducted by a Government department. 
The highest bidder had to deposit certain licence-fee before licence could be 
issued. The plaintiff who was the highest bidder deposited the requisite fee 
but subsequently the Government refused (and there was no question of 
                                                 
22 M.L.J. 459 (P.C.). 
23 (1861) 5 Bom. H.C.R. App. A. 
24 (1875) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 11. 
 218 
 
revocation of the licence which is a quasi-judicial act and is thus justiciable) 
at all to grant the licence or even to return the said deposit fee. The plaintiff 
sued for ‘breach of contract’. Both in the lower court as well as in the High 
Court the action failed for complete reliance placed upon the observation of 
Peacock, C.J., in P. & O. case. Garth, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the 
Court concurred with Phear, J. 
“The Government was, no doubt, rightly advised to meet this 
suit in every possible way, but I should suppose that, if the 
facts of the case are such as they have been made to appear 
to me by the evidence, the plaintiff would recover back his 
deposit money on making a petition for that purpose to the 
Government of India a petition which, if not, strictly 
speaking, a petition of right, would be of the nature of a 
petition of right.”25 
It is submitted that even the above observation is not an authority for the view 
that in cases where the Government has committed a breach of contract, the 
remedy is by way of Petition of Right. Because- firstly, the decision is based 
upon the dicta of Peacock, C.J, in P & O. case which was a case of tort 
committed in pursuance of commercial business and the Government was 
held liable in that case. Secondly, even if the dicta in the P. & O. case is taken 
a correct statement of law the matter does not go too far. For in Nobin 
Chunder’s case there was no question of any breach of contract - indeed there 
was no contract at all, Phear, J, therefore, stated, “I am also of the opinion that 
the evidence… in this case fails to establish any such contract on the part of 
the Government as that upon which the plaintiff relies.”26Thirdly, if it was not 
a contract, what it was the nature of the transaction? It was an act done in 
pursuance of licensing power of the State- power which is an attribute of all, 
sovereign States to regulate private business for collective social good. 
Fourthly, the proposition that contractual liability of the Government being a 
specie of non-sovereign act - is equal to that of an ordinary individual is 
                                                 
25 Id at p. 20. 
26 Id at p. 17. 
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warranted by decisions both prior and after the passing of the Government of 
India Act, 1858. 
In Moodalay v. The East India Company,27the company had entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff and had committed breach thereof and pleaded 
immunity from action equal to one accorded to Crown. This plea was rigidly 
excluded: 
“It hath be said that the East India Company have a 
sovereign power; be it so; but they may contract in a civil 
capacity, it cannot be denied that in a civil capacity they may 
be sued; in the case now before the Court; they entered into a 
private contract; if they break their contract, they are liable 
to answer for it.” 
Bank of Bengal v. East India Company,28is another instance where contract of 
agency was involved. A servant of the company during the course of 
employment wrongfully acted; thereby the company was benefited. In a suit 
to recover the unjust benefit so accrued the company pleaded immunity. 
Again this suggestion was dispelled and the company was held liable for 
restitution as under the ordinary law of contract. It was observed that “the fact 
of the company having been invested with powers usually called sovereign 
powers did not constitute them sovereign.” 
Judicial decisions after passing of the Government of India Act, 1858 have 
substantiated the rule so established. Thus in Forrester v. Secretary of 
State,29the plaintiffs were successors of a Jagirdar who was under a sovereign 
and had purchased certain arms for himself. Upon the conquest by the 
company of the territory, the arms of the Jagirdar were also seized although 
the Jagirdar remained in the same position wider the company administration. 
The plaintiff sued to recover territory as well as damages for seizure of arms. 
The Judicial Committee held that territory was taken from the Ruler under the 
Act of State which was not questionable. But their Lordships allowed the 
                                                 
27 (1785) 1 Bro. C.C. 469. 
28 (1831) Bigwell Rep. 120. 
29 (1874) 12 Beng. L.R. 120 (PC) at pp. 166-67. 
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appeal so far as the “arms suit” was concerned by inferring an ‘implied 
contract’ to pay the value of arms so seized together with interest at the rate of 
12% per annum and remitted the case to India for disposal and decree 
accordingly. 
Another landmark in the history of States contractual liability is the Full 
Bench decision of Madras High Court in Vijaya Ragava v. Secretary of 
State.30In this case a municipal statute empowered the Governor in Council to 
terminate the contract of service and to dismiss an employee on grounds of 
misconduct. The plaintiff a municipal commissioner was removed from 
service and no grounds were given at all for such action. He brought an action 
for wrongful breach of service- contract and the defendant pleaded sovereign 
immunity. The Court accepting the line of thinking propounded in Hari 
Bhanji’s case,31 awarded damages against the Government. As to contractual 
immunity it was said “The Governor in Council removed the plaintiff, 
professing to act under the municipal law and not under a sovereign right 
outside that law”.32 Muttuswami Ayyar, J., who had the privilege of taking 
part in Hari Bhanji’s case again substantiated his earlier view in this case also. 
“A careful examination of the Act of Parliament amending 
the law relating to such petitions… will show that 
proceedings against the Crown in England, even where there 
is a legitimate case for the remedy, have in Her Majesty’s 
Court, and according to law as it stands at present, the 
Secretary of State is liable to be sued in those cases in which 
the late East India Company might be sued.”33 
Besides these cases, the subsequent case law shows that the principle 
enunciated thus as settled. In Shiva Bhajan v. Secretary of State,34 a case on 
tort committed in pursuance to Statutory duty and where damages were not 
awarded, the above position in contract was supported. Referring to section 
                                                 
30 (1884) I.L.R. 7 Mad. 466 (F.B.). 
31 (1882) I.L.R. 5 Mad. 273. 
32 Supra note 15 at p. 472. 
33 Id at p. 478. 
34 (1904) 6 Bom. L.R. 65. 
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65 of the Government of India Act, 1858 by virtue of which the Secretary of 
State was to succeed the East India Company’s liabilities, etc., Jenkins, C.J., 
citing P. & O. case says the Secretary of state was to succeed to debts and 
liabilities lawfully incurred or contracted.35 
Among the cases under the Government of India Act, 1935, two Privy 
Council decisions Raugachari v. Secretary of State,36and, Venkata Rao v. 
Secretary of State,37finally established the rule that in India in cases of 
contract a subject as of right under ordinary law can ‘sue’ the Government 
without recourse to Petition of Right, Lord Roche who decided both these 
cases relating to service contracts answered the question to ether such action 
against the Government was well founded as follows: “The answer to the first 
question seems to their Lordship plainly to be in the affirmative”.38 His 
Lordship went even one step further,39 when he observed: 
“Breach of contract by the Crown can in England be raised by petition of 
right. The fact that for a different reason, namely, that service under the East 
India Company at pleasure-a precisely similar suit could not have been 
brought against the company does not in their Lordships’ view conclude the 
matter either under clause 2, section 32 of the Act, 1919 or on the reasoning 
of Sir Bernes Peacock in P. & O. case.” Therefore the Board concluded: 
“Their Lordship are not prepared to say that remedy by suit 
against the Secretary of State in Council for a breach of the 
Contract of service would not have been available to the 
plaintiff.” 
Right to redress against Government in breaches of contract was held to be an 
established rule based on State morality in Ram Gulam v. U.P. Government,40 
where damages were not awarded for the action itself had no indicia of any 
                                                 
35 Id at p. 68. 
36 I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 517; AIR 1937 P.C. 27. 
37 Id at p. 31 
38 Id at p. 29. 
39 Id at p. 35. 
40 AIR. 1950 All, 206. 
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contract. But the suggestion of sovereign immunity was brushed aside by 
Seth, J.41 
Among the post-constitution decisions P.C. Biswas v. Union of India,42 is a 
case directly on the point. The plaintiff entered into a contract for the supply 
of lime for a Government Stone quarry, which came to an abrupt and for non-
compliance of the terms on the part of the Government. Allowing the appeal 
suit, Ram Labhaya, J., referring to constitutional provisions under Articles 
299 and 300 reiterated the established view as follows: 
“It follows, therefore, that subject to statutory conditions or 
limits the contractual liability of the State under the 
Constitution is not only enforceable but it is the same as that of 
any individual under the ordinary law of contract. No position 
of privilege has been given to the Government in respect of its 
contractual liabilities. It stands on the same footing as any other 
individual.”43 
It is, therefore, submitted that Constitution Act, 1935 & 1919 have determined 
the liability of the Government in contracts equal to that of East India 
Company shorn of archiac English remedy by way of Petition of Right. It is 
again submitted that the judicial decisions which have authoritatively 
adjudicated the extent of contractual liability of the East India Company are 
uniform upon the point that in Contracts, its liability was similar to that of an 
ordinary individual under the law of contract since contract is a specie of non-
sovereign activity. The same is the position of the Government too. Further, 
the only limit within which Government can enter into a contract is that it 
should not be inconsistent of the mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the 
Constitution or derogatory to constitutional operation of the State machinery. 
                                                 
41 Id at p. 207. 
42 AIR 1956 Assam 85. 
43 Id at p. 90. 
 223 
 
5.7 Applicability of Section 65 and 70 of the Contract Act, vis-à-vis 
Article 299 (1) of the Constitution 
The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal44has considered 
the possibility of the application of Sections 65 and 70 of Contract Act to the 
Contracts which are not in compliance of the requirements of Article 299(1) 
of the Constitution. In order to protect the innocent parties, the Supreme Court 
in the instant case held that if the Government derives any benefit under an 
agreement not fulfilling the requisites of Article 299(1) or Section 175 (3) of 
the Government of India Act, 1935, the Government may be held liable to 
compensate the other contracting party under Section 7045of the Contract Act 
on the basis of the quasi contractual liability to the extent of the benefit 
received The reason is that it is not just and equitable for the Government to 
retain any benefit it has received under an agreement which does not bind it. 
Article 299(1) is not nullified if compensation is allowed to the plaintiff for 
work actually done or services rendered on a reasonable ground and not on 
the basis of the terms of the Contract. Gajendragadkar, C.J., rejected the 
contention that by allowing a State to be sued under Section 70 of the 
Contract Act the Court would be indirectly enforcing the contract which is 
void because of disregard of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution. In 
his view the liability under Section 70 was different from and independent of 
a true arid contractual liability. After stressing the point that the liability under 
Section 70 could not arise unless the benefit had been enjoyed voluntarily, the 
learned judge quoted with approval the following observations of Jenkin, C.J., 
in Suchanda Ghosal v. Balram Mardana.46 
                                                 
44 AIR 1962 S.C. 779. 
45 Section 70 is as follows: “Where a person lawfully does anything for another person or delivers 
    anything to him not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit 
thereof, 
    the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore the thing so done 
   or delivered. 
46 (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 1. 
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“The terms of Section 70 are unquestionably wide, but applied with discretion 
they enable the courts to do substantial justice in case where it would be 
difficult to impute to the persons concerned relations actually created by the 
Contract.” 
However, Mr. Seervai,47 in his treatise on the Constitutional law, doubts the 
correctness of the Supreme Court decision in Mondal’s case. He states that 
the objection to the view taken by Gajendragadkar, C.J., can be best put in the 
words of Sir Maurice Gawyer:48 
“It is... difficult to appreciate the common sense of enforcing 
a contract under the provisions of Sections 65 and 70 where it 
is expressly forbidden by the Statute governing the 
corporation.”49 
He further contends that the Supreme Court has given no reasons for rejecting 
the argument that having retard to the requirements of Section 175 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, the Government lacked the capacity to make 
a contract in a manner different from that prescribed by that section, and 
therefore, the decision of the Privy Council in Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas 
Ghosh50 directly applied. There the Privy Council held that as a minor was 
incompetent to contract, Section 65 had no application. Sir Maurice Gawyer, 
Mr. Seervai quoted, said that if the Act under which a corporation exists is 
mandatory and requires the contract to be under seal, the corporation has no 
capacity to contract except under seal. Such contracts alleged to be entered 
into with corporations are neither agreements nor contracts within the 
meaning of those words as defined in the Contract Act and the same applies to 
the contracts of the Union and the States which are required to be made 
indicated by Article 299. 
                                                 
47 Constitutional Law of India, at pp. 809-10 
48 Pollock & Mulla, Indian contract and Specific Relief Act,13th  edn. 2006 vol I and II. 
    Lexis Nexis Butterworths Nagpur at p. 354.   
49 Ibid. 
50 (1903) 30 I.A. 114. 
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It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s decision is not only in keeping with 
the requirements of justice but is also logically correct. Statutory provisions in 
relation to the contractual capacity of an artificial entity like a corporation or 
State may be of three kinds. They may intend in the interest of documental 
authenticity, or they may be necessary to define the identity of an artificial 
personality, or they may define the area and functions of that entity and 
thereby may delimit its capacity. In the last two cases the contract will be void 
for the violation of such provisions. However, a clear distinction between the 
two must be noticed. In the second case the contract is void because it is not a 
contract at all by that entity, whereas in the latter case the contract is void 
because it is beyond the power of that entity to enter into such a contract. 
Where a contract is void because of the second type of infirmity there cannot 
be any logical objection to the applicability of Sections 65 and 70 in such 
cases. It is only where a contract is void because it is ultravires that entity that 
the reasoning of the Privy Council decision in Mohari Bibee v. Dharmodas 
Ghosh51on minors contract is applicable. 
Whatever be the merits of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mondals case, 
it has been followed by the Supreme Court in New Marine Coal Co. v. Union 
of India.52 The Supreme Cot in both the cases has adopted the view on 
practical considerations also. Modern Government is a vast organisation. 
Officers have to enter into a variety of petty contracts, many a time orally or 
through correspondence without strictly complying with Article 299(1). 
If in such a case what has been done is for the benefit of the Government and 
for its use and enjoyment and is otherwise legitimate and proper, Section 70 
would step in and support a claim for compensation made by the contracting 
parties notwithstanding the fact that the contracts have not been made as 
required by Article 299. If Section 70 was to be held inapplicable, it would 
had to extremely unreasonable consequences and may even hamper the day-
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 AIR 1964 S.C. 152. 
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to-day working of the Government. Like ordinary citizen even the 
Government is subject to the provisions of Section 70 of the Contract Act. 
The basis of Section 70 of the Contract Act is the equitable doctrine of 
restitution and not any implied contract. In the Mondal’s case, a Government 
official requested a contractor to construct a building for the Government, 
accepting his tender for the same. The building was constructed and accepted. 
When the contractor was not paid, he filed a suit against the Government for 
the recovery of the amount. The Government pleaded that the request in 
pursuance of which the building was constructed was unauthorised and that 
there was no privity of contract between the State and the contractor. The 
Supreme held that the contract did not fulfil the requirements of Article 
299(1) and as such was not enforceable, but the State was still liable to make 
good the loss suffered by the contractor under Section 70 as a quasi-contract. 
Section 70 lays down three conditions, namely, (i) the person should lawfully 
do something for another person or deliver something to him; (ii) in doing so, 
he must not act a gratuitously; and (iii) the other person for whom something 
is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. In 
the instant case, all the three elements were satisfied and so the Government 
was liable. Similarly, if under the contract with the Government, a person has 
obtained any benefit, he can be sued for the dues under Section 70 though the 
contract does not conform with Article 299.53 
The Supreme Court again considered the question of the applicability of 
Section 70 in Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh.54Following the 
Mondal’s case, the Supreme Court, in the instant ease, held that the provisions 
of Section 70 can be invoked by the aggrieved party to the void contract, if all 
the conditions of Section 70 are satisfied, the Section imposes upon the latter 
the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore the 
thing so done or delivered. 
                                                 
53 B.D. Naithni v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 All. 507. 
54 AIR 1968 SC 1218. 
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But the Supreme court has made it clear that in a case falling under Section 70 
the person doing something for another or delivering something to another 
cannot sue for the specific performance of the Contract, nor ask for damages 
for the breach of the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract 
between him and the other person. So where a claim for compensation is 
made by one person against another under Section 70, the justice basis of the 
obligation is not founded upon any contract or tort but upon a third category 
of law, namely, quasi— contract or restitution. Thus, applying these 
principles, it is manifest that a person whose contract is void for non-
compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution would be entitled to 
compensation under Section 70 if he had adduced evidence in his support. 
Relying upon these cases the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in State of 
Madhya Pradesh v. Jhankar Singh,55 held that where an agreement does not 
comply with the requirements of Article 299(1), the party to the contract is 
entitled to relief under Section 70 if the three conditions mentioned in the 
section are satisfied. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff in whose favour a contract was executed by 
the Forest Department for sale of the forest produce brought a suit for 
recovery of instalments paid under the contract after deducting the profits 
earned by him contending that the contract was invalid. It was held by the 
High Court that the burden was on the plaintiff to show how much he had 
earned from the forest, as then alone he would be entitled to the balance 
outstanding from the instalments paid. 
5.8 Agency in Government Contract 
Whenever a contract is entered into by any person other than the President or 
the Governor personally, the President or Governor stand in the position of a 
principal and that other person in the position of an agent. The Constitution 
wider Article 299 requires that the agent should be authorised by the principal 
                                                 
55 AIR 1973 M.P. 274. 
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and he should enter into contract in the name of the principal. To this extent 
Article 299 follows the normal principles of the law of agency. Under the 
private law of agency the principal is bound by every act done by the agent 
under his actual or ostensible authority, and these acts of the agent, which are 
done by him in the name of the principal without either actual or ostensible 
authority, may be subsequently ratified by the principal. Thus, where a 
contract made by an agent is not binding upon he principal because it is 
beyond or in excess of the agents authority, it is open to the principal, (certain 
conditions being satisfied) to ratify the act of the agent, and, if it is so ratified, 
the contract would be binding upon the principal in the same manner as if it 
had been made with his previous authority. It was on this principle that in a 
very old case, namely, Collector of Masulipatnam v. Venkata,56it was held 
that a contract made by a public official in excess of his authority may be 
binding upon the Government if it is subsequently ratified. Also an agent may 
be held personally liable either for breach of warranty or under the contract. 
In Government contracts the actual authority of the agent will be generally 
found in the notifications published in the official gazettes. But the Supreme 
Court has also held that such an authority can be ad hoc.57In State of Bihar v. 
Karam Chand Thappar,58Mr. Iyer, J., observed: “It was further argued for the 
appellant that there being a Government notification of a formal character, we 
should not travel outside it and find authority in a person who is not 
authorised there under. But Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 
1935, does not prescribe any particular mode in which authority must be 
conferred. Normally, no doubt, such conferment will be by notification in the 
official gazette, but there is nothing in the section itself to prescribe 
authorisation being conferred ad hoc on any person, and when that is 
established, the requirements of the section must be held to be satisfied.”59 
                                                 
56 (1861) 8 M.I.A. 529. 
57 State of Bihar v. Karam Chand Thapar (1962) 11 SC. J. 17. 
58 Supra note 53. 
59 Id at p. 20. 
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So far as the application of the doctrine of ostensible authority in case of 
public agent is concerned, there is very little authority to draw any conclusion. 
In State of Madras v. S.A. Husain,60the Madras High Court quoted with 
approval Story’s observation that the doctrine of ostensible authority did not 
apply to public servants. But this was unnecessary in view of the finding of 
the Court that the respondent was actually net misled. In India, the Supreme 
Court is ready to imply ad hoc authority from oral evidence and attendant 
circumstances and in face of official notifications to the contrary, there is 
much scope for holding that the question of the authority of the public agent 
may be a question of fact. 
In so far as ratification is concerned, before 1968, a judicial view was 
expressed that though, ordinarily, the Government could not be sued on 
informal contracts, yet the Government could accept the responsibility for 
them by ratifying them.61Certain observations of the Supreme Court in 
Chaturbhuj v. Moreshwar,62 however, created some confusion on this point. 
The actual, decision in this case has been explained by the Supreme Court in 
subsequent cases,63 is that though a contract which is in contravention of 
article 299(1) is void and unenforceable against the Government, it is not a 
nullity for collateral purposes, e.g., for determining whether a person entering 
into such a contract has disqualified himself for purposes of election under the 
provisions of Representation of the People Act, 1949. But, in coming to this 
conclusion, Bose, J., speaking for the court observed: 
“It may be that Government will not be bound by the contract 
in that case, but that is very different thing from saying that 
the contracts as such are void and of no effect. It only means 
that the principal cannot be sued; but we take it there would 
be nothing to prevent ratification, especially that was for the 
benefit of Government.”64 
                                                 
60 AIR 1963 Mad. 140. 
61 N.Purkayastha v. India AIR 1955, Ass. 33. 
62 AIR 1954 S.C. 236. 
63 State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal, AIR 1962 SC 779. 
64 Supra note 53 at p. 507. 
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But the Supreme Court in Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh65 has 
again taken a rigid view of article 299(1) and has held that there is no 
question of ratification or estoppel by or against the Government in case of a 
contract not conformity with article 299(1). The reason given is that article 
299(1) has not been enacted for the sake of form and the formalities of article 
299(1) cannot be dispensed with. If the plea of the Government regarding 
estoppel or ratification is admitted, that would mean repeal of an important 
constitutional provision intended for the protection of the general public. 
5.9 Unjust Enrichment: Modern Approach 
(i)  There must be public or Common Law duty-the law was that mandamus 
would lie only to enforce a duty which is public in nature. Therefore, a 
duty private in nature and arising out of a contract was not enforceable 
through the writ. It was on this basis that in CIT v. State of Madras,66 the 
court refused to issue mandamus where the petitioners wanted the 
Government to fulfil its obligation arising out of a contract. However, in 
Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotel,67 the Supreme Court 
issued writ of mandamus for the specific performance of a contract to 
advance money. In this case, the Gujarat Financial Corporation, a 
government instrumentality, had sanctioned a loan of Rs 30 laths to 
Lotus Hotel for the construction but later on refused to pay the amount. 
A public duty is one which is created either by a statute, rules or regulations 
having the force of law, the Constitution, or by some rule of common law.68 
The public duty enforceable through mandamus must also be an absolute 
duty. Absolute is one which is mandatory and not discretionary. Therefore in 
                                                 
65 Supra note 49 at p. 356. 
66 AIR 1954 Mad 54. 
67 (1983) 3 SCC 379. 
68 Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas, AIR 1952 SC 16. 
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Manjula Manjari v. Director of Public Instruction,69 the court refused to issue 
mandamus against the Director of Public Instruction compelling him to 
include the petitioner’s textbook in the list of approved books because it was a 
matter at the complete discretion of the authority. However, if the authority is 
under law obliged to exercise a discretion, mandamus would lie to exercise it 
in one way or the other.70 Mandamus would also lie if the public authority 
invested with discretionary powers abuses the power or exceeds it, or acts 
malafide. Mandamus, thus, is issued to compel performance of public duties 
which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. A statutory 
duty may be either directory or mandatory. A statutory duty, if intended to be 
mandatory in character, is indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must” 
but this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been 
interpreted as ‘may’. Therefore, what is determinative of the nature of duty, 
whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in 
which the duty has been set out. Even if the duty is not set out clearly and 
specifically in the statute, it may be implied as co-relative to a right. If in the 
performance of this duty, the authority in whom the discretion is vested under 
the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the 
instructions and orders of another authority, the court may issue mandamus to 
that authority to exercise its own discretion.71 Writ of mandamus along with 
suitable directions can be issued by the court for the protection and 
enforcement of fundamental rights.72Mandamus cannot be issued to enforce 
administrative directions which do not have the force of law, hence it is 
discretionary that the authority accept it or reject it.73But where the 
administrative instructions are binding, mandamus would lie to enforce 
them.74 
                                                 
69 AIR 1952 Ori 344.  
70 Alcock Ashdown & Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority, 50 IA 227. 
71 Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622. 
72 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241. 
73 G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753. 
74 Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1978) 2 SCC 196. 
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As discussed above, the provisions of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution 
(Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935) are mandatory and if 
they are not compiled with, the contract is not enforceable in a court of law at 
the instance of any of the contracting parties. In these circumstances, with a 
view to protecting innocent persons, courts have applied the provision of 
Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and held the Government liable to 
compensate the other contracting party on the basis of quasi-contractual 
liability. What Section 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted 
or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed, then the liability to pay compensation 
for the enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. 
Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another 
under Section 70, it is not on the basis of the fact the something was done by 
one party for the other and the said work so done has been voluntarily 
accepted by the other party.75 Thus Section 70 of the Contract Act prevents 
‘unjust enrichment’. This doctrine is explained by Lord Wright in Fobrosa v. 
Fairbairn76 in the following words: 
“Any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for 
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust 
benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, 
or some benefit derived from, another which is against great 
conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English 
Law are generally different from remedies in contract or in 
tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of 
the common law which has called quasi-contract or 
restitution.”77 
The doctrine applies as much to corporations and the Government as to 
private individuals. The provision of Section may be invoked by the 
aggrieved party if the following three conditions are satisfied The first 
condition is that a person should lawfully do something for another person or 
deliver something to him. The second condition is that in doing the said thing 
                                                 
75 Chatturbhuj Vithaldas vMoreshwar Parasharam. AIR 1954 SC 236. 
76 (1942) 2 All ER 122. 
77 Id. at p. 135. 
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or delivering the same thing he must not intend to act gratuitously; and the 
third is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom 
something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. If these three 
conditions are satisfied, Section 70 imposes upon the latter person the liability 
to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so 
done or delivered. 
Thus, in State of W.B v. B.K. Mondal,78 at the request of a government officer, 
the contractor constructed a building. The possession was obtained by the 
officer and the building was used by the Government, but no payment was 
made to the contractor. It was contended that as the provisions of Article 
299(1) of the Constitution had not been complied with, the contract was not 
enforceable. The Supreme Court held that the contract was unenforceable but 
the Government was liable to pay to the contractor under Section 70 of the 
Indian Contract Act, 1872 on the basis of quasi-contractual liability. 
Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) rightly stated: “In a sense it may be said 
that Section 70 should be read as supplementing the provisions of Section 
175(3) of the Act.”79 
It is submitted that the following observations of Bose, J.”80 Lay down correct 
law on the point: “We feel that some reasonable meaning must be attached to 
Article 299(l). We do not think the provisions were inserted for the sake of 
mere form. We feel they are there to safeguard Government against 
unauthorised contracts. If in fact a contract is unauthorised or in excess of 
authority it is right that Government should be safe-guarded. On the other 
hand, an officer entering into a contract on behalf of Government can always 
safeguard himself’ by having recourse to the proper form. 
In between is a large class of contracts, probably by far the greatest in 
numbers, which, though authorised, are for one reason or other not in proper 
                                                 
78 AIR 1962 SC 779. 
79 Id at p. 789. 
80 Supra note 75 at p. 817. 
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form. It is only right that an innocent contracting party should not suffer 
because of this and if there is no other defect or objection we have no doubt 
Government will always accept the responsibility. If not, its interests are 
safeguarded as we think the Constitution intended that they should be.”81 
If a person enters into a contract with the Government and is entitled to 
certain benefits there under, he can approach a court of law. The question, 
however, is as to whether he can file a petition under Article 32 or under 
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in R.K. Agarwal v. State of Bihar,82 
the Supreme Court classified cases of breach of contract in three categories: 
(i) Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part 
of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State 
he has acted to his prejudice and predicament. But the agreement is 
short of a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the 
Constitution; 
(ii) Where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the 
State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Acts or Rules 
framed there under and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the 
State; and 
(iii) Where the contract entered into between the State and the person 
aggrieved is not statutory but purely contractual and the rights and 
liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and 
the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State. 
The first type of obligations were held to be enforceable under Article 226 of 
the Constitution by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppels. 
The second category covers those cases where the contract is entered into 
between an individual and the State in the exercise of some statutory power. 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 (1977) 3 SCC 457. 
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In these cases, the breach complained of is of a statutory obligation. In such 
cases, an action of public authority is challenged and hence, a petition is 
maintainable. 
With regard to the third category of cases, the rights of the parties flow from 
mere terms of the contract entered into by the State and a party to such 
contract cannot invoke writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 
32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 
236 
 
 
Chapter VI 
RESTITUTION FROM PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
 
6.1 Introduction   
It is only relatively recently that the law of restitution has developed in a 
principled and structured fashion; it was previously considered to be “no more 
than a heterogeneous collection of unrelated topics.”1The modern 
rationalization of restitution law has been underpinned by the principle that 
“unjust enrichment” should be reversed.2Assessing whether enrichment is 
“unjust” is not a matter of judicial discretion;3 rather, there are established 
grounds of recovery, and where one of those grounds is made out there is 
(subject to any good defence) a right to recovery. Public bodies are subject to 
private restitution law.4 However, there are distinctive features of restitution 
law in its application to public bodies. First, in some situations there is a 
statutory right to restitution against public bodies. For example, there is 
statutory provision for the recovery of wrongly-paid income tax, corporation 
tax, capital gains tax and petrol vehicle duty, but this has stringent limits. In 
particular, the overpayment must have been due to an error or mistake in the 
tax return, and no recovery is allowed where the error was part of the 
revenue’s settled practice at the time.5 Where a special or qualified statutory 
remedy exists, it may be inferred that Parliament intended to exclude any 
common law right to restitution which would or might have arisen on the 
same facts.6Whether common law remedies are excluded is a matter of 
construction of the relevant statutory provision.7Additionally there is a ground 
of recovery in cases involving public bodies which does not apply in cases 
                                                            
1 Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 7th edn. 2007, London: Sweet & Maxwell at p. 5. 
2 Lipkin Goreman (a firm) v Karpale Ltd.(1991) 2 AC 548. 
3 Id at p. 578. 
4 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2006)UKHL 49. 
5 Taxes Management Act, 1970, Sec. 33. 
6 Monro v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 2007 EWHC 114 (CH). 
7 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited (2003) UKHL, 66. 
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between private individuals, namely recovery of payments made pursuant to 
an ultra vires demand by a public authority for tax or other impost (the 
‘Woolwich’ ground).8 It is also possible that the usual defences to a 
restitutionary claim cannot be relied upon by an individual where public 
moneys are paid to him without legal authority. There are, too, particular 
procedural considerations in cases involving public bodies. Each of these 
matters is dealt with below. 
6.2 Nature of Restitution  
The law of restitution is that body of law which is concerned with the award 
of gain-based remedies.9Although the matter has been particularly 
controversial the accepted view is that these gain-based remedies will be 
awarded in three different situations. 
(1)  Where the defendant has profited from the commission of a wrong. 
This could apply to a public authority if it has profited from the 
commission of a tort or, exceptionally, breach of contract. 
(2)  Where the defendant has received property in which the claimant has a 
proprietary interest, the claimant will be able to vindicate that property 
right. 
(3)  Where the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s 
expense. It is this principle which is likely to be most significant to 
restitutionary claims against public authorities. To establish such a 
claim four different issues must be considered: 
(i) Whether the defendant was enriched. This will invariably be satisfied 
by means of showing that the defendant received money. 
(ii) This enrichment was at the expense of the claimant, which means that 
                                                            
8 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC (1993) AC 70. 
9 Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution 2nd edn., 2006: Oxford University Press at p. 3. 
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it was obtained directly from the claimant. 
(iii) This enrichment can be characterized as unjust within one of the 
recognized grounds of restitution. It is the identification of an 
appropriate ground of restitution which has proved to be the most 
controversial aspect of establishing a restitutionary claim against 
public authorities. 
(iv) No defences are available to reduce or limit the claim. Key defences 
include change of position and estoppel. 
This chapter is concerned with the application of the grounds of restitution 
and principles in one particular context, namely, where a restitutionary claim 
is brought against public authorities. There is a public law dimension to such 
a claim which always requires careful consideration. Indeed, there is growing 
evidence that a distinct ground of restitution exists to establish a restitutionary 
claim in unjust enrichment against a public authority and only this ground of 
restitution is available for such claims. Furthermore the researcher in discuss 
about the constitutional considerations and establishment of unjust enrichment 
as reasons why public authorities should be treated differently from other 
defendants, the grounds of restitution (including mistake, duress, extortion by 
colour of office, and total failure of consideration), and recommendation of 
the Law Commission as to the right to restitution and the special defences. 
Again the study gives emphasis and examines restitutionary claims that are 
founded on the commission of a wrong by the defendant. Four types of 
wrongdoing may trigger the award of restitutionary remedies i.e. tort, breach 
of contract, equitable wrongdoing, and the commission of a criminal offence. 
The issue of whether, once the claimant has shown that the defendant has 
committed a wrong, the claimant can obtain a restitutionary remedy from the 
defendant is discussed. The consideration of the essence of restitution for 
wrongs, including the relationship between restitution for wrongs and the 
reversal of the defendant's unjust enrichment; the principles underlying the 
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award of restitutionary remedies for wrongs; types of restitutionary remedy 
for wrongdoing; relationship between restitutionary and compensatory 
remedies for wrongdoing; causation; available defences for restitution for 
wrongs; and recommendations for reform. 
When an offender has committed a criminal offence, the law of restitution 
may be relevant in two ways. First, the offender may have received a benefit 
as a result of the commission of the crime, so the question for the law of 
restitution is whether there is a cause of action which will enable the victim or 
the State to recover the proceeds of the crime. Secondly, a consequence of the 
offender committing the crime may be that he or she is entitled to obtain a 
benefit, and the question is whether the offender can be prevented from 
obtaining this benefit.  
Two different principles on which restitutionary claims can be founded are 
unjust enrichment and wrongdoing. And the third and final principle on which 
such claims may be based, namely, the vindication of the claimant's property 
rights. All restitutionary claims which are founded on the vindication of the 
claimant's proprietary rights are properly classified as proprietary claims, 
since they are dependent solely upon the identification and protection of 
proprietary rights. But the restitutionary remedies by virtue of which these 
property rights are vindicated are not necessarily proprietary remedies, since, 
depending on the particular circumstances of the case, the appropriate remedy 
may either be proprietary or personal.  
For reasons of public policy, most civil actions are subject to a time bar 
whose effect is that, once a particular period of time has passed, the defendant 
can no longer be sued on that particular action. There are two distinct legal 
regimes relating to the barring of restitutionary actions by the passage of time. 
The first and most important regime is contained in the Limitation Act, 1980 
which specifies particular limitation periods for different types of actions. The 
second regime is the equitable defence of laches, which determines whether 
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an equitable action is time barred by reference to the justice of the case having 
regard to all the surrounding circumstances. The researcher has discussesed 
reversal of the defendant's unjust enrichment, qualification of the general 
limitation period for particular restitutionary claims, restitutionary claims 
founded on the commission of tort or breach of contract, restitutionary claims 
founded on equitable wrongs, vindication of proprietary rights, and function 
of the laches defence. 
6.3 Past Restitution 
6.3.1 Policy 
Whether a restitutionary claim grounded on unjust enrichment can be brought 
against a public authority has proved controversial because of the public law 
dimension to such claims, which might justify distinguishing these claims 
from those which operate generally within the private law. 
There are two most important contradictory questions of policy which need to 
be taken into account.  
6.3.1.1 Constitutional Considerations 
There is a constitutional dimension to restitutionary claims brought against 
public authorities which derives from the principle that, where a public 
authority is not entitled to the money which it has received, that money should 
be repaid to the citizen from whom it was unlawfully taken. The justification 
for this principle is that since, the power of the public authority to demand 
payment from the citizen can only exist under the law,10if the demand was 
made unlawfully then the public authority has no right to retain what it 
received and must make restitution to the payer.11That the payer should be 
entitled to restitution as of right seems even more obvious in the light of the 
fact that, where the Crown pays money out of the consolidated fund without 
                                                            
10 Bill of Rights Act, 1689, Art. 4. 
11 Supra note 8 at p.172. 
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statutory authority, it is able to recover it by virtue of its incapacity to make 
the payment in the first place.12 
6.3.1.2 Implications for the General Community 
However, the right to restitution founded on constitutional principles is 
limited by a countervailing principle of public policy. This derives from the 
fact that restitutionary claims which concern public authorities are likely to 
involve large sums of money and the award of restitutionary remedies may 
seriously jeopardise the availability of public funds with consequent 
deleterious effects on the community.13It follows that restitutionary claims 
against public authorities should be deterred, for reasons of public policy. 
6.3.1.3 Balancing Principle and Pragmatism 
Consequently, the question of whether a restitutionary claim can successfully 
be brought against a public authority involves a clash of principle and 
pragmatism. For constitutional principle demands that a public authority 
which has unlawfully received money should return it, but pragmatism 
suggests caution, to preserve the security of the public authority’s receipts for 
the greater good, namely the benefit of the general community. These 
arguments are essentially incompatible but some form of compromise can be 
reached by accepting the right of the payer to bring a restitutionary claim but 
ensuring that the public authority has a number of special defences to protect 
the security of its receipt.   
6.3.2 Establishing Unjust Enrichment 
In the vast majority of cases involving restitutionary claims against public 
authorities it will be easy to show that the defendant has been enriched at the 
claimant’s expense. The real problem comes with the identification of the 
grounds of restitution. 
                                                            
12 Auckland Harbour Board v R. (1924) AC 318. 
13 Glasgow Corporation v Lord Advocate 1959 SC 203, 230. 
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A number of grounds have been recognized. The most significant has been 
mistake, whether of law or fact. In many cases, but not all,14 where an ultra 
vires payment has been made to a public authority it will possible to show that 
the claimant had made a mistake of law but for which the payment would not 
have been made.15The key advantage of founding a claim on mistake is that 
this will extend the limitation period. Under Section 32(1)(c) of the Limitation 
Act, 1980 states that, where an action involves relief from the consequences 
of a mistake, time does not begin to run until the claimant discovered the 
mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.  
Other relevant grounds of restitution for claims against public authorities have 
included duress,16where a public authority has made an unlawful threat to size 
goods in respect of a debt which was not lawfully due; extortion by colour of 
office, where ‘a public officer demands and is paid money he is not entitled 
to, or more than he is entitled to, for the performance of his public 
duty’;17total failure of consideration;18 and absence of consideration19where 
the expected benefit from the defendant could not be provided as a matter of 
law. 
However, the most important ground of restitution has proved to be that 
recognised in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC.20This is an 
independent ground of restitution which is peculiar to restitutionary claims 
against public authorities and enables the recovery of payments made 
pursuant to an ultra vires demand. The Inland Revenue had assessed the tax 
liability of the Woolwich Building Society by reference to regulations made 
under the Finance Act, 1985 regulations which were subsequently held by the 
House of Lords to be ultra vires and so rendered the tax demand invalid.21 
                                                            
14 Supra note 8 at p. 173. 
15 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Lincoln City Council (1999) 2 AC 349,382. 
16 Maskell v Horner (1915) 3 KB 106. 
17 Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108, 140. 
18 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girzoentrale v Islington LBC (1994) 4 All ER 890. 
19 Ibid. 
20 (1993) AC 70. 
21 R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. Woolwich Equitable Building Society (1990) 1 WLR 1400. 
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The effect of this was that the claimant paid nearly £57 million more tax to 
the Revenue than was actually due. The Revenue repaid this money to the 
claimant with interest, but it refused to pay interest in respect of the period 
when it first received the payment until the decision of the trial judge that the 
regulations were void. Consequently, the claimant sought to recover this 
interest, amounting to £6.73 million. The success of the claim depended on 
whether the Revenue was liable to repay the claimant from the moment it 
received the payment or from the moment when the regulations were held to 
be void. If the Revenue’s liability arose by virtue of its unjust enrichment, this 
liability would have existed from the moment when it received the payment 
from the claimant. Clearly the Revenue had been enriched at the claimant’s 
expense. The key question, therefore, was whether the claimant’s claim fell 
within one of the recognized grounds of restitution. 
In determining which grounds of restitution were applicable a number of 
features concerning the payment by the claimant to the Revenue need to be 
emphasised. The claimant paid the sums demanded by the Revenue, even 
though it disputed the legality of the demand since, it felt that it had no choice 
but to pay. This was because on its face the demand was lawful. If the 
claimant had refused to pay the money it would have been the only building 
society to do so. Consequently, any proceedings brought by the Revenue to 
recover the tax would have been gravely embarrassing and would have 
resulted in adverse publicity. If the claimant had failed to pay but the 
Revenue’s demand was eventually vindicated, the building society feared it 
would incur heavy penalties and the interest owing to the Revenue would 
have far outweighed any return that could have been obtained by investment 
of the disputed sum. Finally, at the time when the payments were made it was 
not possible to identify the amount which was in dispute. Therefore, the 
claimant decided to pay but lodged a protest with the Revenue when it did so. 
It was observed that the claim did not fall within any of the recognized 
grounds of restitution. However, it was held that the actual ground of 
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restitution was that ‘money paid by a citizen to a public authority in the form 
of taxes or other levies paid pursuant to an ultra vires demand by the authority 
is prima facie recoverable by the citizen as of right.’22The essential feature of 
this ground of restitution, which was identified by Lord Goff and endorsed by 
Lords Slynn v Browne-Wilkinson,23is that restitution should be awarded 
simply because the tax was unlawfully demanded under an ultra vires statute 
and no public authority can retain money which it had no authority to 
receive.24 
6.3.3 Determining the Ambit of the Ground of Ultra Vires Receipt 
There are a number of outstanding questions about the ambit and effect of this 
ground of restitution. 
6.3.3.1 Does this Ground Apply to all types of Ultra Vires Payment? 
It is unclear whether this ground of ultra vires receipt is confined to cases 
where money was demanded under an invalid statute, as was the case in 
Woolwich itself. Although the point was expressly left open in Woolwich, 
there is no reason why recovery should be confined to such demands.25 The 
essential feature of this ground of restitution is that money was paid to a 
public authority which was not authorized to receive the payment. This lack 
of authority may arise, as in Woolwich, because a statutory regulation was 
invalid or it may arise where a valid statute has been misconstrued. The Law 
Commission has suggested that the notion of an ultra vires payment should 
cover all payments collected by a person or body who was acting outside its 
statutory authority, whether because it was acting in excess of its statutory 
power or because of procedural abuses, abuses of power or errors of law.26 
                                                            
22 Ibid at p. 177. 
23 Id at p. 196. 
24 Id at p. 172. 
25 Supra note 8 at p. 177. 
26 Restitution: Mistakes of Law and Ultra Vires Public Authority Receipts and Payments  
Law Com. No. 227, 1994 at p. 66. 
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6.3.3.2 Is the ground of restitution confined to the recovery of overpaid 
taxes? 
Although Woolwich was concerned with the recovery of overpaid taxes, this 
ground of restitution should be applicable to the recovery of any overpaid 
levy from a public authority. Consequently, this ground of restitution would 
be applicable to unlawful demands for payment made for the supply of 
services by a public authority. In Waikato Regional Airport Ltd. v A-G27the 
Privy Council recognized that the Woolwich principle extended to the 
recovery of governmental levies. Similarly, the Woolwich principle should 
also be applicable where charges have been levied in breach of European 
Community law.28 
6.3.3.3 Must the claimant have protested about the lawfulness of the 
demand? 
Although in Woolwich the claimant had protested to the Revenue when it 
made its payment that the money was not lawfully due, the success of the 
restitutionary claim should not be conditional on the claimant protesting 
against the validity of the demand, for in many cases the claimant will be 
unaware that the demand was unlawful. But the fact that the claimant did 
protest is of vital evidential importance, suggesting that the payment was not 
made voluntarily. 
6.3.3.4 Restricting the right to Restitution 
Where the claimant seeks to obtain restitution from the defendant on the 
ground of ultra vires receipt the right to restitution at common law may be 
restricted in two ways. First, it may be removed by statute so that the claimant 
will have to rely on the statutory mechanism for restitution.29It follows that 
                                                            
27 (2003) UKPC 50, (2004) 3 NZLR 1. 
28 Jones, Restitution and EC Law, Mansfield Press, 2000. 
29 Autologic Holdings plc v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2005) UKHL 54, para. 20. 
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the common law defences to restitution will not apply and the defendant will 
be confined to the defences under the statute. Secondly, the parties may have 
made express provision for restitution of overpayments by contract or such an 
agreement can be implied.30 Again, the consequence of this will be that the 
common law restitutionary mechanism, including the general defences to 
restitutionary claims, will not apply.  
6.4 Restitution Present 
6.4.1 The relationship between the grounds of Restitution 
The crucial issue now concerning restitutionary claims against public 
authorities relates to whether the operation of the Woolwich principle 
excludes the operation of the other private law grounds of restitution. 
In IRC v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc.31the Court of Appeal 
established that claims for restitution of tax paid by mistake can only arise by 
reference to particular statutory provisions32or at common law by virtue of the 
Woolwich principle. In reaching this decision the Court of Appeal drew a 
distinction between public and private restitutionary claims and recognized 
that, for the recovery of overpaid taxes at least, restitution occurs by virtue of 
a specific public law regime which is distinct from the private law regime 
which governs the bulk of the law of unjust enrichment.  
In Deutsche Morgan Grenfell the claimant sought a restitutionary remedy in 
the form of interest33 in respect of taxes which it had paid too early.34 Some of 
these taxes had been paid more than six years before the claim was brought, 
so that the claim was time-barred unless the claimant could found the claim 
on a mistake of law for which time would not begin to run until the mistake 
                                                            
30 Sebel Products Ltd. v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (1949) 1 Ch. 409. 
31 (2005) EWCA Civ 78, (2005) STC 329. 
32 Taxes Management Act, 1970, Sec. 33 and Value Added Tax Act, 1994, sec. 80. 
33 Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners(2005) EWCA Civ. 389. 
34 Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v IRC. (2001) Ch. 620. 
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could reasonably have been discovered35.In considering whether this ground 
of mistake could be relied on the Court of Appeal focused on a crucial dictum 
of Lord Goff in Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC36:in our law of restitution we 
now find two separate and distinct regimes in respect of the repayment of 
money paid under a mistake of law. These are (1) cases concerned with the 
repayment of taxes and other similar charges which, when exacted ultra vires, 
are recoverable as of right at common law under the principle in Woolwich, 
and otherwise are the subject of statutory regimes regulating recovery; and (2) 
other cases, which may broadly be described as concerned with repayment of 
money paid under private transactions, and which are governed by the 
common law. 
Jonathan Parker LJ interpreted37this as meaning that overpaid taxes can be 
recovered either by virtue of a statutory regime, where the demand for 
payment was lawful, or, by reference to the Woolwich principle at common 
law, where the demand was unlawful. Crucially, he considered that these are 
the only regimes which are available for the recovery of overpaid taxes. It 
follows that, at least as regards claims for the recovery of overpaid tax, it is 
not possible to rely on the ground of mistake of law and so gain the benefit of 
the extended limitation period. Although the matter is not free from doubt it 
appears that this ruling applies to the recovery of all payments from public 
authorities, at least when the authority has received the payment in its public 
capacity. Consequently, mistake is not available as a ground of restitution in 
claims involving public authorities. 
The recognition in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell that the Woolwich principle is 
rooted firmly in public law is important, both as regards the proper analysis of 
the claim but also as regard the practicalities of bringing it. Until recently it 
appeared that if claimants wished to challenge a demand from a public 
authority as an ultra vires demand, then, because this constituted a public law 
                                                            
35 Limitation Act, 1980, Sec. 32(1)(c). 
36 (1999) 2 AC 349, 382. 
37 (2005) EWCA Civ 78, (2005) STC 329, para. 205. 
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claim, they had to do so by virtue of judicial review under CPR 5338It is not, 
however, possible to obtain restitutionary relief in judicial review 
proceedings.39This meant that if the claimant wished to obtain restitution from 
a public authority he or she would have to adopt a dual procedure. The 
claimant would first need to apply by judicial review for a declaration that the 
demand was unlawful and then seek restitution of the money in separate 
proceedings. This was the procedure which the Woolwich Building Society 
had to adopt to obtain restitution from the Revenue. The need for judicial 
review has important implications in that the limitation period for such an 
application is three months from the date when the ground for challenge 
arises, though this is subject to the discretion of the court40 
But later on it was accepted by the Court of Appeal that, where the claimant 
wishes to obtain restitution on the ground of ultra vires receipt, it is not 
necessary first to bring judicial review proceedings41The claimant can bring a 
restitutionary claim at common law42to show that the money was not due and, 
once this has been established, to recover the overpaid tax from the public 
authority. This is a perfectly acceptable approach, since the dominant issue 
for the claimant relates to the existence of a private law right,43namely the 
right to restitution because the defendant was unjustly enriched at the 
claimant’s expense, even though the existence of this right is dependent on 
the consideration of a public law issue, concerning whether the public 
authority is authorized to receive the particular payment. This decision is of 
vital importance, both because it avoids the cumbersome procedure involving 
both judicial review and a separate claim for restitution, but also because it 
avoids the very short limitation period which is inherent in an application for 
judicial review. It consequently makes ultra vires receipt a particularly 
                                                            
38 Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder (1985) AC 461. 
39 O’Reily v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237. 
40 CPR 53.4. 
41 British Steel v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1997) 2 All ER 366. 
42 Autologic Holdings plc v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2005) UKHL 54. 
43 Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee (1992) 
1 AC 624. 
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attractive ground of restitution for the claimant to plead. However, the 
emphasis in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell that a restitutionary claim grounded 
on the Woolwich principle is properly characterized as a claim involving the 
public law regime may serve to undermine this sensible approach to 
restitutionary claims against public authorities, such that the former dual 
process of judicial review and then restitutionary claim might be resurrected. 
This appears to have been the approach of the Court of Appeal in Boake Allen 
Ltd v IRC44 where Sedley LJ45emphasized that it was ‘an abuse of process to 
ignore the primary mode of challenge provided by law and instead to bring an 
action which evades the controls on that mode.’ Indeed, the emphasis on the 
public law claim might mean that both the judicial review and the 
restitutionary aspects should be dealt with in the Administrative Court, 
because the right to restitution is properly characterized as being a public law 
rather than a private law right46This would require the courts to accept that a 
restitutionary remedy could be awarded in judicial review proceedings by 
means of the mandatory order47but it would follow that the much shorter 
limitation period would be applicable and that the awarding of a restitutionary 
remedy would lie in the discretion of the court. 
6.4.2 Limiting the Right to Restitution 
Since the recognition of the Woolwich principle attention has also turned to 
whether specific defences should be available. The Law Commission48  has 
acknowledged the need for specific defences to limit the right to restitution 
because of the peculiar circumstances arising from money being repaid by 
public bodies which may have deleterious effects upon the general 
public.49The need to protect public finances was recognized as a legitimate 
                                                            
44 (2006) EWCA Civ 25. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Alder, ‘Restitution in Public Law: Bearing the Cost of Unlawful State Action’ (2002) 22 LS 165. 
47 Ibid  p. 179.  
48 Restitution: Mistakes of Law and Ultra Vires Public Authority Receipts and Payments (Law Com. 
No. 227, 1994). 
49 (2005)STC 329 at para 237. 
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policy aim,50which is justified because in certain cases the amount of tax or 
charge which must be repaid could amount to millions of pounds, with 
disastrous consequences for the public authority and the relevant projects 
which it finances. Although the Law Commission rejected a general defence 
of serious disruption to public finances on the round that such a defence 
would be too uncertain in operation, it did recommend the creation of four 
specific defences to protect public authorities against serious fiscal disruption. 
6.4.2.1 Failure to Exhaust Statutory remedies 
The policy behind this defence is to encourage the submission of disputed 
assessments to appeal before the appropriate statutory tribunal. 
6.4.2.2 Change in an established view of the Law 
Where the claim to restitution is founded on a mistake of law the Law 
Commission recommended that restitution should be denied where the 
payment was made in accordance with a settled view of the law that the 
money was due and that view was subsequently changed by a decision of a 
court or tribunal.51 
But can any defence of change in a settled view of the law ever be justified 
where restitution is sought from a public authority? If the claimant seeks 
restitution of money from the public authority because payment was not due 
to it, the particular reason why the money was not due should be irrelevant. 
Even if the money was paid on the basis of a settled view of the law which is 
later proved to be mistaken, restitution should follow simply because it is 
subsequently acknowledged that the money was not due. The argument of 
constitutional impropriety in the public authority retaining money which was 
not due to it should prevail over that founded on the disruption to public funds 
arising from a mistake as to a settled view of the law. 
                                                            
50 Law Com. No. 227, para 10.5-108. 
51 Supra note 15. 
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6.4.2.3 Compromise 
The Law Commission has also recommended that restitution should be denied 
where the restitutionary claim has either been contractually compromised or 
where the payment was made in response to litigation which had been 
commenced by the public authority, but not where the litigation was merely 
threatened.  
6.4.2.4 Unjust Enrichment 
Finally, the Law Commission recommended that public authorities should 
have a defence to a restitutionary claim where the consequence of the public 
authority repaying the claimant would be that he or she was unjustly enriched. 
This effectively constitutes a defence of passing on and would apply where 
the claimant has passed on the loss to a third party. The recognition of the 
defence is justified because, where the claimant has recouped his or her loss 
following the transfer of a benefit to the defendant by passing that loss on to a 
third party, it appears that the defendant’s enrichment has been at the expense 
of the third party and not the claimant. If the defendant made restitution in full 
to the claimant in such circumstances this would mean that the claimant 
becomes unjustly enriched at the expense of the third party by the receipt of a 
windfall gain. This can be illustrated by the following example. The 
defendant public authority demands the payment of a statutory duty from the 
claimant. The claimant pays this money to the defendant and then recoups it 
from its customers by increasing the price of its goods. The claimant later 
discovers that the defendant had no authority to demand the duty and so the 
claimant seeks restitution from the defendant. Since the claimant has not 
suffered any loss, because the initial loss was passed on to the customers, the 
defendant’s enrichment does not appear to have been at the claimant’s 
expense, but is instead at the expense of the customers, since they have 
ultimately borne the burden of the defendant’s unauthorized demand.  
The defence has been recognized in England. In Marks and Spencer plc v 
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Commissioners of Customs and Excise52Lord Walker of Westingthorpe 
recognized that passing on is a possible defence to any restitutionary claim, 
although his Lordship cited Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia 
Ltd.53in support of this conclusion, even though that decision expressly 
rejected the passing on defence in Australia. Consequently, this dictum cannot 
be considered to be authoritative. However, certain statutory provisions 
relating to the recovery of overpaid VAT, Excise Duty and Car Tax 
effectively recognize the defence. For example, recovery of overpaid VAT is 
denied if repayment would unjustly enrich the person who paid the VAT.54 
This encompasses a defence of passing on, which would be applicable where, 
for example, the taxpayer had passed on the burden of the VAT to its 
customers.55However, the interpretation and ambit of this provision is to be 
considered by the European Court of Justice.56 
Nevertheless, the authorities are generally opposed to the recognition of a 
passing on defence. It has been expressly rejected in Australia.57Although the 
point was left open by Lord Goff in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v 
IRC,58 the defence was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd. v Birmingham CC59 because the law of restitution is concerned 
with the defendant’s gain and not the claimant’s loss. That case involved a 
claim for repayment from a local authority following a decision that interest 
rate swap transactions made with that authority were void. Although the 
defence of passing on was rejected on the facts of the case, its availability was 
left open generally and particularly as regards claims for the recovery of tax 
and other duties.60Evans LJ did not consider these cases to be relevant to the 
                                                            
52 (2005) UKHL 53, para 25. 
53 (2002) 76 ALJR 203. 
54 Value Added Tax Act, 1994, Sec. 80(1). 
55 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Birminghal City Council (1997) QB 380, 389. 
56 Marks and Spencer plc. v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (2005) UKHL 53. 
57 Mason v. New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108. 
58 (1993) AC 70, 178. 
59 (1997) QB 380. 
60 Id at p. 389. 
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Swaps cases because they involved public law claims,61but most of the swaps 
cases also involved a public law element since the restitutionary claim was 
brought against public authorities, albeit for a private law claim. Indeed, 
Kleinwort Benson itself involved a claim brought against a public authority. A 
preferable method for distinguishing the swaps cases from the tax cases is 
that, in the tax cases where the claimant taxpayer has passed on the burden of 
the tax to his or her customers, he or she can be considered to have collected 
the tax from his or her customers on behalf of the taxing 
authority.62Consequently, it is permissible to treat the tax authority as having 
been enriched at the expense of the customers, because the claimant is simply 
acting as the agent for the authority,63so the customers should be able to sue 
the tax authority directly. This analysis will, however, depend on the nature of 
the tax liability.64 
The preferable view is that the defence should not be recognized. The reality 
is that it will invariably be impossible to prove that the claimant has actually 
passed on the loss to a third party.65For example, if the claimant has paid 
money to the defendant and seeks to recoup this loss from his or her 
customers by increasing prices, it does not follow that the claimant will 
necessarily be able to recoup the loss.  
6.5 Restitution Future 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell is dubious 
for the following reasons, and so should be rejected: 
(1)  The dictum of Lord Goff in Kleinwort Benson arose in the course of a 
discussion about the availability of a settled law defence to claims to 
recover different types of payment, and was not concerned with the 
                                                            
61 IRC v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (2005) EWCA Civ. 78. 
62 Supra note 59 at p. 389.. 
63 Commissioner of State Revenue v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd. (1994) 126 ALR 1, 14. 
64 Virgo, ‘Restitution of Overpaid VAT’ 1998 BTR at pp.582, 587-8 
65 McInnes, ‘Passing On in the Law of Restitution: A Reconsideration’ (1997) 19 Sydney  
LR at pp.179, 199. 
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more important question of whether a mistake of law claim is 
unavailable where taxes are involved. If Lord Goff had intended to 
draw such a fundamental distinction he might have been expected to do 
so explicitly. Anyway, the dictum of Lord Goff was obiter because the 
case did not concern restitution of taxes or other charges. 
(2)  More fundamentally, the purported distinction between so-called 
‘public’ and ‘private’ transactions is both unworkable and unnecessary. 
The assumption appears to be that in Woolwich the transaction was 
‘public’ because it involved payments of taxes to the Revenue, whereas 
in Kleinwort Benson the transaction was ‘private’ because it involved 
an interest rate swap transaction between a bank and a local authority. 
But why is the latter transaction treated as ‘private’? Certainly it 
appears to be a commercial transaction which was voluntarily made, 
but the transaction was with a public authority and, crucially, the only 
reason why the transaction was considered to be void was because the 
council lacked the capacity to enter into it as a public authority.66 This 
was also true of the Woolwich case which involved an ultra vires 
transaction with a public authority. Surely the nature of the 
restitutionary claim in each case should be determined by reference to 
the characteristics of the recipient, rather than the perceived nature of 
the transaction. Both Woolwich and Kleinwort Benson concerned 
restitutionary claims against public authorities and should, therefore, 
be treated as complementary and not contradictory, in the sense that 
the cases together should be interpreted as recognizing alternative 
claims for the recovery of overpayments from public authorities, one 
founded on the ultra vires nature of the receipt and the other founded 
on the mistake of the claimant. The claimant should be allowed to 
choose whichever claim best suits his or her circumstances. Indeed, 
Buxton LJ came close to recognizing the significance of the recipient 
                                                            
66 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC (1992) AC 1. 
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rather than the underlying transaction when he stated that:67 
It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that in Woolwich the House of 
Lords recognized, or created, a right and a remedy that were specific to the 
particular circumstances of the demander and of the payer, and which stood 
outside the main stream of restitution as understood in a private law context. 
But he then went on to reach the unnecessary conclusion that Woolwich 
constituted a complete code for the recovery of overpaid taxes and so this 
prevented the claimant from relying on the main-stream ground of mistake of 
law to secure restitution.  
One interpretation for the decision of the Court of Appeal was identified by 
Buxton LJ, namely that the justification for restitution under the Woolwich 
principle and for mistake of law are fundamentally different because they 
involve different reasons why the payment should be returned, namely the 
unlawful demand under the Woolwich principle and the mistake of law under 
Kleinwort Benson.68But this is an irrelevant distinction, because in both cases 
the restitutionary claim is grounded on the same unifying principle, namely 
unjust enrichment, albeit with different grounds of restitution.  
(3)  A consequence of the failure to recognize alternative common law 
claims for the recovery of overpaid taxes is that the court is depriving 
the claimant of a restitutionary remedy which would have been 
available had the transaction been characterized as private, by virtue of 
preventing an extension of the limitation period. Surely the recovery of 
overpaid taxes should, at the very least, be just as readily available as 
other types of payment to a public authority where those payments are 
mistaken. 
Thus, it can be said that a position where there is a conflict between two 
                                                            
67 (2005) EWCA Civ 78, (2005) STC 329, para. 272. 
68 Id, para. 289. 
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fundamental principles. On the one hand we have a fundamental principle of 
constitutional importance that public authorities are not able to demand or 
receive ultra vires payments. On the other hand, we have judicial and 
statutory developments, in the forms of the Court of Appeal in Deutsche 
Morgan Grenfell69 and recent Finance Acts, which make the recovery of such 
payments more difficult by qualifying the limitation period or expanding the 
defences available to the taxing authorities. Constitutional principles appear to 
have been rejected for the benefit of public authorities. Further, the perceived 
distinction between public law and private law claims is unworkable and 
unnecessary. It is to be hoped that the House of Lords in Deutsche Morgan 
Grenfell70 will recognise that the claimant has a choice as to the ground of 
restitution on which it relies. The significance of the defendant being a public 
authority should primarily only be relevant as regards the definition and 
interpretation of particular defences to such claims. 
                                                            
69 Supra note 4 
70 Ibid 
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Chapter - VII 
ENRICHMENT BY WRONGDOING 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The wrongdoing principle is claimant-based: the claimant obtained his con-
tractual rights through a wrongful act. The ‘substantive fairness principle’ has a 
mixed basis: the value of the claimant’s contractual rights is greater than the 
value of the defendant's rights. In practice, however, it is often difficult to tell 
which of these principles (if any) best explains particular rules. In part, this is 
because many of the rules in this area can plausibly be explained on more than 
one of these grounds. Consider the rule that a contract signed under duress-for 
instance, a contract signed at gunpoint-is invalid. The defendant in such a case 
can plausibly argue that she never consented to the contract. But she can also 
plausibly argue that the claimant obtained his apparent rights by a wrongful 
threat and (in most cases anyway) that the actual terms of the agreement are 
unfair. The end result is that there may be more than one good reason for 
refusing to enforce such a contract. In principle, this is not a problem, but in 
practice it exacerbates the difficulty of disentangling the relevant concepts, and 
may help to explain why the law in this area is complex, if not actually 
inconsistent, in certain respects. 
Another reason it is difficult to tell which principle best explains any given rule 
is that these principles are often subject to overlapping definitions. For 
example, lack of consent is often defined in terms of wrongdoing (and vice 
versa); thus it is often said that consent is negated by illegitimate (i.e. wrongful) 
pressure or, alternatively, that it is wrongful to do something that impairs 
another's consent. As for substantive unfairness, it is often defined in terms of 
lack of consent and wrongdoing: a contract is substantively fair, it is often said, 
if it is procedurally fair. 
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A third reason that commentators disagree about how to explain the rules on 
excuses is that the answer has implications for a larger debate in contract law 
regarding the relative significance of procedural as opposed to substantive 
fairness. According to classical theory, while procedural matters of the kind 
that are the focus of consent and wrongdoing principles are properly the 
concern of the law, the substantive outcome of a contract is purely a matter for 
the parties. In this view, the law regulates the way bargains are made in the 
marketplace, leaving the parties to insert whatever content they choose into 
those bargains. In short, even if it is possible to define substantive fairness, 
such a definition is of no concern to the law of contract. But as we have already 
seen, this classical view is frequently criticized, both as an account of what the 
courts actually do and as a prescription for what they should do. The law on 
excuses-particularly the rules on duress, undue influence, and 
unconscionability plays a major role. 
The law in this area thus raises difficult issues. For the moment, it is sufficient 
to make the following observations. First, whatever philosophers may say 
about the meaning of consent, wrongdoing, and substantive fairness, these 
concepts are regularly employed in ordinary conversation and, indeed, in legal 
reasoning. Since judges and others appear to ascribe meaning to them, it is a 
good starting point to assume that these concepts do in fact matter. Secondly, it 
would be surprising if the courts were not motivated by concerns about 
consent, wrongdoing, and substantive fairness. In the cases of consent and 
wrongdoing this proposition is uncontroversial; these are widely recognized as 
fundamental moral concepts. 
Nonetheless, even if it is agreed that judges might hesitate to set a contract 
aside solely because it is substantively unfair (assuming they had the power to 
do this), it would be surprising if they disregarded this concept in instances 
when it was linked to a claim that the defendant's consent was impaired or that 
the claimant acted wrongly, even in cases where such impairment or 
wrongdoing might not alone be sufficient to justify invalidity. The idea that it is 
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wrong to take advantage of another's vulnerability-for that is how these 
situations would ordinarily be described is too ingrained to be ignored entirely 
by the law. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is an important sense in which the law 
on excuses is arguably not a part of the law of contract, strictly understood, or at 
least not uniquely a part of contract law. A contractual obligation that was 
induced by a wrongful threat or a fraudulent representation may be set aside by 
a court. But the same is true of a will, a declaration of trust, or a decision to 
legally change one's name-yet none of these acts are contracts. So too, an 
ordinary transfer of property will be undone if it was induced by a wrongful 
threat or fraud.  
The core idea of fiduciary duty is the assumption of responsibility for the 
property or affairs of others. Parallel developments at common law and in 
equity yielded the recognition of a duty of care of those in analogous positions 
of being entrusted with another's property or affairs, including bailees, carriers, 
trustees, directors and agents. The duty to take care of another's interests in 
such circumstances is clearly established, although the exact standard of 
liability may vary from case to case Hederson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd.1 and 
Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew2 Breaches of this duty of care are 
not breaches of fiduciary duty: It is obvious that not every breach of duty by a 
fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty. Breach of fiduciary obligation, 
therefore, connotes disloyalty or infidelity. More incompetence is not enough. 
A Servant who loyally does his incompetent best for his master is not unfaithful 
and is not guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty. Bristol and West Building 
Society v. Mothew.3 
It is with breaches of the obligation of loyalty with which we are now 
concerned. Where the money or property of another is entrusted to a person, 
                                                          
1 (1995) 2 ACI 45 at p. 205 
2 (1998) Ch. I, at p.17. 
3 Id. at p. 16, 18. 
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equity has always been suspicious of the temptations which might thereby 
arise. A restitutionary response has therefore been recognized and is apt for two 
reasons. First, infidelity is likely to result in enriching behaviour for the person 
entrusted with the money or property of another. Secondly, the policy of 
deterrence or prophylaxis weight heavily with the court. As Professor Jones 
argued in his seminal article, ‘Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of 
Loyalty’.4  
The implications of equity’s rule are far-reaching. Once a fiduciary is shown to 
be in breach of his duty of loyalty he must disgorge any benefit gained even 
though he acted honestly and in his principal’s best interests, even though his 
principal benefited as well as he from his conduct, even though the benefit was 
obtained through the use of the fiduciary’s own assets and in consequence of 
his personal skill and judgment. 
In a number of cases a too-mechanical application of these principal has led to 
unjust results. 
7.2 Who is Fiduciary? 
The categories of fiduciary relationships which give rise to a constructive 
trusteeship should be regarded as falling into a limited number of strait jackets 
or as being necessarily closed. They are, after all, no more than formulae for 
equitable relief. 
No should explicit or implicit consent necessarily be an exhaustive guide to 
fiduciary responsibility. 
For example, in the leading case of Boardman v Phipps,5 the solicitor to a will 
trust and a beneficiary under the trust staged a skilful takeover of an ailing 
textile company in which the trust held a minority shareholding. Using 
considerable business acumen the two men turned the fortunes of the company 
                                                          
4 (1968) 84 LQR 472, at p. 474. 
5 (1967) 2 AC 46. 
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around. This was done with the acquiescence of the active trustees, although no 
formal consent was ever obtained (nor due to the incapacity of one of the 
trustees could it ever have been obtained). In a claim brought by one of the 
other beneficiaries, Wilberforce J labelled the two as ‘self-appointed agents’ 
for the trustees.6 The majority of the House of Lords agreed that the two were 
in a fiduciary position, and were in breach of it by using information and an 
opportunity which came to them by reason of their relationship with the trust. 
However, they did not approve of the appellation of ‘self-appointed agents’. 
Lord Guest, for example, preferred to say that they placed themselves in a 
special position which was of a fiduciary character. 7  It is clear that the 
ascription of fiduciary responsibility is ultimately a matter for the courts. 
Regard is had to the underlying consensual relationship, including the terms of 
any contract between fiduciary and principal. This contractual matrix may 
exclude or modify the full rigour of the fiduciary regime.8 However, in the 
majority of cases the relationship is firmly bottomed on the consent or 
assumption of responsibility by the alleged fiduciary alone. 
7.3 Fiduciary Relationships 
Closely analogous to these cases are those involving what Courts of Equity 
would call a ‘fiduciary relationship’, such as the one that exists between a 
trustee and a beneficiary. In these cases, which often involve contractual 
relationships, the duty not to abuse the fiduciary position includes a require-
ment to disclose all material facts. The same applies to many ‘undue influence’ 
cases which, it is important to emphasise, are not solely concerned with what 
might be called undue influence in the ordinary sense. However, in both these 
and other relevant cases, the duty to disclose is obviously subordinate to the 
general duty to not abuse the position of trust or exploit the relationship 
between the parties. 
                                                          
6 (1964) 1WLR 993, at p. 2007. 
7 Id. at p. 118. 
8 Kelly v Cooper (1993) AC 205. 
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7.4 The Obligation of the Fiduciary 
If the core obligation of the fiduciary is loyalty, the paradigm instance of breach 
of fiduciary duty is non-disclosure. The case law divides into two broad 
categories. First, transactions between the principal and fiduciary, secondly, 
transactions or dealings by the fiduciary with third parties, whether purportedly 
done on behalf of the principal and fiduciary. Secondly, transactions or 
dealings by the fiduciary with third parties, whether purportedly done on behalf 
of the principal or not. As a general rule it may be stated that if the fiduciary 
makes full disclosure of all the circumstances to the principal or not. As a 
general rule it may be stated that if the fiduciary makes full disclosure of all the 
circumstances to the principal and the principal gives informed consent to the 
dealings, the transaction to the principal and the principal gives informed 
consent to the dealings, the transaction will stand in either category. There is no 
room for a detailed survey of the case law and the content of the obligation 
here. Where the fiduciary deals directly with its principal, the burden of proof is 
upon the fiduciary to demonstrate affirmatively that the transaction was fair 
and that in the course of negotiations he made full disclosure of all the facts 
material to the transaction. Any non-disclosure by the fiduciary will entitle the 
principal to rescind the transaction. This is a leading exception to the general 
position in English law that non-disclosure does not vitiate transactions. If 
rescission is no longer possible, in the alternative the fiduciary will be liable to 
account may in appropriate circumstances be reinforced by a proprietary 
restitutionary remedy. 
A significant recent statement of authority came in Guinness plc v. Sauders.9 
Guinness sought to recover 5.2 million paid to ward, an American attorney and 
former director of the company, made at the time of the controversial bid by 
Guinness to take over Distillers. Ward together with the then chief executive, 
Saunders, and another director, Roux, formed a take-over subcommittee of the 
Board. That subcommittee agreed to pay Ward 0.2 percent of the ultimate value 
                                                          
9  (1990) 2 AC 663. 
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of the bid if successful for his services in connection with the bid. This yielded 
5.2 million. It was ultimately held by the House of Lords that Guinness’s 
articles of association only empowered the board of directors to award such 
remuneration Accordingly the contract was void for want of authority of the 
sub-committee. Lord Goff of Chievely stated.  
7.5 Remedies for Breach 
The characteristic remedial response is that a fiduciary must disgorge the 
benefits derived from his breach of duty. Remedial flexibility is demonstrated 
by the two leading cases on the liability of company promoters. 
In Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.10   a syndicate of promoters 
purchased the lease for a West Indian Island for $ 55,000. They promoted a 
company with the object of exploiting the island's phosphate reserve. 
Subsequently the syndicate sold the island to the company for $110,000. They 
failed to disclose the inflated price to the investor. The House of Lords 
unanimously held that the promoters stood in a fiduciary position towards the 
company and owed it a duty to make full disclosure of the circumstances of 
their acquisition of the property. The company was held entitled to rescind the 
contract and to restitution of the property. The company was held entitled to 
rescind the contract and to restitution of the purchase price, conditional upon 
giving up possession of the island and paying over any profits made in the 
interim. 
In Gluckstein v. Barnes,11 a syndicate purchased the Olympia Exhibition Hall 
for $ 140,000. They subsequently promoted a company to which to sell the 
property for $ 180,000. The prospectus disclosed a profit of $ 40,000, but failed 
to disclose a further profit of $ 20,000 made in relation to the property. The 
House rejected an argument that the only remedy was rescission, relying upon 
                                                          
10 (1878) 3 App Cas 1218. 
11 (1990) AC 240. 
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the authority of Hichens v. Congreve.12 
The claim to rescission in Erlanger can be rationalised either as based upon 
vitiated intent to transfer (arising from the nondisclosure), or alternatively as 
parastic upon the wrong of breach of fiduciary duty. In contrast, the liability to 
account in Gluckstein is best classified as a claim based solely upon restitution 
of the wrongdoing. It would be artificial to describe it as a species of 
subtractive unjust enrichment. 
7.6 Diversion of Opportunity 
The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position 
make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends upon 
fraud, or absence of bonafides; or upon such questions or considerations as 
whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or 
whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the 
plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the 
plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did the benefit of the plaintiff, 
or whether the plaintiff, has in fact or acted as he did for the benefit by his 
action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated 
circumstances, been made. The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, 
cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account. 
It was clear that the directors could have protected themselves by a resolution 
of the Legal shareholders approving of their conduct. However, informed 
consent not having been obtained, they were liable to account. 
This was the principle relied upon a Boardman v. Phipps,13 where the solicitor 
to a trust and a beneficiary were held liable to account for the profits made as a 
result of the successful take over and the opportunity of acquiring the shares as 
a result of acting on behalf of the trustee. It was stated that the transaction 
required the fully informed consent of both trustees and beneficiaries. These 
                                                          
12 (1831) 4 Sim 420, 58 ER 157 
13 Supra note 5. 
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extreme applications of the principle are criticized in Jones. 
We do not believe that the only function of the civil law should be to 
compensate and it is our view that restitutionary awards are prima facie 
justified if certain conditions are satisfied. Although the case in favour of 
restitutionary awards would be strengthened if exemplary damages were 
abolished, we do not consider that it depends on such abolition. 
Our view is that for there to be a restitutionary award the following conditions 
must be satisfied. First, there must have been either interference with a 
proprietary right or an analogous right (such as confidentiality and the rights 
enjoyed by the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship) or deliberate 
wrongdoing which could have been restrained by injunction. Secondly, the 
gains made by the defendant must be attributable to the interest infringed. 
In the case of breach of contract we incline to the view that the distinction that 
appears to be drawn between specifically enforceable contracts and contracts 
between fiduciaries where a restitutionary award may be made, and other 
contracts where the gain to a defendant from breach is irrelevant, reflects an 
appropriate balance of the respective of the parties.  
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Chapter-VIII 
ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY AS DEFENCES 
 
8.1 Introduction 
A contract that is expressly or implicitly prohibited by statute is illegal. In this 
context, ‘statute’ includes the orders, rules and regulations that ministers of 
the Crown and other officials are so frequently authorized by Parliament to 
make.  
If the contract in fact made by the parties is expressly forbidden by the statute, 
its illegality is undoubted. Express statutory prohibition of contracts is by no 
means uncommon. So Parliament may provide in pursuance of a policy of 
controlling credit that no contract of hire purchase shall be entered into, 
unless at least 25 percent of the cash prize is paid by way of an initial 
payment.1 Where it is alleged that the prohibition is implied, the court is 
presented with a problem the solution of which depends upon the construction 
of the statute. What must be ascertained is whether the object of the 
legislature is to forbid the contract. In pursuing, this enquiry a variety of tests 
has been applied. For instance, if the sole object of the statute is to increase 
the national revenue, as for instance by requiring a trader to take out a license, 
or to punish a contracting party who fails to furnish or furnishes incorrectly 
certain particulars, the contract that he may have made is not itself 
prohibited.2 On the other hand, if even one of the objects is the protection of 
the public or the furtherance of some other aspect of public policy, a contract 
that fails to comply with the statute may be implicitly prohibited.3 But no one 
test is decisive, for in every case the purpose of the legislature must be 
considered in the light of all the relevant facts and circumstances. 4 
                                             
1  Stonehedge Finance Ltd. V. Phillips (1965) 1 All ER 513. 
2  Learoyd v. Bracken (1894) 1 QB 114. 
3  Victorian Daylesford Syndicate v. Dott (1905) 2 Ch 624 at p 630. 
4  St. John Shipping Corpn v. Joseph Rank Ltd. (1957) 1 QB 267 at pp 285-287 
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8.2 Contracts Illegal at Common Law on Grounds of Public Policy 
Certain types of contract are forbidden at common law and are therefore 
prima facie illegal. The first essential to an understanding of this head of the 
law, which has been clouded by much confusion of thought, is to discover if 
possible the principle upon which the stigma of illegality is based. The 
present law is the result of a development that stretches back to at least 
Elizabethan times5, but its foundations were not effectively laid until the 
eighteenth century. What the judges of that period were at pains to emphasize 
was that they would not tolerate any contract that in their view was injurious 
to society.6 Injury to society, however, is incapable of precise definition, and it 
is not surprising that the particular contracts found distasteful on this ground 
were described in somewhat vague and indeterminate language. To give a few 
examples, nobody would be allowed ‘to stipulate for inequity’,7 no contract 
would be enforced that was ‘contrary to the general policy of the law’,8 or 
‘against the public good’, 9 or contra bonos mores10 or which had arisen ex 
turpi causa.11 
It seems justifiable to infer from such expressions as these that the judges 
were determined to establish and sustain a concept of public policy. 
Contractual freedom must be fostered, but any contract that tended to 
prejudice the social or economic interest of the community must be forbidden. 
Not unnaturally a principle stated in such sweeping terms as these has its 
disadvantages. It is imprecise, since judicial views will inevitably differ upon 
whether a particular contract is immoral or subversive of the common good; 
there is no necessary continuity in the general policy of the law, for what is 
anathema to one generation seems harmless to another; and the public good 
                                             
5  Pollock’s Principles of Contract 13th edn. at 1950, Stevans London at p. 291. 
6  Fifoot Lord Mansfield at pp. 122-125. 
7  Collins v. Blentern (1767) 2 Wils KB 341 at p 350. 
8  Lowe v. Pars (1768) 4 Burr 225 
9  Supra note 7 ,at p 350.   
10 Girardy v. Richardson (1793) 1 Exp 13 
11 Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 at p 343. 
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affects so many walks of life that the causes of action that can be said to arise 
ex turpi causa must in the nature of things very greatly in their degree of harm 
to the community. 
It is this variation in the degree of harm done that requires emphasis, for the 
word ‘illegal’ has been, and still is, used to cover a multitude of sins and even 
cases where little, if any, sin can be discovered. The list of ‘illegal’ contracts 
includes inter alia agreements to commit a crime or a tort, to defraud the 
revenue, to lend money to an alien enemy, to import liquor into a country 
where prohibition is in force, to procure a wife for X in return for a reward, to 
provide for a wife if she should ever separate from her husband and finally an 
agreement in restraint of trade between master and servant or between the 
seller and buyer of a business, such as that by which a servant promises not to 
work in the future for a trade rival of his present employer. If these contracts 
are scrutinized in the order given, it will be seen that the improbity which they 
reveal is a constantly diminishing factor and that it is entirely absent from the 
agreement in restraint of trade. There is nothing disgraceful in a master and 
servant coming to such an agreement, and the only complaint that their 
conduct invokes is the possible economic inexpedience of allowing a 
workman to restrict his freedom to exploit his skill as and where he will. 
Common sense suggests that the consequences at law of entering into one of 
these so-called illegal contracts should vary in severity according to the 
degree of impropriety that the conduct of the parties discloses. It is obvious 
that an agreement to commit a crime cannot be put on the same footing as an 
undertaking by a servant that he will not later enter the employment of a rival 
trader. The former is so transparently reprehensible judged by any standard of 
morals that it must be dismissed as illegal, with the result that both parties 
must be excluded from access to the courts and denied all remedies; but the 
latter should certainly not attract the full rigour of the maxim ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio, with its implication that it can originate no rights or 
liabilities whatsoever. The parties have done nothing disgraceful, they have 
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not conspired against the proprieties and, although they cannot be allowed to 
enforce such part of the contract as is tainted, it would be unjustifiable to 
regard them as outcasts of the law unable to enforce even the innocent part of 
their bargain. To describe their contract as illegal as a whole is an abuse of 
language. Speaking of the contract in restraint of trade, for instance, Farwell 
LJ said, ‘it is not unlawful in the sense that it is criminal or would give any 
cause of action to a third person injured by its operation, but it is unlawful in 
the sense that the law will not enforce it’.12 In the eighteenth century, when 
the principle of public policy was taking root and the instances of unsavoury 
bargains were comparatively simple, it was perhaps not strange that the 
judges should have used somewhat exaggerated language in rejecting 
contracts that revealed wickedness, but in the complex conditions of today the 
indiscriminate use of the term ‘illegal’ is, to say the least, confusing. 
Modern judges have in fact taken a more realistic view of this part of the law 
and have concluded that the so-called illegal contracts fall into two separate 
groups according to the degree of mischief that they involve.13 Some 
agreements are so obviously inimical to the interest of the community that 
they offend almost any concept of public policy; others violate no basic 
feelings of morality, but run counter only to social or economic expedience. 
The significance of their separation into two classes, as we shall see, lies in 
the different consequences that they involve. 
That the various contracts traditionally called illegal do not involve similar 
consequences was stressed by Somervell U, in the following passage:14 
In Bennett v. Bennett, it was pointed out that there are two kinds of illegality 
of differing effect. The lust is where the illegality is criminal, or contra bonos 
mores, and in those cases, which I will not attempt to enumerate or further 
classify, such a provision (sic), if an ingredient in the contract, will invalidate 
                                             
12  Northern Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co. (1912) 107 Lt 439 at p 444. 
13  Bennett v. Bennett (1952) 1 KB 249. 
14  Goodinson v. Goodinson (l954) 2 QB 118 at pp 120-121. 
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the whole, although there may be many other provisions in it. There is a 
second kind of illegality which has no such taint; the other terms in the 
contract stand if the illegal portion can be severed, the illegal portion being a 
provision which the court, on grounds of public policy, will not enforce. The 
simplest and most common example of the latter class of illegality is a 
contract for the sale of a business which contains a provision restricting the 
vendor from competing in or engaging in trade for a certain period or within a 
certain area. There are many cases in the books where, without in any way 
impugning the contract of ask, some provision restricting competition has 
been regarded as in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy. There are 
many cases where not only has the main contract to purchase been left 
standing but part of the clause restricting competition has been allowed to 
stand. 
Assuming, then, that contracts vitiated by some improper element must be 
divided into two classes, how are the more serious examples of ‘illegality’ at 
common law to be distinguished from the less serious? Which of the contracts 
that have been frowned upon by the courts are so patently reprehensible-so 
obviously contrary to public policy-that they must be peremptorily styled 
illegal? Judicial authority is lacking, but it is submitted that the epithet 
‘illegal’ may aptly and correctly be applied to the following six types of 
contract: 
• A contract to commit a crime, a tort or a fraud on a third party. 
• A contract that is sexually immoral. 
• A contract to the prejudice of the public safety. 
• A contract prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
• A contract that tends to corruption in public life. 
• A contract to defraud the revenue. 
There remain three types of contract which offend ‘public policy’, but which 
are inexpedient rather than unprincipled. 
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• A contract to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 
• A contract that tends to prejudice the Status of marriage. 
• A contract in restraint of trade. 
If the word ‘illegal’ is to be reserved for the more reprehensible type of 
contract, another title must be chosen to designate those which fall within the 
second degree of public policy, and which for that reason have been treated - 
with comparative leniency by the courts. The most appropriate title seems to 
be ‘void’, since these contracts are in practice treated by the courts as void 
either as a whole or at least in part. In Bennett v. Bennett Denning LJ 
described covenants in restraint of trade as ‘void not illegal’. 
They are not ‘illegal’, in the sense that a contract to do a prohibited or 
immoral act is illegal. They are not ‘unenforceable’, in the sense that a 
contract within the Statute of Frauds is unenforceable for want of writing. 
These covenants lie somewhere in between. They are invalid and 
unenforceable.15 
The word ‘void’ used as a descriptive title certainly has its disadvantages. It is 
already applied to a number of disparate contracts and is not applied to them 
in any uniform sense or with uniform results. At common law it has long been 
used to indicate the consequences of mistake; by statute it has been used with 
dubious results in wagering transactions and in contracts made by infants. But 
linguistic precision cannot survive the complexity of life. A continental jurist 
has said that unlike typical sciences where there is no interim stage legal 
science the effects of disobeying a legal rule may be graded to suit the 
individual situation. 
Thus, the difference between an act that is valid and an act that is void is 
unlike the difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, between effect and no-effect. It 
is a difference of grade and quantity. Some effects are produced, while others 
                                             
15  (1952) 1 KB 249 at p 260. 
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are not.16 
For better or for worse, then, it has been decided for the purposes of this book 
to describe the three less serious types of ‘illegal’ contracts as contracts void 
at common law on grounds of public policy. 
Some general observations must be added upon the doctrine of public policy 
in the current law.17 
Since public policy reflects the mores and fundamental assumptions of the 
community, the content of the rules should vary from country to country and 
from era to era. There is high authority for the view that in matters of public 
policy the courts should adopt a broader approach than they usually do to the 
use of precedents.18 
Such flexibility may manifest itself in two ways: by the closing down of 
existing heads of public policy and by the opening of new heads. There is no 
doubt that an existing head of public policy may be declared redundant. So in 
the nineteenth century it was stated that Christianity was part of the law of 
England and that accordingly a contract to hire a hail for a meeting to promote 
atheism was contrary to public policy19 but fifty years later this view was 
decisively rejected.20 
More contrary surrounds the question of whether the courts still retain 
freedom to recognize new heads of public policy. It has been denied that any 
such freedom exists21 and Lord Thankerton said that the task of the judge in 
this area was ‘to expound and not to expand’, the law. 22 It may be thought 
surprising however that in this of all areas, the courts should abrogate their 
function of developing the common law. To some extent the discussion is 
                                             
16   64 LQR 326. 
17  Lloyd Public Policy (1953); Winfield 42 Harvard L Rev 76. 
18  Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. (1894) AC 535. 
19  Cowan v. Milbourn (l867) LR 2 Exch 230. 
20  Bowman v. Secular Society (1917) AC 406. 
21  Janson v. Driefintein Consolidated Mines (1902) AC 484 at p. 491. 
22  Fender v. St. John Mildmay (1938) AC 1 at p. 23. 
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artificial since much development may take place within the existing heads 
but it is difficult to assert that new circumstances cannot arise which do not 
fall readily into any of the recognized heads. Courts have responded to this 
challenge in the past by the development of new heads23 and it is thought that 
they will, in exceptional circumstances, do so again. 
This question would be relevant, for instance, if it were argued that contracts 
involving racial, religious or sexual discrimination were contrary to public 
policy. It is arguable that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Nagle Feilden24 
represents recognition of such a possibility and there is some Australian 
authority too.25 Undoubtedly any such argument would raise important 
questions, in particular whether the existence of legislation in this area26 
should be regarded as relevant either as (a) delimiting precisely the area of 
reprehensible discriminatory conductor (b) (preferably) as a legislative signal 
that discrimination is against the public interest.27 Canvassed head of public 
policy has involved the validity of contractual provisions, which attempt to 
allocate some of the risks of inflation by tying repayment of debts to foreign 
currencies. In Treseder-Griffin v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.,28 
Denning LJ expressed the opinion, obiter, that such provisions were contrary 
to public policy but this view was not followed by Browne-Wilkinson J in 
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. v. Marden,29 a decision approved in its turn by 
Lord Denning MR in Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South 
Staffordshire Waterworks Co.30 In none of these cases was any weight 
attached to any argument based on novelty. 
A final observation may be made as to the way in which the courts determine 
the content of public policy. Apart from reliance on previous precedents, this 
                                             
23  Neville v. Dominion of Canada News Co. Ltd. (1915) 3 KB 556. 
24  (1966) 2 QB 633, (1966) 1 All ER 689. 
25  Newcastle Diocese (Church Property Trustees) v. Ebbeck (1960) 34 ALJR 413. 
26  Race Relations Act, 1968; Equal Pay Act, 1970. 
27  Blathwayt v. Baron Cawley (1976) AC 397 at pp. 425-426 
28  (1956) 2 QB 127 (1956) 2 All ER 33. 
29  (1979) Ch 84 (1978) 2 All ER 489 
30  (1978) 3 All ER 769, (1978) 1 WLR 1387. 
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is done by a priori deduction from broad general principles. It is not the 
practice in English courts for the parties to lead sociological or economic 
evidence as to whether particular practices are harmful and it is doubtful to 
what extent such evidence would be regarded as relevant if it were adducted.31 
8.3 The Consequence of Illegality 
8.3.1 The Relevance of the State of Mind of the Parties 
Whether the parties are influenced by a guilty intention is inevitably material 
in estimating the consequences of an illegal contract. Its materiality may be 
stated in three propositions. 
First, if the contract is illegal in its inception, neither party can assert that he 
did not intend to break the law. Both parties have expressly and clearly agreed 
to do something that in fact is prohibited at common law, as for example, 
where a British subject agrees to insure an alien enemy against certain rides. 
The position is the same if the parties have agreed to do something that is 
expressly or implicitly forbidden by statute.32 In both these cases, the contract 
is intrinsically and inevitably illegal, and, so far as consequences are 
concerned, no allowance is made for innocence. The British subject, for 
instance, may well be ignorant that it is unlawful to contract with an alien 
enemy, but none the less he will be precluded by the maxim ignorantia juris 
haud excusat frora relying upon his ignorance.33 The very contract is 
unlawful in its formation. 
Secondly, if the contract is ex facie lawful, but both parties intend to exploit it 
for an illegal purpose, it is illegal in its inception despite its innocuous 
appearance. Both parties intend to accomplish an unlawful end and both are 
remediless. This is true, for instance, of an agreement to let a flat if there is a 
common intention to use it for immoral purposes. 
                                             
31  Texaco Ltd. v. Mulberry Filling Station (1972) 1 All ER 513. 
32  Re Mahmood and Ispahani (1921) 2 KB 716. 
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Thirdly, if the contract is lawful in its formation, but one party alone intends 
to exploit it for an illegal purpose, the law not unnaturally takes the view that 
the innocent party need not be adversely affected by the guilty intention of the 
other.34 This has been frequently stressed by the judges. In one case in 1810, 
for instance, the plaintiffs, acting on behalf of a Russian owner, had insured 
goods on a vessel already en route from St Petersburg and had paid the 
premium. The contract was made after war had broken out between Russia 
and England, but the fact was not known, and could not have been known to 
the plaintiffs. The ship was seized by the Russians and taken back to St 
Petersburg. The plaintiffs succeeded in an action for the recovery of the 
premium.35 Lord Ellenborough, after remarking that the insurance would have 
been Illegal in its inception had the plaintiffs known of the outbreak of war, 
said: 
“But here the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the 
commencement of hostilities by Russia, when they effected 
this insurance; and, therefore no fault is imputable to them 
far entering into the contract; and there is no reason why they 
should not recover lack the premiums which they have paid 
for an insurance from which, without any fault imputable to 
themselves, they could never have derived any benefit.” 36 
Whether a party is innocent or guilty in this respect depends upon whether ‘he 
is himself implicated in the illegality’,37 or more precisely whether he has 
participated in the furtherance of the illegal intention.38 If, for instance, A lets 
a flat to B, a woman whom he knows to be a prostitute, the very contract will 
be unlawful if he knows that B’s object is to use the premises for immoral 
purposes,39 but this will not be the case if all that he is aware of is B’s mode 
of life, for a reasonable person might not necessarily infer that the purpose of 
                                             
34  Oom v. Bruce (1810) 12 East 225. 
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the letting was to further immorality.40 Even a prostitute must have a home. 
Perhaps the best known case on this subject so far as illegality at common law 
is concerned, is Pearce v. Brooks,41 where the facts were as follows: 
The plaintiffs agreed to supply the defendant with a new 
miniature brougham on hire until the purchase money should 
be paid by installments during a period that was not to exceed 
twelve months. The defendant was a prostitute and she 
undoubtedly intended to use the carriage, which was of a 
somewhat intriguing nature, as a lure to hesitant clients. One 
of the two plaintiffs was aware of her mode of life, but there 
was no direct evidence that either of them knew of the use to 
which she intended to put the carriage. The jury, however, 
found that the purpose of the woman was to use the carriage 
as part of her display to attract men and that the plaintiffs 
were aware of her design. On this finding, Bramwell B gave 
judgment for the defendant in an action brought against her 
to recover a sum due under the contract. 
It was held on appeal that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding 
of the jury. The Court of Exchequer Chamber was satisfied on the evidence 
that the plaintiffs were not only aware of the defendant’s intention, but were 
even guilty of some complicity in her provocative scheme. 
In order to emphasize the distinction between innocence and guilt that affects 
this branch of the law, the precise consequences of an illegal contract will 
now be detailed under two separate heads, namely: the consequence where a 
contract is illegal in its inception; the consequence where a contract lawful in 
its inception is later exploited illegally or is illegally performed. 
8.3.2 The Consequence Where the Contract is Illegal in its Inception 
The general principle, founded on public policy, is that any transaction that is 
tainted by illegality in which both parties are equally involved is beyond the 
pale of the law. No person can claim any right or remedy whatsoever under an 
                                             
40  Crisp v. Churchill (1794) 
41  (1886) LR 1 Exch 213. 
277 
 
illegal transaction in which he has participated. 42 Ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio. The court is bound to veto the enforcement of a contract once it knows 
that it is illegal, whether the knowledge comes from the statement of the 
guilty party or from outside sources. 43 Even the defendant can successfully 
plead the turpis causa, and though this ‘defence is very dishonest’44 and 
‘seems only worthy of the Pharisee who shook himself free of his natural 
obligations by saying Corban,’45 it is allowed for the reasons given by Lord 
Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson: 
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and 
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not 
for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in 
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, 
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I 
may say so. The principle of public policy is this: ex dolo malo non oritur 
actio. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon 
an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiffs own stating or otherwise, 
the cause of action appear to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a 
positive law of this country, then the Court says he has no right to be assisted 
is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but 
because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and 
defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action 
against the plaintiff, me latter would then have the advantage of it; for where 
both are equally in fault potior est conditio defendentis.46 
The practical application of this general principle must now be stated in some 
detail. 
A contract that is illegal as formed and is therefore void ab initio is treated by 
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the law as if it had not been made at all.47 It is totally void, and no remedy is 
available to either party. No action lies for damages, for an account of profits 
or for a share of expenses. Thus, in the case of an illegal contract for the sale 
of goods, the buyer, even though he has paid the price, cannot sue for non- 
delivery; the seller who has made delivery cannot recover the price. A servant 
cannot recover arrears of salary under an illegal contract of employment.48 In 
the case of an Illegal lease, the landlord cannot recover the rent or damages 
for the breach of any other covenant.49 The position is the same not only 
where a contract is prohibited at common law on grounds of public policy, but 
also where its very formation is prohibited by statute. An apt illustration is 
afforded by Re Mahmoud and Ispahani50 where the facts were these: 
The plaintiff agreed to sell linseed oil to the defendant, who refused to take 
delivery and was sued for non-acceptance of the goods. A statutory order 
provided that no person should buy or sell certain specified articles, including 
linseed, unless he was licensed to do so. Before the conclusion of the contract, 
the defendant untruthfully alleged that he held a licence and the plaintiff, who 
himself was licensed, believed the allegation. 
Once it was established that each party was forbidden by statute to enter into 
the contract, the court had no option but to enforce the prohibition even 
though the defendant relied upon his own illegality. The honest belief of the 
plaintiff that the defendant held a licence was irrelevant. 
Again, an award made by an arbitrator in respect of a prohibited contract will 
be set aside by the court.51 A builder who does work at a cost exceeding the 
sum authorised by statute cannot recover the excess,52 and if, having done 
both authorised end unauthorized work, he receives payment under the 
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contract generally, he cannot appropriate the sum to the unlawful work.53 
In all cases where a contract is illegal in its formation, neither party can 
circumvent the rule ex turpi causa non oritur action by pleading ignorance of 
the law.54 
Although a contract is illegal in its formation and therefore void, the Court of 
Appeal has now held that the ownership of goods may pass to the buyer trader 
an illegal contract of sale even if both parties are in pari delicto.55 This 
decision requires to be examined with some particularity. 
Since an illegal contract is totally void, the inescapable conclusion would 
seem to be that the ownership of movables cannot pass by virtue of the 
contract itself if this arises ex turpi causa and if both parties to it are in pari 
delicto. Nil posse creari de nilo.56 
If, therefore, the ownership is to pass at all, this must be effected by some 
independent rule of law extraneous to the so-called but abortive contract. It is 
true that in the case of a gift the ownership of goods may be transferred by 
delivery, provided that this is what the parties intend. But since this intention 
is one of the decisive elements of the transaction, it would seem logical to 
insist that it must be disregarded if it is tainted by illegality.57 In 1960, 
however, Lord Denning, giving the opinion of the Privy Council in Singh v. 
Ali58 expressed a view which it is respectfully suggested goes beyond 
previous statements of the law. 
There are many cases which show that when two persons agree together in a 
Conspiracy to effect a fraudulent or illegal purpose-and one of them transfers 
property to the other in pursuance of the conspiracy-then, so soon as the 
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contract is executed and the fraudulent or illegal purpose is achieved, the 
property (be it absolute or special) which has been transferred by the one to 
the other remains vested in the transferee, its illegal origin ... The reason is 
because the transferor, having fully achieved his unworthy end, cannot be 
allowed to turn round and repudiate the means by which he did it-he cannot 
throw over the transfer.59  
8.4 Distinction between Illegal Contracts and Void Contracts 
A void contract is one which has no legal effect. An illegal contract though 
resembling the void contract in that it also has no legal effect as between the 
immediate parties, has this further effect and even transactions collateral to it 
become tainted with illegality and are, therefore, in certain circumstances not 
enforceable.60 
Unless the statute specifically provides that a contract contrary to the 
provisions of the statute would be void the contract would remain binding 
between the parties and could be enforced between the parties themselves.61 
In the absence of any mandatory provisions obliging eviction in case of 
contravention of the provisions of an Act, a lease in violation thereof would 
not be void and the parties would be bound, as between themselves, to 
observe the conditions of the lease. The parties to such a lease cannot assail it 
in a proceeding between themselves.62 
8.5 Proof of Illegality 
The rules of evidence that govern the proof of illegality, whether the contract 
is illegal by the statute or at common law, may be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, where the contract is ex facie illegal, the court takes judicial notice of 
the fact and refuses to enforce the contract, even though its illegality has not 
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been pleaded by the defendant. 
Secondly, where the contract is ex facie lawful, evidence of external 
circumstances showing that it is in fact illegal will not be admitted, unless 
those circumstances have been pleaded. 
Thirdly, when the contract is ex facie lawful, but facts come to light in the 
course of the trial tending to show that it has an illegal purpose, the court 
takes judicial notice of the illegality notwithstanding that these facts have not 
been pleaded. But it must be clear that all the relevant circumstances are 
before the court.63  
8.5.1 The Effect of Illegality 
There is, however, an important qualification which must be made to this 
general principle. A party to a contract will not be held to be innocent if he 
has full knowledge of the facts which constitute the illegality, but yet is 
ignorant of the law, for ignorantia juris haud excusat. In J.M. Allan 
(Merchandising), Ltd. v. Cloke,64 the plaintiffs sued the defendants for money 
payable in respect of a roulette table hired to the defendants and designed for 
the playing of ‘Roulette Royale’, a game which was unlawful by virtue of the 
Betting and Gaming Act 1960.65 At the time they entered into the hiring 
agreement, neither party knew that the game was illegal, and the plaintiffs 
pleaded that they had no ‘wicked intention to break the law’. The Court of 
Appeal rejected this plea and held that ignorance of the law was no answer to 
the charge of illegality. 
In this case, the parties intended that the subject-matter of the contract should 
be used for an unlawful purpose (the playing of ‘Roulette Royale’) and this 
was the only purpose for which it could be used. But where the contract is 
capable of lawful performance and is in fact lawfully performed, although the 
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parties contemplated that it should be performed in an illegal manner, it will 
be material to inquire whether or not they were ignorant of the law. In Waugh 
v. Morris:66 
The defendant chartered a ship belonging to the plaintiff to take a cargo of 
hay from Trouville to London. It was subsequently agreed that the bay should 
be unloaded alongside ship in the river, and landed at a wharf in Deptford 
Creek. Unknown to the parties an Order in Council (made before the charter-
party was entered into) had forbidden the landing of French hay in order to 
prevent the spread of disease among animals. The defendant, on hearing this, 
took the cargo from alongside the ship without landing it, and exported it, 
thus avoiding a breach of the Order in Council. The return of the vessel was 
delayed, and the plaintiff sued for damages arising from the delay. 
The defendant pleaded as a defence that the contract of charter-party 
contemplated an illegal act, the landing of French hay contrary to the Order in 
Council. This defence did not prevail: 
Where a contract is to do a thing which cannot be performed without a 
violation of the law it is void, whether the parties knew the law or not. But we 
think, that in order to avoid a contract which can be legally performed, on the 
ground that there was an intention to perform it in an illegal manner, it is 
necessary to show that there was the wicked intention to break the law; and if 
this be so, the knowledge of what the law is becomes of great importance. 
Accordingly the contract was held to be valid and the plaintiff recovered 
damages for the delay. 
8.5.2 Contracts Unlawful ‘per se’ 
If a contract is expressly or by implication forbidden by statute or by public 
policy, then it is void and unenforceable, though the parties may have been 
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ignorant of the facts constituting the illegality and did not intend to break the 
law. Such contracts are unlawful per se and the intention of the parties is 
irrelevant. 
An example of a contract forbidden by statute has been given in Re Mahmoud 
and Ispahani67 where the plaintiff, who was ignorant of the fact that the 
defendant had no licence to purchase linseed oil, was unable to recover 
damages for non-acceptance in face of a statutory prohibition. An example of 
a contract forbidden by public policy is one which necessarily involves 
intercourse with an alien enemy in time of war. No rights of action will arise, 
even though one party at the time of the agreement is ignorant of the fact that 
war has broken out or that the other party has the status of an enemy. 68 The 
agreement itself is prohibited and cannot be enforced in any way. 
It is clear that considerable difficulty may be experienced in deciding whether 
a particular statute or head of public policy renders the contract unlawful per 
se or merely prevents a guilty party from suing on it. But the modern 
tendency is to hold that a contracting party cannot be cast from the seat of 
judgment unless he participated in the unlawful intention. The state of mind 
of the parties is the crucial factor. Unless it is clear that the legislature 
intended, or public policy demands, that the contract be prohibited altogether, 
the innocent party can sue on the agreement. Moreover, even if the contract is 
one which is unlawful per se, the innocent party is not necessarily without 
remedy. If he has been induced to enter into the contract by the representation 
or promise of the other that it is lawful, then he can recover damages for fraud 
if there is fraud,69 or for breach of a collateral warranty if he prove such to 
have been given,70 provided that he himself has not been guilty of culpable 
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conduct on his part disabling him from that remedy.71 So in Strongman Ltd. v. 
Sincock72 a builder recovered damages for the breach of a collateral assurance 
by his client that he would obtain the necessary licenses to enable the work to 
be carried out, even though a contract to build without a licence was 
absolutely prohibited by statute. 
8.5.3 Benefit from Illegal Contract 
It is sometimes said to be a rule of law that no person can take any benefit 
from a contract, either directly or through his personal representatives, when 
that benefit results from the performance by him of an illegal act.73 In 
Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co., Ltd.:74 
R insured his life with the defendant Company for £ 50,000. A few minutes 
before the policy was due to lapse, he committed suicide. The policy 
contained a term avoiding it in the event of suicide within a year of its 
commencement, hut the suicide occurred after the policy had run for some 
years. 
The House of Lords held that the insurance company had agreed to pay in this 
event, but that the claim was contrary to public policy as the deceased’s 
personal representatives could not obtain any benefit from the assured’s 
illegal act. This case would certainly not be followed at the present day, for 
suicide is no longer a crime,75 and the rule itself is probably too widely stated. 
It is submitted that it will only apply where the statute or head of public 
policy is such as to require that the offender be deprived of the fruits of his 
illegal act;76 and even then the benefit will be recoverable unless it is 
something to which, but for the illegality, he would have had no right or 
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title.77 
8.6 Recovery of Money or Property transferred under an Illegal 
Contract 
It is scarcely surprising that the Courts will refuse to enforce an illegal 
agreement at the suit of a person who is himself implicated in the illegality. 
But it is also a rule of English law that money or property transferred by such 
a person cannot be recovered. In the colourful words of Wilmot C.J.: ‘All 
writers upon our law agree in this, no polluted hand shall touch the pure 
fountains of justice. Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he bath 
once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not 
have the help of a court to fetch it back again.’78 
This principle is expressed in the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio 
defendentis and it may be illustrated by the case of Parkinson v. College of 
Ambulance, Ltd.:79 
The secretary of a charitable organization promised the plaintiff that lie would 
secure for him a knighthood if he would make a sufficient donation to the 
organization’s funds, in consideration of this promise, the plaintiff paid over £ 
3,000 and promised more when he should receive the honour. The knighthood 
never materialized, and the plaintiff sued for time return of his money. 
It was held that the action must fail as it was founded upon a transaction 
which was illegal at common law. 
But there are exceptional cases in which a man will be relieved of the 
consequences of an illegal contract into which he has entered-cases to which 
the maxim just quoted does not apply. They fall into three classes: (a) where 
the illegal purpose has not yet been carried into effect before it is sought to 
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recover the money paid or goods delivered in furtherance of it; (b) where the 
plaintiff is not in pari delicto with the defendant; (c) where the plaintiff does 
not have to rely on the illegality to make out his claim. 
8.7 The Concept of Public Policy 
The concept of public policy is illusive, varying and uncertain. It has also 
been described as ‘untrustworthy guide’, ‘unruly horse’ etc. The term ‘public 
policy’ is not capable of a precise definition and whatever tends to injustice of 
operation, restraint of liberty, commerce and natural or legal rights: whatever 
tends to the obstruction of justice or to the violation of a statute and whatever 
is against good morals can be said to be against public policy. The concept of 
public policy is capable of expansion and modification.80 
In Gherulal Pathak v. Mahadeodas Maiya,81 the Supreme Court observed: 
“Public Policy’ is a vague and unsatisfactory term, and 
calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to 
the decision of legal rights; it is capable of being understood 
in different senses it may, and best for the common good of 
the community; and in that sense there may be every variety 
of opinion, according to education habits, talents and 
dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether an act 
is against public policy or not. To allow this to be a ground of 
judicial decision, would lead to the greatest uncertainty and 
confusion. It is the province of the statesman and not the 
lawyer, to discuss, and of the legislature to determine what is 
best or public good and to provide for it by proper 
enactments. It is of the province of the judge to expound the 
law only; the written from the statutes, the unwritten or 
common law from the decision of our predecessors and of our 
existing Courts, from text writers of acknowledged authority, 
and upon the principles to be clearly deducted from them by 
sound reason and just inference; not to speculate upon what 
is the best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the 
community. Some of these decision may have no doubt been 
founded upon the prevailing and just opinions of the public 
good; for instance, the illegality of the covenants in restraint 
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of marriage or trade. They have became a part of the 
recognized law, and we are therefore bound by them, but are 
not thereby authorised to establish as law everything which 
we may think for the public good, and prohibit everything 
which we think otherwise.” 
Prof. Winfield in his Essay on Public Policy in the English Common Law82 
stated: 
“Public policy is necessarily variable. It may be variable not 
only from one century to another, not only from one 
generation to another but even in the same generation. 
Further it may vary not merely with respect to the particular 
topics which may be included in it, but also with respect in 
the rules relating to any two particular topic… This 
variability of public policy is a stone in the edifice of the 
doctrine and not admissible to be flung at it. Public policy 
would be almost useless without it.” 
In Pandeleton v. Greener,83 it had been held that: 
“Public policy’ is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, 
varying with the habits and fashions of the day, with the 
growth of commerce and usage of trade, that it is difficult to 
determine its limits with any degree of exactness. It has never 
been defined by the Court, but has been let loose and free 
from definition in the same manner as fraud.” 
8.8 Agreements Opposed to Public Policy 
A corporation and a shipping company entered into a contract for three years 
for manning, running, operating, repairing and maintenance on hire of three 
vehicles. One of the clauses of the contract gave right to the- corporation to 
terminate the contract after expiry of one year without assigning any reasons. 
On being challenged the termination of the contract by the company, it was 
held that the stipulation was not unconscionable or opposed to public policy.84 
The object of assignment of the Government land in favour of the lessee is to 
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provide him right to residence. If any such transfer is made contrary to the 
policy, it would be defeating the public purpose. Thus when there is no 
express prohibition in indenture of lease for such bequest without prior 
permission of Government, such a bequest cannot be held to be illegal though 
it was against public policy as object of assignment of Government law in 
favour of lessee was to provide him right of residence.85 
It is correct that any person or company is lawfully entitled to purchase shares 
of another company in open market, but if the transaction is done 
surreptitiously with a malafide intention by making use of some public 
financial institutions as a conduit in a clandestine manner, such deal or 
transaction would be contrary to public policy and illegal.86 
Where A and B arrived at an agreement that though both of them would 
submit tenders, the tender which A would submit would be for a higher 
amount and B would draw a cheque for Rs.15,000 in favour of A for not 
competing with it, held that the agreement was not void nor was opposed to 
public policy.87 If the Court finds that the parties were acting together with a 
view to perpetrate fraud and did not in fact perpetrate that fraud, and that there 
is no difference in the degree of the plaintiff and defendant’s guilt, the duty of 
the Court is to dismiss the claim.88 
When the object of the agreement to postpone the registration of the deed of 
lease is obvious enough from the circumstances and to conceal the actual 
savai amdani of the village and so as to reduce the assessment of the Land 
Revenue, it was held that this would defeat the provisions of the Registration 
Act, Transfer of Property Act and Stamp Act and was thus opposed to public 
policy.89 
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Where a case put forward in the trial Court was that the agreement in question 
was void as being opposed public policy, it was held that in revision the 
contention that the revision was void as being fraudulent on the same facts 
could be raised as the other party was not misled.90 
The defendant under the terms of his licence was forbidden to sell his rice to 
other wholesale merchants in the port on entry than those who were approved 
by the Collector. The plaintiff, a wholesale merchant, contracted to purchase 
rice and paid the price. The rates agreed upon were much higher than the 
controlled rates. Held that plaintiff who was a merchant must have known that 
he could not purchase the rice except by permission from Government. The 
contract was void and the plaintiff can base no claim upon it.91 
It is a paramount public policy that Courts are not lightly to interfere with 
freedom of contract.92 The Court cannot invent a new head of public policy.93 
Public policy is a vague and perhaps unsatisfactory term, a treacherous 
ground for legal decision and a very unsuitable and treacherous foundation on 
which to build. At the same time, it has been and will be a just ground for it 
legal decision and the Court has to give a decision whether a particular 
contract militates against public policy.94 
A threat to prosecute of itself is not illegal. Where there is a just and bona fide 
debt actually existing, and there is a good consideration for giving a security 
and the transaction between the parties involves a civil liability as well as 
possibly a criminal act, a threat to prosecute does riot necessarily vitiate a 
subsequent agreement by the debtor to give security for a debt which he justly 
owes to his creditor.95 
Though the object of the contract is lawful in itself it would be unlawful if it 
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cannot be achieved without violation of law or without doing something 
immoral or opposed to public policy. A contract to do a thing which cannot be 
performed without violation of law is void, whether the parties knew the law 
or not. Likewise the object of the contract may be lawful in law but its 
fulfillment may offend against the well-settled notions of public policy.96 The 
Courts must not invent a new head of public policy. The Courts ought to be 
very cautious in deciding a question of public policy. With the development 
of public opinion and morality the doctrine must be applied with necessary 
variation.97 
Agreements tending to injure the public service are always considered to be 
opposed to public policy. Therefore, any agreement which is in conflict with 
the public good or public policy in respect of public service is illegal and 
void.98 Public Policy does not remain static in any given community. Public 
policy would be almost useless if it were to remain in fixed moulds for all 
time.99 
When the delimitation of municipal area was to be done, the State 
Government agreed to keep certain area leased to a company excluded from 
limits of the municipality, it was held that the agreement with the company 
could not be enforced since it was opposed to public policy.100  
The appointment of a servant for a term or laying down the terms of service 
and conditions under which he could be discharged cannot be said to be 
applicable by the doctrine of public policy.101 Where a party admits that he 
has made a fictitious transfer of his property to another, with a view to effect 
fraud, but asks to have his act undone, the Court would refuse relief and 
would leave the party to the consequence of their misconduct dismissing the 
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claim when the suit was brought by the real owner to get back possession of 
his property and refusing to listen to the defence when he set it up in 
opposition to the person whom he has invested with the legal title.102 
An agreement was entered into between the parties whereby one party was 
required to use his influence with the minister. Such an agreement is void 
because it tends to corrupt or influence the decision-making machinery. 103 In 
Montesfoire v. Menday Motor Components Co. Ltd.,104  it was stated: 
“A contract may be against public policy either from the 
nature of the acts to be performed or from the nature of the 
considerations. In my judgment it is contrary to public policy 
that a person should be hired for money or valuable 
consideration when he has access to persons of influence to 
use his position and interest to procure a benefit from the 
Government.” 
In the same case, it was further held: 
“While I do not go the length of holding that the defendants 
were bargaining with the plaintiff that they should receive an 
office under the Crown, I agree with the remarks of Coltman 
J., in the case of Hopkins v. Prescottl,105 that where a person 
undertakes for money to use his influence with the 
Commissioner of Taxes to procure for another party the tights 
to sell stamps, if the contract were not void for statute, it 
would be void at common law as contrary to public policy. It 
is well settled that in judging the question one has to look at 
the tendency of the acts contemplated by the contract to see 
whether they tend to be injurious to the public interest. In my 
judgment, a contract of the kind has a most pernicious 
tendency. At a time when public money is being advanced to 
private firms for objects of national safety it would tend to 
corrupt the public service and to bring into existence a class 
of persons somewhat like those who in ancient times of 
corrupt politics were described as ‘Carryers’, men who 
undertook for money to get titles and honours for those who 
agreed to pay them for their influence.” 
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A contract which had been entered into with the obvious purpose of 
influencing the authorities to procure a verdict in favour of was a “carrier” 
contract. To enforce such a contract although it tends to injure public weal is 
not only to abdicate one’s public duty but to assist in the promotion of a 
pernicious practice of procuring decisions by influencing authorities when 
they should abide by law.106  
An auction sale was conducted by the corporation. One of the clauses of the 
auction empowered the corporation to charge interest of balance amount of 
consideration from date of auction. It was held that as contracts entered into 
by Government corporations are subject to fundamental rights and are in 
furtherance of directive principles of State Policy, the clause was unlawful.107  
A person who asks an agreement or conveyance to be declared invalid on 
account of its being opposed to public policy must prove the grounds which 
would bring it within the meaning of this section.108 If it is shown that there 
was an agreement between the parties that a certain consideration should 
proceed from the accused person to the complainant in return for the promise 
of the complainant to discontinue the criminal proceedings that dearly is a 
transaction which is opposed to public policy.109 
If in a given subject it is patent that public policy is likely to make indelible 
dents on it, then the Courts themselves ought to raise the questions touching 
on public policy, even ii none of the parties does so. Public policy which is 
often described as unruly horse should be carefully handled lest any improper 
riding of it should take the Courts to difficult and unexplored heights and 
regions.110 The plea that agreement is a nullity being opposed to public policy 
can be raised even by a person who had earlier consented to the agreement. 111 
                                             
106  Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung, (1991) 3 SCC 67. 
107  Sudist Narain Thakur v. Bihar State Financial Corp., AIR 2004 Jha 91. 
108  Subbayyan Chettiar v. T.R. Ponnuchami Chettiar, AIR 1941 Mad 727. 
109  Ouseph Poulo v. Catholic Union Bank Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 166: (1964) 7 SCR 745. 
110  M. Kesava Gounder v. D.C. Rajan, AIR 1976 Mad 102. 
111  Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 248. 
293 
 
In Corpus Juris Scandum,112 it is stated: 
“An illegal contract or agreement, such as one involving 
illegality of the subject matter, one invoking the unlawful sale 
or exchange of intoxicating liquors or a subletting, subleasing 
or hiring out of convicts, held under lease from the State, in 
violation of statute, or stifling a prosecution for public 
offence, or one which is opposed to public policy, cannot 
constitute or effect an accord and satisfaction.” 
After all, by consent or agreement parties cannot achieve what is contrary to 
law and a decree merely based on such agreement cannot furnish a judicial 
amulet against statutory violation The true rule is that the contract of the 
parties is not the less a contract, and subject to the incidents of a contract, 
because there is super added the command of the Judge.113 
Under section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Courts in India have 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and if the agreement provides that they would 
submit to the jurisdiction of the English Cow the agreement itself would be 
void under section 23 of the Contract Act and would also be void being 
opposed to public policy.114  
An agreement by which a man binds himself to associate for the whole of his 
life only with a certain body of is fellow-men and to abstain completely from 
associating with another body is one which ought not to be enforced and for 
the breach of which no penalty can be claimed.115  
Where an agreement to purchase agricultural land, before the commencement 
of the Land Ceiling Act came into being, was entered into, and the suit for 
specific performance was filed and the said Act was repealed before judgment 
was rendered in suit, it was held that specific performance could not be 
refused since the agreement was not against public policy. It was further held 
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that the Act did not prohibit purchase of land by surplus holder.116  
In the field of private International law, Courts refuse to apply a rule of 
foreign law or recognize a foreign judgment or a foreign arbitral award if it is 
found that the same is contrary to the public policy of the country in which it 
is sought to be invoked or enforced.117  The defence of public policy which is 
permissible under section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and 
Enforcement) Act should be construed narrowly. To the same effect is the 
provision of the Protocol & Convention Act of 1937 which requires that the 
enforcement of the foreign award must not be contrary’ to public policy or the 
law of India.118  
When an employee though promoted in a stop-gap arrangement was 
continued in the said post, he was entitled to salary of promotional post and to 
be considered for regular promotion and the agreement that he would not 
claim higher salary’ on being promoted by stop-gap arrangement is not valid 
and cannot be enforced under the provisions of this section.119 
A contract for manning, running, operating, repairing and maintenance on 
hire for three vehicles was entered into between the parties. The contract inter 
alia provided that the employer shall have the right to terminate the contract 
after expiry of one year without assigning any reasons. It was held that such a 
stipulation was not unconscionable or opposed to public policy.120 
It would be contrary to public policy to allow a husband to contract a 
marriage with the wife to consummate the marriage, beget a child from her 
and then turn round to argue- that the respondent was not his wife but the wife 
of ‘R’ because the divorce granted to her was bad for want of jurisdiction of 
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the Court granting the same.121  
The House of Lords in G v. M relying upon the book Law Relating to 
Estoppel by Representation by Spencer and Bower, stated.122  
“I think I perceive that phraseology is like this, and nothing 
more than this, that there may be conduct on the part of the 
person seeking this remedy which ought to estop that person 
from having it, as for instance, any part from which the 
inference ought to be drawn that during the antecedent time 
the party has, with a knowledge of the facts and of the law, 
approbated the marriage he or she afterwards seeks to get rid 
of, or has taken advantages and derived benefits from the 
matrimonial relation which it would be unfair and inequitable 
to permit him or her, after having received them to treat as if 
no such, relation had ever existed.” 
8.8.1 Agreement opposed to Public Policy  
An agreement shall be held to be against public policy if: 
• Judgment-debtor is required to pay a part of his salary to decree-
holder.123  
• Amount had been paid for securing-seat in medical college and not as 
loan.124  
• It is for influencing ministers of the Government.125  
• The father is required to give up entirely-the custody and control of his 
child to mother.126  
• It relates to transfer of decree with object to defraud other creditors. 127  
• It is for alienation of swastivachanam service inam lands.128  
• The partner who holds the non-transferable contract for carrying mails 
to transfer it to the other partner or to continue the contract for the 
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other after dissolution of partnership.129 
• It involves transfer of ration documents in contravention of the Act.130  
• It is to alienate that which is in the nature of personal grant and without 
permission of the Tehsildar as required by the term of that grant.131  
• It confers exclusive perpetual right to perform religious services for the 
whole village.132  
• The purpose is to waive the benefit conferred by section 60(i), Civil 
Procedure Code.133  
• It is of service which in substance amounts to nothing but serfdom.134  
• It is a contract of insurance effected by a person on the life of another 
when he has no insurable interest in the life.135  
• It concerns partnership agreement authorizing one partner having 
licence to sell country liquor to sell English wine.136  
• It tends to injure the public service.137  
• A formation of dealership is made by dealer in cloth with license under 
Madras (Dealers) Control Order.138 
• It is for child marriage.139 
• Execution of decree of divorce is obtained from foreign Court by 
husband whose marriage was solemnized in Goa.140 
• It provides for a premium over and above the standard rent.141  
• Comprised in a suit between landlord and tenant in contravention of 
                                             
129  Bhurmal Ramkaran v. Goduram MangaIchand Jat AIR 1943 Nag 260. 
130  Pisupati Rama Rao v. Tadepalli Papayya, AIR 1954 Andhra 51. 
131  Ganesa Naicken v. Arumugha Naicken, AIR 1954 Mad 811 (DB). 
132  Revashanker Shamji v. Velji Jagjivan Kukama, AIR 1951 Kutch 56. 
133  M. & S.M. Rly. a. Rupchand Jitaji, AIR 1950 Born 155. 
134  Sitaram Deokaran v. Baldeo Jairam, AIR 1958 MP 367. 
135  Mani Shanker Someshwar Pandya v. Allianza Und Stuttagarter Labens Versicherungs 
      Bank, AIR 1941 Lah 33. 
136  Brij Lalv. Rajeshwar Parshad, (1969) 71 Pun LR 122. 
137  Venkatareddi v. Peda Venkatachalam, AIR 1964 AP 465. 
138  V. Basavayya v. N. Kottayya, AIR 1964 AP 145. 
139  Maheswar Das v. Sakhi Dei, AIR 1978 Ori 84. 
140  Joao Gloria Pires v. Ana Joaquina Rodrigues e Pires, AIR 1967 Goa 113 (DB). 
141  Baboolal v. Prem Lata, AIR 1974 Raj 93. 
297 
 
rules and curtailing the powers of District Magistrate.142 
• Tenant contracting himself out of rights conferred by statute solemnly 
enacted for benefit of tenants.143  
• Public corporations enter into contracts whereby performance of their 
duties to public is prevented or unduly restricted.144  
• It is sub-letting of phone in contravention of conditions.145  
• The compromise decree divides amount of pension between parties to 
suit.146  
• It is a contract to serve on Rs. 2 per month for 112 months.147  
• Certain area leased to a company is excluded from limits of the 
Municipality.148  
• A firm had its only business of running a school and that school was 
handed over by one of the partners illegally to another society without 
consent of other parties.149  
• A person belonging to scheduled caste was granted distributorship of 
cooking gas under special quota which was his only source of 
livelihood and as such was not in a bargaining position in respect of the 
clause about termination of agency on 30 days’ notice.150 
• Waiver of protection to agriculturist under section 60(1), Civil 
Procedure Code.151  
• If it lends to injure public interest or public welfare.152  
Even fit is permissible for Courts to evolve a new head of public policy under 
extra-ordinary circumstances giving rise to incontestable harm to the society, 
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wager is not one of such instances of exceptional gravity, for it has been 
recognized for centuries and has been tolerated by the public and the State 
alike.153  
A Court is not bound to pass a decree on the basis of a mere admission of 
claim by the defendant Order 12 Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code is only an 
enabling provision. It is the duty of the Court to see whether the plaintiff is 
entitled to a decree on the basis of the averments in the plaint and admission 
of defendant and as to whether the suit is meant to defeat the provisions of 
Stamps Act, Registration Act, Transfer of Property Act or any other law 
concerning public revenue or is against the public policy.154  
8.8.2 Opposed to Public Policy: What is Not 
An agreement of lease between landlord and tenant for letting and occupation 
of building in contravention of the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings Act is 
not void and is enforceable. A decree for ejectment of the tenant can be 
passed in favour of the landlord on the basis thereof. Further, section 13 of the 
said Act provides that a person who occupies, without any allotment letter 
shall be deemed to be an unauthorized occupant of sub premises. Such a suit 
would not be on the agreement between the parties and thus would not be hit 
by principles of public policy.155  
Sub-letting is not an act forbidden or prohibited by law. The tenant may sub-
let the premises depending on the term of the contract between him and the 
landlord or the consent of the landlord to the tenant to sub-let the premises. It 
is only the absence in writing of the consent of the landlord which makes the 
subletting by tenant a ground for ejectment. 156  
A lease for life created in favour of the lessee or tenant is not inconsistent 
                                             
153  Gherulal Parakh v. Makadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781. 
154  Shisbpal v. Vikram, 1999(1) RCR 628:1999 (122) Pun LR 136. 
155  Nutan Kumar v. 2nd Additional District Judge, AIR 2002 SC 3456. 
156  Mohar Singh v. Deen Dayal Gupta, 1996 (3) DRJ 760. 
299 
 
with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Lease for life or condition of the 
life tenancy of the lease deed or a tenancy cannot be said to be contrary to the 
provisions of law.157 
When it was merely an agreement between two parties under which the 
defendant assigned certain copyrights in favour of the plaintiff and there was 
not obligation towards the public, then such an agreement could not be said to 
be violate of public policy since the assignment of copyright was permissible 
under Copyrights Act. 158  
When an agreement between the landlord and tenants i.e., the plaintiffs 
provided that the petition for eviction brought against the tenant and 
substances of whom the plaintiffs are included would not be contested, and 
that nevertheless, even if an order of eviction is obtained in that proceeding, 
no effort would be made to evict the tenant, it cannot be said that there was 
anything illegal or against public policy in the matter of that agreement. There 
is no law prohibiting the landlord to allow his tenant to continue in possession 
even after getting an order for eviction, may it be on higher rent.159 
An agreement between A and B to purchase property at an auction sale jointly 
and not be bid against each other at the auction is perfectly legal, though the 
object may be to avoid competition between the two. But if there is an 
agreement between all the competing bidders at the auction sale, be it of the 
Court sale or revenue sale or sale by the Government of its property or 
privilege to peg down the price and purchase property and the knock out 
price, it will be unlawful and opposed to public policy.160 
Where residential plots were agreed to be allotted at reserve price by the 
Improvement Trust and according to the scheme of the rules, the price of the 
plots could not be less than the cost price of the land to the Trust, the clause in 
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the agreement for enhancement of price on account of enhanced 
compensation awarded to the original owners as a result of reference made by 
the Trust under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, was not contrary to 
the rules nor was opposed to public policy.161 
An entrepreneur after having availed benefit of rebate for initial period of five 
years on the ground of its being an expanding unit, is not entitled to further 
rebate on the ground of being a new undertaking. It was held that granting of 
further rebate would be against public interest and it would also be against 
public policy as no Government department can run without funds. 162  
If the creditor lays down certain conditions with a view to secure his debt in 
accordance with law, then it cannot be said that the same are opposed to 
public policy. 163 The demand of higher charges/tariff for electricity consumed 
beyond legally fixed limit is reasonable deterrent measure providing 
appropriate sanction not as harsh as disconnection of supply of energy 
altogether and cannot be opposed on the ground of public policy. 164  
The petitioner received a certain sum of money from the respondent, for 
securing admission of the respondent’s son in a M.B.A. course, on the 
representation that the sum had to be paid by way of capitation fees. The 
petitioner was unable to secure admission for the respondent’s son and issued 
a cheque for the amount received. The cheque was dishonoured. Held that the 
sum in question was given by the respondent to the petitioner for the payment 
of capitation fees, and the transaction could not be declared void as contrary 
to public policy. 165  
8.9 Defences 
Illegality will generally prevent both parties from enforcing a tainted 
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transaction or seeking other relief, including restitution of benefits transferred 
under it. 
A contract or other transaction may be illegal in three ways. First, statute may 
expressly prohibit both the formation and the performance of the contract. 
This will be the case where, for example, the statute provides: ‘No action 
shall lie…’ Secondly, statute might impliedly prohibit enforcement of the 
contract. In Phoenix General Insurance Co. of Greece SA v. Halvanon 
Insurance Co. Ltd. 166 
(i)  Where a statute prohibits both parties from concluding or performing a 
contract when both or either of them have no authority to do so, the 
contract is impliedly prohibited… (ii) But where a statute merely 
prohibits one party from entering into a contract without authority, 
and/or imposes a penalty upon him if he does so (i.e. a unilateral 
prohibition) it does not follow that the contract itself is impliedly 
prohibited so as to render it illegal and void. Whether or not this statute 
has this effect depends upon considerations of public policy in the light 
of the mischief which the statue is designed to prevent, its language, 
scope and purpose, the consequences for the innocent party, and any 
other relevant considerations. 
Thirdly, the transaction may be illegal where it contemplates the commission 
of a crime at common law, or another act which the common law deems to be 
contrary to public policy. 
8.9.1 The Scope of the Prohibition of Restitutionary Claims 
The true scope of the in pari delicto principle in relation to restitutionary 
claims is difficult to state. The question is, when does illegality preclude the 
restitutionary claim? In identifying exception to the in pari delicto principle, 
does this create a new ground for restitution? Birks argues that where the 
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parties are held not be in pari delicto, the ground for restitution can usually be 
found elsewhere in the law of restitution, usually in case of vitiated 
voluntariness such as mistake or compulsion.  
8.9.2 Mistake 
In Oom v. Bruce,167 the plaintiff entered into an insurance policy for goods to 
be carried from Russia to England. The contract was made after the 
commencement of hostilities between the two countries but before the 
plaintiff had knowledge of the fact, and after the ship had sailed and been 
seized and made to return to Russia. The plaintiff sought to recover the 
premium paid. The contract was presumably illegal at common law on the 
basis that it involved trading with the enemy. The Court of King’s Bench 
stressed that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the circumstances giving rise 
to the illegality. Accordingly, Lord Ellenborough CJ held ‘there is no reason 
why they should not recover back the premiums which they have paid for an 
insurance from which, without any fault imputable to themselves, they could 
never have derived any benefit.’ 
Induced mistake caused the transfer in Hughes v. Liverpool Victoria Legal 
Friendly Society,168 where the plaintiff was fraudulently persuaded by a 
representative of the insurer that a life insurance policy, in which he had no 
insurable interest, was valid. Upon the plaintiff discovering the policy was 
illegal and void, she claimed recovery of the premiums paid. Phillimore LJ 
stated the principle: 
Where an illegal contract of insurance is entered into, and the assured is 
ignorant of the law and is induced to enter into it by the fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the law by the agent of the assurance company, the 
parties are not in pari delicto and the assured may recover the premiums paid. 
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The unsatisfactory earlier decision of Harse v. Pearl Life Assurance Co. 169  
insists that an innocent misrepresentation would not suffice. This is probably 
not good law. The leading case is Kiriri Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Dewani.170 This 
case requires reinterpretation in the light of Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln 
City Council.171 
8.9.3 Duress and Imposition 
The facts of Smith v. Bromley,172 are reminiscent of the fiction of Fanny 
Burney. A lady was imposed upon by her brother’s chief creditor to pay an 
extra sum to him, before he would sign a certificate of discharge releasing the 
brother from bankruptcy. The money was paid and the defendant creditor 
signed the discharge. The lady then sought recovery of the £40 she had paid. 
The Court of King’s Bench awarded her restitution. Lord Mansfield stated: 
“If the act is in itself immoral, or a violation of the general 
laws of public policy, there, the party paying shall not have 
this action; for where both parties are equally criminal 
against such general laws, the rule is, potior est condito 
defendentis. But there are other laws which are calculated for 
the protection of the subject against oppression, extortion, 
deceit & c. If such laws are violated, and the defendant takes 
advantage of the plaintiff’s condition or situation, there the 
plaintiff shall recover.” 
That case was followed in Smith v. Cuff,173 on similar facts. Lord 
Ellenborough CJ commented that the parties were never equally guilty ‘when 
one holds the rod, and the other bows to it’. 
8.9.4 Failure of Consideration 
In Parkinson v. College of Ambulance Ltd., 174 the plaintiff somewhat 
foolishly paid £3,000 foolishly paid £3,000 to the defendant charity, relying 
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upon a representation by the secretary of the charity that a knighthood would 
be forthcoming in return. Unsurprisingly, the representation turned out to be 
fraudulent and Mr. Parkinson sought restitution from the charity. This was 
held to be a case where the parties were in pan delicto, because even if the 
secretary of the charity was more at fault, the plaintiff had made a contract 
which he ought never have entered into. One can have more sympathy for the 
plaintiff in Berg v Sadler & Moore.175 The plaintiff was on the stop list of the 
Tobacco Trade Association as a result of a breach of their price-fixing rules. 
He attempted to obtain cigarettes using the name of a friend. The money was 
paid, but when the defendant suppliers discovered the true purchaser they 
refused to supply the cigarettes or return the purchase price. The plaintiff’s 
claim for restitution was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The Court stridently 
held that it amounted to an attempt to obtain goods by false pretences, and 
accordingly the Court refused to lend its aid to the plaintiff (but happily lent 
its aid to the anti-competitive practice of the trade association).  
There is a paucity of authority of situations where a party has recovered on 
the ground of failure of consideration on the basis that he was not equally 
guilty in respect of the illegal transaction. Perhaps an example is Hermann v 
Charlesworth,176 in which the plaintiff was a single lady desirous of getting 
married. She agreed to pay the defendant marriage advertising agent £250 if 
an introduction arranged by the defendant led to matrimony. The plaintiff paid 
£52, of which £47 would be returned if no marriage followed within nine 
months. Various introductions led to nothing, and the plaintiff claimed the 
return of her money. The Court of Appeal held that the transaction was illegal 
(which must be of interest to the numerous dating agencies which ro1iferate 
these days). Collins MR acknowledged that the plaintiff had had the benefit of 
a number of introductions, but was prepared to treat these as actions taken by 
the defendant in his own interest in order to improve his chances of winning 
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what was characterized as a wager. Collins MR felt that equity was not 
precluded from ordering the recovery of money under an illegal transaction 
simply because the defendant had incurred and taken some steps towards 
performance in carrying out his side of the contract. The case is explicable 
either on the ground of failure of consideration (and a very beneficial 
interpretation of failure of consideration at that), or on the basis that the 
plaintiff fell within the protected class of vulnerable people, whom the policy 
of outlawing marriage-brokering contracts was aimed at protecting. Compare 
Birks, 210. 
8.9.5 Restitution Prohibited if it is Tantamount to Contractual 
Enforcement 
An important principle is that restitution is impermissible where an award 
would be equivalent to the enforcement of the illegal contract. In Taylor v 
Bhail,177 the headmaster of a school which had suffered storm damage, agreed 
to award a contract to the plaintiff builder on the basis that the builder would 
inflate his estimate by £1,000 in order that the defendant could pocket the 
additional £1,000 recouped from the school’s insurers. The work being done, 
the plaintiff claimed alternatively upon the contract, or for a quantum meruit 
in respect of work done. The ground of restitution was not identified, hut was 
presumably failure of consideration or free acceptance. The Court of Appeal 
refused to enforce either the contractual or the restitutionary claim. 
Millett LJ held that the transaction was illegal. Whereas the defendant was 
enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, it could not be said to be unjust because of 
the illegality of the transaction into which both entered. Further, the existence 
of the illegal contract excluded recourse to the law of restitution. This is an 
application of the primacy of contract principle. To have succeeded, the 
plaintiff should have repudiated the contract. But this could have been done 
only if there had been no partial performance of the illegal purpose. It was 
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now too late to withdraw (at 383). This decision may take the primary of 
contract argument too far.  
More recently, in Mohamed v. Alaga & Co.178 the plaintiff entered into a fee-
sharing agreement with the defendant solicitor, whereby the plaintiff would 
refer asylum-seekers to the solicitor in return for a proportion of the fees 
contrary to the Solicitors’ Practice Rules. The plaintiff again claimed 
alternatively under the contract or in restitution. The Court of Appeal would 
not enforce the illegal contract. However, the plaintiff was allowed to pursue 
a quantum meruit claim, sounding in restitution, as he was apparently 
unaware of the illegality of the transaction. These recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal are difficult to reconcile. Presumably in the latter case the 
award of reasonable remuneration would not have been equivalent to 
contractual enforcement. 
8.9.6 Proprietary Claims under Illegal Transactions 
This is the province of the law of property, but will be briefly discussed here. 
The leading cases are Tinsley v Milligan179 (1994) 1 AC 340 and Tribe v 
Tribe.180 In Tinsley v Milligan, the plaintiff, aged 19, and the defendant, aged 
38, were lesbian lovers. They purchased a property in the sole name of the 
plaintiff, but on a common understanding that they would be joint beneficial 
owners. The house was in the plaintiff’s name in order to enable the defendant 
to make fraudulent claims upon the Department of Social Security (DSS). The 
money obtained by the fraud contributed only in a small way to the 
acquisition of the equity in the home. Subsequently the defendant repented of 
the fraud and disclosed this to the DSS. The parties quarreled and the plaintiff 
moved out. The plaintiff claimed possession of the property, asserting sole 
ownership. The defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that the property 
was held in equal shares. The House of Lords by a majority held for the 
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defendant. The claimant was entitled to vindicate her interest in the property, 
whether legal or equitable, if she was not forced to plead or rely on any 
illegality, even though it transpired that the title relied upon was acquired in 
the course of carrying through an illegal transaction. On the facts there was no 
evidence to rebut the presumption of the resulting trust over the property. 
Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Keith of Kinkel dissented. Lord Goff, with 
Lord Keith agreeing, insisted that a court of equity would not assist a claimant 
who does not come with clean hands. Lord Browne-Wilkinson gave the main 
speech of the majority. It was clearly established at law that property in goods 
or land can pass under or pursuant to an illegal contract.181 The same should 
apply in equity given that there was now a single law of property. All that was 
necessary in this case was for the defendant to plead the common intention 
that the property should he shared between them and that she had contributed 
to the purchase price. Only in the reply, and during cross-examination of the 
defendant, would any illegality emerge. This did not preclude the claim. The 
party claiming title could recover as long as she did not need to plead or rely 
upon the illegal acts. 
In Tribe v. Tribe, the plaintiff transferred shares to his son with the intention 
of deceiving his creditors. The illegal purpose was never carried into effect, 
but the son refused to re-transfer the share. Tue Court of Appeal held that the 
father was entitled to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of advancement, 
without relying upon illegality. Millett LJ, in the leading judgment, pointed 
out that if the transfer had been to a nephew or friend the presumption of 
resulting trust would have arisen. There the burden of proof that the transfer 
was intended to be by way of gift was upon the transferee. Given that the 
transferee was the son the presumption of advancement applied placing the 
burden of proving that the transfer of shares was not intended as a gift upon 
the father. Millett LJ relied upon Tinsley v Milligan,182 and in particular on 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s recognition of the existence of the doctrine of 
locus poenitentiae. Millett U concluded: 
The locus poenitentiae is not therefore an exclusively contractual doctrine 
with no place in the law of restitution. It follows that it cannot be excluded by 
the mere fact that the legal ownership of property has become lawfully vested 
in the transferee. It would be unfortunate if the rule in equity were different. It 
would constitute a further obstacle to the development of a coherent and 
unified law of restitution. 
The locus poenitefltiae operated to mitigate the harshness of a primary rule 
prohibiting enforcement of illegal transactions. However, the plaintiff must 
have withdrawn from the transaction before any further steps were taken. 
Millett LJ concluded by summarizing the present law: 
(1)  Title to property passes both at law and in equity even if the transfer is 
made for an illegal purpose. The fact the title has passed to the 
transferee does not preclude the transferor from bringing an action for 
restitution. 
(2)  The transferor’s action will fail if it would be illegal for him to retain 
any interest in the property. 
(3)  Subject to (2) the transferor can recover the property if he can do so 
without relying on the illegal purpose. This will normally be the case 
where the property was transferred without consideration in 
circumstances where the transferor can rely on an express declaration 
of trust, or a resulting trust in his favour. 
(4)  It will almost invariably be so where the illegal purpose has not been 
carried out. It may he otherwise where the illegal purpose has been 
carried out and the transferee can rely on the transferor’s conduct as 
inconsistent with his retention of a beneficial interest. 
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(5)  The transferor can lead evidence of the illegal purpose whenever, it is 
necessary for him to do o provided that he has withdrawn from the 
transaction before the illegal purpose has been wholly or partly carried 
into effect.   
8.10 Public Policy Precluding a Restitutionary Claim 
Public policy may preclude a restitutionary claim. This is a distinct question, 
short of a finding that a transaction is illegal. The source of the public policy 
may be statute, or common law. Gaff and Jones argue for a general principle 
that public policy may bar a restitutionary claim: 183 There is a general 
principle that restitution will not be allowed if it would in effect enforce a 
transaction which statute or common law prohibits. This is one explanation of 
the failure of the common law claim in Sinclair v Brougham.184 The House of 
Lords held that the policy of ultra vires prohibited the depositors’ claims at 
common law. To allow the common law claim would be indirectly to sanction 
the ultra vires borrowings by the building society. This was the explanation 
given by Lord Goff of Chieveley of Sinclair v Brougham in Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington Landon Borough Council.185 In contrast, 
the majority of the House of Lords held that the-decision on the common law 
claim in Sinclair v Brougham was wrong, and that the money could be 
recovered in restitution. Presumably the majority of the House of Lords in 
Westdeutsche did not think that the allowance of a restitutionary remedy 
would have the indirect effect of enforcing an ultra vires contract. 
The question also arises in respect of contracts which are unenforceable for 
want of formality. The leading modern discussion is that of the High Court of 
Australia in Pavey & Matthews Ply Ltd v Paul.186 The High Court held that 
the enforcement of a restitutionary quantum meruit would not frustrate the 
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policy of a statute prohibiting enforcement of a binding contract not reduced 
to writing, by the builder. Where the work had been completed the claim was 
maintainable. Mason and Wilson JJ attempted to identify the purpose behind 
the statutory provision. It protected the building owner against claims where 
the contract failed properly to identify the work, even where the building was 
completed. However, the statutory protection did not extend to a case where 
the building owner requested and accepted work but declined to pay for it 
purely on the grounds of non-compliance with the statutory formalities. Such 
a contention was ‘Draconian’, and could not have been the intention of the 
legislature. Deane J, delivering the leading judgment, could identify no 
statutory intention to penalise the builder. It is submitted that the dissenting 
judgment of Brennan J is to be preferred. Recourse to restitution would 
frustrate the policy of the statute which was to render such obligations 
unenforceable, This was particularly soon the facts of Pavey, where the oral 
unenforceable contract was to pay a reasonable rate. The enforcement of the 
restitutionary quantum meruit exactly imitated the enforcement of the 
contract. In the case, Ibbetson has observed:187 
“The more profitable approach - in reality the whole crux of 
the problem - is to determine whether the purpose at the base 
of the statutory prohibition of the contractual action would be 
frustrated by the allowance of the restitutionary remedy.” 
A different problem has arisen in the context of industrial action, where 
statute confers an immunity from actions in respect of civil wrongs. In 
Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers’ 
Federation, The Universe Sentinel,188 the ITF had blacked a vessel flying 
under a flag of convenience at Milford Haven. Causes of action in tort against 
the ITF were within the scope of the immunity granted by sections 13 and 14 
of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974. A claim in restitution for 
the return of a contribution to the UFF’s welfare fund under duress was 
                                             
187  (1998) 8 OJLS 312, at p 326. 
188  (1983) 1 AC 366. 
311 
 
allowed by a majority of the House of Lords. Lord Diplock, in the leading 
majority speech, stressed the autonomy of the claim for money had and 
received on the basis of illegitimate pressure. It was not dependent upon the 
existence of any tort. Accordingly the statutory immunities were not directly 
applicable to the claim in restitution. However, that was not the end of the 
statute’s role in the dispute. Lord Diplock observed: 
“Nevertheless, these sections ... afford an indication, which 
your Lordships should respect, of where public policy requires 
the line should be drawn between what kind of commercial 
pressure by a trade union upon an employer in the field of 
industrial relations ought to be treated as legitimized despite the 
fact that the will of the employer is thereby coerced, and what 
kind of commercial pressure in that field does amount to 
economic duress that entitles the employer victim to 
restitutionary remedies.” 
The majority held that there was no public policy bar to recovering restitution, 
by analogy with the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act, 1974, because 
on the facts of a particular dispute the pressure complained of was 
insufficiently connected with the terms and conditions of the employment of 
the crew under section 29.  
The Universe Sentinel was replayed in Sweden in Dimskal Shipping Co. SA v 
International Transport Workers’ Federation.189 The blacking of the ship was 
lawful by Swedish law. However, the majority of the House of Lords held 
that the governing law was a proper law of contract which was English law. 
Accordingly, sums paid were recoverable in restitution on the grounds of 
economic duress.  
It is not necessary for present purposes to explore the basis of this decision. It 
appears to bear some affinity to the principle underlying those cases in which 
the courts have given effect to the inferred purpose of the legislature by 
holding a person entitled to sue for damages for breach of statutory duty, 
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though no such right of suit has been expressly created by the statute 
imposing the duty. It is enough to state that, by parity of reasoning, not only 
may an action of restitution be rejected as inconsistent with the policy of a 
statute such as that under consideration in The Universe Sentinel,190 but in my 
opinion the claim that a contract is voidable for duress by reason of pressure 
legitimized by such a statute may likewise be rejected on the same ground. 
It is submitted that the approaches of Lords Diplock and Goff provide model 
guidance on how judges should reason by analogy from statutory prohibitions 
and statutory immunities. The immaturity of the law of restitution has had the 
unfortunate consequence that, whereas statute often provides for the 
consequence of certain transactions or acts, the question of the recovery of 
benefits transferred is not explicitly addressed. The courts will need to be 
sensitive to whether recovery in restitution is consistent with the scheme of 
the legislation, and that allowing recovery does not frustrate the policy behind 
the statute. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
  
Unjust Enrichment analysis does not appear to view the principle against 
unjust enrichment as a mere instrument of taxonomy. Unlike categories such 
as “employment law” which bring together diverse materials from various 
branches of the law for obvious reasons of convenience, the law of restitution 
is a category identified by and, in some other sense, related to a general 
principle.  
The extent to which the unjust enrichment principle provides a theory of 
liability in this sense is also controversial. Some would claim that the 
principle is stated at such an abstract level that it is incapable of providing an 
explanation for the imposition of liability in any meaningful sense. What does 
it contribute to our understanding to say that enrichments will be reversed 
when it is “unjust” to do otherwise? A related, but distinguishable criticism 
would accuse the principle of legitimating the dispensing of “palm-tree 
justice”. Because of its vague character, the principle would, if taken 
seriously, confer a broad discretion upon judges to do justice in the individual 
case with a resulting lack of stability and predictability in legal doctrine. In 
recent years a third line of attack has rested on the allegation that the principle 
fails for circularity. If an unjust enrichment occurs, restitution will be 
awarded; if restitution has been awarded, there must have been an unjust 
enrichment. As a result of this circularity, the principle appears to lack 
content.  
It is a partial response to the “palm-tree justice” school of criticism to say that 
the question of the extent to which the unjust enrichment principle provides a 
satisfactory theory of liability for restitution is a separate one from the 
question of whether the principle ought to be used as a springboard for growth 
and development of restitutionary doctrine. One could consistently hold the 
view that the unjust enrichment principle does provide an explanation for the 
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liability imposed in restitution cases but, at the same time, take the position 
that the need for stability and predictability in legal doctrine weighs in favors 
of restraining the judiciary from imposing liability in new situations simply 
because they feel it “just” to do so. The general principle can and should be 
made “downward - looking to the cases” rather than upwards to “an 
unknownable justice in the sky”.1 It is clear that existing restitutionary 
doctrine is unsatisfactory in a variety of ways and that recognition of the 
unjust enrichment principle will facilitate progressive change. Nonetheless, it 
is important to emphasize that acceptance of the notion that the unjust 
enrichment principle underlies the existing case law can be severed from the 
question of the desirability of doctrinal change.  
Though it is true that the unjust enrichment principle is abstract and 
necessarily imprecise as a result, the same is equally true of the 
generalizations made with reference to contracts and torts. It is obviously the 
case that not all promises are enforced and that the broad principle underlying 
contract law, pacta sunt servanda, is not very helpful in distinguishing those 
promises that will be enforced from those that will not. So too, the unjust 
enrichment principle is not very helpful in identifying those enrichments 
which are unjust in the requisite sense. Apart from the question of taxonomy, 
then, we may ask whether these broad generalizations do indeed have any 
meaning or significance. Perhaps the beginnings of an answer to this question 
can be found in a closer examination of the relationship between contract law 
and the general principle which is widely believed to underlie it. It is true that 
one who has memorized pacta sunt servanda has learned very little contract 
law. But surely the general principle is understood within professional circles 
simply as an elliptical reference to the reasons of policy that would be 
articulated by thoughtful judges and jurists as the reasons for enforcing 
contractual obligations. The general principle is probably taken, as well, to 
refer to the cumulative effect of those policy reasons as being one of creating 
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a general disposition of the law in favor of the enforcement of promises or, at 
least, of promises of certain kinds. The general principle is, one might say, a 
metaphor for the common sense or policy analysis that lies behind the cases. 
When we examine the common sense lying behind the contract cases, a 
number of interesting features of the general principle emerge. First, it 
appears unlikely that there is any one single reason of policy that would 
justify the enforcement of the many different kinds of undertakings that are 
enforced at common law. The justifications for enforcing commercial 
contracts for the sale of goods, agreements of compromise, separation 
agreements and agreements which restrain trade but not unduly so are likely 
to have slightly or perhaps significantly different contours. Although consent 
is likely to form a significant part of the justification in each case, it is evident 
that there are many “contractual” obligations imposed on parties to which 
their actual consent is more assumed than real. Nonetheless, without 
examining the case in support of this proposition more carefully, there would 
appear to be, at the very least, “family resemblances” among the various 
justifications given for the enforcement of undertakings. The policy reasons 
for the imposition of implied undertakings are likely to be closely related to 
the policy reasons for enforcing express obligations. There are also, 
obviously, reasons of convenience for including the enforcement of implied 
undertakings on account of consensual obligation even if the basic theory of 
obligation cannot offer a complete explanation or justification for the 
imposition of liability. While the general principle is indeed vague, there 
exists nonetheless the possibility of giving it a content which is something 
other than the particular rules arising from the decided cases. 
The general principle can thus be said to have some content, it also appears to 
have some utility as a theory of liability insofar as it serves as a reminder or 
elliptical reference to the policy considerations favoring the enforcement of 
undertakings. To be sure, explicit references to the general principle are likely 
to be rare, at least in the contracts jurisprudence. Some things are so widely 
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accepted that they need not be explicitly stated. In a difficult case, however, 
resort to the basic principle may be thought to be helpful. The important 
decision of Devlin J. in St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd2. 
illustrates the point. It may be recalled that in the course of determining 
whether to enforce a contract for the carriage of goods by sea which had been 
performed unlawfully, Devlin J. invoked the general principle and suggested 
that departures from it should be countenanced only on “serious and sufficient 
grounds”.3 
A thoughtful explanation of the reasons for granting recovery of a payment 
made under mistake of fact is likely to make reference to the unintentional 
nature of the transfer and the windfall nature of the defendant's benefit. A 
similar case of money extracted by duress would likely refer to the same 
considerations and might add that it is inappropriate, for various reasons, to 
allow the defendant to profit from wrongful conduct of this kind and so on. 
Although, as in the case of contract, the list of policy considerations will no 
doubt vary to some extent from one context to the next, and it is suspected 
that references to the windfall benefits issue and to the desirability of 
disgorging the profits of wrongdoing would repeat themselves throughout the 
exercise. If this is so, the unjust enrichment principle would, indeed, appear to 
be a useful shorthand reference to the policy considerations supporting the 
imposition of liability in the domain. Like pacta sunt servanda, the principle 
against unjust enrichment can indeed be given some content. The allegation of 
“circularity” is undermined by the empirical nature of this approach. The 
relevance of the unjust enrichment principle for these purposes can be tested 
by examining the reasons underlying the imposition of liability in restitution 
cases and asking whether the unjust enrichment principle is, in fact, a useful 
reference to recurrent justificatory reasons. 
The unjust enrichment principle provides a better explanation for the 
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imposition of relief in the form of a constructive trust. The substantive or 
quasi-trust school of thought finds expression in the English orthodoxy that a 
constructive trust will be imposed primarily, if not exclusively, in the context 
of breach of fiduciary obligation. The hard cases for the fiduciary duty camp 
are those such as Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) 
Ltd 4 in which it was suggested that constructive trust relief could be awarded 
in a case where the plaintiff had mistakenly made a second payment of U.S. 
52,000,000 to the account of the defendant bank shortly before the latter 
became insolvent. In compliance with the prevailing orthodoxy, the trial judge 
was prepared to impose constructive trust relief on the specious theory that 
the defendant had developed a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff with 
respect to the second and erroneous payment. This is a hard case for the 
fiduciary camp as it is quite evidently not a true case of fiduciary obligation. 
More importantly, and notwithstanding this inconvenient fact, it is evidently a 
case in which it is appropriate to grant constructive trust relief and prevent, 
thereby, the obvious injustice of allowing the insolvent’s estate to enjoy the 
windfall of the second mistaken payment. It is an attractive authority from the 
point of view of the unjust enrichment school, of course, because the 
justification for imposing such relief is likely to be articulated by reference to 
the inappropriateness of granting windfall enrichment at the plaintiff’s 
expense to the creditors of the insolvent bank.  
A very potential role for the unjust enrichment principle might be one of 
providing a foundation for the recognition of a new generalized right to 
restitution or, one might say, the recognition of a new cause of action in 
unjust enrichment. Opinion on this question is severely divided even within 
the unjust enrichment camp. Thus, some observers take the view that the 
unjust enrichment principle can perform, for the law of restitution, the role 
performed by Lord Atkin’s “good neighbour principle” for the law of negli-
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gence.5 One assumes that opponents of unjust enrichment analysis find this 
suggestion simply intolerable.6 Some supporters7 of the concept also feel, 
however, that an analytical move of this kind is unwarranted. The principal 
objection to the recognition of unjust enrichment as a generalized right or 
cause of action is that it is framed at too abstract a level of generality to 
successfully perform this function. Professor Dawson referred to the unjust 
enrichment principle as an “aspiration” and a “standard of judgment” rather 
than a “rule” of law.8 Professor Birks, in opposing the generalized right, 
stresses the latent ambiguity of the unjust enrichment principle which 
embraces both enrichment by “subtraction” and enrichment by doing wrong. 
He notes, as well, that more precisely formulated principles of policy which 
ground various sub-fields of the law of restitution can and should be 
formulated. Reliance on the more abstract unjust enrichment principle would 
be unworkable. On the other hand, Goff and Jones straightforwardly advocate 
recognition of the generalized right.9 A number of arguments can be offered in 
support of this position. The vast bulk of restitutionary case law demonstrates 
that in case after case restitutionary liability is imposed. It does not appear to 
be a giant step to recognize a general right to restitution much in the same 
manner that we have recognized a general right to damages for breach of 
contract. Moreover, the shift in professional discourse from the language and 
conceptual apparatus of the earlier claims may facilitate the process of 
rationalizing and simplifying restitutionary doctrine. When conceived of as a 
general right to restitution, it becomes all the more evident that it is absurd to 
persist in requiring that a total failure of consideration be demonstrated by the 
plaintiff in a particular sub-category of restitutionary claims. In response to a 
concern that recognition of the generalized right would inspire an even greater 
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level of reformist activity with resulting destabilization of doctrine, it is 
argued that once one has accepted that the unjust enrichment principle 
underlies the existing restitutionary case law and, further, provides a device 
for facilitating thoughtful reform of the doctrine, it is unlikely that the shift to 
a generalized right will inspire a change in the willingness of the courts to 
contemplate reasonable adjustment of the doctrine. It is the difference 
between an analytical framework which starts with the decided cases and 
assumes that the rules imposing liability can be reformed and expanded in the 
light of the unjust enrichment principle and, on the other hand, an approach 
which begins with the statement of a generalized right and attempts to find, in 
the light of the relevant authorities, policy reasons for coming to the 
conclusion that the retention of a particular “benefit” obtained at the plaintiffs 
“expense” is “unjust”? 
The “limits” of the unjust enrichment principle might proceed along either 
one or both of two paths. First, one might attempt to provide an account of the 
limitations imposed in the case law on the granting of relief in the decided 
cases. This could involve an analysis of the limitations inherent in the 
concepts of “benefit”, “expense” and “unjust retention”, and, in addition, an 
assessment of such defences to restitutionary claims as “change of position” 
or “bona fide purchase for value”. This would be an inappropriately large 
undertaking to attempt in the present context. Alternatively, and this is the 
path one could consider, against the background of the foregoing rather 
buoyant account of the roles played by the unjust enrichment principle, 
whether there are limits to the utility of unjust enrichment analysis. Although 
western countries experience including Canada, strongly suggests that the 
benefits flowing from recognition of the unjust enrichment principle as the 
underlying basis of restitutionary doctrine far outweigh the costs, it is 
nonetheless important to recognize potential hazards in the move to a new 
analytical framework and to work against them. The risks, are essentially 
those identified by critics of the recognition of a generalized right to 
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restitution. There is, to be sure, some danger that the judicial embrace of the 
unjust enrichment principle will lead judges, perhaps especially those 
confronted with the responsibility of handling a heavy volume of trial deci-
sions, to substitute reference to the unjust enrichment principle for more 
detailed and careful analysis of policy considerations weighing in favour, as 
well as those weighing against, the granting of relief. It may be that this is 
essentially a transitional problem, however, resulting from the need for the 
profession to have some time to absorb new ways of thinking about old 
problems. 
It may well be that the recognition of the remedial nature of the constructive 
trust will create a risk of granting of inappropriate priorities in cases of 
insolvency. 
The unjust enrichment principle has provided an analytical framework which 
has assisted scholars and judges in the rationalization and simplification of the 
doctrine. The mere bringing together of seemingly disparate materials and 
noting their fundamental similarities has served to identify and promote the 
eradication of inconsistencies and anomalies of various kinds. The unjust 
enrichment principle itself has served to focus attention on the policy 
considerations or justifications for granting recovery in restitutionary cases 
which, in turn, have served as a source of guidance in the reshaping of this 
important doctrine. Although the clearest evidence in support of these 
propositions is found in American and Canadian jurisprudence, there is now 
significant evidence that similarly constructive developments are beginning to 
occur in India also. 
A more difficult obstacle to acceptance of the unjust enrichment principle as a 
theory of liability for the restitutionary cases is raised by critics. Quasi-
contractual recovery of money is best explained on the basis of a proprietary 
theory of liability. The reason for recovery is said to derive from the payer’s 
original right of property in the money. Relief is granted because the plaintiff 
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has not “completely” transferred the money to the defendant. Further and less 
accessible explanations are offered for the conferral of money and other 
benefits under ineffective transactions. As has been intimated, it is argued that 
at least some of the restitution cases are not truly instances of unjust 
enrichment but, rather, cases in which the courts compensate the plaintiff for 
injurious reliance. 
It is argued that “the principle of reversing unjust enrichment provides the 
only rational explanation for a large body of law.” But surely this is too 
extravagant a claim. It is very difficult to sustain the argument that they are 
irrational. A more effective response would combine the empirical method 
with a general presumption in favour of larger generalizations.  
One criterion of the legal and social fruitfulness of the analytical scheme 
offered by the unjust enrichment principle must surely be its capacity to 
facilitate sound adjustment and development of the doctrine. As a result, the 
best explanation for the liability imposed in these cases had not been revealed. 
It is my submission that the unjust enrichment principle has indeed enjoyed a 
successful career as an instrument of law reform and that it is likely to 
continue to do so in the future. The principal evidence in support of this view 
will be drawn from Canadian experience as the unjust principle has enjoyed a 
much lengthier career in the jurisprudence of common law Canada than it has 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Further, it is submitted that the unjust 
enrichment principle has demonstrated its capacity to assist in a number of 
law reform tasks: the shedding of old fictions, the simplification and 
restatement of complex and confusing doctrine, the recognition of new types 
of claims, and the reordering of the grounds for deploying various types of 
remedies.  
In the law of mistaken payments, a number of important developments have 
occurred in west. First, the court appears to have recognized that the 
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distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law is untenable.10 
Second, the court has clearly recognized the availability of a defense of 
change of position in mistaken payments cases.11 The latter development has 
facilitated a simplification of the old and unduly complex rules relating to the 
recovery of mistaken payments and has enabled the court to embrace the 
proposition that recovery should be allowed “in any case of enrichment (by 
mistake, whether of fact or law) at the plaintiff’s expense provided the 
enrichment was caused by the mistake and the payment was not made to 
compromise an honest claim, subject of course to any available defenses or 
equitable reasons for denying recovery, such as change of position or 
estoppel.”12 It appears that the court has accepted that the proper explanation 
for the imposition of constructive trust relief in cases like Chase Manhattan 
does not require the finding of a fiduciary relationship.13 
In Rathwell v. Rathwell14 was “a bold and impressive exercise in judicial 
craftsmanship and statesmanship”.15 There will be little dissent from the 
suggestion that the modification of prior doctrine affected in these cases is a 
significant one. In other cases, the court has attempted to develop a rational 
foundation for making available to the plaintiff the special advantages of 
constructive trust relief.16 In such cases, moreover, the court has indicated a 
willingness to either extend or withhold restitutionary proprietary relief in 
unjust enrichment cases regardless of whether the historical foundation of the 
claim might appear to have been in common law or equity. It is conceivable, 
therefore, that a true merger of common law and equitable doctrine may 
occur, to some extent, in this field. 
These law reform activities of the unjust enrichment principle are contro-
                                                            
10 Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.); 
11 Rural Municipality of Siorthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., (1976) 2 S.C.R. 147. 
12 Supra note 10. 
13 LAC Minerals Ltd. v International Corana Resources Ltd., (1989) 2  S.C.R. 574 at pp. 649-652. 
14 (1978) 2 S.C.R. 436. 
15 J.D. McCamus, “Chief Justice Dickson and the Law of Restitution” 1991, 20 Man. L.J. 338 at p. 
348. 
16 Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) 
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versial in at least two respects, only one of which is relevant for present 
purposes. Particular reforms will be considered controversial by those who 
either favour different reforms or oppose change altogether. These disputes 
need not distract us. The more important issue for present purposes is whether 
the unjust enrichment principle can be accurately described as playing a role 
in the achievement of reform of this kind.  
There are some following suggestions to control the unjust enrichment:  
¾ All contracts should be made with registration under the supervision of 
Registrar. 
¾ Contracts must be made before public authorities with at least two 
witnesses. 
¾ Unjust party should pay compensation to just party. 
¾ Mistake, misrepresentation, ignorance and duress should be avoided 
during making contract. 
¾ Unnecessary conditions should not be made in making contracts. 
¾ All facts in the contracts should be clear and just so that justice can be 
done easily. 
¾ The law relating to restitution must be develop as per contemporary Indian 
socio-legal scenario. 
¾ To develop the country, all transactions should be fair and reasonable and 
all known and unknown unjust enrichment should be strongly suppressed. 
All types of transactions must be based on the policy of honesty which is 
the universal policy. 
¾ The constructive trust is a remedy imposed to prevent an unjust 
enrichment rather than a substantive trust in some sense - should be tested 
empirically. Again, it is submitted that without exploring the evidence in 
detail, for imposing constructive trust relief are very likely to be the 
desirability of reversing windfall gains and of lifting profits from 
wrongdoing. If this is so, the case for unjust enrichment as a plausible 
theory of liability is again made out. 
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¾ For any defective transfer or transactions, the consequent damage should 
be compensated in proportion to the loss suffered by the claimant.  
¾ Award of compensation should be made easy, quick, unhindered and 
genuine and in proportion to the damage caused to the aggrieved party. 
¾ Government must bring the innovative ideas and policies to sensitive the 
public towards the moral philosophy of  law which is based on equity, 
justice and good conscience, this is the only way to prevent the unjust 
enrichment in not only contractual obligations but also other commercial 
and social transactions. 
¾ This is the requirement of the natural justice that no one should be 
deprived of his or her genuine claims, and law of equity must prevail. 
¾ There should be a state wise review committee to look after the matter 
relating to unjust enrichment and their subsequent restitution and decision 
of review committee should be very fast like fast track court so that the 
legal remedy should be awarded to the aggrieved party.  
¾ Modern approach should be applied by the courts as under Articles 32 and 
226 of the Indian Constitution and mandamus writ can be effective 
instrument to stop unjust enrichment. 
¾ Last but not the least an exhaustive legislation consisting the description, 
meaning, definition of the doctrine of unjust enrichment including 
remedial measures should be passed by the legislature to handle the unjust 
enrichment cases.  
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